Can there Be a Global Left?

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How to write for a global public that does not yet exist? We, the multitude who might become that public, cannot yet reach each other across the excluding boundaries of language, beneath the power distortions of global media, against the muffling exclusions of poverty and the disparities in information. We are therefore to be forgiven for relying on the discourses that we possess in common as members of partial publics—religion, national belonging, academic knowledge, global business, ethnic tradition—even if these discourses are exclusive, and punishing to outsiders. It is understandable that we wish our particular discourses to have universal status, although we are aware of the extent that the appearance of universality is an effect of power. As there has been no free global debate, dominant ideas, even benevolent ones, exist in a social context of domination that affects their truth content irrefutably.

Globalization is not new, but global "immanence" is. I use this term to refer to the fact that in our era of global capi-

tal, global production, global labor migrations, and global penetration by technologies of communication, there is no spatial outside, no "other" of peoples, territory or environment against which some of us could conveniently define ourselves and, holding ourselves apart, control our fate. The global space that we inhabit in common is overdetermined, contradictory, and intractably diverse. Our lived experiences are simultaneous and incongruous, resisting division into distinct nationalities, pure ethnicities, or racial differences. We are morally accountable in a multiple world where no religion as practiced monopolizes the virtue that would be needed to fight evil in its name, where there is no value-free, objective science that could ground universal, secular truth — just as there is no universal law of the market that can guarantee us a benevolent future.

Those who deny these everyday realities of global immanence fuel fundamentalism, of which there are as many types as there are intolerances. The mark of fundamentalism is not religious belief but dogmatic belief, that refuses to interrogate founding texts and excludes the possibility of critical dialogue, dividing humanity absolutely into pre-given categories of the chosen and the expendable, into "us" and "them." And whether this is preached by a head of state, or in a place of worship, or at the IMF, no cultural practice—religious or secular, economic or political, rational or romantic—is immune to fundamentalism's simplifying appeal.

We in the nascent public sphere can do better than to succumb to mythic fundamentalisms of whatever sort. But how do we form a global public? In what language shall we speak to each other, if all languages exclude? How shall we

express our solidarity, if communication is culturally contingent? Let us address these very basic issues even if we do not have answers, rather than retreating to the academically safe yet insignificant ground of what can be securely known.

I speak as an intellectual in a Western university context —that is, of course, from a very limited perspective. But perspectivalism does not itself disqualify one as witness to the new global immanence, so long as the glasses one wears are not so ideologically thick as to block out sensory, lived experience—whence comes wisdom, which is by definition neither intolerant nor dogmatic. Wisdom teaches that even if science and religion are infallible, human beings who interpret them are not. But where there is human fallibility—as opposed to fundamentalist fate—there is the hope that we may learn from past mistakes.

Wisdom acknowledges limits, and my contribution here will be a partial and specific one. I will ask: what happens to critical thinking in an immanent world? How does global immanence change the conditions of critical reflection, and what significance might this have for a global public sphere? The critical theorists of the Frankfurt School are known for a theoretical method that they called "immanent criticism" (it was the topic of my dissertation, written at Georgetown University under the tutelage of Professor Hisham Sharabi). Relying on the Hegelian dialectics of negativity, combined with a Kantian humility as to the limits of what can be known, immanent criticism as practiced by Theodor Adorno, Max Horkheimer and others sought to transcend the untruth of present society in a non-dogmatic,

critical, hence negative mode, showing the gap between concept and reality—how, for example, so-called democracies were undemocratic; how mass culture was uncultured; how Western civilization was barbaric; and, in a classic study, *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, written in the catastrophic context of World War II, how reason, the highest value of European modernity, had become unreason. The politics of this method is radical, not liberal, because it holds ideas accountable for social practice and uses the legitimating values of power against power itself. Its effectiveness has been discovered independently by activists in many political movements. Immanent criticism gave force to Martin Luther King's discourse in the U.S. civil rights movement against segregation, as it did to Mahatma Ghandi's discourse of anticolonialism that used Britain's self-proclaimed "civilized" status against its own colonial practice; just as anti-colonial movements generally have used the imperialist beliefs of liberty and democracy in order to challenge the legitimacy of imperial rule; just as, more recently, dissidents spoke the truth of socialism to power, undermining the legitimacy of the so-called socialist regimes.

