

Dialogue and UNESCO's Mission:  
an Epistemic Approach<sup>1</sup>



TEXTES DE RÉFÉRENCE

# Dialogue and UNESCO's Mission: an Epistemic Approach<sup>1</sup>

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## Introduction

I too think that “since wars begin in the minds of men, it is in the minds of men that the defences of peace must be constructed,”<sup>2</sup> and “a peace based exclusively upon the political and economic arrangements of governments would not be a peace which could secure the unanimous, lasting and sincere support of the peoples of the world, the peace must therefore be founded, if it is not to fail, upon the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind.”<sup>3</sup>

To fulfill this sacred mission we must first create faith in its ideals in mankind, as otherwise we are ultimately bound to fail. To provide ourselves with one necessary condition for the formation of such a conviction, I find it appropriate to start with the *methodic* rule: “*Prescribe for the people on the basis which they prescribe for themselves.*”<sup>4</sup> Although this *jurisprudential* rule—which is based on a *hadith*—was developed in the domain of Islamic Law, the rationale behind it is so strong and clear that, I believe, its *methodic* extrapolation is also applicable in the field of universal cooperation and dialogue. This methodic rationale carries the flavor of justice, tolerance, mutual understanding and respect, which may finally culminate in a mutual prescription that can be upgraded to mutual understanding

through a genuine dialogue, and consequently expand to a universal understanding.

We need to perceive, to discover or develop common conceptual roots between the beliefs people already hold and the ideals we are inviting them to develop faith in. For this, we need to successfully define or develop a paradigm which can embrace what different peoples of different cultures prescribe collectively for themselves; it seems that dialogue is necessary, inevitable and irreplaceable in achieving this.

In this article, my conceptual deliberations on dialogue have been influenced by two contemporary European philosophers, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Karl Raimund Popper, as well as by the visionary elaborations of the Persian Islamic thinker, Jalaluddin Rumi of the thirteenth century.

I may here note that, with regard to terminology, “dialogue,” “conversation,” “discussion,” and even “negotiation” are sometimes used relatively interchangeably, although I prefer not to use them in this manner. Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example, in some contexts substitutes the terms dialogue and conversation for one another. He refers to Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher’s definitions when differentiating between “dialogue proper” and “free dialogue.” The former, which is the original form of dialectics, refers to the common search for meaning; the latter is nothing but the mutual stimulation of thought in which its content is almost ignored.<sup>5</sup> Also, in Popper’s writings, which I will refer to in this article, “discussion” is close in meaning to “dialogue.” I rather prefer to ascribe “conversation” to Schleiermacher’s concept of free dialogue, and “dialectic”

to “dialogue proper.” However, this is not the case in my direct quotations from Gadamer or Popper. To my understanding, when we “discuss” something, we mainly focus on the subject matter, while in a dialogue or conversation the partners themselves are integral to the process. “Negotiation,” for me, has a different nature which I will address in more detail.

### **The Nature of Negotiation**

Concerning the conduct of dialogue, there is an epistemic subtlety to which we must pay some attention if we are to successfully reform our approach to dialogue as well as our expectations of it. It appears to me that, in practice, dialogue is often mistaken for negotiation. Despite the fact that they may resemble each other in some contexts, their underlying discourses are profoundly different.

Dialogue, as I see it, is not negotiation. “Negotiate” derives from the Latin for “do business.” Negotiation is a process by which parties communicate about ways to deal with issues on which they have different viewpoints. One way to negotiate is to “bargain,” derived from the Old French for “haggle.”<sup>6</sup> Any pre-established plan and desired end will turn the nature of dialogue into “negotiation,” with a calculated, business-like attitude.

In a negotiation we already know what we want; and to pursue our special objectives successfully, we attempt to discover, and then use, the weaknesses of the argument of the other side. If our position is weak, we attempt to improve it through argument. The art of negotiation allows us to

question, not in order to open a new window or stimulate our susceptibility towards a new understanding, but rather to selectively direct the discussion in order to prevent the participants from acknowledging other possibilities. We pretend to question in order to avoid disclosing our pre-established ambitions in the subject matter being addressed.

