

Hegemony and Multiculturalism

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Candido Mendes

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PREFACE

Hégémonie, multiculturalisme et interlocution de la Latinité

Candido Mendes

L'Académie de la Latinité fut l'un des acteurs qui accepta — au sein de l'Occident et à partir de son axe méditerranéen, face au saxon — un dialogue avec l'Islam au niveau des intelligentsias et de la reconnaissance de cette détermination culturelle vouée, par définition, à l'énoncé de la différence, du dedans de l'Occident. Elle voulait se dégager de cette mouvance envers l'hégémonie où se définissait un centre et, à partir du 11 septembre, une identification fondamentaliste et exclusive de son acteur. Les conférences entreprises après cette date montrèrent la justesse de cette démarche à travers un premier exercice, même heuristique,

d'une prise de parole qui impliquait deux efforts de déconstruction. Le premier, portant sur la saisie des atouts de la contemporanéité, au sein de l'intelligentsia islamo-iranienne aux prises avec une refondation révolutionnaire, dans le cas de Téhéran. La suite a l'éveil simultané de la conscience du fait de l'hégémonie au-delà des firmaments technomorphes, ou de la stricte réification de la rationalité. Cet effort mena l'Académie à avoir le désir d'apporter l'acquis de cette réflexion, déjà à son septième colloque — et la même déconstruction — à l'épreuve des universels de la latinité, de son dégagement aux périphéries, du revers colonial occidental, en discutant le sujet d'une afro-latinité. Ce travail s'appliqua de même aux échanges de Téhéran, ou d'Alexandrie, ou prochainement d'Istanbul — s'adressant donc à la masse critique iranienne, arabe et turque de l'envol de l'Islam — face à l'échange continué d'un vis-à-vis occidental. Rio de Janeiro, Paris et Lisbonne, entre les conférences en Orient, ont servi à ce repli, et à cette assurance, d'une prospective pour un tel dialogue.

Comment ce trajet et cet acquis peuvent, aujourd'hui, faire face au cœur même de ce dialogue culturel, aux prises avec l'hégémonie, et devant le travail de son intelligentsia? Ils se saisissent comme l'emprise du multiculturalisme, portant comme noyau critique celui de la réification de la différence, à partir de la quête latine — face au monde d'après le 11 septembre. Tel est donc l'enjeu de la conférence du 6 au 8 octobre, à New York, au Centre King Juan Carlos à Washington Square.



Opening of the Conference

Hégémonie et multiculturalisme

Candido Mendes

Le fait définitif de l'hégémonie "urbi et orbi"

Les premières déclarations de la candidature Kerry nous montrent la convergence entre Démocrates et Républicains quant au déploiement, de fait, du régime américain émergent. Cela exclut toute vieille idée de retour ou même de rationalisation du système d'avant le 11 septembre. La présidence Bush se maintient fidèle à la déclaration de West Point, en août 2002, acceptant la probabilité d'un état de guerre continuel contre le terrorisme, comme normalisation même de l'économie du pays. Il n'est plus question d'un régime de paix, et par conséquent d'un réaménagement ou réduction du pouvoir militaire national. Les États-Unis garderont, à tout prix, et par le moyen d'une expansion indéfinie, une décision unilatérale face au monde qui les entoure, et "les rivalités avec les autres peuples seront laissées au commerce et à d'autres poursuites de la paix". Cela revient à dire que l'insertion internationale est secondaire, dépend de cet impératif intransitif, d'une "nation morale", en conflit entre "le Bien et le Mal"; et l'Amérique appellera le Mal par son nom" (Singer, 2004, p. 178-9).

Kerry ne fit que soutenir cette position à longue échéance, en confirmant que ce serait exactement par la croissance permanente du dispositif militaire qu’il pourrait rétrocéder de la stratégie de la préemption à celle de la dissuasion. Or, le monde ne doit pas se tromper sur le fait que la décision de rester en guerre ne concerne que les États-Unis: en toute souveraineté olympique pour maintenir ou surmonter une culture de la peur. Le post-guerre de l’Iraq reste couvert par la *Patriot Act* et la reconstruction du pays obéit à ce nouvel état des choses, à une modélisation par l’hégémonie. C’est en fait une “fausse dichotomie” (Briody, 2004, p. 205) — soulignera le vice-président Cheney — que de penser “qu’il y a rupture entre nos intérêts commerciaux” et “d’autres intérêts” après les discussions sur la présence des compagnies Halliburton, Kellogg, Brown & Root en Iraq. L’hégémonie met en mouvement un pouvoir sans clivage. L’idée de la paix et de sa culture s’amenuise donc, devant le nouveau régime qui ne cherche pas un système hors de lui et se voit dans le dynamisme du monde de cet “ordre en moins”, de cette réalité intégrale ainsi que le soulignerait Jean Baudrillard (2004a, p. 12).

Déterrance, préemption, modélisation

Nous entrons dans un univers de polarités uniques, ainsi que de leurs démodiations, pour ce qui est de l’étalage de pouvoir, et d’une normalisation qui n’a rien à voir avec un équilibre propre au vieux temps des systèmes, et de leurs jeux de renvois permanents. Il ne s’agit pas simplement de voir jusqu’où ce genre de contrôle collectif peut mener la

Maison Blanche à installer le super-bureau d'une "cyber-sécurité" (Clarke, 2004, p. 252). Mais déjà de ce passage du réel au virtuel où débute, en Moyen Orient, la tentative de ce nouvel ordre par la première *Star War*, comme amorce prémonitoire de la présidence Bush I, hésitant, encore, entre la "déterrance" et la "préemption". La seconde guerre d'Iraq montra définitivement l'obsolescence des rhétoriques classiques, quant à la justification des conflits. L'enjeu de la vérité est parvenu au "paroxysme de l'indifférence", tel que le demande une hégémonie en marche et sa stricte operationalité, liée au "rationales" de la modélisation survenant à l'invasion, extirpée toute la réalité antérieure et par l'imposition de la séquence idéale du pouvoir en scène. Le règne du virtuel devient la deuxième nature de l'hégémonie, en toute conséquence du "caveat" de Baudrillard. Sur le plan des représentations la première guerre d'Iraq "n'a pas eu lieu" et l'histoire réelle passe à un état de guérilla pour survivre.

Nous commencerions donc à nous rendre compte du problème épistémologique qui est en train de naître, avec cette véritable transcendance de la domination classique. Il ne s'agit plus d'un changement d'échelle, mais du dépassement du conflit, comme nous l'entendions soumis à la progression de cet ordre réducteur de l'hégémonie. Elle va au-delà donc de la normalisation, vue comme idéal originel de la complexité moderne, se tenant au labyrinthe fait de renvois qui ne font que cacher la sortie, gardée "in extremis". Elle se perd face au pouvoir qui débute comme détournement infini des séquences sans retour ou d'annulation permanente. On retiendrait, dans cette perspective, qui va

jusqu'à changer la nature des futuribles classiques, son impact sur la virtualisation imposée au monde subjectif, accéléré par le post 11 septembre, dans son reflet crucial sur l'univers des cultures.

Hégémonie, réalité intégrale, virtualisation subjective

L'hégémonie n'avancera pas, par conséquent, sans la réification de la différence, où se joue encore la nostalgie des scénarios périmés, un monde qui aurait dépassé l'État-nation, mais au bénéfice, justement, d'un multiculturalisme — ancre de ce contexte de l'homme et de l'“être en situation”. Nous nous trouverions face — toujours selon Jean Baudrillard — à cet aboutissement du temps réel, en facture de réalité intégrale, où l'histoire passe sans résidu, au mouvement irréversible de totalisation du monde; où la mouvance primaire de l'objectif/subjectif s'empreint, se retourne et le virtuel s'installe au-delà de tout gage (Baudrillard, 2004b, p. 111).

Les instances de l'échec de la post-invasion de l'Iraq — le déraillement de la modélisation — ne cèdent en rien sur ce rapt de la représentation qui devient le postulat de l'hégémonie. Où fait-on le point sur cette ébauche contemporaine de l'univers de la culture, en termes d'opération caractéristique du post-moderne, comme reconstruction, toujours assurée de l'arcane référentiel, en fin de tâche récupératrice, face à ces contenus et mises en page d'une nouvelle régie matricielle du monde? La réalité intégrale broie les adductions et les dépôts du temps brut à venir; elle s'impose par découpage sommaire des continuités préalables.

Il n'est pas question de se rendre compte seulement du dépassement de la structure des simples dominations d'antan, que réclame le rapport organique de complémentarité des extrêmes d'une relation de pouvoir, entre le seigneur et l'assujetti, laissée à l'inertie des abus, des complicités, des menaces et des punitions exemplaires. Si la préemption assure le déplacement au bénéfice du virtuel, du script de sens, son résultat est l'affirmation d'une matrice qui ne connaît d'autre scénario que le rayonnement. Toute différence s'annule tant que l'autre n'est que support et reflet de ce nouvel ordre entré en chantier, depuis la modélisation entreprise pour le post-Saddam en Iraq. Du redressement des usines aux villages fonctionnels, aux projets de drapeaux d'optimisation symbolique, au régime démocratique reproduit sur toutes les gammes, la logique identitaire s'est installée: ses valeurs, ses droits, ses croyances sans restes. Et, coup final: des missions protestantes évangéliques, tous équipements en mains, débarquent, après les forces d'occupation, pour la conversion d'islam, dans cette vision intégrale d'un monde à annexations, pour toujours, en réverbère.

La catastrophe, rhétorique anticipatoire de l'expropriation hégémonique

Le 11 septembre permet à l'hégémonie de partir en croisade culturelle au devant d'un état de choses, qui par son conditionnement sans échappatoire, aurait pu — peut-être sans coup férir — s'emparer de l'histoire par simple synchronisation universelle du nouveau régime d'inégalités

sans retour, et son exponentiel de contrôle sur la subjectivité mondiale. La catastrophe, faite accident, précipite, se débarasse des vieux futuribles en anticipation rhétorique et grandiose des mécanismes de l'hégémonie. Les tours tombèrent "in camara lenta" sur une radicalisation de ce processus et des nouveaux jeux et anéantissements de la contradiction, comme une ancienne gâchette d'une histoire de dominations (Derrida et Habermas, 1992, p. 13). Le terroriste embusqué l'autre, le vrai ennemi dorénavant porteur de la différence. Cette guerre déclenchée tous azimuts assurait la véhémence plus que la préemption à son temps — encore une fois — de cet évincement du subjectif. L'hégémonie porteuse de la réalité intégrale n'admettrait ni la confrontation avec la différence condamnée, ni le résidu comme survie du simulacre comme dernière excuse.

L'hégémonie et la réification de la différence

Nous ne sommes plus aux bons vieux temps, où toute guerre était interruption d'un état de choses international, entendu comme paix, effet de la coexistence universelle de tous les acteurs reconnus comme protagonistes de la souveraineté. Nous pénétrons effectivement, dans une nouvelle ère collective. A le reconnaître, les premiers partenaires des États-Unis se détachèrent de l'ordre des Nations Unies; pour essayer, après, une tentative de retour au pré-Iraq, aussi anachronique que fragile.

L'hégémonie dépasse donc la vision de la normalité mondiale, dont se rendent compte, à leur insu, les premiers partenaires de la croisade. De toute façon celle-ci, comme justification du conflit, se rapportait aux prétendus WMD de

Saddam, aux anciennes raisons de ralliement devant un ennemi précis. Il s'agissait en fait, à travers cette instrumentation, de permettre, ici ou outre-frontière, les alertes perpétuelles d'où naissent les conditionnements à somme nulle, ou à séquence virale de cet "ordre en moins", face à la terreur répandue de partout (Chomski, 2003, p. 36). Le vieil ordre n'aurait plus de prise sur le monde annoncé par la croisade. Peu l'intéresserait — dans sa dynamique concertée — la dénonciation du contrôle flou du terrorisme d'avant le 11 septembre, de même que les manques de connexion reconnus entre Saddam et l'Al Qaeda.

Les plans de reconstitution de l'Iraq se développèrent avant la démolition du régime sur le terrain. Une suite d'interrogations du Congrès américain concernant la gestion du budget national en vue, déjà, de l'hégémonie, s'allonge face aux attentes du pays, fidèle à la grande ouverture démocratique. Kerry pourra faire de la déchirure entre les États-Unis de toujours et le pays de Bush son mot-clef, pour se consacrer à son dépassement. Mais, en fait, l'immensité américaine glisse vers l'hégémonie. Les Démocrates prêtèrent au thème toute son angoisse, mais le changement qualitatif produit par l'hégémonie sur l'ordre préalable force une *realpolitik*, une assomption sans retour. En fait, cela n'empêcherait pas, comme la demande de l'identité des États-Unis d'aujourd'hui, la dialectique entre la vision fondamentaliste radicalisée par l'exploit terroriste et la grande mouvance d'intégration, qui se poursuit par le propre élan de première nation moderne — comme le souligne Louis Harris (Vidal, 2002, p. 52). C'est cette poussée vers le grand large, qui fait de la réception d'un État de Droit la clé de voûte d'un pays d'immigration, d'accueil de mino-

rités en masse, des exclus et bannis du monde européen. Telle est la vision naturelle et spontanée de la grande puissance, comme elle traversa les deux guerres mondiales et se fit gardienne de l'hémisphère des libertés divisé par le mur, en lui permettant de servir de théâtre, à grande échelle, de l'affirmation des droits de l'homme et des certitudes d'un acquis grandissant, depuis la guerre froide jusqu'à la chute de l'URSS.

La grande action affirmative et la pléthore de la différence

Le mouvement de conquête des libertés raciales au sein des États-Unis fut, à la fois, le résultat incontestable de la pression directe de la société civile qui permit l'équation parfaite d'une mobilité politique de base et de sa réclame identitaire. Martin Luther King couronne de son action et de son martyre cette victoire de l'action affirmative. Ce cumul de conscience, d'action et de ratification sociale ont permis l'avènement de cet âge d'or d'un niveau extrême d'organisation collective menée par sa propre dynamique intérieure. La présidence de Clinton marqua en même temps l'épanouissement de ces ONGs où se reconnaît la reproduction atomisée de l'ancienne *ágora* mûrie en force de la citoyenneté. Il serait question de *feedbacks* entre les marches monumentales sur Washington à la fin de la conquête de l'égalité raciale, des mouvements identitaires d'immigrants, surtout ceux issus des cultures latines, de même qu'une poussée finale des demandes résiduelles, de la promotion de la femme, de l'égalité des sexes, de l'insertion écologique,

jusqu'à la reprise d'un nouveau "convenant" avec la nature dans la meilleure tradition du naturisme de Emerson ou Thoreau.

Un éveil des racines utopiques renforçait cette avance du rêve de progrès américain dans tous les sens, entériné par la croyance en un marché providentiel. Parallèlement au spectacle quotidien de la marche, du boycottage, de la dénonciation, du *picketing*, la société américaine de la fin du XX^e siècle trouva en même temps un degré inédit de rapprochement avec son intelligentsia. Les États-Unis y pointent, comme oecuménique port d'avènement de la citoyenneté pleine du lendemain. Le dernier mandat démocratique conduisit le pays à une véritable transparence mondiale. Il devient un espace canonique de discussions sur les nouveaux perfectionnements des droits individuels, où resplendit la vitrine du pays de Jefferson, Wilson et Franklin Roosevelt (Reich, 2004, p. 147). L'ampleur de ce moulage ne pourrait que conditionner, en retour, un fondamentalisme spontané; sortent des nerfs d'un pays où le rappel fondateur jouerait pour une logique identitaire ponctuelle mais, néanmoins, ouverte à un contrat de reconnaissance: à une "franchise" de subjectivité, tel que l'exige un pays régi par des minorités, de préférence au pluralisme à armes égales. Cette croissance se soutiendrait par un assimilationisme final, sans droit de toucher au *core* identitaire.

La double signature de l'afro-islam en Amérique

La poussée citoyenne se répandit en même temps, et du gain des droits civils elle se déversa sur un désir accru de

différence. Au milieu de la houle identitaire, elle se renforça encore davantage avec le mouvement des droits des afro-américains. Un exercice-limite d'émancipation prend racine et se veut comme chorégraphie de gratuité totale, menant dans ce cas les acteurs de la ligne de pointe de l'élan libertaire à s'investir d'un surnom d'ethnie islamique. C'est comme si, dans ce désir d'autonomie, cette levée des anciens exclus aiguïsait la confrontation avec les blancs, surtout ceux des *creedals* anglo-saxon et protestant, à vouloir encore raffiner une identité culturelle foncière. Ce désir de différence grandissant frôlerait un vide dans le premier choix immédiat face à la dispersion des fonds culturels, de stricte généalogie africaine, tout appel broyé à la refonte et à la nomination d'une acculturation par "ethnies".

La toile ancestrale africaine était un tel vide vis-à-vis de ce premier prélèvement, que les demandeurs d'une identité à double vis passèrent au monde islamique, visible, indéchirable et dressé à une échelle d'affrontement comparable à cette immensité américaine qui accueillit dans son vestibule historique les petit-fils des esclaves de la *Wasp Society*. C'était à la fois, face à ce ralliement autant gratuit que généreux, que les afro-islamiques s'assuraient également d'une insurgence *in latentia* mais nullement pressentie au moment de l'âge d'or, de la marche sur Washington et du discours du "*I have a dream*".

L'hyperactivité de cette époque des afro-islamiques, dont Elijah et Malcolm X restent les parangons, créait ce jalon inattendu, où la prise de conscience civile protestataire se joignait à l'affirmation d'une étrangeté culturelle — d'une *otherness* — le même lien citoyen. Il n'y eut pas,

néanmoins, au premier moment de cette plateforme, d'un plus de différences de configuration identitaire totalisante, où le religieux, apparaîtrait dans toute sa magnitude, se rapportât à une capacité symbolique d'appartenance claire (Cesari, 2004, p. 63). L'afro-islamisme ajouté fit contraste et écarta le mouvement contestataire des renvois aux religions africaines, tribalisées et méconnaissables, dans les remous d'une réintégration à laquelle manquait une mémoire collective. Il n'y aurait pas de clameur pour une prise réfléchie de racines effectives et à l'égard de laquelle une reconnaissance sociale se faisait impossible au début du XXI^e siècle.

Retour au *core* et excès de différence

Nous faisons face à une surdétermination pratiquement gratuite, amenée à l'épopée du gain des droits civils, dans les deux dernières décennies du siècle de la modernité, et qui tint mal au tout début du passage fulgurant de la subjectivité américaine aux contours hégémoniques. C'est par conséquent ce trop d'identité qui va souffrir, tout de suite, du rebroussement de chemin du pays d'après la chute des tours, et de l'essor de la voix fondamentaliste qui remplace l'âge d'or de l'Amérique oecuménique et citoyenne universelle (Brzezinski, 2004, p. 214). Bush sortant de la fumée des débris du WTC joignait dans une cumulation historique, tout à fait accidentelle, la conformation d'une conscience demandée par l'hégémonie émergente, de pair avec le contenu de croisade porté à la protagonisation limite de l'agression aux États-Unis dans son "Saint des Saints". La marque fondamentaliste du sujet de la réplique monumenta-

le s'accoudait avec cette expression dorénavant asymétrique du pays au pouvoir sans pareil, au centre de l'économie globalisée. Il résulte du 11 septembre cette combinaison paradoxale d'un pays pour la première fois saisi d'une menace de destruction anonyme et continue, déclenchée par le terrorisme tous azimuts, et de la toute-puissance de nation appliquée à l'exponentiel sans retour de sa force militaire, passée d'exigence de son propre dynamisme économique à gardienne nécessaire d'un univers fait selon sa maîtrise et sa loi; confrontable à l'anomie où s'exilent la terreur et l'anéantissement.

Identité menacée et préfiguration de l'ennemi

Le *Patriot Act* devint donc, d'emblée, dans les semaines succédant au 11 septembre, un nouveau "convenant act" de fait pour tout le pays, assurant des ressources, dans une proportion de 10% du Produit National Brut américain, d'abord, au nouveau règlement de l'ordre, et reconnaissait tout le pouvoir de le faire à un gouvernement immédiatement requis à la riposte de l'attaque, par les avions-bombe de l'Al Qaeda. La nation devenait un sursaut concret qui délaissait l'œcuménisme universel en demande de rachat et de réaffirmation, dont la Maison Blanche exerçait dans un mandat plénier indiscutable, et au-delà de n'importe quelle représentation, en sous-distinction ou exception. C'est l'unanimité ressortissant de la peur, comme du refus de tout "dissent" voué à l'exécration collective face à l'enjeu que l'hégémonie étalait aux yeux de l'opinion publique du pays. D'emblée, la nation se reconnaissait en retour au noyau

identitaire, comme contrepartie du caractère diffus de la menace de destruction portée contre la puissance américaine.

Un fondamentalisme s'affirmait, d'ores et déjà, poussé au *core* du pays et de la représentation intouchable de ses valeurs aux dépens de toute velléité de différence et, surtout, de par des afro-islamiques, de ce surplus d'identité, comme une double signature. Ils disparaissent sur-le-champ, ils se taisent, et quittent la scène. Il ne s'agit nullement de trêve ou de stratégie, mais de cet écoulement intérieur et radical du ralliement national, à l'autre extrême d'un étalage universel de sa citoyenneté. Nous serions devant un retournement du chemin identitaire de ces groupes, nés de l'ascension par la différence extrême, d'un début de suspicion face au combat de la nation néo-fondamentaliste. Le contenu culturel de polarisation, autour de l'islam, toutes portes ouvertes pour la contre-partie identitaire, aide l'hégémonie à s'assumer contre le terrorisme, vu comme le non-être américain. Une première esquisse du fantôme nécessaire à cette figuration, s'accrocherait à un grand plan, amenable au risque d'une possible guerre de religions. En deçà encore de l'avenance des contradictions-limite de la complexité, et de la nécessaire postulation de l'autre comme ennemi immédiat, Bush brûla ce contenu culturel en renforçant par une synergie paracatastrophique, un cahier de charges antérieur à la mouvance fondamentaliste ostensible au cœur de l'Occident. Il se rapportait face à la radicalité de la révolution Khomeyni, au conflit arabo-israélien déjà sans fin, à la catégorisation du groupe Al Qaeda comme acteur d'un terrorisme universel; à la création d'un réflexe de peur et d'agression, face au danger d'une force en réseau, au-delà de tout État-Nation, et ca-

pable de garder, à un niveau de guérilla un pouvoir d'attaque mondial et sans fin.

La différence comme prise de conscience ralentie

Toute cette refonte, en escalade instantanée, des Etats-Unis pouvoir hégémonique ne se fit pas cependant à l'insu des dialectiques de confrontation du *status quo*, antérieures au déferlement des conflits culturels, portés au niveau de rupture extrême avec l'Occident (Cesari, 2004, p. 254). Elle ressortirait de ce noyautage final, entre l'accès aux bénéfiques, et la sujétion du pouvoir limite de la dite civilisation universelle. S'il y a, aujourd'hui, exigence d'une prospective à l'enjeu de l'hégémonie, à ce que réclame sa déconstruction, en termes de méthodologie de la post-modernité, de sa refonte épistémologique, l'enjeu de la différence vient de prime abord, au contenu immédiatement énonçable, de l'issue de ses conflits, et peut-être encore au gâchis de sa prise de conscience ralentie. La révolution de Khomeyni permit cette confrontation à la tension, ne fut pas autre que celle de dépasser les classiques internalisations de l'ordre occidental, vues comme civilisation du progrès et des réseaux internationaux d'intérêts où poindraient, après les dernières guerres du XX^e siècle, l'enjeu présent de la globalisation. De Khatamy partit justement cette invitation au dialogue différent, dressé sur l'issue identitaire, à impliquer comme première prémisse d'une normalisation internationale la reconnaissance de l'autonomie des acteurs mis en confrontation et un échange qui ne soit pas la simple réverbération des hégémonies.

Comment y voir, en même temps, le repli de ce pouvoir-limite dans sa pleine souche, face aux super-identités ou aux différences à double-vis des afro-islamiques au cœur de leur pays? De quelle façon, justement devant la latinité et l'exemple mexicain, le retour de l'Amérique à un possible fondamentalisme, et à la conversion de toute houle migratoire à une fusion inévitable, régie par le renouveau du *creedal* originaire de la première nation moderne, face au tournant du post-11 septembre?

L'instauration des nouveaux temps hégémoniques en Iraq à la suite de ce qui serait encore un script de "guerre-et-de-peace", la persistance des deux États-Unis dans le même engagement, la difficulté de revenir à un *status quo* de l'ordre international, antérieur à la prise de Kabul et de Bagdad, montrent le niveau de refonte qu'impliquera, aujourd'hui, tout effort de Washington pour arriver au dialogue culturel tel que désiré avant la tombée des tours. Il se double encore de l'interrogation de savoir jusqu'où le protagonisme de la terreur exprime-t-il la frappe multinationale d'un factionnalisme, encore à ses débuts, d'États contrecarrés dans leur modernisation. Ou la lutte, aux grands et irrémédiables creux historiques, des "guerres de religion" comme corporification du conflit culturel à sa plus haute dimension. Ou, déjà en termes d'une contagion de tout un inconscient collectif, une révulsion de l'Occident, comme saisie de cette âme des civilisations, étouffée par le virtuel universel et la violence de la révolution médiatique tous azimuts, irrésistible.

De même on pourrait déceler, en toute prospective, les institutions de l'hégémonie montante que dessine le *Patriot Act*, comme création d'un État national permanent de sécu-

rité, *urbi et orbi* contre le terrorisme, indépendamment d'actions localisées sur des théâtres de guerre, comme ceux d'Afghanistan ou d'Iraq. C'est ce que réclame, en même temps, le retour de la nation sur ces racines, mais non comme une reprise de troubles et de guerres, telle la commotion mobilisatrice, résultant de Pearl Harbour en 41. Il s'agit de la nouvelle transparence opérationnelle que demande, en frappe inédite, la subjectivité collective atteinte au *Sanctum Sanctorum*, ou à l'autel de son identité première (Huntington, 2004, p. 336). Il s'agit, impérativement, de repartir au cœur géométrique d'un espace intérieur où le protagonisme refait, au vouloir d'une nation, retracée, iconique, raidie, et passée, en même temps, à l'hégémonie mondiale. Le traumatisme des tours ralentit et accélère, en même temps, cette démarche de contrôle, se déploie sur le silence du cratère en plein Manhattan d'où jaillit une subjectivité vengeresse, aujourd'hui autant plénière que menacée.

Assimilationisme et hégémonie

Il n'y a cependant que prospective dans l'ordre de l'hégémonie. La catastrophe bafoua l'entrée dans un monde saisi dans ses représentations par le virtuel, et les jeux à l'infini de l'information, désaxés du vrai, et ses otages échangeables dans la vieille réalité. Les États-Unis promis à l'hégémonie accélèrent, par le choc du 9-11, le court circuit fondamentaliste imposé aux dialectiques naturelles d'épanouissement de cette logique identitaire naissante.

Le blocage iconique tranche avec un véritable moment canonique de l'universalisme américain des années 60: elles

marquaient l'affirmation de la coexistence, à part entière, avec les afro-américains qui se permettaient, encore, cette double affirmation d'une volonté de différence, comme trace de la réussite personnelle, au sein de la société en constante réouverture de ses possibilités de progrès et d'emplois.