But what happens when immanent criticism operates in an overdetermined, global public sphere where, by definition, the legitimating values of power are not shared? Do the two immanences necessarily cancel each other out, so that immanent critique in one discourse becomes transcendent and affirmative in another? Or is it possible to maintain the critical power of negativity despite the superimposition of discursive frames? And—here is the leap of faith—how might the emergence of a trans-global Left be made possible

in the process of critical thinking? What would "the Left" mean in a global public sphere.

To address these questions, let me draw on the concrete case of the Middle East that includes the explosive and urgent issue of Islamism, and on the work of Hisham Sharabi, whose analyses of Arab intellectual life have been creatively autonomous, politically courageous, and critically analytic. Those who like myself were fortunate to be his students in Western intellectual history will recall his method of teaching the canonical the works of Nietzsche, Freud, Weber, Marx and others. Always he would suggest two entrances to the texts: the first, individual and existential—experiencing personally the attractiveness of the ideas through what he has described as the "subversive and liberating function of reading."[1] The second entrance was social—how the text functioned in a given historical context, how it worked politically to support the inequities of power in society and how it also might work against these inequities. His understanding of the crucial significance of a double critique, one existential the other social, emerged, I am sure, from his work as a scholar of Arab intellectual history, and the perspective on Western thinking that such work necessarily entails.

Abdul-Kabir al-Khatibi, the Algerian-born, French-trained sociologist, has written of the necessity of a "double critique" practiced by Arab theorists to criticize their own societies from within, and at the same time to criticize, from without, the Western concepts used to describe them.[2] Edward Said's book *Orientalism* has been, at least in the West, the most widely discussed account of the mythic nature of

Western understanding of the Arab world, laying the ground (with others, like Talal Asad) for the argument that Orientalist "science" reveals more about the colonizers than the colonized.[3] More recently, Asad brilliantly criticized Western critiques of the Islamic reaction to Salman Rushdie's novel, *Satanic Verses*, using anthropological methods to describe the curiously specific British cultural reaction to the affair, turning the tables on the former colonizers.[4]

Such literature that criticizes the criticizers, warns us, in fact, to qualify the claim with which this essay began: that global immanence is something new in history. In fact, throughout the modern colonial period, Western hegemony produced global immanence in a one-sided fashion. The immanent superimposition of conflicting values was the contradictory and unavoidable state of the colonized, but not the colonizers, whose very identity as "modern," historically in "advance" of the rest of the world, was their claim to legitimacy as a colonizing force. Other cultures, those of the colonized, existed as objects of anthropological investigation or, as "civilizations" accessible to historical study—that is, as vestiges of the past—coeval with, but not immanent to "modernity," a word and a concept which as critics have noted was in fact Europe's way of defining itself. To "modernize" meant to Westernize, an alien task, in an exemplary case, for "Oriental" subjectivities who, described as inscrutable, irrational, emotional, unscientific, and personalistic, were the quintessential other of Enlightened modern man.

Within the Orientalist context, Arab consciousness was by definition overdetermined: both immanent and transcen-

dent, a discourse within the West and a discourse from without. But a critical stance within one discourse did not necessarily include a critical stance in the other. The great Awakening of Arab intellectual life at the turn of the twentieth century employed an apologist discourse, justifying Arabic traditions of religious and secular thought precisely because they were compatible with modern Western values of scientific positivism, democratic reasoning, and the rule of law. Kemalism, the modernizing ideology of the Turkish movement of nationalist liberation, broke from Western colonialism by, literally, copying its legal-political and cultural forms. The Turkish leader Mustafa Kemal ridiculed traditional Islam as a "symbol of obscurantism," the "enemy of civilization and science," and "a corpse which poisons our lives."[5] When Western critical discourse was adopted by Arabs in the Marxist mode, this absence of a double critique tended to be just as prevalent, as Arab Marxists were similarly adamant that their own societal and religious forms were vestiges of the feudal past.