In this context, then, we are not seeking knowledge for its own sake, as we are not originally considering our partner and the other possibilities as possibilities. Knowledge for its own sake conceptually relies on the priority of the question over the answer, as gaining knowledge essentially relies on having questions instead of attempting to keep the pre-established opinion. Thus the desire for genuine listening does not originate in the act of questioning. We pretend to question and to listen while, in fact, retaining our previously constructed ideas we are preparing ourselves to counter-speak, to perform the art of argument, to attain the goal we have in mind. It is thus considered a success, a virtuous attempt to the utmost extent, to make our opinion the dominant one and to immobilize and avoid any query. Once dominance is achieved, we appreciate the restriction of the spectrum of other possibilities whilst building a shield of irrefutability around our suggestions. “Victory” is a meaningful and wanted term in the course of the process of negotiation.

## **Dialogue and the Art of Questioning**

Dialogue requires the opposite approach. In the realm of a genuine dialogue the term victory is alien and out of



context. While one may agree that: “to accomplish almost anything worthwhile it is necessary to distinguish between the ideal and the practical,”<sup>7</sup> a dialogue is, by nature, different from any attempt to compromise between two or more monologues.

Dialogue implies questioning by its very nature. Without accepting the priority of the question over the answer, we neither can conduct a genuine dialogue, nor develop a new understanding, nor gain new knowledge. One source of our questions is the shock we receive to our expectations. The Socratic dialectic creates the necessary conditions for questioning as it guides us to the realization that we do not know, through the artistic confusion it inspires.<sup>8</sup> “Knowledge always means, precisely, considering opposites”;<sup>9</sup> “Knowledge is dialectical from the ground up.”<sup>10</sup>

There is no method by which we can expect to systematically arrive at an idea. Ideas occur to us, but they do not arise from nowhere, nor can they develop in the absence of presupposed questions, which themselves only spring from openness: “Every sudden idea has the structure of a question.”<sup>11</sup>

An idea can only be born if the fertile mental womb is receptive to questions, which are as waves on the sea of openness. We cannot, then, halt the process of giving birth to the ripened idea, even if it causes us pain through disturbing the opinion we are accustomed to.

In the mystic realm, this point is manifested in Rumi’s very simple yet rich example: “Blood does not become sweet milk until thy fortune gives birth to a new babe. Hearken well.”<sup>12</sup> For bitter dark blood will turn into sweet white

milk only if, firstly, the seed of the new idea is sown and, secondly, the necessary time and the process are secured. In the context of our discussion, this could be conceptualized as a metaphor in which the seeds are questions and the process is genuine dialogue.

As Gadamer points out, in the Socratic-Platonic dialectic questioning belongs to the realm of conscious art, although in a different sense from the Greek *techne* which can be taught. Only the one who, seeking the truth, wants to know, only the one who continuously keeps himself oriented towards openness, can perform this art, as only he will be able to ask genuine questions.<sup>13</sup>

To question means to lay open, to place in the open. As against the fixity of opinions, questioning makes the object and all its possibilities fluid. A person skilled in the “art” of questioning is a person who can prevent questions from being suppressed by the dominant opinion.<sup>14</sup>

Dialectic, as we see in Platonic dialogues, is not the art of arguing through which we “can make a strong case out of a weak one, but the art of thinking which can strengthen objections by referring to the subject matter.”<sup>15</sup> Thus in a genuine dialogue we do not attempt to discover our partner’s weakness; rather, we endeavor to reveal the true strength of his opinions. “In this process what is said is continually transformed into the uttermost possibilities of its rightness and truth, and overcomes all opposition that tries to limit its validity.”<sup>16</sup> Thus dialogue depends upon thought rather than argument, even if this may bring about hidden objections in a compounded manner. The more genuine the dialogue, the

less participants try to pursue pre-established goals. It is the 'way' itself which dictates how it should be paved.

In his works on scientific theory, Popper teaches us that the power of science resides in its openness to criticism and its invitation to be refuted.<sup>17</sup> These characteristics are also required for dialogue. In a genuine dialogue we should try to avoid the possible tyranny of the dominant opinion and allow queries to arise. In other words, in a genuine dialogue we welcome any possibility of the refutability of our opinion. Needless to say, I do not mean that we welcome the refutation of our ideas, but rather that we encourage their being refutable, and these two are very different. In a dialogue questioning opens up the subject matter, while fixed opinions attempt to immobilise it. Questioning releases a range of possibilities which rigid opinions would restrict.