C'est aujourd'hui la Latinité qui brave l'autre pente et soulève à moyenne échéance, le maintien de l'idéal du multiculturalisme face au pays parti à la sidération sans retour de son *core*. Son assimilationisme montant fera face aux routes opposées, des cubains et mexicains. La Floride, il y a déjà un demi-siècle, subit l'affluence en masse d'exilés anti-castristes aujourd'hui, en très large majorité, identifiés au monde américain, et allant jusqu'à adopter la vision républicaine radicale, une résignation stratégique, avec la Havane, faisant confiance à la chute du régime à la mort de son responsable. C'est, au contraire, le flux incessant, anonyme, déterminé, même hors la loi, des mexicains qui inquiète un futur tranquillement fusionniste pour les nouveaux États Unis. La frontière terrestre permet ce contact perpétuel des deux nations aux allures continentales, les mexicains atteignant la première centaine de millions, et déferlant de leur territoire par une mécanique de pesanteur historique, cherchant la compensation de la différence monumentale de prospérité. Les États-Unis n'ont jamais craint des reprises identitaires de la part de ses immigrants, devant l'intégration naturelle, et le dépassement d'une vision de ghetto, où pourrait s'enraciner une persistance de refus, à la force de la synergie du pays historiquement omnivore, et bassin océanique de tous les courants étrangers qui s'y installeraient.

La différence latine

La différence mexicaine pointe, à moyen terme, après le règne de l'hégémonie face à ce contrepoint potentiel, entre la prise d'une conscience réductrice, au moment du protagonisme post 9-11 des Etats-Unis et de la portée spécifique de cette affluence, capable de créer un déséquilibre dans les statistiques démographiques de Washington. Il ne s'agit pas d'une volonté farouche de contraste qui ferait du "chicano" un envahisseur acharné de l'être collectif américain, disposé à une réorganisation au-delà de la frontière, de sa structure sociale et historique originale. La frontière de cristal y est, et Carlos Fuentes a exprimé d'une façon magistrale, comment le mexicain croise le Rio Grande en tant que dépourvu total, séparé de sa famille, abandonné à l'expression minimale, acteur social, condamné au strict sauvetage dans un marché de travail implacable. Néanmoins, le lien original demeurerait, à cause même de cette exclusion qui réagit — par la civilisation de la fête propre aux latins — se vouant à la venue subséquente de la famille, et au rappel permanent d'une mémoire. Une véritable invasion, restée en partie clandestine, s'affronte à cette recherche d'une nouvelle identité rétrécie de l'Amérique, en guerre indéfinie et constante après le 11 septembre. A l'impact électoral de ces groupes — déjà senti en Californie, ou au Nouveau Mexique — s'ajoute une différence par contraste avec le *mainstream*, marqué par le maintien d'une culture non compétitive, détachée du culte de la "performance", comme l'indiquent ses indices de fréquentation universitaire, et porterait les premiers doutes, relatifs à un idéal de fusion, que renforce le pays devenu hégémonique

(Huntington, 2004, p. 316). C'est cette même perspective qui refuse, d'ores et déjà, de contempler une bifurcation culturelle à l'avenir, comme ce fut le cas des deux cultures au poids isonomique, au Canada, entre les souches de Toronto et Montréal. L'Amérique patriote s'oppose, par conséquent, à un statut permanent de multiculturalisme comme pourrait le suggérer, dans sa nature actuelle, le flux mexicain. C'est d'ailleurs ce qui apparaît dans les premiers sondages quant au dénouement de la poussée des "chicanos". Ce n'est que l'intelligentsia, entre les groupes de la société américaine, qui résiste à une visée nécessairement assimilationniste, en montrant en même temps l'élargissement du "gap" entre l'élite et la moulée moyenne, dans l'opinion publique du pays.

Cette élite-là reconnaîtrait, néanmoins, une différence de 42% entre le *mainstream* de la vision des *campi* du pays et celle de la population universitaire mexicaine, confrontée, par exemple, à 34 questions concernant la politique extérieure de la nation d'après la tombée des tours. La croisade souleva un *patriot public* qui, en dépit des voix de ses *leaders*, se prononça naturellement pour une unité nationale faite de la fusion irréversible de ses partenaires. Donc, la tendance émergente, à prôner pour le cas mexicain, serait la conversion manifeste, à travers le renouveau du *creedal* fondateur des États-Unis jeffersoniens. Dans un tel cadre, une loi d'éraïn de l'assimilationnisme s'étalerait largement, impliquant la chute de tout essai de différence devant la culture de noyau — la *core culture* — et il ne resterait aux influx latins aux États-Unis que la règle d'une compensation rationnelle, moyennant une soumission volontaire, même

au niveau d'un "second pacte" de citoyenneté. Il se lierait à un serment national, à la décision de ne pas résister, ou faire face à l'économie inertielle de fusion. Ni par des protestations contre la différence, ni surtout par l'idée de faire de l'espagnol une deuxième langue obligatoire du pays — une langue reconnue, à ce niveau, comme outil essentiel à une identité en refonte.

Les années Bush, vouées à une affirmation fondamentaliste de l'identité américaine, contredisent le vœu proféré par Clinton en 1997, en vue de la troisième grande révolution du pays, de façon à ce que, en devenant totalement multiculturelle, l'Amérique puisse exhiber au monde une configuration différente "de toute issue directe et dominante en son sein, d'une culture européenne".

Au-delà de la patrie universelle

Devant la capacité de nier le multiculturalisme, face à cette montée conjointe du fondamentalisme et du superpouvoir de la nation américaine, nous devrions faire appel à la surdétermination de la rationalité, pour parer aux jeux normaux des inconscients collectifs, au profit d'une nouvelle mobilisation identitaire. On ferait face à la décision pour une personnalisation collective "en moins" et à une volonté d'histoire aussi monumentale que réductrice des contenus fondateurs d'une nation ouverte, d'origine, comme "patrie universelle". Le foyer original de déplacés de toute origine convergera vers l'instauration de l'idéal politique du monde des Lumières, contemporain des institutions jeffersoniennes. C'est ce qui mena, encore dans l'Amérique contem-

poraine, à la défense forcenée du multiculturalisme des Etats-Unis selon la vision, entre autres, de James Banks, de Patrick Moynihan ou Nathan Glazer, défenseurs jusqu'au bout d'un contenu identitaire toujours débordant de l'immense pays et ne se déterminant, enfin, que par l'ampleur et la prospective de sa mouvance fondatrice.

La lutte contre le terrorisme impliqua un contre-mouvement extrême, où une identification radicale de la nation mise à l'épreuve se définissait comme contrepoint dialectique inévitable de cet ennemi diffus, préparé à n'importe quelle agression vouée à la destruction de l'Amérique. L'appropriation patriotique avancée sur le multi-enjeu collectif réduisait la marque identitaire au vieux carcan de la nation blanche, anglo-saxonne et protestante, du point de vue de l'idéal de réponse à tous les appels faits à la force d'une histoire, rendue à ses traditions les plus strictes et vénérables. La grande visée du bassin d'histoire américain, en s'ouvrant en réseau, prêt au dernier des accueils sur le continent se dresse et se tord, tant que l'impératif de sécurité, en jumeau de l'archi-pouvoir, exposé désormais au triage d'une civilisation de la peur latente. C'est ce que réclame un exponentiel de rationalité défensive, de nouveau objectif d'un pacte, le retour d'un *creede* (Huntington, 2004, p. 336 ss) tel que suggéré, par exemple, par Samuel Huntington. Il faudrait trouver la façon de répondre à une nouvelle demande identitaire de cet inconscient collectif crispé, en quête du nouveau du pacte de fidélité et de soulagement au bénéfice de l'immense nation, atteinte, pour la première fois sur son sol, par les engins meurtriers d'un terrorisme *urbi et orbi*.

Différence et “serendipity” historique

La nouvelle portée de l’esquisse du projet américain reflète cette mobilisation en alarme, et ce raidissement de sa quête identitaire. Dans cet ensemble, et chaque fois davantage, l’apport de la différence introduit par la latinité — responsable aujourd’hui de la plus dynamique de ces affluences formatrices — impose même un piège à cet inconscient collectif, fait entièrement d’une tradition d’intégration, laissant grande ouverte la prémisse des coexistences différentielles en son sein. Au contraire, la visée naissante nous permet de parler d’une réification réelle de cette différence selon la coupure réductionniste, posée au ressort identitaire comme gâchette nécessaire à une mobilisation limite. L’hyper-sécurité ne se sépare pas de cette hégémonie, assurée, par le nouveau serment, à son édification virtuelle, explorée dans tous ses scénarios, avant de retomber à un choix de réalité. Un monde qui peut s’épargner une recherche concrète de ses futuribles, poussé par l’option raidie que réclame le défi terroriste permanent, s’écarte de tout énoncé en *serendipity*, en grande volupté de différence. Indépendamment des guerres perpétuelles, les États-Unis reviennent à leurs mêmes réalités fondamentales dans cette dernière préemption. Une nation, dans sa représentation, en moindre ou en plus, pousse davantage le levier de sa mobilisation aussi aigüe que permanente. Le multiculturalisme s’endort pour être, à longue échéance, évincé d’un pays qui perd ses vieux miroirs, face à une cybernétique soucieuse de nous donner le portrait final que doit voir la terreur, écarté tout *sfumato*, tout nouveau brin de tournure, raidis, à jamais. Les États-Unis mis en alerte éternelle.

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Towards the World of Hegemony

La Réalité Intégrale*

Jean Baudrillard

J'appelle "Réalité Intégrale" la perpétration sur le monde d'un projet opérationnel sans limites: que tout devienne réel, que tout devienne visible et transparent, que tout soit "libéré", que tout s'accomplisse et que tout ait un sens (or le propre du sens est que tout n'en a pas).

Qu'il n'y ait plus rien dont il n'y ait rien à dire.

L'évanouissement de Dieu nous a laissés face à la réalité et à la perspective idéale de transformer ce monde réel. Et nous nous sommes trouvés confrontés à l'entreprise de *réaliser* le monde, de faire qu'il devienne techniquement, intégralement réel.

Or, le monde, même délivré de toute illusion, ne se prête pas du tout à la réalité. Plus nous avançons dans cette entreprise, plus elle devient ambiguë, plus elle se perd de vue elle-même. À peine la réalité a-t-elle le temps d'exister qu'elle est déjà en train de disparaître...

La réalité qui s'est inventée au cours des siècles derniers et dont nous avons fait un principe, celle-là est en voie de disparition. Vouloir la ressusciter à tout prix comme réfè-

* In: *Le pacte de lucidité on l'intelligence du Mal*, Paris, Galilée, 2004, p. 11-30.

rence ou comme valeur morale est un contresens, car le principe en est mort. Ce à quoi nous assistons derrière l'effacement du réel "objectif", c'est à la montée en puissance de la Réalité Intégrale, d'une Réalité Virtuelle qui repose sur la dérégulation du principe même de réalité.

On ne reviendra plus en deçà de ce point aveugle, irréparable, où le réel a cessé d'être réel.

Ce qui est réel existe — c'est tout ce qu'on peut dire (mais l'existence n'est pas tout — c'est même la moindre des choses).

Entendons-nous: quand on dit que la réalité a disparu, ce n'est pas qu'elle a disparu physiquement, c'est qu'elle a disparu métaphysiquement. La réalité continue d'exister — c'est son principe qui est mort.

Or, la réalité sans son principe n'est plus du tout la même. Si, pour de multiples raisons, le principe de représentation, qui seul lui donne un sens, est défaillant, c'est le réel tout entier qui défaille. Ou plutôt il déborde son propre principe et entre dans une extension sans mesure n'obéissant plus à aucune règle.

La réalité objective — relative au sens et à la représentation — laisse place à la "Réalité Intégrale", réalité sans bornes, où tout est réalisé, techniquement matérialisé, sans référence à quelque principe ou destination finale que ce soit.

La "Réalité Intégrale" passe donc par le meurtre du réel, par la perte de toute imagination du réel.

L'imaginaire, qu'on associait volontiers au réel comme son ombre complice, s'évanouit du même coup. La "Réalité Intégrale" est sans imaginaire.

Tout comme la libération n'a plus rien à voir avec le jeu de la liberté — celle d'un sujet aux prises avec lui-même et qui implique, entre autres, qu'on reste libre d'être libre (et tel n'est pas le cas dans le dispositif actuel d'une libération inconditionnelle) —, tout comme la vérification met fin au jeu de la vérité (car la vérité, si elle existe, est un enjeu, alors que la vérification la transforme en fait accompli), ainsi on passe de la réalité comme principe et comme concept à la réalisation technique du réel et à sa performance.

Et pourtant, cette réalité, il n'y a, et il n'y aura jamais de preuves de sons existence — pas plus que de celle de Dieu. C'est un objet de croyance, comme Dieu.

Et quand on commence à y croire, c'est qu'elle est en voie de disparition.

C'est quand on n'est plus sûr de l'existence de Dieu, ou quand on a perdu la foi naïve en une réalité qui allait de soi, qu'il devient de toute nécessité d'y croire.

Ainsi avons-nous investi la réalité de tout notre imaginaire, mais c'est cet imaginaire qui est en train de s'évanouir, car nous n'avons plus l'énergie d'y croire.

Même la volonté s'en est retirée.

La passion de la réalité, la passion de la vérité s'en sont allées.

Il ne reste plus qu'un devoir de réalité, un devoir de vérité.

Désormais, il nous *faut* y croire. En même temps que le doute s'installe partout, en fonction de la défaillance des systèmes de représentation, la réalité devient un mot d'ordre absolu, elle devient le fondement d'un ordre moral. Or, ni

les choses ni les êtres n'obéissent à un principe de réalité, ni à un impératif moral.

C'est le trop de réalité qui fait qu'on n'y croit plus.

Saturation du monde, saturation technique de la vie, excès de possibilités, d'actualisation des besoins et des désirs. Comment y croire, dès lors que la production de la réalité est devenue automatique?

Le réel est asphyxié par sa propre accumulation. Plus moyen que le rêve soit l'expression d'un désir, puisque son accomplissement virtuel est déjà là.

Déprivation de rêve, déprivation de désir. Or, on sait le désordre mental qu'entraîne la déprivation de rêve.

Au fond, le problème est le même que celui de la part maudite: celui de l'excédent — non pas du manque, mais de l'excès de réalité, dont nous ne savons plus nous débarrasser.

Il n'y a plus de résolution symbolique, par le sacrifice, de l'excédent.

Sinon dans l'accident, ou par l'irruption d'une violence anomique qui, quelles que soient ses déterminations sociales ou politiques, est toujours un défi à cette irrésistible contrainte objective d'un monde normalisé.

Effectuer, matérialiser, réaliser, produire: il semble que ce soit la destination idéale de toute chose que de passer du stade du possible à celui du réel, selon un mouvement qui est à la fois celui du progrès et d'une nécessité interne.

Tous les besoins, tous les désirs, toutes les virtualités tendent vers cette sanction objective, vers cette épreuve de

vérité. C'est la même voie qui semble vouer les apparences et l'illusion à s'évanouir devant la vérité.

Peut-être est-ce un rêve que cette réalité; dans ce cas le réel fait partie de notre imaginaire. Et la réalisation de toute chose est semblable à un accomplissement de désir universel.

Or, nous vivons aujourd'hui un renversement qui nous fait apparaître cet accomplissement universel comme un destin négatif — une épreuve catastrophique de vérité. Le trop de réalité, sous toutes ses formes, l'extension de tous les possibles devient insupportable. Rien n'est plus laissé à l'éventualité d'un destin ou à l'insatisfaction du désir.

Ce virage, cette inversion catastrophique des effets est-elle, elle-même, un effet pervers? Relève-t-elle d'une théorie des catastrophes? Ou bien d'un passage à l'acte universel, d'une logique inflexible du *world-processing*, dont il est impossible de dire ce qui peut en résulter: l'assomption d'une réalité définitive, ou le *collapse* de cette même réalité, vouée à la perte par son excès et sa perfection mêmes?

L'effacement de Dieu nous a laissés face à la réalité.

Qu'en sera-t-il de l'effacement de la réalité?

Est-ce là un destin négatif, ou tout simplement l'absence de destin: l'avènement d'une banalité implacable, liée au, calcul intégral de la réalité?

Le destin n'a pas dit son dernier mot.

Il est sensible, au coeur même de cette réalisation intégrale, au coeur de la puissance, dans cette convulsion interne qui en suit la logique et en précipite les effets, dans ce retournement maléfique de la structure elle-même, qui

transforme une destination positive en une finalité meurtrière: là est le principe même du Mal et là doit jouer l'intelligence du Mal.

Soit deux mouvements antagonistes:

La Réalité Intégrale: le mouvement irréversible de totalisation du monde.

La Forme Duelle: la réversibilité interne au mouvement irréversible du réel.

Il semble que l'évolution (ou l'involution) vers un univers intégral soit irrésistible. Mais il semble, en même temps, que la forme duelle soit indestructible.

Rien ne permet de spéculer sur l'issue de ce double mouvement contradictoire. On reste devant la confrontation sans issue d'une forme duelle et d'une intégration totale.

Mais celle-ci ne l'est qu'en apparence, car toujours en proie à une désintégration secrète, à cette dissension qui la travaille de l'intérieur. C'est la violence mondiale immanente au système-monde lui-même, et qui lui oppose de l'intérieur la forme symbolique la plus pure du défi.

Rien ne permet d'entrevoir une réconciliation, et, en toute lucidité, rien ne permet de parier sur l'une ou l'autre puissance. Non par impartialité, puisque, secrètement, nous avons déjà pris parti, mais par conscience de la fatalité de cette éternelle divergence, de cet antagonisme insoluble.

Pulsion intégrale et pulsion duelle: c'est là le Grand Jeu.

L'idée même d'achèvement, de Réalité Intégrale, est insupportable, mais la forme duelle, celle qui nie toute réconciliation finale, tout accomplissement définitif, est elle aussi

bien difficile, peut-être même impossible à concevoir dans sa radicalité.

C'est là pourtant, dans cette vision lucide d'une réversion sans fin, dans cette dénégation de toute solution objective, que se fonde, si elle existe, l'intelligence du Mal.

N'importe quelle mise en cause de la réalité, de son évidence et de son principe, est irrecevable et se voit condamnée comme négationniste.

Chef d'accusation: que faites-vous de la réalité de la misère, de la souffrance et de la mort?

Or, il ne s'agit pas de prendre son parti de la violence matérielle, de la violence du malheur — il s'agit d'une ligne qu'il est interdit de franchir, celle d'un tabou de la réalité, qui vise également la moindre tentative de toucher à une partition claire entre le Bien et le Mal, sous peine de passer pour un traître ou un imposteur.

L'affirmation ou la contestation de la réalité, du principe de réalité, est donc un choix politique, et presque religieux, dans la mesure où toute infraction à ce principe est sacrilège — l'hypothèse même de la simulation étant profondément perçue comme diabolique (elle prend la succession des hérésies dans l'archéologie de la pensée du Mal).

Les intégristes de la réalité s'arment d'une pensée magique, celle qui confond le message et le messenger: si vous parlez du simulacre, c'est que vous êtes un simulateur — si vous parlez de la virtualité de la guerre, c'est que vous en êtes complice, au mépris des centaines de milliers de morts.

Toute analyse autre que morale est frappée d'illusionnisme et d'irresponsabilité.

Or, si la réalité est une question de croyance et si tous les signes qui en faisaient foi ont perdu leur crédibilité, s'il y a un discrédit fondamental sur le réel et si le principe en est partout chancelant, ce n'est pas nous, les messagers du simulacre, qui avons plongé les choses dans ce discrédit, c'est le système lui-même qui a fomenté cette incertitude qui touche aujourd'hui toute chose, et jusqu'au sentiment d'exister.

Ce qui se profile avec l'avènement de la mondialisation, c'est la constitution d'une puissance intégrale, d'une Réalité Intégrale du pouvoir et d'une désintégration, d'une défaillance tout aussi intégrale et automatique de cette puissance.

Une forme dramatique de réversibilité.

Une sorte de retournement, de revanche et d'ironie dévastatrice, de réaction négative du monde lui-même contre la mondialisation.

Toutes leeds forces niées, expulsées par ce processus même, et qui deviennent par là les forces du Mal, se rebellent. La puissance elle-même se défend d'être totale, elle se défause, elle se désinvestit, finalement elle travaille secrètement contre elle-même.

Dire le Mal, c'est décrire l'hégémonie grandissante des puissances du Bien et, en même temps, leur défaillance interne, leur désagrégation suicidaire, leur réversion, leur ex-croissance, leur disjonction vers des univers parallèles, une fois franchie la ligne de partage de l'Universel.

Aux confins du réel

Jean Baudrillard

Nous avons supprimé le monde vrai — quel monde subsiste alors?

Le monde des apparences? Nullement. Avec le monde vrai, nous avons supprimé du même coup le monde des apparences.

FRIEDRICH NIETZCHE

S'il ne faut pas croire que la vérité reste la vérité quand on lui enlève son voile, alors la vérité n'a pas d'existence nue.

Et s'il ne faut pas croire que le réel reste le réel quand on en a chassé l'illusion, alors le réel n'a pas de réalité objective.

Que devient le monde délivré de la vérité et des apparences? Il devient l'univers réel, l'univers de la Réalité Intégrale. Ni vérité ni apparence, mais Réalité Intégrale.

Si le monde est parti jadis vers la transcendance, s'il est tombé dans d'autres arrière-mondes, aujourd'hui, il a chu dans la réalité.

S'il y avait jadis une transcendance vers le haut, il y a aujourd'hui une transcendance vers le bas. C'est en quelque sorte la deuxième chute de l'homme, dont parle Heidegger:

la chute dans la banalité — mais, cette fois, sans rédemption possible.

Une fois perdu, selon Nietzsche, le monde vrai en même temps que celui des apparences, l'univers devient un univers de fait, positif, tel quel, qui n'a même plus besoins d'être vrai. Aussi factuel qu'un ready-made.

La "fontaine" de Duchamps est l'emblème de notre hyperréalité moderne, résultat d'un contre-transfert violent de toute illusion poétique sur la réalité pure, l'objet transféré sur lui-même coupant court à toute métaphore possible.

Le monde est devenu d'une telle réalité qu'elle n'est supportable qu'au prix d'une dénegation perpétuelle. "Ceci n'est pas un monde", évoquant le "ceci n'est pas une pipe" de Magritte, comme déni surréaliste de l'évidence même — ce double mouvement de l'évidence absolue, définitive, du monde et de la dénegation tout aussi radicale de cette évidence, dominant la trajectoire de l'art moderne.

Mais pas seulement de l'art: de toutes nos perceptions profondes, de toute notre appréhension mentale du monde.

Il ne s'agit plus ici de morale philosophique, du genre: "Le monde n'est pas ce qu'il devrait être" ou encore "le monde n'est plus ce qu'il était".

Non: le monde est tel qu'il est.

Une fois escamotée toute transcendance, les choses ne sont plus que ce qu'elles sont et, telles qu'elles sont, elles, sont insupportables. Elles ont perdu toute illusion et sont devenues immédiatement et totalement réelles, sans ombre, sans commentaire.

Et, du même coup, cette réalité indépassable n'existe plus. Elle n'a plus lieu d'exister puisqu'elle ne s'échange plus contre rien et n'a plus de contrepartie.

“La réalité existe-t-elle? Somme-nous dans un monde réel?” — tel est le leitmotiv de toute notre culture actuelle. Mais cela traduit simplement le fait que ce monde en proie à la réalité, nous ne pouvons le supporter que sous forme d'une dénégation radicale. Et cela est logique: le monde ne pouvant plus être justifié dans un autre monde, il lui faut dès maintenant se justifier dans celui-ci, en se donnant force de réalité, en se purgeant de toute illusion. Mais en même temps, par l'effet même de ce contre-transfert, grandit la dénégation du réel en tant que tel.

La réalité, ayant perdu ses prédateurs naturels, grandit comme une espèce proliférante, un peu comme une algue ou même comme l'espèce humaine en général.

Le Réel grandit comme le désert. “*Welcome in the desert of the Real.*”

L'illusion, le rêve, la passion, la folie, la drogue, mais aussi l'artifice, le simulacre — tels étaient les prédateurs naturels de la réalité. Tout cela a perdu de son énergie, comme atteint d'une maladie incurable et sournoise. Il faut donc en trouver l'équivalent artificiel, faute de quoi la réalité, une fois atteinte sa masse critique, finira par s'autodétruire spontanément, implosera d'elle-même — ce qu'elle est d'ailleurs en train de faire, laissant place au Virtuel sous toutes ses formes.

Le Virtuel: voilà bien l'ultime prédateur et déprédateur de la réalité — sécrété par elle-même comme une sorte d'agent viral et autodestructeur.

La réalité est devenue la proie de la Réalité Virtuelle. Ultime conséquence du processus amorcé dans l'abstraction de la réalité objective, et qui s'achève dans la Réalité Intégrale.

Avec le Virtuel, il ne s'agit plus d'arrière-monde: la substitution du monde est totale, c'en est le doublage à l'identique, le mirage parfait, et la question est réglée par l'anéantissement pur et simple de la substance symbolique. Même la réalité objective devient une fonction inutile, une sorte de déchet, dont l'échange et la circulation deviennent de plus en plus difficiles.

On est donc passé de la réalité objective à un stade ultérieur, une sorte d'ultraréalité qui met fin à la fois à la réalité et à l'illusion.

La Réalité Intégrale est aussi bien dans la musique intégrale — celle qu'on trouve dans les espaces quadriphoniques ou qu'on peut "composer" sur ordinateur. Celle où les sons ont été clarifiés et expurgés et qui, au-delà de tout bruit et de tout parasite, est comme restaurée dans sa perfection technique. Les sonorités n'y sont plus le jeu d'une forme, mais l'actualisation d'un programme. Musique réduite à une pure longueur d'ondes et dont la réception finale, l'effet sensible sur l'auditeur, est elle aussi exactement programmée comme dans un circuit fermé. Musique virtuelle en quelque sorte, sans défaillance, sans imagination, qui se confond avec son propre modèle, et dont la jouissance elle-même est virtuelle. Est-ce encore de la musique? Rien

n'est moins sûr, puisqu'on a même imaginé d'y réintroduire du bruit pour faire plus "musical".

Telle est aussi l'image de synthèse, image numérique et digitale, construite de toutes pièces, sans référence réelle, et où, à la différence de l'image analogique, le négatif lui-même a disparu, non seulement le négatif du film, mais aussi le moment négatif qui est au coeur de l'image, cette absence qui fait la vibration de l'image. Ici, la mise au point technique est parfaite, il n'y a pas de place pour le flou, le tremblement ou le hasard. Est-ce encore une image?

Plus loin encore, c'est le principe même de l'Homme Intégral, revu et corrigé par la génétique, dans le sens de la perfection. Expurgé de tout accident, de toute pathologie physiologique ou caractérielle. Car ce que vise la manipulation génétique n'est pas une formule originale de l'humain, mais bien la formule la plus conforme et la plus efficace (*serial morphing*).

On en a l'avant-goût dans le film *Minority Report* (de Steven Spielberg), où le crime est prévenu et sanctionné avant même d'avoir lieu, et sans qu'on sache jamais s'il aurait eu lieu. Détruit dans l'oeuf, dans son imagination même, selon de principe universel de précaution.

Pourtant, le film est anachronique, car il met encore en jeu la répression, alors que la future prévention sera génétique, intragénique: le "gène criminel" sera opéré à la naissance ou même avant, par une sorte de stérilisation prophylactique (qu'il faudra d'ailleurs généraliser très vite car, du point de vue policier, qui est celui du pouvoir, nous sommes tous des criminels en puissance).