Of Course, it was Islamism that inaugurated an autonomous tradition of immanent critique within the Middle East. Sayyid Qutb, a contemporary of the Frankfurt School theorists, critically attacked Islamic regimes as a return of the condition of ignorance—the *Jahiliyyah* of pre-Islamic times. Hence present-day Islamic societies were un-Islamic. The strategy precisely paralleled the argument of Adorno and Horkheimer in *Dialectic of Enlightenment* that Western reason, which emerged from myth, had itself turned back into myth. The difference, of course, was Qutb's move to positivity, his affirmation of a return to Islam as stated liter-

ally in the Qur'an. This affirmation of the true Islam can be seen to mark a definitive break from Western-defined modernity, allowing for an Islamic model to replace it. But what is interesting about Qutb's understanding of the "self-evidence" of Qur'anic thought, is that it, too, was dependent on the West, in the dialectical sense of critical negation. Islam—the true Islam—appears in Qutb's work as the inverted other of Western modernity: spiritual where the West is materialist; communal where the West is egoistically individual, socially just where the West is greedy and competitive, morally disciplined where the West is negligently libertine. This was, of course, the antithesis of the apologists' strategy of redeeming Islam within the value categories of the West. Redeeming Islam because it was "other" opened the way for endorsing an alternative road to modernity, different from both the capitalist west and the Soviet Union[6]—at the enormous price, however, of affirming neo-patriarchal social forms and opening the door for dogmatic, fundamentalist belief.[7]

Now, the Western modernity that Qutb and others attacked was in fact the impoverished tradition of instrumental reason, possessive individualism and lack of social consciousness that the members of the Frankfurt School and other European Marxists were criticizing from within. It would have taken a radical cosmopolitanism far in advance of what was possible at the time for both sides (German Jewish and Arab Muslim) to join forces in a critique of Western reason in its impoverished, (neo-)liberal, instrumentalized form. But the very thought of such an alliance, an attack launched from both inside and without,

suggests the power that a new Left in a global public sphere might begin to have today. To accomplish a global critique, however, it is the object criticized that must have priority, not the discursive model. If Western-centrism is to be avoided, Islam-centrism is only its other, not the theoretical solution. But just as clearly from the global perspective, the rejection of Western-centrism does not place a taboo on using the tools of Western thought. On the contrary, it frees the critical tools of the Enlightenment (as well as those of Islam) for original and creative application. To cite the Moroccan historian, Muhammad 'Abid al-Jabiri, who as a leading critic of Orientalist discourses and Eurocentric world views, nonetheless makes eclectic use of Western concepts from Kant, Freud, Foucault, Marx, and others:

> I do not limit myself to the constraints present in the original frameworks, but often utilize them with considerable freedom (…). We should not consider these concepts molds cast in iron, but tools to be used in each instance in the most productive way (…).[8]

If we are interested in the genealogy of a global public sphere, we will need to note that the first radically cosmopolitan critique of Western-centric thought did not come from the Islamic world. It came from the French-speaking Caribbean, via secular, Marxist transport with a detour to Algeria—and when it appeared it came with a Western wrapping. I am referring to Frantz Fanon's remarkable book, *The Wretched of the Earth*, which (paradoxically introduced by the European, existentialist Marxist Jean-Paul Sartre) called on the non-Western world to leave Europe "behind"—that is, to produce a modernity that transcended the European model, which had proven itself bankrupt.

Fanon's gesture suggested an intellectual liberation of a totally new order because while his politics was still identifiably Marxist, his approach refused submission to any ideology. It resonated with the actually lived experience of much of the colonized world that modernity had meant decline rather than progress—what Aijaz Ahmad has described as "the descent into bourgeois modernity" that marked the era of European imperialism.[9] It received brilliant rearticulation in a 1967 article by the Lebanese poet Ahmad 'Ali Sa'id (Adonis)—cited as the last sentence of Sharabi's book, *Arab Intellectuals and the West*:

> We no longer believe in Europe. We no longer have faith in its political system or in its philosophies. Worms have eaten into its social structure as they have into (…) its very soul. Europe for us—we backward, ignorant, impoverished people—is a corpse.[10]

Here the very words used by Kemal in rejecting Islam are turned against the postcolonial West. But Adonis is a secular thinker, who has no desire to posit, as did Sayyid Qutb, an inverted West as the road to the future. The Fanonist critique was, however, taken up by Islamists, by Ali al-Shariati, for example, whose thought and writings would play a leading role in the Iranian revolution, and who was influenced as well by the Cuban Marxist, Ché Guevara, and by Latin American liberation theology—an eclectic theoretical mix held together by the object criticized—world imperialism, racism and class exploitation—rather than any ideological form.[11]