For Plato, holding an opinion or a pre-conviction leads to the suppression of questions. Opinion carries a power which veils us from the realization that we do not know. It resists accepting our ignorance, and exercises its curious tendency to manifest and diffuse itself to evolve into the general opinion.<sup>18</sup> This tendency will subtly become a form of prejudice or self-interest.

In Rumi's visionary mystical paradigm—where knowledge embraces not only rational and intellectual knowledge, but also that which is spiritual and intuitive—when a specific desire or a presupposed tendency appears, the art of understanding “becomes hidden: a hundred veils rise from the heart to the eye.”<sup>19</sup> “Pre-intention is a veil upon the eye of the heart,”<sup>20</sup> it enfolds “the sight, like a veil”<sup>21</sup>; “Therefore he does not see the whole in all its various aspects.”<sup>22</sup> De-

sire makes “a man squint-eyed” and diverts “the spirit from rectitude.”<sup>23</sup> “Freedom from prejudice is light to the eyes”<sup>24</sup>; while prejudice will put our “knowledge into the grave. Unprejudicedness makes ignorance wise; prejudice makes knowledge perverse and iniquitous.”<sup>25</sup> “Whence shall we seek knowledge? From renouncing knowledge,”<sup>26</sup> from departing from preconceived opinions.

## **Dialogue and its Conduct**

Although we use the term ‘to conduct’ in reference to dialogue, according to Gadamer this term is not accurate as a dialogue which is “conducted” by the interlocutors can never be genuine. A genuine dialogue involves us in its internal dynamics: “The more genuine a conversation is, the less its conduct lies within the will of either partner.”<sup>27</sup>

The partners conversing are far less the leaders of it than the led. No one knows in advance what will “come out” of a conversation. Understanding or its failure is like an event that happens to us. Thus we can say that something was a good conversation or that it was ill fated. All this shows that a conversation has a spirit of its own, and that the language in which it is conducted bears its own truth within it—i.e., that it allows something to “emerge” which henceforth exists.<sup>28</sup>

The art of conducting a genuine dialogue essentially shares the same category as the art of thinking, the art of questioning, the art of listening and seeking the truth, as conceptually they are all closely inter-linked. This category, by its very nature, is incompatible with the intention of winning an argument. Indeed, it may open the way to losing it as

“the art of questioning as being the art of questioning ever further, that is, the art of thinking, which involves being able to preserve our orientation toward openness.”<sup>29</sup> We may then conclude that losing, if we can call it that, may even be an art in the realm of the search for truth.

In dialogue the value systems, experiences, analysis, synthesis and paradigms of understanding of the other are welcome to inspire the process of a genuine dialogue, and are breathed, grasped and absorbed by it. It carries an openness to re-contemplating one's own stance and understanding. A genuine dialogue is eager for any external impetus, which suggests new explorations of direction as well as content, inviting the soul to incline towards “conversion” in order to transcend another orbit of perception. In a dialogue, we are thus finally speaking to ourselves as well as through the medium of the “other,” since it invariably culminates in a new self-understanding. This radical change becomes possible only if we are able to understand the other's perspective. Such empathy can only be attained through a “dialogic” exercise.<sup>30</sup> “To become at home in the alien, is the basic movement of spirit, whose being consists only in returning to itself from what is other.”<sup>31</sup> If the actors of dialogue lay themselves open to the possibility of conversion, then the mutual cross-fertilization will be more successful with a greater variety of views.

A smooth oscillation between being an actor and being acted upon is an integral characteristic of dialogue, as it is of life in its fullest sense. An inter-subjective life involves an on-going struggle to reconcile, balance or mediate these antithetical potentialities of being, such that no person or

group ever arrogates agency so completely and permanently to itself that another is reduced to the status of a mere object, a cipher, an anonymous creature of blind fate.<sup>32</sup>

Thus, dialogue is a vast “in-between” area, where that which operates is not the trait of difference, symbolized by the characteristics of “One”, but the very space-making of human memories; a passage through “the places” of memory and origin, from which unknown energies of inventiveness are drawn. The critical point is not the difference between them, but the double movement of that which happens between them. It is a process, a dynamic, a vehicle between oneself and one’s origin rather than an “end product.”<sup>33</sup>

## **Dialogue and the Art of Listening**

To perform the art of questioning, in this sense, we need to possess the ability and the conviction to perform the art of listening, which in turn should conclude in the art of thinking, the nature of which requires openness. Dialectic, then, is based on this art, which is, by implication, the art of conducting a dialogue.