Cette manipulation dit bien ce qu'il en sera de l'être futur. Ce sera un être humain corrigé, rectifié. Il sera d'emblée ce qu'il aurait dû être idéalement, il ne deviendra donc jamais ce qu'il est. Il ne sera même plus aliéné, puisqu'il sera pré-existentiellement modifié, pour le meilleur ou pour le pire.

Il ne risque même plus de rencontrer sa propre altérité, puisqu'il aura été d'emblée dévoré par son modèle.

Tout cela repose sur un processus universel d'éradication du Mal.

Jadis principe métaphysique ou moral, le Mal est aujourd'hui matériellement traqué jusque dans le gènes (mais aussi bien dans l'"axe du Mal"). Il devient une réalité objective, donc objectivement liquidable. On va pouvoir l'expurger à la racine, et, avec lui, de proche en proche, tout ce qui était rêve, utopie, illusion, phantasme — tout cela se trouvant selon le même processus global, arraché au possible, pour être reversé au réel.

Cette réalité absolue est aussi celle de l'argent lorsqu'il passe de l'abstraction relative de la valeur d'échange au stade purement spéculatif de l'économie virtuelle. Selon Marx, déjà, le mouvement de la valeur d'échange est plus réel que la simple valeur d'usage, mais, dans notre situation, où les flux de capitaux sont sans référence aux échanges marchands, l'argent devient d'une hyperréalité encore bien plus étrange — il devient l'argent absolu, il atteint à la Réalité Intégrale du calcul. N'étant plus l'équivalent de rien, il devient l'objet d'une passion universelle. Le hiéroglyphe de la marchandise est devenu le fétichisme intégral de l'argent.

Last but not least: l'opération chirurgicale du langage, par où est éliminé, dans sa version numérique et digitale, tout ce qu'il y a en lui de symbolique c'est-à-dire tout ce par quoi il est bien plus que ce qu'il signifie... Tout ce qu'il y a en lui d'absence, de vide, mais aussi de littéralité, se trouve éliminé, tout comme le négatif dans l'image de synthèse — tout ce qui s'oppose à une mise au point exclusive. Telle est la Réalité Intégrale du langage: ne plus signifier que ce qu'il signifie.

Le temps lui-même, le temps vécu, n'a plus le temps d'avoir lieu. Le temps historique de l'événement, le temps psychologique de l'affect et de la passion, le temps subjectif du jugement et de la volonté, tous sont remis en cause simultanément par le temps virtuel, qu'on appelle, sans doute par dérision, le "temps réel".

En fait, ce n'est pas un accident si l'espace-temps est appelé "réel". *Real time*, *Echtzeit*: c'est le temps "authentique", le temps non différé, celui d'une présence instantanée, qui n'est même plus le moment présent par rapport à un passé ou à un futur, mais un point de convergence et, en même temps, d'annulation de toutes les autres dimensions. Réalité Intégrale du temps qui ne s'embarrasse plus que de sa seule opération: *time-processing* (comme le *world-processing*, le *war-processing*, etc.)

Avec cette notion de "temps réel", toutes les dimensions se sont contractées sur un seul point focal, sur une forme fractale du temps. Le différentiel du temps ayant disparu, c'est la fonction intégrale qui l'emporte: la présence immédiate, totale, d'une chose à elle-même, ce qui signifie que la réalité est désormais le privilège de ce qui est identique à

soi. Tout ce qui est absent de soi-même, tout ce qui diffère de soi n'est pas vraiment réel.

Bien entendu, toute cette histoire est purement phantasmatique.

Rien ni personne n'est absolument présent à soi-même (ni aux autres *a fortiori*). Donc, rien ni personne n'est vraiment réel et le temps réel n'existe pas.

Même le soleil, nous ne le percevons pas en temps réel, puisque la vitesse de la lumière est relative. Et toutes choses ainsi.

Dans ce sens, la réalité est inconcevable. La Réalité Intégrale est une utopie. C'est pourtant ce qu'on est en train de nous imposer par un artifice gigantesque.

Derrière l'immatérialité des technologies du Virtuel, du numérique et de l'écran, se cachent une injonction, un impératif que McLuhan avait déjà fort bien repéré dans l'image télévisuelle et médiatique: celui d'une participation renforcée, d'un investissement interactif qui peut tourner au vertige, à l'implication "extatique" qu'on peut constater partout dans le cybermonde.

Immersion, immanence, immédiateté, telles sont les caractéristiques du Virtuel.

Plus de regard, plus de scène, plus d'imaginaire, plus d'illusion même, plus d'extériorité ni de spectacle: c'est le fétiche opérationnel qui a absorbé toute extériorité, résorbé toute intériorité, absorbé le temps même dans l'opération du temps réel.

Ainsi se rapproche-t-on d'un monde intégralement réalisé, effectué et identifié comme tel, mais non pas du *monde tel qu'il est*, ce qui est tout à fait différent.

Car le monde, tel qu'il est, est de l'ordre des apparences, voire de l'illusion intégrale, puisqu'il n'y en a pas de représentation possible.

Double hypothèse sur cette stratégie fatale de transnumérisation du monde en information pure, de clonage du réel par la Réalité Virtuelle, de substitution au monde "naturel" d'un univers technique et artificiel.

La première est celle de l'illusion radicale du monde — c'est-à-dire de l'échange impossible du monde contre une quelconque vérité ou destination finale.

Tel qu'il est, le monde est sans explication causale ni représentation possible (n'importe quel miroir ferait encore partie du monde).

Or, ce dont il n'y a ni sens ni raison définitive est une illusion.

Le monde a donc toutes les caractéristiques d'une illusion radicale.

Mais pour nous, quelle qu'en soit la beauté métaphysique, cette illusion est insupportable. D'où la nécessité de produire toutes les formes possibles de simulacre de sens, de transcendance — toutes choses qui masquent cette illusion originelle et qui nous en protègent.

Ainsi, le simulacre n'est pas ce qui cache la vérité, mais ce qui cache l'absence de vérité.

Dans cette perspective se situe l'invention de la réalité.

À l'ombre de la réalité, de ce modèle de simulation causal et rationnel, l'échange du monde est désormais possible, puisqu'il est défini par les lois objectives.

Autre hypothèse: le monde nous est donné. Or, selon la règle symbolique, ce qui est donné, il faut pouvoir le rendre.

Jadis, on pouvait rendre grâce d'une façon ou d'une autre, à Dieu ou à une instance quelconque, répondre au don par le sacrifice.

Désormais, nous n'avons plus personne à qui rendre grâce, dès lors que toute transcendance a disparu. Et si nous ne pouvons rien donner en échange de ce monde, il est inacceptable.

C'est ainsi qu'il va falloir liquider le monde naturel, et lui substituer un monde artificiel — un monde construit de toutes pièces, pour lequel nous n'aurons de comptes à rendre à personne.

D'où cette gigantesque entreprise technique d'élimination du monde naturel sous toutes ses formes. Tout ce qui est naturel sera nié, à plus ou moins long terme, en vertu de cette substitution forcée. Le Virtuel apparaît comme solution finale à l'échange impossible du monde.

Mais l'affaire n'est pas réglée pour autant. Car nous n'échapperons pas à cette nouvelle dette, contractée cette fois envers nous-mêmes. Comment nous absoudre de ce monde technique et de cette toute-puissance artificielle?

Il nous faut donc, là aussi, à défaut de pouvoir l'échanger (contre quoi?), détruire ce monde ou le nier. D'où, en même temps que nous avançons dans l'édification de cet univers artificiel, l'immense contre-transfert négatif envers cette Réalité Intégrale que nous nous sommes forgée.

Dénégation en profondeur aujourd'hui partout présente — et dont nous ne savons laquelle l'emportera, de cette entreprise irrésistible ou de cette abréaction violente.

De toute façon, cette entreprise n'est jamais achevée.

On n'en finit jamais de combler le vide de la vérité.

D'où la fuite en avant vers toujours d'autres simulacres.

D'où l'invention d'une réalité de plus en plus artificielle, telle qu'il n'y en a plus de contrepartie ni d'alternative idéale, plus de miroir ni de négatif.

Avec la toute nouvelle Réalité Virtuelle, nous entrons dans la phase ultime de cette entreprise de simulation, qui débouche cette fois sur un artefact technique du monde d'où toute trace d'illusion a disparu.

Un monde tellement réel, hyperréel, opérationnel et programmé qu'il n'a plus besoin d'être vrai. Ou plutôt il est vrai, absolument vrai au sens où rien ne s'y oppose plus.

C'est l'absurdité d'une vérité totale à laquelle il manque le faux — celle du bien absolu auquel il manque le mal, du positif auquel il manque le négatif.

Si l'invention de la réalité est le substitut à l'absence de vérité, alors, quand l'évidence de ce monde "réel" devient partout problématique, cela ne signifie-t-il pas que nous sommes plus près de l'absence de vérité — c'est-à-dire du monde tel qu'il est?

Nous sommes certainement de plus en plus loin de la solution, mais de plus en plus près du problème.

Car le monde n'est pas réel. Il l'est devenu, mais il est en train de cesser de l'être. Mais il n'est pas non plus virtuel — ce qu'il est en train de devenir.

C'est contre ce monde devenu tout entier opérationnel, objectif et sans alternative que se développe le déni de réalité, le désaveu de réalité.

Si le monde est à prendre en bloc, c'est alors qu'on le refuse en bloc. Il n'y a pas d'autre solution. C'est un rejet semblable au rejet biologique d'un corps étranger.

C'est par une sorte d'instinct, de réaction vitale que nous nous insurgeons contre cette immersion dans un monde achevé, dans le "Royaume des Cieux", où la vie réelle est sacrifiée à l'hyperréalisation de toutes ses possibilités, à sa performance maximale, un peu comme l'espèce est aujourd'hui à sa perfection génétique.

Notre abréaction négative résulte de notre hypersensibilité aux conditions idéales de vie qui nous sont faites.

Cette réalité parfaite, à laquelle nous sacrifions toute illusion, comme au seuil de l'enfer on laisse toute espérance, est bien évidemment une régularité fantôme.

Nous en souffrons exactement comme d'un membre fantôme.

Or, comme le dit Achab dans *Moby Dick*: "Si je ressens les douleurs de ma jambe, alors qu'elle n'existe plus, qu'est-ce qui vous assure que vous ne souffrirez pas les tourments de l'enfer, alors même que vous serez mort?"

Ce sacrifice n'a rien de métaphorique, il tient plutôt de l'opération chirurgicale — qui tire en plus d'elle-même une forme de jouissance: "L'humanité, qui jadis avec Homère avait été objet de contemplation pour les dieux olympiens, l'est maintenant devenue pour elle-même. Son aliénation d'elle-même par elle-même a atteint ce degré qui lui fait vivre sa propre destruction comme une sensation esthétique de premier ordre" (Walter Benjamin).

Une des possibilités est en effet l'autodestruction — exceptionnelle en ce qu'elle est un défi à toutes les autres.

Double illusion: celle d'une réalité objective du monde, celle d'une réalité subjective du sujet — qui se réfractent dans le même miroir et se confondent dans le même mouvement fondateur de notre métaphysique.

Le monde lui, rel qu'il est, n'est pas du tout objectif, et aurait plutôt la forme d'un attracteur étrange.

Mais parce que la séduction du monde et des apparences est dangereuse, nous préférons l'échanger contre son simulacre opérationnel, sa vérité artificielle et son écriture automatique. Cependant, cette protection même est périlleuse car, tout ce par quoi nous nous défendons contre cette illusion vitale, toute cette stratégie de défense joue comme un véritable bouclier caractériel et nous devient elle-même insupportable.

Finalement, c'est l'étrangeté du monde qui est fondamentale et c'est elle qui résiste au statut de réalité objective.

De même, c'est notre étrangeté à nous-mêmes qui est fondamentale et qui résiste au statut de sujet.

Il ne s'agit pas de résister à l'aliénation, mais au statut même de sujet.

Dans toutes ces formes de désaveu, de démenti, de dénégation, il ne s'agit plus d'une dialectique de la négativité ni du travail du négatif. Il ne s'agit plus d'une pensée critique de la réalité, mais d'une subversion de la réalité dans son principe, dans son évidence même. Plus grandit la positivité, plus la dénégation, éventuellement silencieuse, se fait violente. Nous sommes tous aujourd'hui des dissidents de la réalité, dissidents clandestins la plupart du temps.

Si la pensée ne s'échange pas contre la réalité, alors sa dénégation immédiate devient la seule pensée de la réalité. Mais cette dénégation n'ouvre pas sur l'espoir, comme le voudrait Adorno: "L'espoir, tel qu'il émerge de la réalité en luttant contre elle pour la nier, est la seule manifestation de la lucidité." Ce n'est — heureusement ou malheureusement — pas vrai.

L'espoir, s'il nous était laissé, serait celui de l'intelligence du Bien. Or, ce qui nous est laissé, c'est l'intelligence du Mal, c'est-à-dire non pas celle d'une réalité critique, mais celle d'une réalité devenue irréelle à force de positivité, devenue spéculative à force de simulation.

Parce qu'elle est là pour conjurer un vide, toute l'entreprise de simulation et d'information, cette exaspération du réel et du savoir sur le réel, ne fait que susciter une incertitude de plus en plus grande. Sa profusion même, son acharnement ne font qu'affoler les esprits.

Et cette incertitude est sans appel, car elle est faite de toutes les solutions possibles.

Sommes-nous définitivement prisonniers de ce transfert du réel vers une positivité totale, et du contre-transfert tout aussi massif qui vire à sa dénégation pure et simple?

Alors que tout nous pousse vers cette totalisation du réel, *il faut au contraire arracher le monde à son principe de réalité*. Car c'est cette confusion qui nous masque le monde tel qu'il est, c'est-à-dire, au fond, comme singularité.

Italo Svevo: "La recherche de causes est un immense malentendu, une superstition tenace qui empêche les choses, les événements, de se produire tels qu'ils sont."

Le réel est de l'ordre de la généralité, le monde est de l'ordre de la singularité. C'est-à-dire d'une différence absolue, d'une différence radicale, de quelque chose de plus différent que la différence — au plus loin de cette confusion du monde avec son double.

Quelque chose nous résiste en définitive, autre que la vérité ou que la réalité.

Quelque chose résiste à tous nos efforts pour enfermer le monde dans un enchaînement des causes et des effets.

Il y a un ailleurs de la réalité (la plupart des cultures n'en ont même pas le concept). Quelque chose d'avant le monde dit "réel", d'irréductible, lié à l'illusion originelle, et à l'impossibilité de donner au monde tel qu'il est un sens ultime quel qu'il soit.

Vouloir, savoir et sentir constituent un écheveau inextricable.

Mais il y a peut-être un moyen de traverser le monde autrement qu'en suivant le fil du réel?

R. MUSIL

Les univers parallèles*

Jean Baudrillard

La totalisation du monde, cet avènement d'une Réalité Intégrale, laisse derrière elle toutes sortes de fonctions inutiles: le corps, le sexe, la reproduction, de langage, la mort. Tout cela est inutile au regard des réseaux, du clonage, de l'Intelligence Artificielle. La pensée, le travail, le réel, vidés de leur essence par leurs produits de substitution, deviennent des vestiges ou des singularités inutiles.

La mort elle-même cesse d'être un événement, un destin individuel spécifique. Diluée dans le clone ou dans une sorte de coma mental, elle disparaît à l'horizon biologique du corps machinique.

Mais peut-être devient-elle alors une singularité inaliénable, qui prend toute sa force comme enjeu symbolique, comme défi, comme forme pure de la réversibilité?

Peut-être toutes ces fonctions, en même temps qu'elles disparaissent à l'horizon du réel, sont-elles vouées à se perpétuer comme univers parallèles, comme singularités autonomes, complètement dissociées de l'univers dominant?

* In: *Le parti de lucidité ou l'intelligente du Mal*, Paris, Galilée, 2004, p. 169-76.

Ainsi, la vie elle-même peut devenir une sorte d'univers parallèle, quelque chose d'étrange qui nous arrive tandis que nous vaquons à d'autres choses.

Et le moi lui aussi, délivré de son identité, peut s'engager sur les voies parallèles du devenir.

Les mots, délivrés de leur sens, se meuvent sur une autre orbite, celle du langage à l'état pur.

Ainsi se forment, à partir de ce qui est expulsé par le réel, toutes sortes de circulations silencieuses, de vies doubles, d'événements absents, de dimensions transversales.

Existential divide

La naissance comme ligne de crête, ligne de démarcation entre deux univers, le moi et le non-moi. La seule éventualité qui ait pris corps étant le Moi.

Mais cette discrimination n'est pas si décisive qu'on le pense, car toutes les possibilités écartées à la naissance courent parallèlement au Moi, à la seule éventualité réalisée, et de temps en temps font incursion dans sa ligne de vie.

Ce sont ces alternatives exclues qui constituent l'altérité, et par là même une des formes du devenir — liée à la possibilité de repasser la ligne dans l'autre sens, de franchir cette ligne de démarcation vers l'autre, vers tous les autres — de devenir l'autre.

Tandis que le Moi identitaire se contente de poursuivre son histoire à l'intérieur de cette ligne de vie, le jeu du destin implique de franchir cet "*existential divide*".

Telles sont les deux dimensions parallèles de toute existence: celle de son histoire et de son déroulement visible, et

celle de son devenir, transfusion de formes vers ces univers parallèles, dévolution, anamorphose de la volonté.

À la double vie correspond une double mort.

Dans l'une des deux vies, on peut être déjà mort, et sans doute sans le savoir. Parfois, c'est le mort qui tire le vivant. Dans les visages mêmes, souvent, une partie est vivante et l'autre est déjà morte.

Une double vie donne droit à deux morts — et pourquoi pas à deux passions amoureuses simultanées? Tant qu'elles restent parallèles, tout va bien. C'est lorsqu'elles interfèrent qu'il y a danger. On peut de temps en temps désertier sa vie — l'une des deux — et se réfugier dans l'autre. Celle où on existe, celle où on n'existe pas.

Là où cette mort vivante n'existe pas, c'est la vie qui prend sa place. Tout comme celui qui perd son ombre devient ombre de lui-même.

(“L'ombre de lui-même” — ce serait un beau titre. En soustitre: “Souvenirs d'une vie double”.)

Tous les problèmes d'identité se heurent à cette paralaxe de la mort — à cet axe parallèle de la mort. Qui n'est jamais que l'échéance fatale contemporaine de l'existence, vécue simultanément — et qui donc ne nous attend pas au terme de la vie, mais nous accompagne fidèlement et implacablement.

Mais cela n'est qu'un cas particulier dans la distribution de la vie et de la mort.

On est mort de son vivant même — de multiples morts nous accompagnent, fantômes pas forcément hostiles — et

d'autres encore, pas assez morts, pas morts depuis assez longtemps pour faire un cadavre.

Ainsi dans le film *La Leçon de piano* (de Jane Campion), Ada, du moins l'une d'elles, est restée au fond de l'océan, enchaînée au piano qui a coulé, et l'autre s'est dégagée et a refait surface dans une vie antérieure, ou ultérieure.

De toute façon, nous avons tous déjà été morts avants de vivre, et nous en sommes sortis vivants. Morts, on l'a été avant, et on le sera après.

On se pose des tas de questions sur le temps d'après la mort, et paradoxalement, aucune sur le temps d'avant la naissance.

Mort et vie peuvent s'inverser dans cette perspective. Et cela implique une autre présence de la mort à la vie, parce qu'elle a été là avant — non pas seulement un néant indéterminé, mais une mort déterminée, personnelle, et qu'elle ne cesse pas d'exister et de se faire sentir avec la naissance.

Elle n'est pas seulement en suspens dans le futur, comme une épée de Damoclès, elle est aussi notre destin antérieur — il y a comme une précession de la mort, qui se conjugue avec l'anticipation de la fin dans le déroulement même de la vie.

Cela rejoint le processus génétique de l'apoptose, où commencent en même temps les deux processus inverses de la vie et de la mort. Où la mort n'est pas l'épuisement progressif de la vie: ce sont des processus autonomes — complices en quelque sorte, parallèles et indissociables.

D'où l'absurdité de vouloir, comme le font toutes nos techniques actuelles, éradiquer la mort au seul profit de la vie.

Dans le même ordre d'idées, Lichtenberg faisait une proposition amusante: il imaginait un monde où les hommes viendraient au monde vieillards, puis seraient de plus en plus frais jusqu'à redevenir des enfants — ceux-ci continuant de rajeunir jusqu'à ce qu'on les enferme dans une bouteille où ils perdraient la vie après être revenus à l'état d'embryon. "Les filles de 50 à 60 ans éprouveraient un plaisir particulier à élever en bouteilles leurs mères devenues minuscules..."

Time divide

On peut imaginer aussi une ligne de partage du temps, tel qu'il s'écoule de part et d'autre selon une double flèche contradictoire, à l'image des eaux séparées par le *Continental Divide* et finalement réunies dans le même cycle océanique.

Selon Prigogine, "nous avons l'intuition de l'irréversibilité des phénomènes physiques" — et la flèche du temps est irréversible. Mais on peut faire l'hypothèse, au coeur même du temps, tout comme au coeur de la pensée, d'un processus réversible. Double flèche du temps, double flèche de la pensée (selon certains scientifiques, les lois physiques élémentaires sont réversibles, c'est-à-dire que leur expression mathématique est inchangée si on renverse la variable temporelle. Comment concilier cette réversibilité avec l'irréversibilité que nous observons, selon l'intuition vulgaire que nous avons du temps?).

Cette autre dimension du temps n'est pas une autre flèche directionnelle en sens inverse, ce n'est pas une régression (comme dans la plupart des romans de science-fiction), c'est une réversion. Et si on peut désigner la dimension habituelle du temps par une flèche, alors l'autre serait plutôt un infléchissement, un clinamen, une déclinaison inverse.

Au fond, le Big Bang et le Big Crunch naissent en même temps. L'un n'arrive pas au terme de l'autre (pas plus que la mort n'arrive au terme de la vie) ni ne succède à l'autre dans un cycle cosmique. Ils éclatent simultanément et se déroulent parallèlement, quoique dans l'autre sens.

C'est comme si le temps louchait — métalepsie qui lui fait prendre l'effet pour la cause et fait se dérouler les choses dans l'autre direction, on mieux: dans les deux directions à la fois, comme ce fameux vent qui souffle dans toutes les directions.

Il n'y a pas plus de linéarité, de fin ou d'irréversibilité qu'il n'y a de fonction linéaire indéfinie. Dans l'ordre du chaos, tous les systèmes et toutes les fonctions se convulsent, se recourbent, involuent selon une logique qui exclut toute théorie évolutionniste (or, celle de la flèche du temps tout comme celle de l'entropie sont des théories évolutionnistes).

Ainsi, ce qui n'est qu'une hypothèse en termes de physique est une métaphore éclatante de notre vie et de notre histoire propres: à notre échelle aussi, les choses se reversent à chaque instant, elles involuent en même temps qu'elles évoluent. Elles ne sont pas là d'abord, pour ensuite

s'épuiser progressivement, elles s'évanouissent en même temps qu'elles se produisent.

Au phantasme d'un univers intégral de l'information et de la communication s'oppose secrètement le désir d'un univers tout entier fait d'affinités électives et de coïncidences imprévisibles.

Celui de la chance, de la fortune et du jeu.

Où rien n'arrive accidentellement, mais de par une nécessité interne, ou selon une convergence heureuse ou malheureuse.

Ici, rien n'est laissé à la probabilité statistique, mais à la libre éventualité pour l'événement de se produire. Or, *tout veut se produire*, et c'est nous qui faisons obstacle à cette possibilité infinie.

Tous les événements sont là en puissance. Cette puissance-là, c'est celle des choses en mal d'apparition, et elle a un écho en nous. De là viennent l'intuition, et même la certitude a priori que quelque chose *doit* se produire. Et l'événement est fait de tous ceux qui, simultanément, n'ont pas eu lieu. Car rien de ce qui n'a pas eu lieu ne disparaît définitivement. Les événements absents continuent d'exister au fil d'une histoire parallèle, et ressurgissent parfois soudainement, d'une façon pour nous inintelligible. Le présent actuel est fait de cette inactualité toujours vivante.

John Updike, *Aux Confins du temps*:

Cette petite *bifurcation du réel* est observable dans toute opération de mesure en mécanique quantique. Chaque fois que nous mesurons soit la position soit la quantité de mouvement d'une particule élémentaire, l'autre propriété, suivant le principe d'incer-

titude des relations de Heisenberg, n'est plus évaluable. La longueur d'onde de la particule ne peut plus être appréciée.

Notre observation ne peut se situer que dans le cadre de notre univers.

Mais, selon certains cosmologistes, le système (*i.e.* l'ensemble constitué par la particule, l'appareil de mesure et l'observateur) dont l'état a été modifié par l'opération de mesure, *continue d'exister sous la forme de ses autres états possibles dans des univers parallèles* qui se sont greffés sur le nôtre au moment de la mesure. Il s'agit là de la théorie des mondes multiples...

Selon certaines formulations tout à fait vérifiables de la physique quantique, il est possible que notre univers, sorti de rien, ait connu dès sa naissance, en raison des propriétés d'inversion de la pesanteur, propres à un "faux" virtuel vide, une expansion si monstrueuse que ses véritables limites se trouveraient bien au-delà de la matière dont nos télescopes les plus puissants nous révèlent la trace.

L'hypothèse des événements et des lignes de vie parallèles remet en question la conception de l'histoire linéaire et progressive.

À tout instant, l'existence linéaire de l'individu peut-être traversée par ces lignes de force venues d'ailleurs. Lorsque ces parallèles ne se rejoignent jamais c'est mauvais signe (mais nous ne vivons pas dans une géométrie euclidienne).

Lorsque rien ne vient interrompre le fil de l'histoire, alors celle-ci peut être considérée comme morte, puisque se déroulant sur un modèle identique.

On peut évoquer ici le concept d'"uchronie", introduit au XIX^e siècle par le philosophe Renouvin, faisant écho à celui d'utopie, mais en sens inverse.

Celle-ci relève d'un avenir imaginaire: "Que pourrait-il-advenir idéalement, si..." L'uchronie, elle, joue de la

même perspective dans le passé: “Que serait-il advenu, si...” En faisant jouer les variables événementielles, à quel autre événement aurait-on abouti? À quel autre déroulement retrospectivement possible? (Voir le nez de Cléopâtre, ou les hasards multiples dans la mort de Diana, ou l’arrivée inattendue de Blücher sur le champ de bataille de Waterloo..)

Il y a ainsi tout un imaginaire uchronique, dont on peut penser qu’il est parfaitement vain, si on a une vision réaliste des choses, mais qui prend toute sa force si on garde l’hypothèse de la puissance virtuelle des événements absents.

Aujourd’hui, fin de l’utopie, fin de l’uchronie — tout cela est absorbé dans le seul univers possible, celui du temps réel et d’une actualité inexorable.

La modernité, en même temps qu’elle a suscité la dimension utopique, a suscité celle, inverse, de la réalité objective — technologique, scientifique, économique — qui, elle, poursuit impitoyablement sa voie, à l’exclusion de tout imaginaire.

Et si, pendant longtemps, elles ont pu toutes deux mener une existence contradictoire, mais complice, aujourd’hui elles se résorbent toutes deux dans l’opération du Virtuel.

Dans le calcul numérique, la fiction ne peut plus ressurgir — quant au réel, notre bon vieux réel qui jouissait de son image et de sa référence au monde, il y a longtemps qu’il a disparu.