My goal in this short essay is not the retelling of intellectual history. Rather, it is to contribute to a discussion regarding a very specific, very political question: How today,

in what intellectually critical idiom, might a global Left learn to speak together? In this context, intellectual history undergoes a transfiguration, no longer a story of specific civilizational continuities, be they Western or Arabic or Islamic, but an "archaeology of knowledge," to use Foucault's term, of a present global possibility. In the language of Walter Benjamin, we are looking for *Urforms* of the present, genealogical lineages that would guide us in articulating a critical discourse adequate to the demands of a global public sphere, in which the hegemony of the colonizing discourses has been shaken so that all criticism must be double critique. At the same time, if a new, global Left is to matter politically, it needs, as Sharabi writes, to "go beyond the negative," rising creatively above critique—without, however, falling into a new dogmatism—a tall order indeed.[12]

We are looking for a route that will connect critical discourses that have evolved in partial contexts, in order to make them useful for a yet-to-be-constituted, global, progressive Left. We will not be satisfied with the realists' maxim: The enemy of my enemy is my friend—as this will not support global solidarity in a meaningful way. We also suspect that the splintering of the Left along the lines of discrete "identities" has run its course as a progressive form of critique, at least in its Western form, where identity politics now threatens to work to the advantage of anti-immigration nativism rather than the protection of cultural minorities. In its Islamist form, "identity politics" is indeed a powerful force, a constituency within civil society of over a billion people, connected in a global network. But those who desire (or fear) the crafting of this public into a uniform Islamist,

global view do a disservice to the richness of debate that informs Islam, which not only allows critical thinking but requires it as a duty. If there are Islamist politicians who think they can count on support from a monolithic, unquestioning Muslim bloc, then these politicians are no less cynical and no less manipulative than their Western counterparts.

Islamist politics has been multiple and contentious, spanning a wide variety of political positions, including a critical Left. And although the term "Left" is clearly a Western category, emerging in the context of the French Revolution, its nondenominational character may permit it to be applied in a global public space. The "Left" here would mean radical in the critical sense, challenging not only the power inequities of the given world, but also the justifying discourses used to describe it. The Left would also mean cosmopolitan, defining social justice in a way that excludes no group of humanity from both the benefits of, and moral accountability within the global public sphere.

Given the dominance of the West in recent history, any attempt at global organization risks re-inscribing the colonial difference. And yet, critical Muslims, critical Israelis, critical Americans and Europeans, cannot allow their identities to hold them apart. We recall Gramsci's insight that hegemony depends not on the absence of oppositional discourses but, rather, on the "disorganization of dissent." We are indeed traveling a difficult road. But let us at least agree to eliminate false steps along the way. I shall discuss a few of these briefly.

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There is the view, held by many serious and critical writers, particularly by those from former colonies living in (or writing for) Western audiences, that Samuel Huntington's prediction of a "clash of civilizations" has cleared the way for a counter-hegemonic challenge. Although Huntington, a realist, was describing a gloomy scenario of global struggle, his acknowledgement that civilizations other than the "West" have a role to play in a modernizing project (i.e., that Westernizing and modernizing are not synonymous), posits the coevalness of civilizations, that do not have to give up their identities in order to be full participants in progress. But Huntington is not radically critical in either the immanent or the transcendent sense, and his affirmation of other civilizations is more apparent than real. The Turkish intellectual, Ahmet Davutoglu, speaking specifically to Habermas's claim that modernity is an "unfinished project," asks, then, "who shall complete it? (…) [W]hat will be the role of non-Western civilizations, which have been the object of this project, in the next phase?" Now this might have led Davutoglu to a radical, cosmopolitan position, if he had allied himself with the original impulse of Habermas's statement, its immanent critique of the Enlightenment project that holds Western modernization accountable for its own shortcomings. But instead, Davutoglu drops the burden of double critique and falls into Huntington's fantasy of separate civilizations—as if any civilization could remain separate within the immanent global sphere. The West's self-critique, he asserts, becomes "an inter-civilisational crisis in response to the resistance and revival of the authentic self-perceptions of non-Western civilizations."[13] But a clash

of civilizations cannot perform the critical, counter-hegemonic task at hand, which is not to replace one dominating civilization by another, but rather, to put an end to the structures of cultural domination.