When we speak, we are manifesting what we have already constructed in our mind, while when we understand through listening, we in fact reconstruct a construction. Thus “every act of understanding is the inverse of an act of speech.”<sup>34</sup> In a real dialogue we should thus not only go beyond hearing to listening, but moreover perform the art of listening, which is of the same essence as the art of understanding.

By performing the art of listening, we will discover new layers of meaning in our own value systems. This will alter our paradigm of understanding, which in turn could even transform our supposed contradictory orientations into a harmonized manifestation of a cluster understanding, a harmonized package of values and beliefs, rather than a set of separate elements of faith.

We can clearly find strong encouragement in religious teachings to learn the art of listening, as can be seen in the following example from the Quran: "Give good news to those servants of Mine who listen to sayings and follow the best; indeed those are the ones whom God has guided and those are the owners of knowledge."<sup>35</sup> The Quran also states that those who will receive punishment on the Day of Judgment shall say: "Had we but listened or pondered, we should not have been among the inmates of the burning fire."<sup>36</sup>

Through the art of listening we can cross the gaps created by our illusions which, in turn, are mainly created through ignorance of each other's language, ways of understanding and living. "Ignorance of each other's ways and lives has been a common cause, throughout the history of mankind, of the suspicion and mistrust between the peoples of the world through which their differences have all too often broken into wars"<sup>37</sup>; while in a genuine dialogue the variety of competing views would be considered a value rather than a prelude to trouble.

In a real dialogue each partner listens to the other as openly, sympathetically and with as much empathy as possible in an attempt to understand the other's position as precisely and, as it were, as much from within as possible. Such

an attitude carries with it the possibility that, at any point, we might find the other's perception so persuasive that we might be tempted to shift our own opinion—if not our own position—even though such change may seem to us disturbing.

## Language and Being

In Gadamer's thought, understanding relies on and even, in a special sense, is synonymous with hermeneutics. It introduces a general relation between thinking and speaking. Interpretation, like conversation, is dialectic and occurs within the circle of questions and answers. It is through language that we understand existence. "The essential relation between language and understanding is seen primarily in the fact that the essence of tradition is to exist in the medium of language, so that the preferred *object* of interpretation is a verbal one."<sup>38</sup> For Gadamer, then, sharing a medium, language, fundamentally contributes to the very process of the formation of the actors in dialogue; but Gadamer does not conceive communication as the passing of information from one person to another. Rather, in communication some subject matter becomes mutually accessible for two or more people, while the medium, which gives us this access, withdraws from prominence.<sup>39</sup>

For Popper, a genuine dialogue rather primarily relies on a will from within. He thinks that it is a mistake to assume that the possibility of a discussion, a dialogue, depends on the existence of a common language or common basic assumptions between the partners. The main precon-



dition is that they be ready to learn from and understand each other. Then, the more the variety of competing opinions, the more rich, fruitful and valuable the discussion. "Had there been no Tower of Babel, we should invent it."<sup>40</sup>

There are differences between contemporary philosophers concerning the understanding of "understanding" in dialogue, as can be observed between Gadamer and Donald Davidson, for whom common understanding forms the main basis of dialogue rather than common language.<sup>41</sup> However, in both these cases, dialogue is seen to emerge through a three-fold interaction between the self, the other and the world.<sup>42</sup>

However, in another realm, the mystic one, where transcendental communion is beyond meditation, the Persian Islamic thinker Jalaluddin Rumi tells us that "the tongue of mutual understanding is different indeed" from sharing the same language:

To speak the same tongue is a kinship and affinity: a man, when he is with those in whom he cannot confide, is like a prisoner in chains. Oh, many are the Indians and Turks that speak the same tongue, oh, many the pair of Turks that are as strangers to each other. Therefore the tongue of mutual understanding is different indeed: to be one in heart is better than to be one in tongue. Without speech and without sign or scroll, hundreds of thousands of interpreters arise from the heart.<sup>43</sup>

For Rumi it is the communicative "vision" which not only evaporates words, but rather introduces a unifying paradigm between the self, the other and the world:

*I am thinking of rhymes, and my Sweetheart says to me,  
'Do not think of aught except vision of Me.*

Sit at thy ease, My rhyme-meditating friend: in My presence thou art rhymed with (attached to) felicity.