Le possible lui-même n’est plus possible.

Ce qui a lieu a lieu, un point c’est tout.

C’est donc la fin de l’histoire dans sa continuité linéaire, et la fin de l’événement dans sa discontinuité radicale.

Il n'y a plus que l'évidence flagrante de l'actualité, de la performance actuelle qui, du coup, redevient une hallucination et une fiction totale.



The Subjective Limits of Hegemony

East of the Sun (West of the Moon): *Islam, the Ahmadis, and African America*^{*}

Moustafa Bayoumi

Prologue

This article attempts to intervene in the standard narrative of African American Islam, where ideas of separation and exclusion reign. Far less inscribed, however, is a history of African American Islam which views the faith as a religion of universal belonging but one which arrives at it through a particular aesthetics of living. Music is an important part of this story and of this article and, when it was originally delivered, the paper began with Yusef Lateef's "Meditation" (Prestige, 1957) and concluded with John Coltrane's "Acknowledgment". (*Impulse*, 1964.)

Sepia Tones

Traveling somewhere between living in a racialized state and stating the life of a race lies the story of African American Islam. Found in narratives of struggle and spirit, of edification and propagation, of incarceration, incarnation, and ideology, and of Blacks, Asians, and Middle East-

^{*} In: *After the World Trade Center*, Michael Sorkin and Sharou Zukin (eds.), New York, Rutledge, 2002, p. 251-63.

erners, this is a tale seldom told and even less often heard. When it does get some play, the way is in a single key. Separation is sounded brassily as the dominant chord, modulating being minor into a major ideology. The dissonances of dissidence. From Moorish Science to Garveyism, from Elijah's honor to Malcolm's rage, Islam is understood as a tool of politics, pliant to complaint and made to speak a language of plain truth against the tricknology of white folk. The soul almost disappears, replaced with an iconography of militarized Islam, boots and bowties battling white supremacy, dividing One Nation Under God with the Nation of Islam.

The fate of Malcolm concludes this narrative by necessity. Epiphanies of a universal spirit clash with narrow-minded parochialism in a death match of blood and assassination. Malcolm is lionized and history, tragically, marches on. But did this battle between the particular and the universal, between Islam as a unique expression of African American political aspirations for separation and Islam as a universal religion of belonging first find its articulation with Malcolm's rupture with Elijah Muhammad, or has the customary story we have up until now been unable to comprehend the complexity of Islam in the African American experience? Is the divide between the universal and the particular so easily drawn as a picture in black and white, or are there sepia tones of black, brown, and beige that call out to be seen? This article is an examination of the browns and beiges, a look at the notes and tones of the Muslim experience.

I would like to start with three tableaux, one involving an Asian immigrant, another looking at Brother Malcolm, and the third a study in sound. All three are signifying the

idea of Islam in the United States, finding a context in which to belong along with a place to disagree, and providing me a text with which to continue.

The Mufti

Islam in African America has a history as long as memory, when Muslim slaves from Africa wrapped their faith tightly around them as invisible armor against daily degradation. But the practice does not seem to continue. Religious revivalists in the early part of the twentieth century, mostly in the North where large numbers of new migrants sought the strength of a community, found populations willing to listen and eager to believe. In 1913, Timothy Drew donned a fez and claimed Moroccan heritage for his people in the Moorish Science Temple. For all its imaginative reconstruction, the Moorish Science Temple has little under the surface to connect in to worldwide Islam. But its spirit of displacing the term “Negro” from Blacks, of thinking of darker skinned peoples as Asiatics and Moroccans, of allying Drew Ali with “Jesus, Mohamed, Buddha, and Confucius”¹ is part of the productive tension between separatism and universalism that will follow all African American Islam throughout the rest of the century. But it would be in the next decade, with the growth of the Ahmadiyya community, that the Asian connection forges ahead.

One night in January 1920, a gentle and bespectacled Muslim by the name of Mufti Muhammad Sadiq left London for New York to become one of the first “Pioneers in the spiritual Colonization of the Western world.”² This phrase,

conveyed by the then leader of the Ahmadiyya movement in India, Mirza Mahmud Ahmad, to the Mufti's work, interestingly linked Ahmadiyya missionary activity with British rule and with its own missionary activity, along with the pioneer mythology of the New World. The Ahmadis had objected to the manner in which British missionaries were defaming Islam by reviling the Prophet Muhammad, and set out not just to correct this error but also to illustrate how Jesus was a prophet of Islam. They had observed how missionaries in the East had succeeded in misrepresenting Islam and felt that a proactive agenda of missionizing was needed to counteract this damage. Recent Hindu-only movements in India also fueled the drive to survive in a world of plural faiths. "Reason itself revolts against this exclusiveness," wrote Ahmadi founder Ghulam Ahmed.³

The Ahmadiyya community began in late-nineteenth-century India with the figure of Mirza Ghulam Ahmed, a charismatic reformer who believed he had received divine revelations, starting in 1876, requiring him to promote the unity of all religions as manifest through Islam, whose chief object is "to establish the unity and majesty of God on earth, to extirpate idolatry and to weld all nations into one by collecting all of them around one faith."⁴ It is a *particular* universalism. In seeking this unity, Ahmad would call himself "the Mahdi of Islam... the Promised Messiah of Christianity and Islam, and an avatar of Krishna for the Hindus,"⁵ a claim which would ultimately oust him and his movement from the mainstream Muslim establishment. We should note how Ahmad's ideas are an attempt to confront communal feelings in India of his day, and how this relationship be-

tween faith and nation would resonate in the American Ahmadiyya movement.

We can note then the links between the putative universalism of colonialism, which saw the spread of Western values as a mission manifest in direct and indirect colonial rule (*la mission civilisatrice*), to the missionary activities of the Ahmadis. Ahmadi missionizing, particularly in its pioneering New World aspects, thus borrows heavily from the script of European expansion and accepts modernity's commonplace division between the spiritual and secular words ("the spiritual colonization") where the East is spiritual and the West material. A significant difference, however, divides the methodologies of Western expansionism and Ahmadi missionary activity, for the Ahmadis were addressing the rest of the world as a colonized people and the religious foundation of their work is thus by definition a minority religion, unencumbered by state apparatuses or ideology. Its universalism percolates from below rather than being dusted from above, thus achieving a kind of dissident political flavor separate from the tastes of dominant rule.

In 1920, the movement, fresh from its missionary successes around the world (including England and West Africa) and full of the optimism that the new world is supposed to hold, sent its first missionary to the United States. Mufti Muhammad Sadiq boarded his ship in London and, each day, entertained his fellow passengers with his erudition. "Say, if you love Allah, follow me; then will Allah love you," he is reported to have intoned. Before the end of the trip, Sadiq is said to have "converted four Chinese men, one American, one Syrian, and one Yugoslavian to Islam."

The American authorities were hardly as sanguine with Sadiq's sagacity. They seized him before he could leave the ship, accusing him of coming to the United States to practice polygamy, and placed him in a Philadelphia detention house. So began a dark hour for the gentle Sadiq. Seven weeks later, he was eventually released but not before making nineteen other converts in jail, from Jamaica, British Guyana, Azores, Poland, Russia, Germany, Belgium, Portugal, Italy, and France.

What Sadiq found when he reached the welcoming shores of the US was a history of institutional racism and Asian exclusion laws for which he was unprepared. White nationalism would already be working against the Mufti's message. Later he would write that "if Jesus Christ comes to America and applies for admission to the United States under the immigration laws, [he] would not be allowed to enter this country because:

1. He comes from a land which is out of the permitted zone.
2. He has no money with him;
3. He is not decently dressed.
4. His hands have holes in the palms.
5. He remains bare-footed, which is a disorderly act.
6. He is against fighting for the country.
7. He believes in making wine when he thinks necessary.
8. He has no credential to show that he is an authorized preacher.
9. He believes in practicing the Law of Moses [polygamy].⁶

Originally conceiving of his work as broad-based, ecumenical, multiracial missionary activity, Sadiq soon realized that Whites were bitter and fearful of his message and African Americans interested and open. Early reports indicate that several Garveyites attended his lectures and were among his first converts, and the white press seemed gener-

ally baffled and lost in its own prejudices when considering the movement. One account tells us that “all the audience has adopted Arabic names... There is the very dark Mr. Augustus, who used to belong to St. Marks church in this city [Chicago], but who now sings a pretty Arabic prayer and acts rather sphinx-like. Half a dozen Garvey cohorts are counted, one in his resplendent uniform. There is one pretty yellow girl and another not so pretty.”⁷

The fact is that the Ahmadiyya movement attracted women and men. It formed a community made up of black, brown, and white people in a scattering of cities across the eastern half of the country (and St. Louis). But it mostly attracted African Americans, who were also given early leadership roles.⁸ Participating in Islam vitally meant discovering the history of black contributions to Islam, a topic generating some interest broadly in the black press at the time. In these years, articles appeared in *The Crisis* (1913), the *Messenger* (1927), and *Opportunity* (1930), about Islam, notably about Bilal, the Abyssinian slave freed by Prophet Muhammad and Islam’s first *muezzin*, illustrating Islam’s historic connection with Africa.⁹ It is important to underline that Islam within the Ahmadiyya community was not considered a religion just for Blacks but a religion in which Blacks had an *alternative* universal history to which to pledge allegiance. Christianity and narrow nationalisms allowed no such things, as *The Moslem Sunrise*, the Ahmadi journal argued. In 1923, it printed a half-page exhortation on “the real solution of the Negro Question” calling on African Americans to see that

Christian profiteers brought you out of your native lands of Africa and in Christianizing you made you forget the religion and language of your forefathers—which were Islam and Arabic. You have experienced Christianity for so many years and it has proved to be no good. It is a failure. Christianity cannot bring real brotherhood to the nations. So, now leave it alone. And join Islam, the real faith of Universal Brotherhood.¹⁰

Universal brotherhood, of course, sounds similar to Universal Negro, as in the Improvement Organization, and links should be made between the philosophy of Garveyism and the Ahmadis, but again not simply through the lens of separatism but a reconfigured universalism. Considering the racial and religious divisions in the world, the Ahmadis reinterpreted the Islamic concept of *tawheed*, the one-ness of God, as unifying the world, people, and faith around Islam (as Ghulam Ahmad wanted for India). In the American context, then, Ahmadi thought opened a critical space for race in the realm of the sacred. In this way, African Americans could metaphorically travel beyond the confines of national identities. They could become “Asiatics” and remain Black, could be proud of their African heritage *and* feel a sense of belonging to and participation with Asia. Being plural in this scheme meant not having to feel the psychic tear of double consciousness, but a way of living wholly in the holy. This ecumenicalism could be very powerful, both spiritually and politically. By being opened-palmed about life when the secular world is clenching fists at you meant that your pluralists unity viewed the divisions of the world as contemptibly parochial.

By 1940, the movement could claim around ten thousand converts. Its impact would be wider still, and in his early years it would reach the ears of Malcolm X.

Brother Malcolm

Malcolm X, the eloquent minister of information for Elijah Muhammad, is commonly seen as speaking the fire of separatism and black pride until his fateful Hajj in 1964 tamed his message, as he discovered the true universal spirit of Islam. Conventional as this story is, with its Augustinian turns of the will, it fails when confronted with history. The rise and development of Malcolm's message is a story of the conflict between the particular universalism of Ahmadi-type Islam against the more narrow confines of Nation of Islam creed.¹¹ When we understand this, we can view the intellectual development of Malcolm as a way of thinking through the role of faith in determining consciousness, and that that activity itself for Malcolm was hardly a settled issue.

Consider, for example, the fact that early in his life and while considering the value of Islam while in prison, Malcolm was visited by an Ahmadi, Abdul Hameed, who was on his outreach to local populations. Abdul Hameed even sent Malcolm a book of Arabic Muslim prayers, which Malcolm memorized phonetically.¹² This contact may help to explain why, after being released from Charlestown prison on parole, Malcolm too identifies himself at least once as an "Asiatic," which I have been arguing is not false consciousness of African American history or self-hatred,

but a strategic belief in the particular universal of Islam. The incident was as follows.

In 1953, Malcolm, who was now a fully fledged Muslim and member of Elijah Muhammad's flock, was pulled aside one day at his work at the Gar Wood factory in Wayne, Michigan by the FBI. He had failed to register for the Korean War draft, the agent needled him, and was thereby jeopardizing his parole. Malcolm heeded the warning and registered, but how he registered is noteworthy. Under the section on citizenship, which read, "I am a citizen of...," Malcolm inscribed "Asia." In his form on being a conscientious objector, he stated his belief that "Allah is God, not of one particular people or race, but of All the Worlds, thus forming All Peoples into One Universal Brotherhood." Asked to identify his religious guide, Malcolm wrote "Allah the Divine Supreme Being, who resides at the Holy City of Mecca, in Arabia."¹³

Unlike orthodox Nation of Islam creed, which would connect Allah with WD. Fard and the religious guide as Elijah Muhammad, Malcolm identifies Allah with the God of Islam and, like the Ahmadis, stresses the universal character of God. We could perhaps cynically see this move as a means to defeat the draft by identifying with a more orthodox religion than the Nation, but to do so is to miss the manner in which Malcolm would later repeatedly seek to integrate the Nation into the fold of worldwide Islam. In 1960, after the scholar C. Eric Lincoln coined the term "Black Muslims" for Nation followers, Malcolm objected vehemently. "I tried for at least two years to kill off that *Black Muslims*," he said. "Every newspaper and magazine

writer and microphone I got close to [I would say] ‘No! We are black *people* here in America. Our *religion* is Islam. We are properly called ‘Muslims!’ But that ‘Black Muslims’ name never got dislodged.’¹⁴

This tension, between the Ahmadi vision of a particular universal vision of Islam and the Nation’s notion of an Islam for black people underscores the conflict between two very different roles for religion in the political sphere. Admittedly, the Ahmadi spirit is less confrontational, less public, less typical of the struggle we have come to recognize as identity politics, and yet it is still revolutionary in its own way by providing a radical ontology of self. To reorient one’s body towards the Orient means a refusal to engage with the first principles of white America’s definitions of blackness, but instead to cut to the heart of an old American principle, the freedom of worship. Yet unlike the primary demand placed upon American religion, that religion be relegated solely to the private sphere, Islamic faith is seen as enveloping and thereby surpassing national belonging.

Reverberating through the African American community, this notion that a reconfigured universal faith can free your mind and body gained ground. While the Nation used the media (and the media used the Nation) to promote its belief, this other vision of Islam was quietly seeping into the pores of African American communities around the country, giving them a spiritual place to repudiate the nation of America not with the Nation of Islam but with a new universalism. Genealogically, this idea should be seen as descending from the Ahmadiyya movement, and musically it had a soundtrack that large segments of the American public were

listening to. Many of the major figures of mid-century jazz were themselves directly influenced by the Ahmadiyya movement, and the yearning for a universal and spiritual sound was in large part a result of Ahmadiyya labor.

A Love Supreme

In 1953, *Ebony* magazine felt the rise of Islam among the jazz musicians of the era was sufficiently important to publish its article on “Moslem Musicians.” “Ancient Religion Attracts Moderns” spoke its headline, and it centered on the importance of jazz among musicians. Drummer Art Blakey, we are told, “started looking for a new philosophy after having been beaten almost to death in a police station in Albany Ga., because he had not addressed a white policeman as ‘sir’”¹⁵ Talib Dawood, a former jazz player and Ahmadi, introduced Blakey to Islam. Blakey's house was a known center for Islamic learning, and in an important engagement at Small's Paradise in Harlem, he organized a seventeen-member band, all Muslim, as the Messengers. Later, the band's personnel would change, as would the name (to the Jazz Messengers), but the Islamic influence in jazz would continue.¹⁶

Other important figures of the period also converted to Islam. Yusef Lateef, Sahib Shihab, Ahmed Jamal, and McCoy Tyner would all convert, and Dizzy Gillespie, Miles Davis, and John Coltrane would all be significantly influenced by its spirit. It is with John Coltrane that I want to conclude this article, since his influence has been so remarkable in the jazz sound and because his debt to other Eastern phi-

osophies is relatively well known. But this relationship to Islam has not, to my knowledge, been sufficiently acknowledged despite the fact that it can be heard in his most famous work.

To have a soundtrack to a movement does not mean to play an anthem. Rather than indicating a representational scheme of signifying a specific community, I am interested in listening for the ways in which the yearning for a new kind of community, one based on a new universalism that has a (but not by necessity the only) base in Islam, can be heard in the ways in which the music is pushing itself. Coltrane's search for a tone that could extend the saxophone is well known, as is the critics' initial bewilderment to his pitch. He himself talked about his desire to incorporate the fullness of expression in his music. "I want to cover as many forms of music that I can put into a jazz context and play on my instruments," he wrote in his notebooks. "I like Eastern music; Yusef Lateef has been using this in his playing for some time. And Ornette Coleman sometimes plays music with a Spanish content."¹⁷ In an unreleased session from his Village Vanguard recordings, Coltrane is also playing with Ahmed Abdul Malik, a Sudanese bass and 'oud player who was part of Monk's band, a regular partner to Randy Weston, and an innovator in incorporating Middle Eastern modal organization in jazz improvisation. Coltrane's sideman regularly included Muslim musicians from Philadelphia, and he himself, married to Naima (a Muslim) and, after 1957, increasingly interested in all things spiritual, regularly engaged his friend, piano player Hassan Abdullah, in discussions about Islam.

Space prevents me from etching in detail the milieu in which Coltrane repeatedly encountered and considered Islam. Instead I want to move towards a conclusion in a musical note by considering the ecumenical sound of Islam found in Coltrane's most commercially successful recording, *A Love Supreme*. Significantly, Coltrane was often portrayed by the media of his day as blowing the sounds of black rage. The Angry Young Tenor was the musical equivalent of the angry Malcolm X. But Coltrane never saw his music this way. Responding to his critics, he said, "If [my music] is interpreted as angry, it is taken wrong. The only one I'm angry at is myself when I don't make what I'm trying to play."¹⁸ Later he would be quoted as saying this about the philosophy of his music:

I think the main thing a musician would like to do is to give a picture to the listener of the many wonderful things he knows of and senses in the universe. That's what music is to me — it's just another way of saying this is a big, beautiful universe we live in, that's been given to us, and here's an example of just how magnificent and encompassing it is.¹⁹

If there is a tendency to view this wisdom as apolitical, liberal claptrap, it is I think misplaced. Searching for the universal in a minor key is less about escape, or about colonizing the spiritual experiences of the dark world to rejuvenate an exhausted Western sensibility, in the mode of Richard Burton through George Harrison. Coltrane's universal is a search for a big philosophy of sound, which repudiates the thin, reedy existence of American racial politics, and it does so, often, by an invocation of Islam.

“During the year of 1957, I experienced, by the grace of God, a spiritual awakening which was to lead me to a richer, fuller, more productive life.” So wrote Coltrane in the famous liner notes for *A Love Supreme*. The notes continue in this tenor, and anyone with an ear attuned to Islamic language will hear its echoes. “NO MATTER WHAT... IT IS WITH GOD. HE IS GRACIOUS AND MERCIFUL. HIS WAY IS IN LOVE, THROUGH WHICH WE ALL ARE. IT IS TRULY—A LOVE SUPREME.” Al-rahman, al-raheem. The Gracious, the Merciful. The two qualities which follow God everywhere in the Muslim tradition are invoked by Coltrane, who ends his text with “ALL PRAISE TO GOD.” Alhamd’ulillah. Consider the first track, “Acknowledgement.” Built around a simple, four note structure, this piece is an attempt to unify and capture the rapture of the divine. Listen how, two-thirds of the way through, Coltrane meanders around the simple theme in every key, as if to suggest the manner in which God’s greatness truly is found everywhere, and then the ways in which the band begins to sing the phrase “A Love Supreme,” like a roving band of sufi mendicants singing their *dhikr*. The words could change. As the Love is extolled, the phrase begins to include the sounds of “Allah Supreme,” another Arabic expression, Allahu Akbar. Coltrane makes the connection from A Love Supreme to Allah Supreme for his entire listening audience, forever delivering a sound of Islam to the world of American music.

To appreciate the depth of mutual involvement between Blacks and Asians means acknowledging not just how histories of faith exist to be excavated, which illustrates a level

of shared struggle towards an acceptable ontology for living in the racialized United States, but it also means investing the sacred with the possibilities for radical thought, even if its effects are less visible to us than the legacy of political activism through ideologies of separatism. Ahmadi Islam was the space where this place was opened up for many African Americans. It defines a certain aesthetics of living, where the text to life is in a language white America cannot read and the sounds of existence flutter beyond white America's ears. This isn't about being Omni-American, to use a phrase associated with Albert Murray, but it is about assimilating into the omnipresence of a just universal order. It is where Blacks become Asians and Asians Black, under color of divine law.

Notes

1. C. Eric Lincoln, *The Black Muslims of America* (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Erdmanns, 1994), 49.
2. *The Moslem Sunrise* (July 1921): 3.
3. Quoted in Yvonne Haddad and Jane Smith, *Mission to America: Five Islamic Sectarian Communities in North America* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993), 55.
4. Hazrat Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, *Message of Peace* (Columbus, Ohio: Ahmadiyya Anjuman Isha'at Islam Labore, 1993 [1908]), 23.
5. Quoted in Richard Brent Turner, *Islam in the African American Experience* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997), 112.
6. "If Jesus Comes to America," *The Moslem Sunrise* (April 1922): 55-56.
7. Roger Didier, "Those Who're Missionaires to Christians: Prophet Sadiq Brings Allah's Message Into Chicago and Makes Proselytes," reprinted in *The Moslem Sunrise* (October, 1922): 139.

8. Aminah McCloud reports that eventually, dissension arose among Ahmadis over the fact that more African Americans were not appointed to leadership positions and that the Indian customs of the missionaries and the immigrant Muslims eventually clashed with the African American desires to apply the faith to domestic situations. See Aminah McCloud, *African American Islam* (New York: Routledge, 1995), 21. However, in the early years the community was certainly highly multiracial in many ways, including in its leadership roles. *The Moslem Sunrise* contains many such photographs and examples, including highlighting the role of one early “zealous worker for Islam, appointed a Sheikh to work among his people in the district of St. Louis and vicinity,” named Sheikh Ahmad Din (formerly P. Nathaniel Jonson). See, for example, *The Moslem Sunrise* (July 1922): 119.
9. J. A. Rogers, “Bilal Ibn Rahab—Warrior Priest,” *The Messenger* 9 (July 1927): 213-14. Rogers states: “When the Christian Negro points with pride to St. Augustine, the Numidian Negro, and tells what he did to advance Christianity, the Mohammedan one can point to Bilal, and tell what he did for Christianity’s greatest rival. The Mohammedan Negro is, however, hardly likely to do as Islam not only in theory, but in actuality, knows no color line. This probably accounts for its success in Africa.” Also see A. T. Hoffert, “Moslem Propaganda: The Hand to Islam stretches out to Aframerica,” *The Messenger* (May 1927): 141, 160. Hoffert describes, “A woman convert who had belonged to various churches spoke of her previous life like that of a dog or cat before its eyes are opened; they are going to have their share of good things and stand on their own feet. She spoke of the universality of Islam, its way of life, one God, one aim, one destiny.” Blanche Watson, “The First Muezzin,” *Opportunity* (September 1930): 275.
10. “True Salvation of the American Negroes: The Real Solution to the Negro Question,” *The Moslem Sunrise* (April-July 1923): 184.
11. It should be stressed that the dichotomy I am establishing here, between the particularism of the Nation and the ecumenicalism of the Ahmadis is obviously more complicated in many circumstances

and that the Nation has at its heart the ability to see itself as a universal theology in certain respects, just as Ahmadi creed can be (and is often, by the mainstream Muslim community) understood as a narrower and more particular vision, especially since the Ahmadis themselves are marginalized by the mainstream Muslim establishment. The Nation also often employed Sunni Muslims as advisors and teachers, such as Abdul Basit Naeem, editor of a couple of small publications (*Moslem World the USA and The African-Asian World*) and author of the introduction to Elijah Muhammad's *The Supreme Wisdom*, 2 (Atlanta: Messenger Elijah Muhammad Propagation Society, n.d.), 3. These advisors and, later, Elijah Muhammad himself recognized the radical differences between the Nation of Islam creed and mainstream Sunni beliefs yet justified the Nation's theology as being the best way to bring African Americans to Islam. At the very end of his life, it appears that even Elijah Muhammad believed in mainstream Islam. Similarly, Louis Farrakhan, now facing his mortality as he battles cancer, has made significant gestures towards reforming Nation of Islam creeds towards an acceptable form of mainstream Islam.

12. Louis DeCaro, *On the Side of My People: A Religious Life of Malcolm X* (New York: New York University Press, 1996), 136.
13. *Ibid.*, 97-98.
14. *The Autobiography of Malcolm X* (New York: Grove Press, 1964), 247.
15. "Moslem Musicians Take Firm Stand Against Racism," *Ebony* (April 1953):111.
16. Charley Gerard, *Jazz in Black and White: Race, Culture, and Identity in the Jazz Community* (Westport, Connecticut: Praeger, 1998), 75.
17. C. O. Simpkins, *Coltrane: A Biography* (Baltimore: Black Classic Press, 1975), 118.
18. *Ibid.*, 84.
19. *Ibid.*, 151.

Letter to a G-Man*

Moustafa Bayoumi

Let me ask you something. Have you heard the story of the vizier's son? His father, the minister, had offended the ruler, and so he and his family were imprisoned for a very long time, so long in fact that the son knew only prison life. He reached the age of reason shortly after his release and, one night at dinner, the son asked his father about the meat he had been eating. "It's lamb," said the father. The son then asked the father, "What is lamb?" The father described the animal to the son, to which the son replied, "Do you mean it is like a rat?" "No!," said the father. "What have lambs to do with rats?" And the same continued then with cows and camels for, you see, the son had seen only rats in prison. He knew no other animal.

You may be wondering why I begin this brief correspondence with such a story, but I beg your indulgence. There will be time for all things. Suffice it to say that, as the son shows us, confinement defeats the imagination. Call it arrested development if you will, but if you are forced to stay put, how can you discover the delicacy of lamb, sprin-

* *In: After the World Trade Center*, Michael Sorkin and Sharon Zukin (eds.), New York, Rutledge, 2002, p. 131-42.

kled generously with garlic, and massaged with allspice, roasting over an open flame? Perhaps you can almost taste it now. Yes, the mind wanders, and the wanderer's mind, well, it expands, you could say. But without knowledge or history or experience, the son could only learn of these things when it was too late. I hope it is not too late for you—and for me.

You see, I fear that you have become like the son. You believe only what you already know, see only what you want to see, but you must ask yourself how you understand those things.

I have been told that you have arrested hundreds of us and seek to question thousands more. I imagine you are looking for me. You are concerned, naturally, after the eleventh of September, as we all are. I too watched the tower fall, as did everyone I know, with a tear in my eye and the air stuck hard in my lungs. Who could have imagined such malefaction! I prayed for the people lost in those towers, just as I have since prayed for the innocents everywhere, my benedictions sounding like Walt Whitman's brassy cornet and drums, which, as he said, play marches for conquer'd and slain persons. Didn't we all suffer on that terrible day, the families of the dead most of all?