The recognition of cultural domination as just as important, and perhaps even the condition of possibility of political and economic domination is a true advance in our thinking. Moreover, if the West does not have a monopoly on the future's meaning, then we are obliged to look to all cultural pasts in imagining a future that is yet to come. But —this is crucial—it is to the cultural imaginaries of past civilizations that we must look for inspiration, not the power realities. In other words, cultures must be understood as always radical, in the sense that they are always negotiations between the real and the ideal, hence at least potentially in protest against the societies and power structures in which they emerge. The cultures that defenders of tradition look back to with such nostalgia are the dream-form of the societies that gave them birth. Precisely for that reason, in their time they functioned ideologically, covering up the inequities and iniquities of minority rule, patriarchal domination, class domination—all forms of the violence of power that deserve to be called "barbaric."

Culture *and* barbarism—the barbarism of power that at the same time provides the control, the "law and order," that allows culture to flourish—these are the two sides of the Golden Age of every civilization, whether it is called the *Pax Romana*, or *Pax Britanica*, or *Pax Americana*, or the Classical Age of Islam, or the heights of civilization of the Aztecs and Incas. No great civilization has been free of this

contradiction. This was the tremendous insight of Walter Benjamin when he insisted:

> Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate. (...) There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.[14]

In revering and desiring within changed current conditions to salvage our different cultural traditions (and Marxism is one of them, as is Islam's Golden Age and the European Enlightenment) we would be well advised not to confuse the dream of the past with its reality. As we value the former, we must continue to criticize the latter. Such redemption of past culture would rip it out of its ideological role of justifying not only past violence, but new violence committed in its name.

The goal of a radical cosmopolitan Left cannot be reduced to the meaningless project of changing the religion, or skin color, or ethnicity of the exploiters. Whenever a social system produces a wealthy and powerful few on the backs of the many, a culture worth defending cannot be identified with its justification. Confucianism and Islam may point to the development of a different kind of capitalism, but it is not enough if this difference remains at the level of ideological justification, while the exploitation of human beings' creative labor and nature's creative labor remain the foundation of the production of social wealth. What is needed, as Sharabi writes, is not merely theological exegesis, but critical analysis that might actually solve the problems.[15]

A deceptively attractive argument heard today in some postmodern circles appears precisely not to drop a dou-

ble-critique, but rather retains them both, knitting two op-
posing critiques together, Islamism and postmodernism.
Now these may sound like a highly unlikely ideological
pair, but in his intellectually smart book *A Fundamental
Fear*, Bobby Sayyid describes the emergence of the Islamist
discourse of the Ayatollah Ruhulla Khomeini with the aid of
postmodern categories gleaned from Lacan, Derrida and
Rorty that almost convince us of the postmodern correctness
of Khomeini's theory. Khomeini, he argues, by not even try-
ing to justify his political theory in the categories of Western
thought, has managed a triumphal escape from Western he-
gemony. Khomeini's Islamism has managed to "decenter"
the West,[16] leading Sayyid to the paradoxical conclusion:
Only by refusing dialogue can true dialogue be found.

This is not a convincing proposal. Critical judgment
does not end with liberation from Western thought models.
It only begins there. Without denying the positive elements
of the Iranian revolution that rejected the Pahlavi Shah's
terroristic regime, with its political and military dependency
on U.S. government support, we do not need to endorse the
violently authoritarian, punishing, neopatriarchal aspects of
the Iranian Revolution—which has had significant critics
from within the discourse of Islamism—any more than a de-
finitive critique of capitalism demands uncritically embrac-
ing the socialism of Stalin. That fallacy was precisely what
Adorno and Horkheimer were criticizing when they wrote
Dialectic of Enlightenment against both variants, capitalist
and socialist, of so-called Western reason.

So the lineages are complicated ones, and Sayyid does
his important topic no favors by ignoring the complications.