What are words that thou shouldst think of them? What are words? Thorns in the hedge of the vineyard.

*I will throw word and sound and speech into confusion, that without these I may converse with thee.*

Rumi sees this paradigm as being capable of transcending individuality through non-individuality. Then there is a mutual need between the self and the other to *be* in that world which embodies love:

*I found (true) individuality in non-individuality: therefore I wove (my) individuality into non-individuality.*

Whomsoever thou didst deem to be a lover, regard him to be the loved one, for relatively he is both this and that.

*If they that are thirsty seek water from the world, yet water too seeks in the world them that are thirsty.*<sup>44</sup>

*Without that mutual incorporation, without love, Rumi believes that the world is too empty to talk about, and with them, it is too full to talk about:*

*Out beyond ideas of wrong doing and right doing, there lies a field. I will meet you there. When the soul lies down in that sweet grass, the world is too full to talk about. Ideas, language, even the phrase "each other" doesn't make any sense.*<sup>45</sup>

## **Dialogue and its Socio-Political Context**

There are certain social and political preconditions for the fulfillment of Gadamer's exhortation to a genuine dialogue, which depends on openness towards "others." Actors in such dialogue would first need to develop a critical ability, which can be achieved through a relevant education. I agree with Jurgen Habermas, who thinks that Gadamer

should elucidate these pre-conditions, as there are normative elements in his doctrine concerning dialogue, despite the fact that Gadamer thinks of his thesis as being merely descriptive.<sup>46</sup>

In his political philosophy, Popper tells us that “the liberal does not dream of a perfect consensus of opinion; he only hopes for the mutual fertilization of opinions, and the consequent growth of ideas. Even when we solve a problem to universal satisfaction, we create, in solving it, many new problems over which we are bound to disagree. This is not to be regretted.”<sup>47</sup>

Popper attempts to introduce some characteristics of the socio-political circumstances which are needed, as well as the appropriate attitude we should adopt. He suggests that reaching consensus on what people prefer to avoid is easier than agreeing on what they wish to achieve. “We must work for the elimination of concrete evils rather than for the realization of abstract goods.”<sup>48</sup> Popper’s ideas remind us of the rationale we adopt during heavy rainfall: we do not attempt to alter the laws and mechanisms of the sky, but instead we attempt to find an umbrella. Our political duty is not to create paradise on earth, but to reduce pain and suffering.

He encourages the formation of a society which “calls for the bold propounding of trial solutions which are then subjected to criticism and error-elimination.”<sup>49</sup> He believes it is wrong to wish for absolute solutions; rather it suffices to develop a social orientation towards solving the problem. For this, he recommends that the priority should be the kind of arrangement we need to establish free institutions in order to prevent abuses, rather than to discuss who should

rule.<sup>50</sup> To what extent should and can we provide such institutions with the maximum freedom they need? We, of course, need democratic governance in order to protect the freedom of these institutions. However, freedom is a “dangerous weapon: without it, or too little, freedom dies; but with too much of it freedom dies also.”<sup>51</sup>

Popper also argues that we should not confuse our search for truth with our appetite for certainty. This means that we should fight continuously against our mistakes, and that despite all our precautions, while we can never be sure that we are not wrong, we can be sure that we are wrong. “You may be right and I may be wrong, and by an effort together we may get to the truth.”<sup>52</sup> Popper elaborates on this simple but brilliant idea that we, as human beings, should not kill and tear each other apart; instead, we should let our theories fight each other.

And, finally, a genuine dialogue simply can not happen if we are not really convinced that we are not the absolute owners of truth and cannot be so; we can belong to truth and stay within its context, but cannot own it. In each dialogue we have to consider some cognizance of the truth for the “other,” as well as some contribution to it by the “other,” otherwise dialogue is meaningless.