The city itself was in mourning, with its gaping wound right there on the skin of Lower Manhattan. And here I am going to tell you something I presume you do not know. This is almost the exact same spot where, just over a century ago, the first of our extended Arab family came to this country. Have you ever wondered how Cedar Street got its name? I cannot tell you precisely, but I like to think it was because on Cedar Street, the Lebanese merchants from

Zahle would sell you milk as sweet as honey and honey as rich as cream. We came first for the 1876 World's Fair, then began arriving in larger numbers, until in the 1890s we lived busily between Greenwich, Morris, Rector, and Washington streets. By the early part of the twentieth century, our community had expanded, reaching from Cedar Street on the north to Battery Place on the south. The western border was no less than West Street, and to the east, Trinity Place. But the center of our world was always Washington Street, a lane now blocked by emergency vehicles and ten-foot fences. To us, Washington Street was never just a street. It was our *Amrika!* After passing through Ellis Island, we would trudge up Manhattan Island with out weathered bags, looking for a friendly face in all the frenetic energy of New York, until we could hear a little Arabic and smell the food from home, knowing that on a street named for an American we had found Little Syria.

We came, like so many others, simply to make a better life for ourselves and our families. You could shovel gold on Washington Street, we were told, and so we trekked across the Atlantic, endured the verminous hostelries of Marseilles, and arrived with our satchels stuffed with hope. City life was new to most of us, since we had lived typically in villages and hamlets, and it was exciting. I remember what Abraham Ribhany wrote back in 1914:

New York is three cities on top of one another. The one city is in the air—in the elevated railway trains, which roar overhead like thunder, and in the amazingly lofty buildings, the windows of whose upper stories look to one on the ground only a little bigger than human eyes. I cannot think of those living so far away from the

ground as being human beings; they seem to me more like the *jinn*. The second city is on the ground where huge armies of men and women live and move and work. The third city is underground, where I find stores, dwellings, machine shops, and railroad trains. The inside of the earth here is alive with human beings; I hope they will go upward they die.

His words never seemed so tragically real to me.

We came as sojourners, and after establishing ourselves in New York, we launched out, men and women both, around the country as pack peddlers. Loading up on goods from the stores on Washington Street, we carried what felt like the world on our backs. Our shops were fables to you. Never had you seen our soft rugs for sale, or a grossamer web of silken lace with Arabic letters hugging its border. Boxes rested on boxes in our tiny dark shops, full of carved olivewood trinkets or luxurious satins or silver wire as thin as a spider's web. As the *New York Tribune* put it in 1892: "In the midst of all this riot of the beautiful and odd stands the dealer, the natural gravity of his features relaxed into a smile of satisfaction at the wonder and delight expressed by his American visitor. But the vision ends, and with many parting 'salaams' one goes back to the dust and dirt, the noise and bustle" of Washington Street.

We found no magic in our stores, however, just opportunity. We carefully folded the crocheted tablecloths of linen and stiff silk dress collars and loaded them with the spicy perfumes and soft talcum powders into our packs. The scrubbing soaps and gentle creams came next, and on top, the rosaries, crosses, and carved icons that the people across this country so loved to buy from us, the Holy Land vendors.

These are the things we carried. Jewelry and notions, we used to call them, and if you stopped to talk to us along our route, you might, as someone once said, buy a story with your bargain.

From the beginning then, our lives here have been about being on the move, carting goods and people across borders to make life a little bit better, a little bit easier, just a little more comfortable. We were the ones who brought the city to the country. We were Internet shopping before eBay, the catalogue before Sears. We went places others would not, namely, into the warm hearths of African-American homes, which ringed the cities we visited. There the food was heavier and the laughter heartier, and we would be treated to a hospitality we recognized like home. Detroit, Chicago, Fargo, Kansas City, Minneapolis, Fort Wayne, we knew the veinlike crisscrosses of this country before Jack Kerouac spoke his first French word. And we walked, mostly, and then we ached to come back to Washington Street, where we could replace our worn soles and enjoy a little backgammon before heading out again.

But that was a long time ago, and, well, nothing gold can stay. Maybe it is true that nostalgia makes time simple by the loss of detail, but today things seem so different. Since those early days, we have become doctors and lawyers, writers and engineers, but we are still shopkeepers and taxi drivers, and we continue to move lives around this country. And yet these days many of us sit stationary in our homes, unsure of what will happen to us if we step beyond the threshold of our doors. But I will come to that, all in good time, my good man.

We came from Mount Lebanon, from Syria and Palestine, but you called us all Syrians or, less accurately, Turks. We were mostly Melkite and Maronite, but there were a few Muslims, Druze, and Jews among us. By the 1920s, we had grown as a community into Brooklyn as well as Manhattan, on Joralemon Street, State Street, and Boerum Place, close to Atlantic Avenue, where you find many of our shops today. We continued to trade, and we worked in dusty factories, mostly sewing clothes and fine lace.

But in fact everything started to change in the 1920s. I talk not only about how, in the years leading up to that troubled decade, the immigration authorities became increasingly frustrated by our dusky looks, questioning whether we were “free white people” or “Asiatics.” This racial Ping-Pong game used a strange chromatic logic that mostly bewildered us, and after the 1924 Johnson-Reed Quota Act and the harsh Depression of the 1930s, the numbers of our newcomers dwindled. Rather, I refer also to our daring to dream of self-determination back home.

After the door closed on the Sublime Porte, the lofty gate of Istanbul, the dissolution of the Ottoman empire was supposed to mean that we would have the right to determine our own fates. We thought you would support us, in the pioneer spirit of independence from foreign rule. But what we were left with were mandates and protectorates, leading to fracture and complaint in a moment when we felt unified and needed each other. The Europeans did not rule lightly, something I was sure you would have understood, but you have consistently lived up to underestimation, I dare say. It was the catastrophe of 1948, however, that broke our hearts.

Tell me, what did the Palestinians do to warrant having their homes seized from them, their worlds disrupted, their lives bulldozed now for over fifty years? Because another people wanted the land the Palestinians had always lived on, they—the Palestinians—must be dispossessed into misery and squalor? Indeed the genocidal horror inflicted on the Jewish community in Europe was evil unmasked, but what had this to do with the Palestinians, except to turn them into the victims of another policy of extermination and cultural supremacy? It seems I am asking so many questions, but why you continue to deny the rights of the Palestinians just confounds me. It seems that their “crime” is simply to be born Palestinian, and in this scheme, a Palestinian life counts less than another. Yet there is no greater wrong in the world, for whoever degrades another degrades me and you and all of us.

Your ears prick up now that I am talking about the Palestinians. I think that when you hear this word, all you hear is terrorism. To us, we hear the echo of dispossession and the call for justice, but these days especially it appears to us that you are criminalizing all references to us and our Palestinian family, and it is affecting how we live here. For fifty years we have been speaking to you about this tragedy, but the actions of a handful of lunatics, madmen who have never until recently and only when convenient spoken about Palestine, have given you the motivation to shut us up and shut us down. You are infiltrating our mosques and gathering places, tapping our phones, detaining us by the hundreds, and seizing our charity. At airports you search us, and if you find Allah on a leaf of paper, you accuse us of sedition. We

are beginning to wonder what you think you are protecting by all these actions—the people of this country or policies abroad that continue an injustice and lead to slaughter. But never mind that for now. There will be time. First, before you continue to cast us as perpetual foreigners, lent me tell you why Muslim New York is our modern Granada.

For over half a century, we crossed the Atlantic to land on its avenue in Brooklyn. No doubt you know of this constellation of stores, restaurants, butchers, and bookshops, their wares piled high like the old stores on Washington Street. But does it surprise you to hear that our first recorded community organized around a mosque, back in 1907, stood not on this throughfare but in Williamsburg, Brooklyn, and was founded by a group of Polish, Lithuanian, and Russian Muslims? By 1931, this American Mohammedam Society had purchased three buildings on Powers Street for worship and community affairs. But Islam in this land surely precedes these intrepid travelers, for the first of us Muslims to arrive in this country dates back far before the birth of the republic. (You are confused because I had written we arrived in the late nineteenth century, and so you think I contradict myself. But I am large. I contain multitudes.)

Islam in this country is about as old as Virginia, and the first Muslims were brothers and sisters of our faith who were captured on the African continent and brought here solely for their labor. Have you read the slave statutes, like this early one, from 1670, which states that “negroes, moores, mollatoes and others borne of and in heathenish, idollatrous, pagan and mahometan parentage and country... may be purchased procured, or otherwise obteigned as

slaves”? We labored and suffered, and yet we continued to pray, fast, and recite the word of Allah whenever we could.

Take Ibrahim Abdur Rahman, for example. A son of royalty from Futa Jallon in West Africa, he was captured and made into a slave, landing in Natchez, Mississippi, in 1788. Over the next forty years, he was known to steal away to the riverbank when he could. There he would sit alone and scratch out Arabic words in the dirt and remember home. Later, the public learned about brother Ibrahim and his talents, and with his newfound notoriety, he sought to return to his people. Thus began a nationwide tour for Ibrahim. Paraded around the country by the American Colonization Society as an African curiosity, he raised money for his and his family’s release from bondage and travel back to the African continent. This tour took Ibrahim not only to our New York but also to the White House, where he met John Quincy Adams. It seems the always polite Ibrahim had a sly, winking view of the politics of this country. He described his visit simply: “I found the President the best piece of furniture in the house,” he states in a letter.

We are lucky to have Brother Ibrahim’s story preserved. Most of our sisters and brothers who were enslaved have sadly fallen through history’s sieve. We do have enough evidence, though, to know that Muslim slaves dot the forcefully tilled landscape of this country throughout its history and across its geography, from Natchez to New York and beyond.

In addition to this part of our family, there are the Muslim mariners, many of whom arrived in the ports of Brooklyn, ruddy-faced, out of breath, and eager for a place to bow

their heads in remembrance of God. They surely came in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. But we know that from 1939, after they landed they made their way to State Street, in the heart of the Arab community, where Sheikh Daoud Ahmed Faisal and his wife Khadija had their mosque, the Islamic Mission of America. (It is still there, but you must know that already.) In the cramped quarters of the brownstone mosque, sailor prayed with seamstress, African American shoulder to shoulder with Arab. It is said that the sheikh, by day employed by the railroad (again, on the road!), and his wife were individually responsible for spreading the faith to sixty thousand souls.

In fact, what we have always loved about this city is that we were never lost in it. By discovering each other, we found ourselves here. The Indian Muslims found the Albanians, the Malays prostrated beside the Africans, and all in front of Allah only. We didn't need mosques, only a clean place to lay our foreheads gently on the ground. The sun gave us all the direction we needed. In those early years, like today, we converted brownstones and storefronts into prayer halls and mosques. And it continues. Did you know, for example, that for the thousands of Muslims who worked in the area around the World Trade Center there was a cavernous room used for Friday prayer? From the beginning, we have lived here in a kind of plurality that reminds me of Cordoba or Haroun el-Rashid's Baghdad, and seems rivaled only by Mecca during Hajj.

But then after September 11 our halls and mosques had targets painted on them, sometimes quite literally. What was for us a geography of freedom and opportunity transformed

overnight into a frightening topography of rage. In the Bronx, our taxis were set on fire; in Manhattan, two drivers were beaten; in Bensonhurst, nine livery cars and taxis were vandalized. Don't move, these thugs seemed to be telling us, because we are coming for you. Death threats, physical assaults, verbal harassment, and a handful of murders across the country is what we (and our brother Sikhs) endured. We were shocked and angry on September 11 too, and then we were afraid. When Timothy McVeigh bombed the building in Oklahoma, was it right to seek retribution on any face that reminded you of him? (Instead, then too, we were blamed and we suffered.) Vengeance is a strong emotion, but as Cleopatra tells her attendant Charmian: "innocents 'scape not the thunderbolt."

By the smoke of my breath, we survived this terrible time with great thanks to the grace of our neighbors. They deserve a thousand blessings and one more, these decent, good-hearted people who wanted to help, understand, and accompany us around our cities and neighborhoods. They helped restore the streets as sites of circulation for us. But while all this was happening, I daresay, now we have you to contend with. Do you realize how you are chipping away at this sense of security we were just beginning to feel again? I think you do.

There are many stories to tell, like our Afghan brother (shall we call him Yousef K?) who was visiting his immigration lawyer's office in Lower Manhattan and was stopped by the police. They inquired into his religion, and after he responded "Muslim," he was put into detention. Or then there is the story of brother Burt. Someone must have been

telling lies about Muhammad Rafiq Butt, for without having done anything wrong he was arrested one fine morning. It was September 19, and the FBI was following lead 1556, a telephone tip from someone in South Ozone Park, Queens. The caller was concerned that two vans had stopped outside Mr. Butt's apartment building and six "Middle Eastern looking men" exited from each vehicle (no matter that Mr. Butt lived there with three other Pakistani men). After they arrested him, the FBI took a day to determine that this harmless 55-year-old man was innocent even to the temptations of the world ("He no smoke, he no drink, he don't go nowhere," is how his nephew put it). On October 23, after being detained for almost five weeks at the Hudson Country Jail, Muhammad Rafiq Butt took his last breath and died that Tuesday morning, apparently of a heart attack. May God have mercy on his soul.

You see, my good man, we have lost our faith in your activities. You are turning what was for us an open geography into some kind of penal colony. Hundreds of us now languish in your prisons, not even sure why. You have admitted to the press that we have nothing to do with terrorism and that we have committed no crime, but still we cannot walk away, even if a judge has ordered us freed. Instead, you invoke an emergency, bond is laid aside, and we sit alone for 23 hours a day, the lights blazing the whole time so that night has lost its identity to day. Then you won't tell us who you have arrested. We have a difficult time finding out where our friends are as you fly them around the country with shackled legs and hands in midnight planes. You claim everyone has an attorney, but we have heard differently. You come in the middle of the night and take away our brot-

hers and fathers and sons, and tell us nothing. Then you require us to “volunteer” for interviews, your reason for choosing us simply the kink of our hair, the caramel of our skin, the country name stamped on our passport. We have felt the freedom of the road in this country for a long time, and so you will understand if we are bewildered that this could happen here.

The other day, I heard a professor say that this was a time when we as a society should be thinking about what the balance between liberty and security should be, but the problem is that most of the country is willing to trade someone else’s liberty—namely ours—for their own sense of security. He is a smart man, this professor, and he makes me wonder if this is the deal you have entered us into. While waiting for you, I have been reading James Madison. (Surprised? Didn’t I tell you I have been here for over a century?) Since September, haven’t we become vulnerable to the passions of the majority? I was under the impression that this required your greater vigilance for our safety, since, as Madison writes: “In a society under the forms of which the stronger faction can readily unite and oppress the weaker, anarchy may as truly be said to reign, as in a state of nature where the weaker individual is not secured against the violence of the stronger.” You mouth the words of protection, but then why do we feel your violence lashing our backs?

Everywhere you say you are looking for rats, but I think you are finding lambs and unwilling to admit this. So many of us came here to escape terrible restrictions on our lives, not to rediscover them. But all around the world—in Chile, Iran, Iraq, Nicaragua, the Congo, Indonesia, Panama, and South Africa—hasn’t the problem historically been not that

you can't tell the difference between the rats and the lambs, but that you have preferred the rats?

Perhaps you would feel safer if I came to your office? Save you a trip? Under normal circumstances I would, but right now I would prefer not to. Like *Bartleby*, I have become a wanderer who refuses to budge. So send me off to the city's holding cells, the Tombs, if you wish. What will I discover there but the Egyptian masonry and forlorn history that lonely souls have scratched onto the stone in their spare time, for time is all they have in the Tombs.

In the meantime, they tell me that you are failing to fetch me, but keep encouraged. You may be missing me from one place, and so you search another. But I am here, my good man, under your boot soles. I am at home. I have stopped here, waiting for you. If I go anywhere these days, it is only to my roof, to hear the call to prayer from the mosque on Atlantic Avenue or the Sunday church bells on Pacific, and I sing along in what must sound like the yelp of a Barbary pirate to some. But to me these tunes are the sign of democracy. Don't you think so, too?

So come, ask me your questions. I will listen to them with devoted concentration, my head angled like a mendicant. But I won't answer them right away, for you must first have a sip of my syrupy coffee, a bite of crumbly sweet *halawa*, and a taste of our hospitality. There will be time for all things, believe me. And though you hardly know who I am or what I mean, I will be good to you nonetheless. We have much to discuss, you and I, and a long night ahead of us. *Yalla*, my good man, hurry and arrive. I've been expecting you.

For the Last Time: Civilizations¹

Hamid Dabashi

In the summer of 1993, Samuel P. Huntington, Albert J. Weatherhead III University Professor at Harvard, published an article he called “The Clash of Civilization?” and published it in *Foreign Affairs*, a leading conservative organ of the political right in Washington, DC.² Not since the 1940’s and the publication of George Kennan’s “X” on containment, the journal subsequently boasted, had an article received so much detailed and global attention.

Huntington’s proposal, subsequently expanded into a book,³ was rather simple. With the age of competing ideologies over, a *fait accompli* diagnosed and proclaimed by Huntington’s kindred soul Francis Fukuyama about a decade earlier,⁴ it was now an age of civilizational conflict. The West has won the historical game, he agreed with Fukuyama, but that victory has generated civilizational *ressentiment* among the rest of the world, the Muslims and Asians in particular. So they are resorting back to their civilizational identities and thus opposing the West. The result: “The Clash of Civilizations.” In his own words:

Indigenization and the revival of religion are global phenomena. They have been most evident, however, in the cultural assertiveness and challenges to the West that have come from Asia and from

Islam. These have been the dynamic civilizations of the last quarter of the twentieth century. The Islamic challenge is manifest in the pervasive cultural, social, and political resurgence of Islam in the Muslim world and the accompanying rejection of Western values and institutions. The Asian challenge is manifest in all the East Asian civilizations—Sinic, Japanese, Buddhist, and Muslim—and emphasizes their cultural differences from the West and, at times, the commonalities they share, often identified with Confucianism. Both Asians and Muslims stress the superiority of their cultures to Western culture. In contrast, people in other non-Western civilizations—Hindu, Orthodox, Latin American, African—may affirm the distinctive character of their cultures, but as of the mid-1990's had been hesitant about proclaiming their superiority to Western culture. Asia and Islam stand alone, and at times together, in their increasingly confident assertiveness with respect to the West.⁵

Huntington had practical advice for his Washington policy makers and other readers. They better recognize civilizational boundaries as the defining categories of the new world and thus order their foreign affairs accordingly. With a Machiavellian precision to his voice, taking whoever is the American President for Lorenzo de Medici, Huntington gives civilizational advice as how to be accommodating to some alien civilizations, confrontational to others. Eastern Europe and Latin America have hopes of being accommodated, whereas the Confucian and Islamic civilizations ought to be confronted with full military might.

In this essay, which reads like a State Department policy directive, Samuel Huntington seemed in effect to outline the intellectual contour of a new imperialist agenda for the United States. As proof and evidence of his civilizational re-orientation of American foreign policy, Huntington points to the global scene in which in his estimation the con-

flicts in Eastern Europe, the former Soviet Union, the Indian subcontinent, the Middle East and North Africa, as well as the rest of Africa and Latin America are all on the “fault lines” of civilizations and cultural identities. He singles out Islam and Asia as the primary sites of conflict with the Western Civilization and its accomplishments. He thus concludes with specific recommendations as to how the West can preserve its unique identity and its historical achievements by incorporating Westernized societies, opposing ant-Western civilizations, and instigating hostilities among non-Western civilizations in order to exhaust each others’ energy. Machiavelli at large.

Foreign Affairs?

The publication of Huntington’s essay in *Foreign Affairs* and its ostensible international agenda soon convinced everyone that he had indeed targeted a global matter of extreme urgency facing the triumphant West and that he ought to be responded to accordingly. The primary targets of Huntington’s assessment, Muslims and Asians, obviously took him quite seriously and began to respond. Huntington’s own colleague at Harvard, Roy Mottahedeh, in fact wrote a critical response in which he pointed out some of the inconsistencies and counter examples in Huntington’s thesis, taking his Poli-Sci. cavalier treatment of history very politely and bashfully to task.⁶ But far more important than academic and journalistic responses, translations of Huntington’s essay began to appear in Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and many other languages, consolidating the thesis of civilizational

confrontation in political and ideological circles, and confirming the (false) supposition that the Harvard Professor of Poli-Sci had indeed addressed an issue of international magnitude.

As a piece of self-fulfilling prophecy, Huntington's essay was the delivery of its own promise. By "accusing" the Asian and Islamic civilizations to feel superior to the Western civilization he achieved, ipso facto, a number of simultaneous objectives, all fictive, all misleading, all dangerous. He consolidated the very idea of civilizational thinking, confirmed the very idea of "the West" in its moral and material facticity, cornered the Muslims and the Asians in reciprocating in kind and thinking of themselves in their presumably superior civilizations, and arranged the global chess game in such a way that not just the folks in the US State department but their counterparts in every ministry of foreign affairs throughout the Asian and the Islamic countries began to think that they were up to some serious game plan Huntington had devised. It was a perfect trap and because of the hegemonic language of its delivery from Washington DC everyone fell for it.

What was totally concealed to the international observers of and respondents to Huntington's resurrection of the dead horse of civilizational thinking was that the target of Huntington's essay and subsequent book was not any global audience at all. It was an entirely domestic issue that had harassed Huntington, along with a wide ranging spectrum of knee-jerk reactions to developments domestic to the United States and yet indices of far more global developments. In his limited, Poli.-Sci kind of way, advisory capacity, Hun-

tington had an entirely domestic concern, successfully disguised in foreign terms.

Huntington's conception of the clash of civilization is part and parcel of a larger conservative reaction to massive demographic changes *inside* the United States that have made themselves particularly palpable on American University campuses where Huntington and most his conservative cohorts first notice the phenomenon. Waves of successive labor migrations into the United States from Asia and Latin America in the 1970's and 1980's began to make their presence particularly palpable in early 1970's. Statistically, these waves of labor migrations began noticeably to change the demographic composition of the United States in major metropolitan areas in favor of colors and cultures ostensibly different from the WASP ruling elite. Of the total immigration of more than 4.4 million in the 1970's, 1.8 million were from Latin America and the Caribbean and 1.6 from Asia, both more than two times the third largest body of immigration, a little more than 800 thousand from Europe. The combined immigration of Asian and Latin Americans amounted to 3.4 million or more than 90% of total immigration. In the 1980's the same trend continued. Of the total immigration of more than 7.3 million, more than 3.4 came from Latin America and the Caribbean, and more than 2.7 came from Asia, both close to four to five times the third largest body of immigration, more than 760 thousand from Europe.⁷ Again the combined number of immigration from Asia and Latin America was 6.1 million or more than 83% of the total immigration. That means that for every European who immigrated in the 1970's, 3.9 Asian and Latinos

did the same, and that for every European who immigrated in the 1980's, 8.02 Asian and Latinos did the same.

The more recent statistics are even more alarming to the custodians of the Western Civilization. According to the most recent statistics about the state of California, a principal target of Asian and Latino immigration, by the year 2040, some 70% of the total population will consist of Asians, Pacific Islanders, non-Hispanic Blacks, and Hispanic. The non-Hispanic whites will figure not more than 30% of the total population. Thirty years ago, in 1970 and at the commencement of the new wave of labor migration, the demographic configuration was exactly the opposite. The racially categorized and culturally constituted Whites were close to 80% of the population, while Asian and Pacific Islanders a little more than 20%.⁸

These demographic changes, and the even more drastic changes that they are anticipating, began to alarm the defenders of the Western Civilization that their very civilizational identity was at risk. It was all but inevitable that the material basis of the evidence will soon assume cultural and civilizational terms of debate. North America, as the latter-day extension of Western Civilization, was losing ground to alien cultures and civilizations.

Before the Storm

Before we read the signs of civilizational debate rising in the 1980's at the wake of these demographic changes, it is quite instructive to look at an essay like Northrop Frye's on Oswald Spengler's *The Decline of the West* (1974) and see

how it is almost completely devoid of any contemporary reference. Frye examines Spengler's book for a special issue of *Daedalus* dedicated to "Twentieth-Century Classics" with a cool and care-free language of a great academic intellectual. He in fact at one point notes with admiration the prolonged influence of Spengler:

What seems to me most impressive about Spengler is the fact that everybody does accept his main thesis in practice, whatever they think or say they accept. Everybody thinks in terms of a "Western" culture to which Europeans and Americans belong; everybody thinks of that culture as old, not young; everybody realizes that its most striking parallels are with the Roman period of Classical culture; everybody realizes that some crucial change in our way of life took place around Napoleon's time The decline, or aging, of the West is as much a part of our mental outlook today as the electron or the dinosaur, and in that sense we are all Spenglerians.⁹

That bit of scholarly precision and its accompanying historical memory, that the very idea of "The West" is of a very recent vintage, completely disappears from the horizon of the generation of radical right that Huntington will soon come to represent.

Clouds Gather

More than a decade after the publication of that essay by Northrop Frye, the massive demographic changes in the United States had threatened to tear apart the very assumption of a cultural fabric that held the whole together. The first prominent alarm was sounded by Allan Bloom in his *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education*

has failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students (1987). The book became a sensational bestseller in the United States. Saul Bellow wrote a laudatory introduction to his fellow-Chicagoan and used the example of his own *Herzog* to remind his contemporary American readers how illiterate they were and how erudite he and Allan Bloom are. Bloom's own prolonged essay was a highfalutin, old-professoriate, bickering about how illiterate the students are and that they no longer make them the way they used to. Democracy was in danger because the students no longer entered the university with a minimum that their professors could expect. We foreign professors were particularly to blame, so were critical theories from Europe, and so were the universities that were catering to Women and Gender Studies, or Black Studies, etc. Bloom's regret was that "It is difficult to imagine that there is either the wherewithal or the energy within the university to constitute or reconstitute the idea of an educated human being and establish a liberal education again."¹⁰

Not an iota of critical intelligence ever alerts Bloom in this diatribe as to what exactly could have happened in the world that suddenly the IQ of his students in Chicago plummeted so drastically. There was either something constitutionally flawed in the human gene pool after the 1960's or there must have been another explanation. It never occurred to Bloom and Co. that the student body they were facing in their classrooms in Chicago or elsewhere in the major metropolitan areas of the United States was constitutionally different from those on the same campuses generations earlier. It never occurred to Bloom that the very idea and ideal of

“an educated human being” or a “liberal education” were fabrications of very specific period and purpose; that the material bases that had articulated those moral ideals had now drastically changed from those that had occasioned the Enlightenment modernity; that those very material mutations had now resulted in a situation that if Bloom and Bellow were jointly given a brand new laptop computer and told that their dear lives depended on their opening it up, plugging it in, and then accessing the internet (with unfathomable vistas of knowledge immediately at their finger-tips) they would be in very grave danger; and yet any one of these illiterate students of his would sing and dance in and out a software in a way that would make Bloom and Bellow’s heads spin. Different material realities and thus *different* literacy.

The antiquarianism of Bloom was responding to the frustrating experience when a Professor’s knowledge becomes utterly irrelevant to the world in which he is supposed to teach and thus he begins to blame the world. Soon after the publication of Bloom’s diatribe, Robert L. Stone edited a collection of essays, *Essays on the Closing of the American Mind* (1989), collectively celebrating Bloom’s diagnosis.¹¹ What becomes evident in this collection of essays is a collective orchestration of conservative will to adhere to those outdated ideals by way of condemning the world that has no longer any use for those ideals. Both Bloom and his accolades categorically fail to establish a link between precisely those ideals of a “liberal education” and “an educated human being” and the catastrophic consequences of the selfsame project that engendered and cele-

brated them: That the Enlightenment had the Holocaust in its belly and colonialism in its trail. By delegating Holocaust to an evil accident and framing colonialism out of the picture, Bloom is symptomatic of an innocent liberalism that becomes particularly incensed when students no longer read the Plato and Rousseau that he has translated and that, *horribile dicto*, could not care less.