What I am suggesting here is that a truly global public sphere might liberate thinking so that we are not compelled to take sides—"us" v. "them"—or limit ourselves to one paradigm of thought—religious or secular, postmodern or modern—in a way that stunts our capacity for critical judgments, leads to false intellectual and political conclusions, and prevents us from identifying similarities among fundamentalist positions—which must include the self-understanding of the United States as the "Chosen Nation" and the neo-liberal fundamentalism that leads to blind faith in the market mechanism, to name only two of the most blatant, non-Islamic examples. American hegemony is constitutive of the fundamentalist Islamism that opposes it; Israeli and U.S. state terror is not so much the effect as the cause of the terror that resists it. These are the truths that need to be expressed by a global Left.

One way that we as intellectuals can help to make such a discourse possible is to teach and write against the disciplinary boundaries that enforce the myth of civilizations and see them as the difference that matters. We can make use of critical tools of thought wherever we find them. My graduate training at Georgetown University in the 1970s was impoverished by the fact that, as a European history major and as a student of critical theory, I was not required to take a course from Professor Sharabi in Arab intellectual history. But if civilizational divisions were unavoidable in the second half of the twentieth century, they must not be so today. Hisham Sharabi's critical legacy, both inside and outside the West, both inside and outside the Arab world, opens up the space of a global public sphere in which a critical, cosmopolitan Left might find a home.

Notes

1. Hisham Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy: a Theory of Distorted Change in Arab Society* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1988), p. 87.
2. Hisham Sharabi, "The Scholarly Point of View: Politics, Perspective, Paradigm," in Hisham Sharabi, ed., *Theory, Politics and the Arab World* (New York, Routledge, 1990), p. 36-7, Sharabi points out that Khatibi's French-language texts needed to be translated into Arabic (in 1980).
3. Edward W. Said, *Orientalism* (New York, Pantheon Books, 1978); Talal Asad, ed., *Anthropology and the Colonial Encounter* [1978] (Amherst, N.Y., Humanity Books, 1998).
4. Talal Asad, *Genealogies of Religion: Discipline and Reasons of Power in Christianity and Islam* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993), Chapters 7 and 8.
5. Mustafa Kemal, cited in Bobby S. Sayyid, *A Fundamental Fear: Eurocentrism and the Emergence of* Islamism (New York and London, Zed Books, 1997), p. 65.
6. In regard to the prominent theme of social justice in Qutb's writings, Olivier Roy claims "it is Marxism that is the mirror and foil of the Islamist effort" (cited in Roxanne L. Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, A Work of Comparative Political Theory* [Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1999], p. 81). Euben's book, a landmark in comparative political philosophy, mentions the similarities between the critiques of Qutb and the Frankfurt School.
7. Qutb did not neglect a double-critique. A chapter of his book, *Islam and Universal Peace* dealing with the hypocrisy of United States policies in the Middle East was deleted by the government of Egypt after the 1952 revolution (Euben, *Enemy in the Mirror*, 186n).
8. From The Contemporary Arab Discourse (in Arabic), 1982, cited in Sharabi, "The Scholarly Point of View," p. 27.
9. Aijaz Ahmad, "In the Mirror of Urdu: Recompositions of Nation and Community 1947-1965" (Rashtrapati Nivas, Shimla, 1993), p. 20.

10. Sharabi, *Arab Intellectuals and the West: The Formative Years, 1875-1914* (Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1970) p. 136.

11. "Come friends let us abandon Europe; let us cease this nauseating, apish imitation of Europe. Let us leave behind this Europe that always speaks of humanity, but destroys human beings wherever it finds them" (Shariati, cited in John L. Esposito and John O. Voll, *Islam and Democracy* (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996), p. 59.

12. Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy*, p. 120.

13. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Philosophical and Institutional Dimensions of Secularization: A comparative analysis," John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamini, eds., *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East* (New York, New York University Press, 2000), p. 174.

14. Walter Benjamin, Theses on the Philosophy of History," *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn (New York, Schocken Books, 1968), p. 256.

15. Sharabi, *Neopatriarchy*, p. 140-1.

16. "In contrast [to the earlier Islamic "apologists"], Khomeini does not try to claim that Islam is 'real democracy,' or that Islam anticipates socialism, or that Islam is compatible with science, etc." (Sayyid, *Fundamental Fear*, p. 113.)