## **UNESCO’s Mission**

UNESCO, as an intergovernmental organization entrusted with an intellectual mission, can have an effective impact in providing the international community with the institutional basis it needs to establish a genuine dialogue.

UNESCO must search for ways to present concrete suggestions for paving the way towards the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind at decision-making tables in the political arena. It is this mission that makes its role rather difficult and complicated. In modern times, especially within the context of the political philosophies behind the notion of a democratic nation state, governments are not entrusted with the notions of intellectuality and morality as such. It is not an easy task to discover or define not only convincing but rather applicable political modalities for politicians which are capable of targeting solidarity through intellectuality and morality. It is not and cannot evolve into a routine task at all, as intellectuality by its very nature rejects routine while political bureaucracy usually prefers and relies on it. Thus, not only should the strategies and the programming orientation of UNESCO be capable of evolving, but it must also develop flexible conceptual modalities for entrusting political units with the final duty of targeting the minds of the people for the sake of peace based on intellectual and moral solidarity. This is a task which historically and traditionally has been mastered by philosophers, mentors and spiritual leaders, not by the political institution of a nation state.

However, UNESCO is entrusted by its Constitution with creating modalities and developing ideas and programmes which aim to perform a sacred task within a secular framework, or to transcend the subject of the political decision-making process into a realm which is described in its Constitution as being sacred.

After the terrible shock that World War II inflicted on nations around the world, UNESCO was founded in 1945

“to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture.”

The Organization’s Constitution further states that World War II was “made possible by the denial of the democratic principles of the dignity, equality and mutual respect of men, and by the propagation, in their place, through ignorance and prejudice, of the doctrine of the inequality of men and races.”<sup>53</sup>

If we are constitutionally entrusted “to increase the means of communication between their peoples and to employ these means for the purpose of mutual understanding and a true and more perfect knowledge of each other’s lives,” then we need dialogue for the sake of understanding, which is far beyond the balanced compromise that we try to achieve in the course of negotiation. For such a dialogue, as Popper advised us,<sup>54</sup> we should not primarily seek a common ground or language; rather, all that we need is a genuine wish and will to listen, understand and learn from each other. In this case, the variety of opinions and background cultures of the participants is expected to be an asset to be appreciated rather than a problem to be avoided.<sup>55</sup>

While we cannot realize abstract ideals and create a paradise on earth, we can learn how to manage the elimination of concrete evils and reduce pain and suffering on earth, by on the one hand replacing fighting among one another with fighting among our theories, and on the other by replacing our search for the weaknesses of the other’s opinion with the search for their strength. It is through dialogue that we can create faith in the idea that the defences of peace must be

constructed in the minds of men, and offer a suitable paradigm for the intellectual and moral solidarity of mankind. It is also through dialogue that we learn how to mobilize our potential for the actualization of relevant free institutions, bearing in mind “that the wide diffusion of culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.”<sup>56</sup> It is worth noting that while referring to “solidarity” in this context, we are naturally encouraged to broaden its conceptual prerequisites beyond the rational realm. Thus “solidarity” can be attained not only on the basis of rationality, but also on other human faculties beyond the rational realm.

Bitter experience in today's world indicates that it is for everybody's long-term benefit, both for the ruled and the rulers, not to deny this spirit its rightful place at the heart of the international community. This will provide us not only with a constructive vision but also with a regenerative and refreshing mechanism for it. If we combine the power of our collective conscience with our institutional capacity, if we resolve to promote a genuine dialogue for the sake of knowledge oriented to solidarity, then we will find ourselves ever more powerful.

## Notes

1. The content of this article was delivered on the occasion of the Conference on Dialogue among Civilizations: the Key to a Safe Future, 23 April 2003, Warsaw, Poland.