Allan Bloom's bestseller unleashed an avalanche of similar attacks by the American right. Charles J. Sykes wrote *Profscam: Professors and the Demise of Higher Education* in 1988, Peter Shaw *The war Against the Intellect: Episodes in the Decline of Discourse* in 1989. Soon followed Roger Kimball's *Tenured Radicals: How Politics Has Corrupted Our Higher Education* (1990) and Page Smith's *Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America* (1990). Charles J. Sykes did not feel satisfied by one stab, so he came back with another, *The Hollow Man: Politics and Corruption in Higher Education* in 1990. Dinesh D'Souza followed suit with his *Illiberal education: The Politics of Race and Sex on Campus* in 1991. William Bennett made a splash with his *De-Valuing of America: The Fight for Our Culture and Our Children* in 1992. Martin Anderson went for the juggernaut in his *Imposters in the Temple: America Intellectuals are Destroying Our Universities and Cheating Our Students of Their Future* in 1992. Richard Bernstein caught up with the band wagon in 1994 with his *Dictatorship of Virtue: Multiculturalism and the Battle for America's Future*. What is immediately evident about these texts is of course their very colorful titles and subtitles, jour-

nalistic, bombastic, combative in their verbosity. The nervous meltdown was electrifying in late 1980's, early 1990's.

The sum total of all these combative arguments was that the American higher education had been destroyed by a corrupt professoriate, an illiterate student body, and a complacent administration. But while Bloom's book opened the complaints and suggestion box of the American Right one contemptuous volume after another, the picture became clearer with the opening of another front.

It was only two years after the publication of Bloom's *Closing of the American Mind*, and in the middle of the collapse of the Eastern block, that Francis Fukuyama's essay "The End of History" (1989) appeared in the *National Interest*. We in fact know that it was none other than Allan Bloom himself who in the same year that *The Closing of the American Mind* appeared extended an invitation to Fukuyama to come to his John M. Onlin Center for Inquiry into the Theory and Practice of Democracy at the University of Chicago to deliver the essay that would later be known as "The End of History."¹² Now, the agenda of Bloom's book is ostensibly domestic, whereas the target of Fukuyama's book is blatantly foreign. If there were to be one corroborating evidence that these two collapse in the overriding agenda of the American right to prevent the massive demographic change to take its natural course it is this very invitation. Otherwise what would the author of the most critical diatribe against American higher education have to do with the coroner of the End of History and the appearance of the Last Man?

Fukuyama did nothing more than taking Bloom's domestic battle to foreign territories. As the great custodians of the Western Civilization (a bit odd for Fukuyama, but there it is), both Bloom and Fukuyama were frightened witless of the massive demographic changes that had driven Peter Brimelow to drop all pretensions to civility and expose his racism. Fukuyama's categorical claim that The West had won the game and that the game was over, the end of history in sight and the very last man upon us, were all universal claims to a fictitious foreign audience to settle the account right here domestically and declare the culture war over and moot. If the West had won globally, then how imbecilic would be to compromise its very validity domestically. The massive demographic changes caused by decades of labor migration were palpable on American campuses. The presumed superiority, indeed the very supposition, of "The Western Civilization," was being radically debated right here in the middle of what Bloom likes to think of as the flowering achievement of its Hegelian promise. To claim victory for Bloom's *civil war*, Fukuyama called the *global game over*.

Beyond Bloom, Fukuyama, and Co., the American University campuses remained the focus of critical attention throughout the 1990's. The higher education became the barometer of a much larger reality: The massive material changes at the very heart of the greatest achievement of the Western Civilization. What was at stake was much more than the presumed illiteracy of the new generation. That was only a decoy. By far the most distinguished intervention in the early 1990's was by the prominent historian of Christian

dogma Jaroslav Pelikan who in his *The Idea of the University: A Reexamination* (1992) updated Cardinal Newman's mid-Nineteenth century defense of the autonomy of the institution. Pelikan's elegant argument, like its distinguished predecessor and model, remained Platonically above and beyond the mundane materiality of the evidence and argued passionately, as Newman had done a century and a half earlier, for production of knowledge for knowledge sake. It was quite accidental that in the very same year that Pelikan produced this passionate defense of the autonomy of the academic life, Sigmund Diamond's *Compromised Campus: The Collaboration of Universities with the Intelligence Community, 1946-1955* (1992) appeared and put the distinguished Yale Professor's argument in the context of the most mundane realities. In Diamond's brilliant documentation of Harvard and Yale collaboration with FBI during the darkest days of McCarthyism, the material basis of a modern university are fully exposed.

The Center Cannot Hold

If there were any illusion as to what exactly was at issue in these campus battles they were eradicated with the publication of Arthur Schlesinger Jr.'s *The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society* (1992). In this book Schlesinger clearly outlined what the real battle was. He went against multiculturalism with a vengeance. He warned that the new wave of immigrants were threatening the very fabric of the Union, and that their identity politics was disruptive of the very ideals of the United States. Bilin-

gualism and Afrocentrism were targeted for his particular attention. As a former assistant to President Kennedy and an advocate of FDR's New Deal, Schlesinger saw no parity between what the new immigrants were doing to the nation and his liberal ideals. The "Schlesinger's Syllabus," 13 books that he considered "indispensable to an understanding of America," was his program of action to incorporate and assimilate the new wave of immigrants back into the bosom of the founding fathers. *The Federalist Papers*, Tocqueville's *Democracy in America*, *Uncle Tom's Cabin*, *The Adventures of Huckleberry Finn*: These were among the books that the new immigrants had to read.¹³

But the crisis on Schlesinger, Fukuyama, and Bloom's hands was much more critical than they could handle. Not only the wave of history was against them, but the changing shape of the globe and its implications for the very idea of "American" were now translated into extraordinarily eloquent voices *inside* the United States. Voices at once subtle and critical, coming at times from unexpected corners. One such eloquent voice was that of Lawrence W. Levine who took Bloom and Co. to such a magnificent task in his *The Opening of the American Mind: Canons, Culture, and History*. With perspicacity, wisdom, and a brilliant historical imagination, Levine celebrated in joy where Bloom and Co. were mourning in horror:

The historical pattern of American higher education (...) has been toward increasing openness, greater inclusiveness, expanded choice, the study of the modern as well as the ancient, a concentration on American, African and Asians well as European culture. These have not been inventions of our own time; they have not resulted

from the plots of the New Left activists, the chauvinism of Afrocentrists, the philistinism of unsophisticated, gullible students, or the Machiavellianism of crafty faculty. This pattern has been the result of fundamental changes in the nature and composition of our society and has emanated from continuous encounters with those who have held a more fixed, Eurocentric, past-oriented, hierarchical conception of education.¹⁴

But even Levine is limited here in his conception of the “American” as he tries to rescue it from the Radical Right. Far more serious challenges were in the offing. Consider Catherine A. Lutz and Jane L. Collins’ *Reading National Geographic* (1993). This was a brilliant study by an anthropologist and a sociologist who documented in impressive detail the insidious function of an innocent-looking institution like the National Geographic in constituting the very idea of the “American” as *normal* by abnormalizing the rest of the world into the exotic window of a museum at best and a zoo at worst. The implication of Lutz and Collins’ study was much more radical than even they were willing to articulate. But even in their guarded and conservative estimation the whole Pandora Box of negational constitution of the “American” identity as an extension of the European and the flowering achievement of the Western Civilization were challenged. That challenge had obvious implications for the new wave of immigrants. It added theoretical force to their material evidence that they had an organic right to reconstitute their living space and recast the Schlesinger’s list, talk back to Bloom, and reach for their pillow every time they heard of Fukuyama.

Of the same force and magnificence was Ronald A. T. Judy's *DisForming the American canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the Vernacular* (1993). This single volume very innocently introduced a blatantly evident but categorically excluded element in the making of the "American" narrative as an extension of the "European" and its Enlightenment Reason. Through a careful examination of African-American slave narratives written in Arabic, Judy quietly disrupted the canonicity of the Enlightenment as the singular achievement of Western Civilization. Judy argued that through the intermediary of the Arabic text the African slaves had access to a mode of self-representation categorically independent of the European Enlightenment and its exclusive claim to Reason. Judy's daring imagination eloquently argued for a reconstitution of the very idea of the American literary nationalism which is far more global and inclusive in its defining moments.

Judy's exposition of Kant's negrophobia was a critical move in disarming the very author of "What is the Enlightenment." Judy celebrated the indivisibility of *Ben Ali's Diary*, its having been written in Arabic, by an African, in the condition of servitude, negritude, dismissal. In the eloquent words of Wahneema Lubiano's introduction, Judy's text is

a surgical critique of Kant's inability to "reason" away the Negro's being; a mapping of the means by which Douglass's narrative strips Kant's veil of rationality away from the xenophobia that undermines his project; a sustained analysis of one of Black studies's founding moments and its relation to the incredibly "interested" nature of academic knowledge production, circulation, and legitimation; an evisceration of Allan Bloom, his genealogy, and his

progeny; an engagement with the reconstructionists intervention in African American literary studies; a serious—and often productive—reading of the Douglass and Equiano narratives; and finally, the recovery of an African-Arabic American slave narrative and the deconstruction of its literary history.¹⁵

But Judy has an agenda far more radical than just adding yet another, albeit in a “foreign” language, slave narrative to the model established by Douglass and theorized by Henry Louis Gates Jr. He means, and he delivers, to destroy the whole sub-categorical canonicity of the “slave-narrative” as a knowable referent. He means, and he delivers, to prevent the mutation of the defiant fact of a slave’s reality from the constitutionally compromising categorization of it into a literary narrative.

These were not ordinary moments in American history, and these were not negligible waves in academic fascination with one theory or another. There was a perfect correspondence between these revolutionary ideas and the material shifts in the very basis of the nation. Priscilla Wald’s *Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form* (1995) shook the very assumption of who these “We the People” are who have constituted the Americans at their very constitutional inauguration.¹⁶ Wald read carefully through Frederick Douglass’s autobiography, *My Bondage and My Freedom*, Herman Melville’s *Pierre*, Harriet Wilson’s *Our Nig*, W. E. B. Dubois’ *The Souls of Black Folk*, and Gertrude Stein’s *The Making of Americans* in order to shatter the metaphysical presence invested in the very constitution of the term “American.” “Douglass’s analogue calls attention to both the literariness of United States na-

tionalism and the importance of literature to the project of nation-building. That was also the explicit and resounding message of self-proclaimed literary nationalists who called upon authors to articulate a cultural identity for the imagined community.”¹⁷ In such splendid detail documenting the function of an amorphous narrative constitution of the very idea of a nation were not exactly reassuring for the custodians of the most advanced achievement of the Western Civilization.

What Donald E. Pease achieved in his edited volume, *National Identities and Post-Americanism Narratives* (1994), was even more radical in its explicit findings. Pease brought together a collection of groundbreaking essays that successively destructed the very conception of an “American” narrative in which the conception of the American *identity* is predicated on a constellation of non-American *alterities*. By divesting from an array of constructed categories—the Women, the Blacks, the Foreigners, the Homeless—any claim to membership, the nationalizing narratives have in effect constituted the “American” by a radical demarcation of the non-American. The post-nationalist, post-Americanism argument that emerges from Pease’s volume destroys the very assumption of any categorical claim to a national culture and a universal civilization to which the Americans can belong. Pease’s volume is one of the most accurate description of how a national narrative is artificially and politically assembled and how its dismantling conceptually corresponds to the material shifts long suppressed by the dominant ideologies of Americanism. In his brilliant contribution to this volume, “Nationalism,

Hypercanonization, and *Huckleberry Finn*,” Jonathan Arac demonstrated the extraordinary fixation of American literary nationalism on a handful of characterizing texts at the expense of a vast array of possibilities made impossible by an over-nervous literary identity politics.

(. . .) *Huckleberry Finn* is famous for bringing crucial moral issues to bear on and in the psyche of its protagonist, yet this, too, is a further centering; the form and fable of *Huckleberry Finn* rejects the very possibility of public debate. After the political failures that had led to the Civil War, after the political failures that had brought Reconstruction to an end, Twain’s literary narrative takes the obliquity of radical ellipsis (...) Huck Finn lives so as to feel right with no sanction beyond his own psyche, the imaginative construction of an autonomous self is the cultural work of literary narrative.”¹⁸

The construction of that autonomous self has been central to the entire project of not just nation-building and its historical agency but to the very national culture which is to authorize that agency.

The destruction of the millennium-old assumption of national cultures as placed within a universal (Western) civilization was not limited to any single country, nor was its implications confined to dismantling only the hegemonic power of the Western Civilization. Derek Gregory’s *Geographical Imagination* (1994) went for a far more vital juggernaut and with a single stroke of scholarly imagination revealed the very constitution of geography not just as a power-basing discipline but as a colonial discourse. Gregory demonstrated how the fabrication of imaginative space is in fact constitutional to categorical thinking. What we learn from Gregory’s study is the organic link of historical

narratives, intellectual genealogies, philosophical teleologies, as the most evident example, to the centrality of an imaginative landscape in the creative memory. What emerges from Gregory's groundbreaking work is the organic link between geographical imagination, the colonial constitution of power, and the production of vested knowledge.

Now Enter Huntington and Co.

None of these radically destructive interventions, representing a much larger philosophical dislocation identified with poststructuralism and postmodernism, could have gone unnoticed by the self-appointed custodians of the Western Civilization who saw their privileged position as the sole defining voice of a cultural polity which was being radically challenged. It is precisely in this context and against this movement that Samuel P. Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?" (1993) ought to be read and understood. Its apparent global audience is an entirely bogus decoy to conceal the deep anxiety of its domestic concerns. The massive movement of labor and capital has radically challenged the Nineteenth century invention of the nation-state as the optimum unit of economic operation and as Saskia Sassen, among others, has extensively demonstrated the notion of national sovereignty in the age of globalization is now the most critical task facing the outdated nation-states.¹⁹

People like Huntington, with their impeccable racist records dating back all the way to Vietnam War, are now

threatened by the evident change in the demographic composition of a nation they thought was God's gift to Western Civilization. When the spellbinding movement of labor and capital has totally confused the national boundaries and the fabrication of national cultures, Huntington goes up-stream, as it were, to catch the movement at a higher level of abstraction. In this endeavor he is capably aided by other reactionary intellectuals, organic to the hegemonic supposition of the Western Civilization, far more learned and erudite in their command of their craft.

Harold Bloom's *The Western Canon* (1994) was a Miltonian reassertion of power as to who and what counts in the Western Canon.²⁰ Bloom was dauntless against the onslaught of an army of nemesis he identified as Multiculturalism, Feminism, Marxism, or Afrocentricism. He championed himself as the defender of taste and of aesthetics autonomous of ideology. The rhetoric of Bloom's account of the Western Canon is inundated with exclusionary jabs like "our culture" and "our Western literary tradition." He lamented with Yates that "the center has not held" and that "mere anarchy" is upon the world. The confusion about Bloom is to collapse some of the greatest literary achievements in the world into the abstraction of "The Western Canon." We as a result learn that indeed Shakespeare is a great dramatist and that he belongs to the "The Western Canon." The false dichotomy between which Bloom inserts his diatribe is that good literature is either part of the Western, or even Eastern, Canon, foregrounding a civilization, or else we are illiterate philistines who do not, cannot, and will not read these masterpiece and opt for cultural studies. It

never occurs to the great Bloom that one can read Shakespeare and Dante and love them as much as he does and still kick the very notion of canonicity and the foregrounding of civilizational thinking royally, that one can revolt against the tyranny of any power precisely on the premise of the creative imagination that Homer and Ferdowsi, Virgil and Abu Nuwas, Goethe and Hafez map out. That he does not know the second half of every pair I listed is not the issue. At issue is the self-centralizing powers of civilizational thinking that with all his readings in the Western canon Bloom is yet to learn from a good piece of creative imagination.

The sorts of issues that Harold Bloom was raising were not limited to academic circles. David Denby's *Great Books: My Adventures with Homer, Rousseau, Woolf, and other Indestructible Writers of the Western World* (1996) clearly indicated that there is a massive contingency in the market that even a journalist could exploit.²¹ The need to protect the Western Civilization now assumed a sizeable social basis. Canonicity was no longer a matter of literary or philosophical debate. What the epithet "Indestructible Writers of the Western World" militantly put forward was the iconic status of these texts, their standing for something else, their safeguarding the best in the Western Civilization.

People like Denby were of course right in their commercial estimation that vapid reminiscences about Western Canons sell. The conservative crusade to save the Western Civilization had now assumed a widespread proportion that embraced very odd couples. It was not just people like Brimelow whose racism is underlined by a remarkable historical illiteracy and ignorance of the circumstances that in-

stigate global migration of capital and labor, but public intellectuals of a far superior and fairer nature equally failed to understand the constitutional forces at work in massive demographic changes from the periphery of capitalist Cosmopolis to its centers, challenging the very metaphor of a center and a periphery to the gyration of capital and labor. Richard Rorty's *Achieving Our Country* is one such regrettable evidence of a lifetime record of admirable academic and political career to come to such tribalist *cul-de-sac*. With admirable tenacity and liberal-minded fairness, Rorty asks for a return to the tradition of democratic intellectual labor of Walt Whitman and John Dewey generation. Rorty, who has been one of the most successful American pragmatists in assimilating Continental Philosophy into his revised reading of that American tradition, now cannot resist siding with Harold Bloom in taking a swipe at the "school of resentment" as they call the critical reading of the so-called "Classics." He says that he has "no doubt that cultural studies will be as old hat thirty years from now as was logical positivism thirty years after its triumph."²² He also joins Bloom in prophesying that the "odd blend of Foucault and Marx [is] (...) a very minor episode in the endless history of Platonism."²³ This may indeed be the case. But what Rorty and Bloom have both missed, in Rorty's case much more regrettably, is the constitutional difference between the changing location of the United States in late global capitalism from the time of Whitman and Dewey's. The spiraling chase of labor and capital has resulted in massive migratory patterns in the world. It is not for vacationing in good climate that the flood of legal and illegal immigrants pour from

Africa, Asia and Latin America into Europe and North America. The ever-versatile capital duck them as it may and go and build up factories where they used to live for even cheaper labor, the motion is set in gear. Electronic capitalism now has constitutionally transgressed the very assumption of national boundaries in such radical terms that we can no longer really “achieve our country.”

By the end of the millennium, a spirit of doom and termination pervaded the soul of the American Right and there is no better text to see that sense of nostalgia and decay than in Jacques Barzun’s *From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life* (2000). As one of the most distinguished cultural historians of this century, Barzun has written *From Dawn to Decadence* with a sense of prophetic doom. With a magisterial language at once celebratory and mournful Barzun sets upon himself the obituary task of grieving the demise of the Western Civilization. “It takes only a look at the numbers,” Barzun declares early in his massive volume, “to see that the 20th century is coming to an end. A wider and deeper scrutiny is needed to see that in the West the culture of the last 500 years is ending at the same time. Believing this to be true, I have thought it the right moment to review in sequence the great achievements and the sorry failures of our half millennium.”²⁴ To Barzun the present is decadent, corrupt, misguided, and a failure. The great achievements of the Western Civilization have been made and now is the autumn of its decline, its universal promises undelivered. Barzun notes with curiosity the fact that his possessive “our past” is a problem as to whom exactly it refers to, but whitewashes over it as “that is for each

person to decide.”²⁵ That is the first in a succession of narrative strategies to claim the West for the mighty and the victorious over the last five hundred years with nothing as much as a hint at the catastrophic consequences of “Our Western Civilization” at its home and its abroad. The text as a result is a nostalgic celebration of High European Culture, its art and music, philosophy and literature, sciences and technology. The result a visit to the museum, guided by a world class museum tour guide, knowledgeable of all the dead certainties.

Whence Civilization?

The re-emergence of civilizational thinking at the last two decades of the 20th century and at the heart of capitalist modernity was a defense mechanism, a futile attempt to save the outdated mutation of capital and culture at the commencement of the project. The very categorical constitution of “civilization” is an Enlightenment invention for very specific reasons and objectives. Neither the aristocratic nor the ecclesiastical orders of feudalism and scholasticism thought or practiced in civilizational terms. From Hegel’s *Philosophy of History* to Göthe’s conception of *Weltliteratur* to Herder’s idea of World History, to Kant’s groundbreaking metaphysics of morals, the very conceptual categories of civilizational thinking were coined and set in motion at the commencement of capitalist modernity.

From the dawn of civilizational thinking in Hegel and Herder to the wake of instrumental rationalism in Max Weber, the collapse of the polyvocality of what had not yet

given birth to the very idea of “Europe” as a cultural contingency announced the supra-tribal formation of the “Western Civilization.” “Islam,” as indeed “Africa,” “China” or “India” were simultaneous abstractions invented and animated by project of Orientalism in the speculum of “The West” as the Self of all its Others.

The pre-modern configuration of power in medieval Europe had placed the aristocratic houses and the ecclesiastical orders as the bipolar centers of social order, corresponding with a dynastic historiography (aristocratic) claiming Christendom (ecclesiastical) as its universal frame of reference. At the dawn of the capitalist revolution, the aristocratic and ecclesiastical nuclei of power gradually give way to the rising bourgeoisie and as a result the dynastic history yielded to conceptions of national cultures, while Christendom simultaneously yielded to the idea of Western Civilization, with the rising Enlightenment philosophers replacing the clerical order as intellectuals organic to the new social order.

The idea of the Western *Civilization* at the commencement of capitalist modernity was to the European national *cultures* what Christendom was to dynastic histories during the medieval period. As the rising bourgeoisie replaced in power and prestige both the aristocratic and the ecclesiastical orders, the conceptual legitimacy of dynastic histories and Christendom lost their epistemic credibility to those of national *cultures* and their enframing and emplotment in the Western *Civilization*. Because of its anxiety of class legitimacy, and because it could not genealogically compete either with the aristocratic or with the ecclesiastical orders,

the rising European new class was intuitively drawn to such universal and universalizing abstractions as national *cultures* and universal *civilizations*.

There has been a division of labor to the nature and function of national cultures and their civilizational context. While the national cultures corresponded to national economies as the analytical unit of the economic working of capital, their constructed civilizational context targeted the colonial consequences of the capital. European national cultures were the domestic expressions of the national economic units of the working capital, while the simultaneous construction of the Western Civilization identified and distinguished the constellation of these national capitals and cultures from their colonial consequences.

The European national cultures were the ideological insignia separating the European national economies as the currencies of cultural exchange-value, while the very idea of The Western Civilization was to distinguish the accrued totality of those cultures and economies from their colonial consequences. It is thus not accidental that practically the entire scholarly apparatus at the service of civilizational studies of non-Western civilizations were the handiwork of Orientalism as the intelligence arm of colonialism. Islamic, Indian, or Chinese civilizations were concocted, crafted, documented and textualized from scattered bodies of alternating evidence by successive armies of European Orientalists negationally authenticating the simultaneous construction of the Western civilization. As from Hegel to Herder the idea of The Western Civilization is being crafted, far less illustrious but far more numerous an army of Orien-

talists are mirroring its civilizational others as eastern Civilizations in general and Islamic, Indian, etc. in particular. As the colonial territories are mined to extract the raw material of a massive productive machinery switchboard in European capitals, the same exploitations are at work on the historical memories and evidence of colonized societies to serve the ideological foregrounding of The Western Civilization. Practically all these civilizational mirrors are on the site of the colonial territories of the European capital. They were all constructed to raise the Western Civilization as the normative achievement of world history and lower all others as its abnormal antecedents.

By the sheer force of the European capital, conceptions of national cultures and civilizational constructs is hegemonically adapted in colonial territories with the same force as their economies are being incorporated in to the global force. Very soon in the colonies too dynastic, regional, or tribal histories are carved into national cultures and placed within the civilizational constructs—Islamic, Indian, or Chinese. Iranian, Egyptian, or Turkish cultures are carved out of scattered memories and evidence and placed within the general rubric of the Islamic Civilization. Thus on the colonial territories, fabricated national cultures and civilizational contexts become the sites of hegemonic incorporation into the project of capitalist modernity, though from its colonial end. The more political nationalism functions as a site of resistance to colonialism, the more cultural nationalism incorporates vast bodies of extraterritorial resistances to the project of capitalist modernity. We launch nationalist movements against colonialism just to entrap ourselves ever so

thoroughly in the project, modernized from the colonial end of the capital.

The Islamic civilization did not roll over and play dead to authenticate the Western Civilization. Islam also became the site of sustained ideological resistance to colonialism and called itself the Islamic Ideology. The result was the production of a knowledge industry, a journalistic off-shoot of Orientalism, that began to brand moral and material resistance to imperialism “Islamic Fundamentalism” and use it as a ploy to authenticate the civilizational superiority of The West and the barbaric inferiority of the Rest.

Barnard Lewis continues to authenticate the Islamic Civilization as the supreme civilizational other of the Western Civilization.

Meanwhile native informers as varied as Fouad Ajami, Bisam Tibi, Fatimah Mernisi, and Daryoush Shayegan doubly authenticate the Islamic Civilization having taken a vacation from history. Whereas Al-e Ahmad’s notion of Westoxication was a conceptual fallacy concocted to resist the moral and material hegemony of colonialism, these native informers are there to blame the victim and diagnose a disease.

In this context and in the emerging globality, the metaphoric division of the world into civilizational boundaries and center and periphery no longer are valid. Whether in dialogue or headed for clash, the very practice of civilizational thinking has once again received a new lease on life by Huntington’s generation of nervous reactions to yet to be fully charted consequences of globalization. The move is to pull back the terms of engagement with our present predicament

back to the early nineteenth century when civilizational thinking was first launched in correspondence to the specifics of capital and colonial bifurcation of the world. The move is to place the colonial cultures back where they belong and restore authenticity to the utterly discredited notion of the Western Civilization.

Civilizational dialogue, as indeed civilizational debates, clashes as indeed conversations, is a latter-day collapse into the bare necessity of will to power disguising itself as will to truth, pragmatics of power selling itself as political theory. After the onslaught of the project of modernity and its intelligence arm the Enlightenment, the very idea of “Islam” emerges as the defeated counterpart of the victorious “West.” The two construct became the civilizational Other of each other, as one particular case in the larger teleology between the Western and the eastern civilizations.

Prior to the colonial extension of capitalist modernity, with Orientalism as its intelligence arm, what we know of Islam as an historical practice is the simultaneous polyvocality of its discourse, polylocality of its geographical manifestations, and the polyfocality of its visions. In response to the monolithic instrumentalization of colonialism, Orientalism successfully suppressed this cacophonous configuration and collectively theorized it as one particularly poignant civilizational other of “The West.”

Reversing back to civilizational dialogue or debate, clash or conversation, is to resist ideologically the corroding power of the spiral capital that sells you a pair of Nike whether you take them off before you do your ablutions and

pray in a mosque or put them on to go for a jog in your bikini, so far as you wear them out quickly and go back for another pair.

Reality

At what particular moment in our history does Huntington launch this belated idea of civilizational conflict at us? He is entirely oblivious to the fact that the critical intelligence behind the events such as the Iranian revolution of 1979 is not reducible to its categorical reduction to an Islamic event. His conception of the world, that of an Islamic Revolution included, still operates at the colonial level at which such categorical designations took place. He is completely innocent of the fact that from Edward Said (“The Orient”), to V. Y. Mudimbe (“Africa”), to José Martí (“Latin America”) to Ranajit Guha (“India”), we have long since learnt the specifics of the relation of power under which such categorical terms were invented to dominate. We have resisted all such designations site by site in theoretical articulations, as we have had to resist them on the battlefield of their colonial counterparts.

Huntington’s clahs, as indeed Khatami’s dialogue, of civilizations also come as the reversal ploys of precisely a moment when the rapid globalization of capital flies in the face of such grandiloquent museum relics. They rise and belatedly announce themselves at a time when the torpedo of hurricane Floyd in the Caribbean Sea and its effect on Texas oil refiners can and does fluctuate the volume of “Death to America” chants on the Tehran University soccer field.

Globalization of capital equals the atomization of individuals, their de-cultivation, de-nationalization, de-territorialization, their being expurgated from the political parameters of their historical agency. Under these circumstances, capital and its cultural categories, through such instrumental mechanisms as CNN and its successful mutation of capital as culture, becomes the naked nerve of Oedipalization independent of all cultural constitutions of father or creative sites of resistance to them.

Formation of national cultures and civilizational contexts of those cultures was the ideological by-product of a specific period in the operation of capital. In that nascent configuration of forces and relations of production, the aggressive formation of national economies was the optimal unitary basis for the working of the capital and its colonial consequences. National economies and national cultures were first concocted at the metropolitan centers of the capital and then gradually extended into the colonial consequences of the project.

Civilizational thinking was a European Enlightenment project to give its rising bourgeoisie a universal frame of collective identity. "The Western Civilization" gave universal identity to European national cultures. German, French, or British cultures were particular manifestations of , so the story unfolded, "The Western Civilization." While national cultures were concocted to distinguish one economic unit of capital from another, civilizational thinking was invented to unify these cultures against their colonial consequences. Islamic, Indian, or African civilizations were invented contrapuntally by Orientalism, as the intelligence arm of co-

lonialism, in order to match, balance, and thus authenticate “The Western Civilization.”

All-non-Western civilizations were invented exactly as such, as negational formulations of the Western, thus authenticating the Western. But there was much more to these non-Western civilization than simply to authenticate the Western negationally. Hegel subjected all his preceding human history into civilizations stages leading to the Western civilization, thus in effect infantilizing, Orientalizing, exoticizing, and abnormalizing the entire human history as preparatory stages towards their implicated spiritual goal. As colonial nationalism aped and replicated nationalism of the capital at the European centers of the project, so did Islamic or Indian civilizations mirrored, though in a contorted image, the principiality of “The Western Civilization.”

Both the formation of national cultures and the civilizational framing of them corresponded to a age of capital in which the economic constitution of national economies were the optimal unitary operation of economic production. At the threshold of the 21st century, the selfsame capital has evolved in the global logic of its operation and the unitary basis of national economies no longer can serve as the currency of its operation. The circular spiral of capital and labor has now so ferociously destroyed the artificial national boundaries of its own making not more than 200 years ago that it is no longer possible for any claim to national economy to have a legitimate claim on operation. The result is the aggressive acculturation of individuals from their national economies and national cultures, as they are being

thrown into an entirely new configuration of capital and its culture.

A quick look at the United States, which is by far the most aggressively mutated national economy and national culture reveals that we can no longer think of this country as having a claim over either a national economy or a national culture. The influx of the migratory labor into the United States has initially created a so-called multicultural society to which conservative thinkers like Huntington, Fukuyama, Bloom, Barzun, etc. have violently reacted. Huntington's thesis of the clash of civilization is a disturbed reaction to this phase of cultural confusion at the heart of the globalizing capital. What he does not understand is that he is quite late in responding, and that he is responding to something already on its way to change. His real heart break is yet to come. This so-called multicultural phase to which Huntington and Co, have responded so violently is only a transitory period in the modular reconfiguration of capital and labor. The real fire-work is yet to come. This transitory multiculturalism we witness today in the United States or the Western Europe will soon give way to the logic of the globalizing capital that has already entered its electronic phase. Asian and Latinos in the United States, South Asians in England, the Turks in Germany, the Indians and Koreans in the Persian Gulf, etc., are now the prime examples a global migratory movement that will utterly shatter not only the unit of national economy but also its constituent conception of national cultures. From the new configuration of the global capital and labor the material basis of a new culture will soon emerge that is neither nationally cultural nor recogniz-

ably multicultural. That material reconfiguration of capital and labor will generate its own culture which will be at once post-national and as a result post-civilizational.

National cultures like Iran or their civilizational categories like Islam have an equally antiquarian claim to outdated conceptions of culture and civilization. With a lag-time constitutional to their secondary nature, they to are drawn, willy-nilly, into the bosom of the globalizing capital and its emerging culture. In the inherent logic of the new configuration of capital and its corresponding culture it no longer matters if one lives in Tehran or New York, speaks Persian or English, practices Islam, Judaism, or Christianity. What matters is the particular location in the universal operation of capital at work in articulating its own corresponding culture.

Notes

1. Published in the *International Sociology*, September 2001, v. 16, n. 3, p. 361-8.
2. See Huntington's "The Clash of Civilizations?", in *Foreign Affairs*, 72,3 (Summer 1993).
3. See Samuel P. Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996.
4. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man*. New York, The Free Press, 1992.
5. Huntington, 1996: 102.
6. See Roy P. Mottahedeh, "The Clash of Civilizations: An Islamicist Critique," *Harvard Middle Eastern and Islamic Review* 2 (1995), 2: 1-26.
7. From "Immigrants Admitted by Country or Region of Birth," Fiscal Years 1950-1993, *Statistical Yearbook of the Immigration and Na-*

- turalization Services*, 1992, Immigration and naturalization Service, US Department of Justice.
8. See Todd S. Purdum's report, "Shift in the Mix Alters the Face of California," in *The New York Times*, 4 July 2000.
 9. See Northrop Frye, "*The Decline of the West* by Oswald Spengler," *Daedalus*, "Twentieth-Century Classics Revisited," Winter 1974, p. 1- 13.
 10. See Allan Bloom, *The Closing of the American Mind: How Higher Education has failed Democracy and Impoverished the Souls of Today's Students*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1987: 380.
 11. See Robert L. Stone (ed), *Essays on the Closing of the American Mind*. Chicago, Chicago Review Press, 1989.
 12. See Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Lat Man*. New York, The Free Press, 1992: ix.
 13. Arthur Schlesinger Jr., *The Disuniting of America : Reflections on a Multicultural Society*. New York, W. W. Norton, 1998.
 14. Lawrence W. Levine, *The Opening of the American Mind: Canon, Culture, and History*. Boston, Beacon Press, 1996: 170.
 15. Ronald A. T. Judy, *DisForming the American canon: African-Arabic Slave Narratives and the Vernacular*. Foreword by Wahneema Lubiano. Minneapolis, University of Minneapolis Press, 1993: xv-xvi.
 16. Priscilla Wald, *Constituting Americans: Cultural Anxiety and Narrative Form*. Durham, Duke University Press, 1995.
 17. Wald 1995: 105.
 18. See Jonathan Arac, "Nationalism, Hypercanonization, and Huckleberry Finn," in Donald E. Pease *National Identities and Post-Americanism Narratives*. Durham, Duke University Press, 1994: 33.
 19. See for example Saskia Sassen's *Losing Control: Socerignty in an Age of Globalization*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1996.
 20. See Harold Bloom's *The Western Canon*. New York, Harcourt Brace & Company, 1994.
 21. See David Denby, *Great Books: My Adventures with Homer. Rousseau, Woolf, and other Indestructible Writers of the Western World*. New York, Simon and Schuster, 1996.

22. Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country*. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1998: 132.
23. Rorty 1998: 138.
24. Jacques Barzun, *From Dawn to Decadence: 1500 to the Present: 500 Years of Western Cultural Life*. New York, Harper Collins, 2000: ix.
25. Barzun 2000: xiii.



Hegemony and the Return of Difference

Hégémonie et réification de la différence: Les sous-médiations au travail

Candido Mendes

Contradiction et différence

Le 11 septembre força une prise de conscience universelle quant à la radicalité de la cassure de l'enjeu des pouvoirs sur la scène globale. La catastrophe, cependant, n'aurait fait qu'ajouter la seule véhémence pour accélérer une brisure fondamentale, déjà entérinée par l'inconscient collectif de notre temps (Baudrillard, 2004a, p. 23). C'est ce qui découlerait de soi-même, des jeux accomplis à la longue durée de l'exploit civilisateur, porté à l'expropriation de l'âme ou de la subjectivité dressée au-delà des frontières naturelles de l'Occident. La guerre antiterroriste ne fit que précipiter le développement hégémonique face aux vieilles dominations classiques; elle ne fit qu'éclaircir cette nouvelle condition d'un monde unipolaire, sans retournement possible, ni compromis capable d'assurer un équilibre de contrôle tel que celui pourvu par l'ancienne dépendance organique coloniale.

L'attentat battait de tout son plein ce rejet de l'Occident, misé sur la plus auguste de ses cibles. Mais il s'amenuisait déjà, dans cette levée dans le monde qui couvrait le plus large

des ressentiments historiques à longue échéance, de façon plus ou moins nette, pour faire exploser la contradiction entre le procès civilisateur et le culturel d'où naquit la tension même de la modernité. L'Iran de Khomeyni permit le contraste dramatique requis pour le départ de cette révolusion en haine. Le régime du Shah atteignit le maximum de ces dépaysements subjectifs d'où se double, faisant écrouler implacablement le système d'auparavant, ses valeurs et sa visée identitaire. A la fin du siècle dernier, la percée des mollahs constituait exactement le contraste radical avec cet accueil d'Occident obtenu par Atatürk dans la Turquie islamique, entre les deux guerres mondiales. La révolution khomeyniste reprit, à l'envers, ce même chemin et décela cette filière dialectique d'un rejet, qui dépassait de loin tous les motifs évidents de contrôle économique ou politique, pour en cerner le malaise en son propre cœur comme sentiment diffus, mais non moins percutant, du déracinement historique qu'apportait l'Occident sous l'idéologie du progrès, rompu à toute concession. A partir de la viabilité de ce résultat — et de l'exécration subie par le nouveau gouvernement de Téhéran vis-à-vis du monde occidental — la confrontation ne se détacha plus de son vrai signifiant. De plus en plus, les attentats marquaient de la plus cruelle des signatures le niveau du conflit et l'aspect de déferlement continu par lequel un monde soumis à l'empiètement civilisateur trouverait en l'islam la toile de fond encore intègre pour commencer à parer le coup. Et à le faire, sans aucun doute, par une filière de gestes sans délai ni répit, comme une résistance débutant en pure praxis ouverte et premier éveil brutal de conscience expropriée.

Terrorisme et rejet de civilisation

La suite des attaques à la puissance occidentale ne put montrer toute l'ampleur radicale de sa protestation. Elle est confuse dans son prime abord et sa force symbolique première, ayant fait sauter le dernier étage du même WTC de 1999. Les attentats contre les ambassades américaines en Tanzanie et au Quénia, l'explosion du "Cole" au Yémen, en ont frôlé l'envergure, sans montrer, tout de suite, l'ampleur du conflit déchaîné et le dépassement, dans le message meurtrier continu, d'une demande, nette ou négociable, de leurs prétentions (Clarke, 2004, p. 222 ss). Elles montaient vers le degré maximum de la confrontation, passée au dénominateur d'un rejet de l'Occident en rôle d'extermination. Les acteurs à l'œuvre ne cachèrent pas le nom du collectif mis en marche, ou la présomption de le faire en son nom: celui d'une culture de retour aux dimensions totalisantes d'un credo mobilisateur des guerres saintes, non en tant que missionnaires d'antan, mais revenus comme Jihads défensifs aux remparts d'une authenticité, à la fois redécouverte dans ses dimensions plurinationales, et perçue comme menacée par ce progrès vu chaque fois, davantage, comme équivoque, en dépassant l'empoigne — et l'idéologie — d'une culture qui se dédoubla en civilisation et technologie conquérante du monde de la modernité.

La désignation de terrorisme immédiatement assumée pour indiquer les agresseurs des tours de Manhattan reflétait, en fait, cet ennemi innommable et abstrait, porté par une violence radicale, au-delà de tout apaisement ramené à la culture des conflits et de ses possibles communications. Au niveau des grands rythmes historiques, l'accélération du 11

septembre fit devancer l'agresseur sur la toile de fond, où la chute du WTC mettrait en dernière confrontation l'islam (Hall, 1992, p. 94), et dans le répertoire déjà connu de l'Histoire, une guerre de religion mise au compte d'un terrorisme, ainsi appelé opérationnellement comme étant l'agresseur embusqué, tous azimuts, du 11 septembre.

En effet, cette architecture pour le conflit global était dépassée par la façon selon laquelle, en partant pour la guerre contre la terreur, l'Occident s'assumait en tant que culture globale arrivée à un pouvoir hégémonique et capable de refaire le monde selon les exigences du marché, de ses règles d'action de sens, sa réification de la subjectivité consummatrice, vouée aux échelles sans merci de l'affluence, ses bénéficiaires, ses parias.

Hégémonie et simulacre

Il ne faudrait plus penser à un retour en arrière — des guerres d'Afghanistan ou d'Iraq, à la normalité préalable — car c'est, justement, l'état de la dynamique de l'univers qui a changé de qualité. Les fumées de la chute des tours permettaient de passer à la pulsion défensive-agressive où s'étalerait l'hégémonie, sans avoir besoin de manifester sa logique profonde, face aux mobilisations de la vieille guerre des États Nationaux pour parer au conflit émergent. Elle passerait aux dynamiques de la préemption; ou de rapt de subjectivités par le virtuel du nouvel ordre des choses, et des relations, devenues simulacres, entre le centre et le reste de la nouvelle expression de pouvoir. Donc, la nouvelle confrontation ne peut être proposée que comme un mode terminal, du point de vue de l'annulation des antagonistes. Mais

l'anéantissement de l'ennemi implique, également, dans ce long terme rétréci par la catastrophe du 11 septembre. la modification tranchante des rapports avec la réalité qu'implique la frontière virtuelle. Elle répond à un marché limité par les pouvoirs de l'hégémonie, la conformation imposée au subjectif, la lecture du monde en simulacre et en modèle. Il s'agirait de reconnaître le dépassement des premières réifications liées, seulement, à un début d'avènement de la nouvelle réalité, en tant que civilisation de la consommation, où le monde des complémentarités technomorphes n'avait pas encore anéanti la différence. Ce ne serait qu'avec le déclic de l'hégémonie que la polarité unilatérale du nouvel univers passerait à la réification radicale du subjectif (Baudrillard, 2004a, p. 31). La catastrophe obligea à un premier exercice anticipateur de l'exploit préemptif, employé à l'éviction du comportement adversaire réel avant de se donner, par la même action de prévention et de refonte, à l'architecture de ce monde d'interaction, réglé d'avance et sans chance de reprise par ordre de l'hégémonie.

Au-delà des ressorts historiques de la différence

De toute façon, dans la force radicale de la catastrophe en sa véhémence, c'est par une réponse au fait de la polarisation occidentale que le 11 septembre brouille et anticipe la reconnaissance historique des acteurs de la confrontation. Il amena à une formule sans retour d'énonciation des antagonismes et des porteurs collectivement identifiables d'un renvoi de perspectives, d'une négation ou d'un rejet, susceptibles d'arriver au ressort dialectique d'une histoire. Il n'est pas question uniquement d'entendre jusqu'où, avec le

dépassement des rapports linéaires de domination — dont le Mur de Berlin représenterait la dernière archéologie des vis-à-vis — disparaissait la vision d'une paix et de sa culture — telle que celle faite à la fin du XX^e siècle comme condition présumée d'une coexistence de systèmes, de contrepoids supportables, de leur hétérogénéité. Les rapports dialectiques ne s'estompent pas seulement, ils s'annulent et se perdent dans le monde de l'hégémonie. Toute lecture antérieure des antagonismes en percée, entre le monde de 1989 et celui de l'abat des tours devient obsolète. Il y eut une vraie suture de rapports en tout lien dialectique, à son dernier degré. Il ne s'agirait plus de voir l'opposition développée-sous-développé, pays affluents et régions radicalement exclues, comme des antagonismes, en termes de conscience collective, amenable à une réduction de distances, peut-être à un réglage de totalité (Baudrillard, 2004b, p. 29). La lutte indiscriminée contre la terreur crée un nouveau rapport d'altérité, un clivage sans retour dans la ligne des mobilisations et d'attentes collectives. Il n'est plus question d'espace social interne, pour trouver des ressorts et, par conséquent, des médiations où, au fond, poindrait la notion aménageable de la différence même, comme cette lecture dégradée d'un "plus" ou d'un "moins être", dont les mondes de domination pourraient corriger — toujours avec une bienveillance rationnelle — l'inertie des dynamiques économiques.

Hégémonie et ordre international

Le terrorisme annule l'autre, et le fait de le pourchasser donne au super-pouvoir unique la condition non seulement de riposter mais encore de rendre la guerre préemptive pos-

tulat absolu d'évincement de tout antagoniste. En hégémonie, l'élimination de l'autre dépasse toute vision de la relation dominant/dominé, comme abus toujours réversible. Donc un rapport resté en échange, même si la contrepartie passive se maintenait entièrement dépourvue d'initiative de passer à une stratégie, pour un aménagement du moindre, tel que tous les mouvements périphériques dans le monde pré-hégémonique. Nous ne nous rendons pas encore compte du vide ouvert par la chute des tours, qui a marqué l'avènement d'un véritable nouveau temps social, par cette prise de pouvoir de la toute puissance littérale, qui n'a aucun besoin de ses périphéries, ayant réussi à se rabattre sur sa prospérité endogénique, même si en un premier moment, elle fût encore dépendante des derniers *handicaps* géographiques de son économie continentale. Elle se voit capable de porter ses dynamismes de consommation au-delà des "effets de démonstration", des décalages entre marchés et innovations technologiques, dans une nouvelle rationalité de l'affluence.

La rupture avec la "Belle Époque" des Nations Unies

Le 11 septembre impliqua donc, en contrecoup d'une désuétude historique radicale, des enjeux de l'étreinte de la paix ou de la coopération internationale, arrivés à une première prise de conscience effective, aujourd'hui avortée (Woodward, 2004, p. 179-81). La demande d'un retour à l'ordre de la part des Nations Unies, pour parer au nouveau conflit d'Iraq — désormais irréversible — ne s'avertit pas de cette différence intégrale de qualité proposée par l'hégé-

monie aux jeux de pouvoir. Toute cette perpétuelle attente de réabsorption du post-Saddam se noue de la nostalgie du post-Kosovo et des beaux retours réussis des vieilles guerres. Le spectacle, comme rhétorique de ce pouvoir achevé le 11 septembre fit, par lui-même, le procès de la cassure, et le laissa à la confrontation de la terreur, comme lecture finale et sans retour de la gamme des conflits où se jouèrent les différences permises au moment des dominations et sa “belle époque” au XX siècle. Finis les temps d’entente internationale, en termes d’un partage de prospérité et de compréhension du développement comme la *summa* des cahiers de charges historiques pour parvenir à la déconcentration de la richesse et aux meilleures conditions de vie partageables dans le monde contemporain.

L’hégémonie non seulement élimine toute idée d’un système, en renvoi de complémentarité globale, mais fait de la guerre préemptive la prémisse de sa présence ostensible dans ce monde, fait son reflet par éviction de toute contre-initiative en assurant le règne d’un état idéal, congelé en menace et donc en alerte perpétuelle. Toute la terreur devient diffuse, à jamais. Toute “l’archi-veille”, à l’autre mouvance, rendue à une intrigue négative radicale, ne se soutient que par l’abat continu, d’une anti-histoire, réduite de toute mémoire au sismographe des attentes et des préemptions.

Nous nous trouvons donc, du point de vue d’une économie éventrée dans son vieux système, face à un dynamisme de la défense aux dépenses infinies, incorporés désormais au régime et à l’investissement induit, à jamais, des coûts militaires. La remodelisation suit, sur le terrain, l’occupation, et de plus en plus ses services se tisseraient en producti-

ons stabilisées ou s'estompent le militaire et le civil. Des blanchisseries d'uniformes aux industries de loisir pour des armées laissées sur place, à tout jamais.

L'hégémonie à l'unanimité

L'accroissement de l'engin militaire doit désormais continuer indéfiniment et la décision de le mettre en jeu, ou donc d'exercer la guerre préemptive dans tous les cas et à toute heure, restent une décision unilatérale *urbi et orbi* du gouvernement américain soit-il républicain ou démocrate, et Kerry vient de le proclamer solennellement. Il ne s'agit donc pas uniquement de voir jusqu'où toute tournure politique à Washington ne change en rien une détermination ou une géographie du pouvoir, où l'hégémonie s'est répandue, en simple anticipation par le 11 septembre. Ni de considérer n'importe quel retour *ex ante* à la règle du jeu d'un monde éclaté en tant que système, après la chute des tours. Ni surtout de constater jusqu'où l'intérêt du Salon oval élimine toute co-extensibilité à la classique *salus republicae*, quand Rome n'acceptait les barbares que comme demandeurs, en leur temps, d'une règle laissée à la conversion des confins, anticipés par le ménage provisoire de l'hétérogénéité et d'une différence — en sursis d'impunité dialectique. La vieillesse de l'Empire ne rendrait pas compte de l'acculturation, de la force du "nouveau vin dans de vieilles outres" — dont sont faits les acteurs d'histoire, comme nous les connaissons.

L'hégémonie passe directement à son inertie en aplatissant toutes les anciennes expressions systématiques de pou-

voir, porteuses de différence. Le Salon oval logera, pour jamais et à côté, l'appareil de cette "cyber-sécurité", dont les circuits ne font qu'essayer leur stochastique, et qui ont appris cette configuration par la peur d'un univers départi de la réalité. Commence l'exercice du virtuel, dans des scénarios totalement nouveaux pour se rabattre sur le conflit, l'épuiser dans leur simulation, et surtout empêcher leur fuite perverse comme simulacre. Un nouveau point nodal vide toute carte géographique pour étaler le monde de l'alerte, et à partir de là, la disposition des zones chaudes pour la préemption, où peuvent, pêle-mêle, se ranger terroristes et délaissés de tout ordre, ceux-ci ayant perdu pour toujours les marchandages envers un centre qui, à l'ère cyber-hégémonique, recueille à jamais tout pont-levis. Et comment le reconnâtrons-nous, les territoires à l'écart, repérés dans leur sursaut de violence significative comme terrorisme, laissés aux sommes nulles de ses propres contradictions, déjà prévus par l'excès d'hégémonie, que colmate, dans ses renvois, la stochastique en exercice sans répit de tout futurible? Il n'est plus question de reprendre les scénarios axés sur le monde d'avant le 11 septembre, pour ne voir que l'ancienne politique de complémentarité organique dans la domination portée aux rationalités post-modernes de la prospérité possible, selon la recette d'une mondialisation, pas encore pénétrée par l'ordre des États-Unis bushiens.

La rupture avec les accords de Kyoto ne serait que l'ébranlement de cette fracture croissante, où les nouvelles limites d'une extension continentale de marchés ou de reprise des discriminations des règles des conventions internatio-

nales de l'OMC se joignaient à la refonte des circuits de soumission, soustraits à l'ancien empire d'Orient du monde atlantique, à l'Europe — Byzance. Paris et Berlin sont aujourd'hui entourés d'un même anneau d'Europe de l'Est, que ni fit que volte face à l'ancienne satellisation vis-à-vis de l'Union Soviétique. L'Union Européenne menace de s'avorter, après ce premier élan, qui a vu son âge d'or avec l'adoption de l'euro. Elle fait face à la bi-partition occidentale, ramolli la Fédération par l'alliance prioritaire britannique outre-mer, et l'américanisme des nouveaux patrons outre-Elbe. Le jeu de l'hégémonie, au-delà d'un Occident à deux empires, part du Salon oval, à la frontière ouverte, par la *Patriot Act* au contrôle illimité des marchés soumis par la "Civilisation de la Peur" (Brzezinski, 2004, p. 179).

Monde unipolaire, périphéries glissantes

Les vestiges du vieux monde, laissé à la géographie dépassée où se rangent les périphéries, déploient cette pesanteur historique en perte, désaxée. Il ne faudrait que prévoir le retour à une inertie dans l'arc des pays voués à leur affirmation nationale par le développement. Ils n'en resteraient pas moins les gardiens, quoique fossiles, de la différence, mise en sursis par les chances du gain de l'autodétermination, réussie à la onzième heure. Sur toute la bande atlantique de cet éveil ralenti, une latinité apparaît en tant que référentiel, à contre-pied d'une "volonté d'histoire" issue de l'expérience nationale, en voie d'échec. Les premiers fonds de culture d'une Amérique méditerranéenne hébergeraient l'aventure frustrée, d'un "pour-soi" collectif travaillé par le

début d'autodétermination, ratée? Est-ce que, en perte de confrontation ostensible, avec l'Empire, propre à la force barbare, les périphéries rentrent dans un vide identitaire? Est-ce que un début de différence, propre au dépassement colonial et à l'éveil national se reprendrait vis-à-vis des hégémonies et leurs virtuels sans remparts? Est-ce que ce départ de subjectivité collective, rendue à l'extrême de son inertie, une fois perdu tout regard de l'autre devient prisonnier d'une ipséité stérilisante, dont le châtement final est la réification de la différence? (Mendes, 2004a, p. 25) Ou en cette perte de référentiel, de comparaison et d'exploitation, malgré tout, une altérité est à l'œuvre, et met en marche le dynamisme de contrastes où l'on perçoit une consistance d'affirmation, l'envers l'autre, que suppose le miroir pour le dépasser?

Solipsisme identitaire et créolisation

Le solipsisme identitaire, dans la plongée finale d'un vécu intransitif et en termes de la large histoire des acculturations, répond pour la créolisation des périphéries. Cette espèce de fuite par inertie, dans une pratique identitaire de répétition, est témoin, par toute perte d'horizon à la longue, du passage du communicable à la simplification, presque sémaphorique perdue toute ancienne volonté de différence. Même face au début d'un "en-soi", encore collectif aux prises avec l'"autre-colonisateur" et dont le dialecte, gagné à la langue, parié en secret, se permettrait un codage d'intimité, une subjectivité en marche. Le créole serait comme le résultat de ce rideau tombé sur l'intercommunication ouverte, sur l'horizon des échanges effectivement historiques quoique, à

la limite de l'exploitation. Plus les horizons disparaissaient, plus en Haïti, par exemple, la Rangué se retranche sur un français et un dahoméen aussi vétustes que fossiles. La collectivité en gage d'abandon radical se trompe dans sa propre identité, ne s'organise plus comme un soi envers l'autre. Elle devient prisonnière sans barreaux d'une communication exposée à ce plus d'inertie, à ce rationnement inconscient d'échanges alourdis dans leurs prix, aux moindres des survies cernées dans une régression ininterrompue, où les codes s'amenuisent. De plus en plus, une telle subjectivité ne peut que prendre les contours du minimal, dont se fait l'élémentaire de la *res*, le dernier contour, et sa condition iconographique de strict passage.

Le cas extrême de la tombée en inertie illustre par contraste celui des périphéries où se développa une latinité où l'on trouve un ressort dialectique, de réveil d'une subjectivité, sa crispation par contraste, et l'exploit débutant de l'histoire et de la réussite. Ou bien, par contraste, de la chute de la forme nationale comme reprise de l'Occident, pour ce qui est des sujets historiques reconnus dans une mémoire commune en tant qu'acteurs achevés de la différence. Dans ces corps collectifs s'accomplit un mode de vision du monde et un style de vie conséquent.