2. The preamble of the Constitution of UNESCO, adopted in London, 16 November 1945
3. *Ibid.*
4. *مفسر فن ادب، او جزل ادب، موهزل او*
5. See Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, second revised edition (translation revised by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marsal), Sheed & Ward, London, 1989, p. 188, as he cites Schleiermacher, *Dialektik*, ed. Odebrecht, p. 572.
6. See Walter C. Clemens Jr., *The Dynamics of International Relations*, Lanham, Maryland, Rowman & Littlefield, 1998.
7. Franklin D. Roosevelt, *The Macmillan Dictionary of Political Quotations*, New York.
8. See Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 365-66.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 365.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 365.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 366.
12. Rumi, *Mathnavi* (see *The Mathnavi of Jalalu'ddin Rumi*, edited and translated by Reynold A. Nicholson, E.J.W. Gibb Memorial Trust, 1982), Book II, line 2. Explaining the reason he paused while writing his *Mathnavi*, Rumi said, "This *Mathnawi* has been delayed for a while: an interval was needed in order that the blood might turn to milk."
13. See Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 366-67.
14. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 367
15. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 367.
16. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 367.
17. Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations – The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*.
18. "Just as the words that the Greeks have for opinion, doxa, also means the decision made by the majority in the council assembly." Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 366.
19. Rumi, *Mathnawi*, Book I, line 334 (with some modification of Nicholson's translation according to the Persian original).
20. *Ibid.*, Book III, line 2,871.
21. *Ibid.*, Book III, line 2,873.



22. *Ibid.*, Book III, line 2,874.
23. *Ibid.*, Book I, line 333.
24. *Ibid.*, Book II, line 2,750.
25. *Ibid.*, Book II, line 2,751-2.
26. *Ibid.*, Book VI, line 823.
27. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 383.
28. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 383.
29. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 367.
30. See Edmund Neill, "On the Horizons," TLS, April 25, 2003, reviewing *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*, (Robert J. Dostal, editor) and *Gadamer's Century*, (Jeff Malpas *et al.*, editors).
31. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 14.
32. Hannah Arendt, *The Human Condition*, Chicago University Press, 1958.
33. Sibony, Daniel, *Entre-Deux – L'Origine en Partage*, Paris, Editions du Seuil, 1991.
34. Gadamer's Understanding of Schleiermacher, Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p.188.
35. *The Quran*, Surah Zumar, verse 39.
36. *The Quran*, Surah Al-Mulk, verse 10.
37. Preamble of the Constitution of UNESCO, *op. cit.*
38. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, p. 389.
39. Gadamer, *op. cit.*, the translator's preface, p. xv; see also Julian Roberts, *The Guardian*, Monday March 18, 2002, <http://amsterdam.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-l-0203/msg00094.html>.
40. Popper, *op. cit.*, p. 352.
41. See Davidson, *Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2nd edn., 2001; *Gadamer's Century*, Jeff Malpas *et al.*, editors; Edmund Neill, "On the Horizons," TLS, April 25, 2003.
42. See *Gadamer's Century*, Jeff Malpas *et al.*, editors; Edmund Neill, "On the Horizons," TLS, April 25, 2003.
43. Rumi, *op. cit.*, Book I, p. 67, lines 1,205-1,208.
44. *Ibid.*, Book I, p. 95, lines 1,727-1,730, 1,735, 1,740, 1,741.
45. Rumi, translated by Coleman Barks.

46. See Edmund Neill, "On the Horizons," TLS, April 25, 2003, reviewing *The Cambridge Companion to Gadamer*, (Robert J. Dostal, editor), and *Gadamer's Century*, (Jeff Malpas *et al.*, editors).
47. Popper, *op. cit.*, p. 352.
48. Popper, "Utopia and Violence," *in op. cit.*
49. See Popper, *Open Society and its Enemies*, 1945.
50. See "Sir Karl Raimund Popper: In Memoriam," by Eugene Yue-Ching Ho and Pui-Chong Lund, *in Intellectus* (a bulletin of the Hong Kong Institute of Economic Science), July-September, 1994, n. 31, p. 1-3; web link: <http://www.eeng.dcu.ie/~tkpw/hk-ies/n31/> and also: <http://www.ee.surrey.ac.uk/Contrib/Edupage/1998/06/21-06-1998-trailer.html>.
51. As quoted by Peter Landry's biography of Popper on the web: <http://www.blupete.com/Literature/Biographies/Philosophy/Popper.htmrfn1>
52. See Popper, *Open Society and its Enemies*.
53. The Constitution of UNESCO, *op. cit.*
54. See Popper, *Conjectures and Refutations—The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, p. 352.
55. *Ibid.*, p. 352.
56. The Constitution of UNESCO, *op. cit.*