Elle est là, l'histoire de cet effort, dans lequel l'impulsion de "l'être en soi" en périphérie partit, en effet, de ce fondement de la différence empiriquement entamée par le désir d'indépendance politique, face aux divers empires coloniaux. Elle donnerait cause, par la suite, à tous les malentendus des contrefaçons, à vouloir des contrepoids suivis entre diverses expressions de domination originales d'Occident. Ou en termes de confusions étendues, entre autodé-

termination et autosuffisance, face à leur panoplie de ressources ou à leurs dimensions naturelles ou géographiques originales de marché.

L'avènement de l'hégémonie brouillera encore ce qui reste exercice de "futurible", des dites révolutions nationales par le développement. La mise en marche d'un en-soi à la suite du nominalisme de leur indépendance politique marqua irrémédiablement une implantation décisive de la latinité dans cet inconscient collectif, mû par l'effort national en gerbe. Nous ne sommes pas voués à une "créolisation" tardive dans toutes ses souches, de dynamismes effectivement vécus, en ce qui concerne le dépassement, même avorté, de l'économie coloniale. Elle assura l'insertion initiale d'une subjectivité, donnée à la reprise d'une expérience historique, dont la nation assurait la base d'une reconnaissance culturelle. La latinité y engageait la nation et créait — à bon ou mauvais terme — un fondement définitif de subjectivité collective, un sens de l'appartenance (Calhoun, 2004, p. 61). Elle n'aurait plus de retour au soubassements d'une identité, qui continue à se nouer, indépendamment des sous-médiations qui replacent les anciens renvois formateurs d'une conscience en montée. Les croisements des statuts, en survie ou en reprise, face à l'éveil des classes; les réductionnismes de la représentations du social; l'empiétement du corporatif sur les vraies mobilisations peuvent se dresser sur la vraie praxis d'un "en soi", parvenu à une logique identitaire. Les freinages accrus de cette poussée ressortent de cette hégémonie survécue en temps d'achèvement national entamé lors de l'âge d'or international de la percée des révolutions par le dévelop-

pement. De toute façon, au moins deux de ces achèvement identitaires profiteraient d'une onzième heure, encore du monde du pré 11 septembre. Le Brésil et le Mexique en latinité atlantique, face à des contextes entièrement distincts mais toutefois aussi extrêmes, contiennent l'enjeu de la transformation effective sans devenir encore un retour à des situations macro-sociales de marginalité collective.

Prise de conscience et sous-médiations

En temps d'hégémonie, s'il y a un vide par où puisse avancer la nouvelle inertie du post-système, nous ferions face non pas aux inerties, aux retombées dans les radicalismes, une fois lâchée la domination organique, mais plutôt, en effet, à ces demi-conditionnements maintenus dans un provisoire indéfini où s'enchevêtrent ou se déguisent les anciens enjeux des oppositions nettes et donc des prises de conscience qui s'ensuivraient, tournées, maintes fois, en idéologies correctives. Le résultat final consiste en ce maréage de pseudo-conductions à l'"en-soi", et au réveil de la subjectivité, nuisible, en fait, à ces deux mécanismes essentiels et historiquement jumeaux de la prise de conscience et de la mobilisation.

Que présente donc, exactement, le Brésil, après la victoire du PT en tant qu'organisation effectivement créatrice de cette prise de conscience et de cette mobilisation? Ces médiations y sont à l'œuvre (Mendes, 2004b, p. 175). Peut-on voir dans l'accès au pouvoir du "parti différent", la mise en marche des ressorts effectifs, comme subjectivités fondatrices du pays de l'autre côté? De même, l'immense cadre

historique des révolutions ratées du développement à son empoigne sur une subjectivité de base — bien qu'avortée — où se joue leur horizon historique, social et une confrontation acquise face au centre de l'Occident, devenu hégémonique.

C'est de toute façon comme fantôme, que la latinité joue de sa sous-médiation, non seulement en créant des figurations, mais en se trempant dans le désir d'histoire qui lui reste, vis-à-vis des nouvelles expropriations où le vide apparent de l'hégémonie peut se marquer d'expropriations silencieuses. Le nouvel univers y peut toujours faire démarrer son excès d'inertie comme il le fait dans un "premier monde" en simulacre, île robotisée dans les périphéries, par une béance du virtuel, comme le permettent les nœuds d'hyperaffluence.

Pédagogie d'une latinité résiduelle

L'acquis de cette latinité resterait dans les apports d'une conscience collective, avortée ou non, par l'issue nationale; par primauté de la défense de l'entité collective sur l'individuelle; de l'État sur la société; du pluralisme et du maintien des différences contre les régimes de coexistences éclairées, entre minorités inchangeables. Le paradigme de l'expérience de ce nouvel "en-soi" brésilien et la pédagogie de base de cette prise de conscience différente confère à Lula, en principe, une signification qui dépasse le pays même et gagne un canon de représentation collective pour cette latinité atlantique. De même, l'exploit obsolète et topique

d'une intervention à l'ancienne des États-Unis au Venezuela fit probablement de Chávez, après le référendum, le dernier héros de cette expérience nationale menacée par une domination désuète. Elle fit appel néanmoins aux ressources anticipées de la modélisation, après la gageure qui empêcha le *recall* de servir ses desseins d'origine, renforçant au contraire le Président condamné.

La vraie prospective, et le contre-coup de l'anachronique, se croisent en créant un nouveau paradigme pour la représentation d'un "en-soi" en Amérique Latine. Peut-être, pour une fois, au-delà de la carrure nationale, et mettant en cause la supposition fondamentale de cette perspective de l'avènement hégémonique mondial. Sera-t-il possible, en temps utile — face au perfectionnement du pouvoir unipolaire — de dépasser ces sous-médiations et de trouver un "en-soi" capable de garder, au moins, la différence face aux enjeux de sa réification? Son futur est-il l'exil créole? Ou une vraie prise d'essor, d'une identité au-delà des engins de sous-domination, par cette prise de conscience tardive, mais massive, telle celle du Brésil de Lula, en échappant à la dernière heure du fait accompli de l'hégémonie et ses frontières désormais virtuelles?

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Dialogue, Distance and Voicing

Vers une latinité critique

François L'Yvonnet

*Le commencement ne gît pas derrière nous, il se
dresse devant nous.*

HEIDEGGER

Rio, Paris, Lisbonne, Alexandrie et maintenant New York: c'est la cinquième fois que nous nous exprimons dans le cadre de l'Académie de la Latinité. Mais, peut-on parler de "latinité" dans les mêmes termes et dans le même esprit, ici et là, dans les confins lusitaniens de l'Europe finissante et au-delà des mers, dans sa réplique carioca? À Paris, "port de mer", disait Cendrars, à Alexandrie, ville de la romanité hellène, mais aussi "ville d'empire" ou à New York, épice de la fin du monde, pour parler comme Baudrillard?

Et pourquoi un tel titre: "Vers une *latinité critique*"? Rassurez-vous, il ne s'agit pas de se lancer dans une entreprise fondatrice, métaphysiquement fondatrice, voire "critique" au sens kantien, ou même programmatique, qui annoncerait d'improbables "prolégomènes à toute latinité future"... La latinité est *in-fondable*, déjà, parce que la question du fondement est *sans* fondement. Quant aux programmes, ils abondent, ils surabondent même... Les programmes s'annulent par leur multiplication. "*Pro-gramme*": à la lettre même, c'est "écri-

re à l'avance"; un programme est une séquence d'action déjà prédéterminée, assignable, donc, et prévisible. Une tâche vaine, si l'en est, une tâche réductrice, peut-être même une tâche impossible si nous sommes effectivement "au-delà de la fin", si l'histoire est, non pas finie (Fukuyama), mais sans fin (Baudrillard). Le programmeur est aujourd'hui un ventriloque frappé de glossolalie.



L'idée de latinité, prise sans précaution, à la mesure de son indétermination, peut s'apparenter à tous ces mots qui chantent, qui ont plus de valeur que de sens, comme le disait Valéry, qui chantent plus qu'ils ne parlent, qui demandent plus qu'ils ne répondent. De ces mots, qui ont tous les métiers, "très bons pour la controverse, la dialectique, l'éloquence"...

Sous nos climats, à l'extrême pointe occidentale du continent eurasiatique, il est parfois des usages nostalgiques, sinon "réactionnaires" de la latinité. D'aucuns verront alors en elle, la renaissance tardive et déguisée de la vieille arrogance européenne qui forte du legs antique, dont elle aurait le dépôt, rappellerait à l'ordre — au bon ordre — ceux qui s'en seraient émancipés. Naguère, Carlos Fuentes ne cacha pas son agacement face à cette "latinité" eurocentrée qui s'avance masquée, "*larvatus prodeo*".

Est-il besoin de dire, que ce que nous entendons par "latinité" n'a rien à voir avec l'universalisme de pacotille, ni avec le vers latin, l'huile d'olive et la mantille.

S'il est éventuellement une latinité "critique", c'est sans doute que toute latinité ne l'est pas. Ni camouflage, ni cabi-

net de curiosité, ni hospice, elle n'est pas davantage le dernier club à la mode du vieux monde où les bonnes manières se draperaient d'indignation devant les mœurs rugueuses des "derniers venus". Une boutade fait encore rire dans les chaumières outre-Atlantique: les Américains seraient le seul peuple à être passé directement de la barbarie à la décadence sans passer par la civilisation.



Le mot critique, doit être pris ici dans son sens étymologique, du grec "*krisis*", ce qui dans le langage de la médecine antique, celui d'Hippocrate, permettait de faire le diagnostic, de distinguer, pour prendre une décision. La situation actuelle du monde nous plonge dans l'indécision et, l'hégémonie est précisément le règne de l'indistinction. On parle ainsi de "seuil critique", le moment où une décision s'impose pour éviter des conséquences catastrophiques.

Avec la "fin de l'histoire" — niée par ses tueurs — la catastrophe est peut-être pour les événements la seule manière d'avoir lieu. C'est du moins ce que l'on aimerait croire. Comme si la catastrophe était la persistance rétinienne, mais tournée en caricature, des crimes inouïs perpétrés dans les siècles passés. Comme le retour du refoulé, l'histoire se rappellerait à notre bon souvenir, mais travestie en catastrophe. Pourtant, si on y regarde d'un peu plus près, la catastrophe n'est-elle pas la solution la plus facile? "*Tout comme la liberté s'impose comme la solution la plus facile au problème du sujet et de son destin, (...) le bonheur s'est imposé comme la solution la plus facile au problème du mal*" (Baudrillard). La catastrophe s'est elle-même imposée com-

me la solution la plus facile à l'absence de sens de l'histoire, à l'absence de finalité. L'apocalypse, conjuguée à toutes les sauces, ne faisant qu'ajouter un surcroît de sacralité à l'inanité générale. Nous sommes dans une situation où le spectacle des convulsions du monde (dont le terrorisme n'est qu'un symptôme), consacre la disparition du sens, de la question même du sens. Liberté intégrale, bonheur intégral, sens intégral et, réversiblement, servitude intégrale, culture du malheur, non-sens absolu!

Les vieux récits de légitimation, dont parlait jadis Jean-François Lyotard, se sont usés. Il y a eu comme une saturation. Usés, sont les récits d'émancipation à la française (Condorcet), usées les ficelles de l'idéalisme allemand (Hegel). Pareillement usées, sont les grandes synthèses de la modernité (Marx). On ne peut plus rapporter l'aventure collective humaine à un espace homogène et qualifié, ni à un temps univoque et vectorisé où s'accomplirait exemplairement notre destinée. La multiplication des récits, prévient toutes les tentatives d'ériger le malheur des uns en mal absolu, alors que celui des autres ne serait que mésaventures collatérales. De même, la vérité et les droits supposés imprescriptibles et inaliénables, sont-ils seulement des figures historiques tardives et contingentes de la culture.

Les catégories héritées des Lumières, les "universaux" de la modernité, sont plus que jamais à ébranler. Ainsi en va-t-il de l'universel (et du particulier), de la culture (et de la nature), de l'homme (et de la femme), des droits qui leur sont associés, du bien, du vrai. Autant de solutions de facilité, alors qu'à l'évidence, c'est ailleurs que les choses se jouent. La "latinité critique" doit être l'atelier des défini-

tions fluctuantes, d'un relativisme prudent, d'un agacement des frontières, celles des cultures, celles des peuples, comme celles des États. Il est des géographies où les espaces ne se touchent pas par leurs frontières, mais par leur centre. Massignon parlait de géographie "spirituelle". Il suffit de se mettre en marche, d'être le pèlerin de quelque cause, pour que l'espace s'anime, se sacralise, pour qu'il s'enrichisse de tous les ébranlements improvisés. Le multiculturalisme, objet de notre rencontre, est de cette nature. Qu'est-ce que le multiculturalisme, sinon dans son ordre propre, la coïncidence des opposés? Sinon une certaine irréductibilité, sinon encore — et le vocable choisi est encore trop "intégré" — la manière d'être de toutes les singularités souterraines dans leur affrontement dissymétrique à la puissance hégémonique.

Derrida nous invite à prendre acte que le 11 septembre est, certes, lourd de menaces pour l'avenir du monde, mais qu'il l'est aussi, "plus radicalement encore" pour "le système d'interprétation, l'axiomatique, la logique, la rhétorique, les concepts et les évaluations qui sont censés permettre de *comprendre* et d'expliquer, justement, quelque chose comme le 11 septembre".

À en perdre son latin!



Il faut jouer avec les mots — c'est une manière de faire obstacle à la platitude du slogan: Kant définissait les Lumières comme "la sortie de l'homme de l'état de minorité". J'ose souhaiter pour ma part, sans trahir l'injonction kantienne "*Sapere aude*", un retour à l'état de minorité. C'est à la

fois la vitalité juvénile — *puer aeternus* — dont jailliront les temps nouveaux. L'ensauvagement rimbaldien de la vie. Mais aussi parce que les minorités sont en premières lignes, ce sont elles qui toujours disent "Non". En mai 1968, à Paris, des manifestants avaient marqué leur solidarité avec Daniel Cohn-Bendit (menacé d'expulsion) en scandant: "Nous sommes tous des Juifs allemands". Je crois que l'esprit de la latinité nous invite à prendre conscience que nous sommes tous des minoritaires en sursis. La latinité, parce qu'essentiellement polycentrée, est inséparable des marges ou des marches, comme on disait à l'époque carolingienne. Elle est expérience de la périphérie.

N'en déplaise aux puissants, n'en déplaise à leur vulgate, les minorités ne cherchent pas à se *libérer*, ne cherchent pas à dissiper le brouillard, selon le mot de Philippe Muray, ni à rompre le secret, car on n'avance jamais qu'à tâtons. Elles opposent l'infinie complexité du monde aux promesses de perfection. Il est des libérations exterminatrices, notre vieux monde en sait quelque chose. Alors surtout, maîtres-penseurs et autres maîtres-redresseurs, gardez vos leçons! Laissez les hommes aller à leur rythme dans le silence des espaces infinis.



Il faut prendre langue. Si le terrorisme est un défaut de communication (Habermas), cela vaut pour toutes les formes de terrorisme (qu'il soit d'État ou non). La latinité est initiative. Elle est prise de parole dans l'espace public, hors des frontières "monologiques", pour parler comme Habermas (i.e. la participation de l'individu à l'espace public se bornant au simple partage d'opinions et de décisions).

L'islam est également initiative, une des rares initiatives *différentes*, avec l'inévitable errance des grandes aventures, ce qui suffit amplement à justifier la volonté d'engager avec lui un jeu croisé de rencontres, de questionnements et d'échanges...

Le monde hégémonique condamne les hommes à l'exil (au propre et au figuré), la latinité — en tant que paradigme d'un certain décentrement — offre le salut de l'exode, une sortie de soi pour être soi. Une latinité non point tolérante (Derrida a bien montré ce que vaut pareille vertu), mais hospitalière. Autant dire, que la posture est essentiellement asymétrique.

Prendre langue avec l'autre en tant qu'autre... Il faut, ici, dissiper un malentendu qui a nom "dialogue". Dialogue interculturel, dialogue interreligieux, on nous bassine avec un certain catéchisme universaliste paré de toutes les vertus, qui n'est qu'une manière déguisée de garder la main. Certes, il est préférable de "dialoguer" que d'échanger des coups (jusqu'à un certain point), comme il est préférable d'être riche et bien portant que pauvre et malade (jusqu'à un certain point), mais qui peut croire raisonnablement que les ressources du dialogue (*dia-logos*), fut-il socratique, peuvent combler l'infinie distance des pauvres et des riches, des opprimés et des oppresseurs? Que les humiliés, comme l'esclave de Ménon, trouveront la voie de la vérité à force de persévérance rationnelle bien conduite?



Il ne s'agit donc pas de redonner du sens au sens, de réintroduire de la finalité, de la téléologie. De dire, par

exemple, que le progrès n'est que moribond, et qu'à son chevet veille la bonne vieille latinité, qui n'a pas dit son dernier mot. Il y a peut-être, dans la latinité, une manière de se tenir dans l'expectative, plus que dans l'attente. Un certain quant à soi qui a pu la faire passer pour de l'attentisme. Passagère du meilleur et du pire, encore titubante, elle nous invite à ne pas gager sur l'avenir, mais plutôt à méditer notre propre destin.

L'Amérique, après le 11 septembre, "scrute l'abîme de l'avenir", titrait le *New York Times* du 23 septembre 2001. Aujourd'hui, peur panique de l'avenir, hier, promesse d'un futur consolateur. C'est au fond la même sinistre farce. Contre le millénarisme de bazar, contre le messianisme "fondamentaliste", contre ceux qui tracent des plans sur la comète, à grand renfort de canons... Contre les catastrophistes qui annoncent le grand "choc"... Tenons-nous dans le flux du devenir, dans le faisceau des possibles, attachons-nous à laisser sourdre des sources, de toutes les sources, les contours incertains de l'avenir.

La latinité est une norme paradoxale. On peut voir en elle un remède salutaire contre l'intelligence. C'est une proposition très scandaleuse. Baudrillard, dans des pages d'une rare densité, dit que l'intelligence ne protège de rien, pas même de la bêtise. Parler, comme il est d'usage aujourd'hui chez les gens intelligents, de l'immense bêtise de tel homme politique ou de l'intelligence de tel ou tel de ses conseillers, montre la réversibilité de l'une en l'autre (et réciproquement!). "Ceux qui ne sont pas avec nous sont contre nous". Bouvard et Pécuchet, héros de la modernité, ont poussé jusqu'à la perfection ce retournement prodigieux. Plus encore,

“il n’y a pas d’autre issue à l’excès d’intelligence que la bêtise”. C’est dire que la latinité ne doit pas être un réservoir d’intelligence face à l’indigence des illuminés, face à la haute technicité des imbéciles. Pas plus que la latinité ne saurait être une réserve d’accessoires pour temps bouchés. Que nous reste-t-il, sinon l’exercice de la pensée, la lucidité, dit Baudrillard, l’exercice équilibriste du danseur de corde.

Axe du Mal, Axe du Bien, les inventeurs de la “guerre préventive” ont épuisé les ressources classiques de la bonne vieille morale, jusqu’à la peur. Contre la rhétorique dominante, il faut inventer d’autres récits. Il faut autrement “enchaîner le discours”.

Un remède contre l’intelligence qui n’est pas sans rapport avec la modeste proposition de Swift concernant les enfants des classes pauvres: il se proposait de régler, à sa manière, la “question irlandaise”, en donnant à manger aux Anglais, la chair des bébés sains et bien nourris d’Irlande, qui “constitue à l’âge d’un an un plat délicieux, riche en calories et hygiénique, qu’il soit préparé à l’étouffée, à la broche, au four ou en pot-au-feu...” Offrons donc à l’intelligence et la bêtise, l’occasion de banqueter ensemble d’abondance. Renvoyons le terrorisme à ce qu’il est, l’arme des forts, et non l’arme des faibles (Chomsky a dit sur cette question ce qu’il fallait dire). Que la Cène soit enfin consommée.



À côté d’une latinité “forte”, il y a peut-être la place pour une latinité “faible”. Que Gianni Vattimo, éminent membre de l’Académie de la Latinité, nous pardonne de

jouer métaphoriquement de sa “pensée faible”. La latinité “forte” porte en elle la marque impériale de la romanité triomphante, Simone Weil parlait de cette poignée de fugitifs (les Romains), idolâtres de l’État, de la force — qui réifie l’homme, qui le cadavérise —, intrinsèquement cupides, prétendument dépositaires d’une mission civilisatrice qui les conduira à déraciner par le glaive les peuples conquis. Cette latinité agressive a laissé des traces durables dans la mémoire des peuples. Les aventures coloniales modernes en porteront la marque d’infamie. Mais, il est aussi peut-être une latinité “faible”. “Faible”, parce qu’aimable (la “*philia*”), faible parce que capable de doute, et donc de décentrement. La latinité est l’expérience séculaire de la périphérie, dont les mœurs sont plus circonspectes.

La pensée “faible” s’apparente à un “nihilisme joyeux” ou “gai” (si l’on pense à la “*gaya scienza*” nietzschéenne). C’est une pensée flexible, “rémissive” et permissive. Pareillement, si l’on peut dire, la latinité “faible” serait d’abord “relativiste”, ce qui ne veut pas dire qu’elle renonce à toute valeur. Forte de Montaigne, elle se souvient qu’on nomme barbarie ce qui n’est pas de notre usage. Mais elle se souvient aussi de quelques leçons grecques, l’affaiblissement n’est pas abaissement. La faiblesse est ici ce qu’il faut opposer à la réquisition violente, celle de puissances sans âme, comme celle de l’impérialisme. C’est une fois encore l’affirmation de l’asymétrie, c’est une fois encore l’expérience des périphéries.



Une latinité faible, voire une “patalatinité”, si vous me permettez ce clin d’œil très (trop?) français à Alfred Jarry et

son Docteur Faustroll, au roi Ubu qui enfermait sa conscience dans une valise ou qui, lorsqu'il s'ennuyait, décidait de faire la guerre à la Pologne. Sur le modèle de la "pataphysique", science des solutions imaginaires (à des problèmes, eux-mêmes imaginaires), la "patalinité" serait ce ferment violent, cet acide détersif, dont parle Baudrillard, une des rares réponses possibles, tout en dérision, à l'accomplissement ubuesque du monde, à la confusion totale, à l'ambition de totale plénitude (liberté, bonheur, sens) que la puissance hégémonique réalise... en douceur!

Los Excesos de la Cultura y los Fantasmas del Enemigo

Enrique Rodríguez Larreta

Hace algunos años un conocido experto en nacionalismo, contrastaba dos mapas de distintas épocas etnográficas del mundo trazando un paralelo con la pintura de Kokoschka y Modigliani. La primera era una representación del mundo caracterizada por

the riot of diverse points of colour is such that no clear pattern can be discerned in any detail, though the picture as a whole has one. A great diversity and plurality and complexity characterizes all distinct parts of the whole: the minute social groups, which are the atoms of which the picture is composed, have complex and ambiguous and multiple relations to many cultures; some through speech, others through their dominant faith, another still through a variant faith or set of practices, a fourth through administrative loyalty, and so forth. (Gellner, 1983, p.139.)

El otro mapa presentado por Ernest Gellner evoca Modigliani antes que Kokoschka: pocas sombras, superficies netas y homogéneas, separadas claramente unas de otras, con escasas ambigüedades y superposiciones (Hannerz, 1996).

La primera representación cartográfica es la del mundo anterior a la era de los Estados Nacionales y la otra corres-

ponde a un mapa del mundo dividido en Estados nacionales en el cual la economía, y la cultura tienden a coincidir en el mismo territorio y comunidad política. Se trata de una realidad de la economía industrial que requiere movilidad y comunicación entre individuos, en el cual el estado a través del control del sistema educativo garantiza una socialización bastante homogénea de los individuos.

En la perspectiva de Hannerz (1996) la representación del mundo en que nos encontramos hoy significa un retorno a la imagen de Kokoschka. Se trataría de un mundo en creolización anticipado por Salman Rushdie y otros. Estaría caracterizado por la inesperada combinación de seres humanos, culturas, ideas, políticas, música e imágenes. La novedad ingresa en el mundo a través del sincretismo, la mezcla y el mestizaje. Se trata de un punto de vista genéricamente postmoderno que coincide a grandes rasgos con otras influyentes contribuciones a los procesos de hibridación cultural y la reflexión crítica sobre la cultura en las ciencias humanas de los años 90 (García Canclini, 1989; Appadurai, 1996).

Estos estudios son parte de una reflexión crítica de las producciones de identidad cultural y religiosa considerándolas como parte de procesos complejos en la era global. Un aspecto de estos procesos es una reactivación de los agenciamientos y los modos políticos de manipulación de las identidades étnicas y religiosas que desde el punto de vista de las ciencias humanas requieren un urgente análisis crítico de hechos y contextos.

El carácter simbólico de los procesos culturales, sus diversos espacios sociales de apropiación, sus desplazamientos territoriales y las formas del imaginario, configuran

nuevos temas de reflexión. Criticando una idea habitual de “tradición cultural” se observa que:

hay que cuestionar que esa hipótesis central del tradicionalismo, según la cual la identidad cultural se apoya en un patrimonio constituido a través de dos movimientos: la ocupación de un territorio y la formación de colecciones. Tener una identidad sería, ante todo, tener un país, una ciudad o un barrio, una entidad donde todo lo compartido por los que habitan ese lugar se vuelve idéntico o intercambiable. En esos territorios la identidad se pone en escena, se celebra con las fiestas y se dramatiza también en los rituales cotidianos. (Canclini, 1989, p. 177.)

Lo que se propone es una reformulación del imaginario cultural de la nación, introduciendo una distribución social de la cultura, pensando sus áreas de interacción e hibridación, apostando en la dirección de la heterogeneidad y las combinaciones inesperadas, disolviendo los fijismos y las oposiciones binarias entre modernidad y tradición, convencidos de que las integraciones románticas de los nacionalismos son tan precarias y peligrosas como las integraciones neoclásicas del racionalismo hegeliano de los marxismos compactos. Pero un autor latinoamericano considera que la preocupación por la totalidad social permanece plena de sentido para las modernidades híbridas latinoamericanas (Canclini, 1989).

El lugar de la cultura y la noción de hibridación son entonces conceptos claves sometidos a intenso escrutinio desde una perspectiva influenciada por la deconstrucción postmoderna. Las narrativas de la globalización y los marcos interpretativos de los conflictos de identidad y choques culturales proporcionan el marco de fondo de los estudios sobre sincretismo cultural.

Al estudiar los movimientos recientes de la globalización advertimos que esta no sólo integra y genera mestizajes; también segrega, produce nuevas desigualdades y estimula redacciones diferencialistas (...). Los impulsos dados por la globalización a las hibridaciones deben examinarse junto con las reacciones y alianzas identitarias (los latinos o los árabes en los Estados Unidos y/o en Europa). A veces se aprovecha la globalización empresarial y del consumo para firmar particularidades étnicas o regiones culturales como ocurre con la música latina en la actualidad. Algunos actores sociales encuentran en estas alianzas recursos para resistir o modificar la globalización y replantear las condiciones de hibridación”. Se establece un juicio en general positivo de las políticas de hibridación como espacio de negociación dialógica de las diferencias. “Podemos elegir vivir en estado de guerra o en estado de hibridación. (Canclini, 2000, p. 71.)

Tanto en algunas de las versiones más prominentes del multiculturalismo (Taylor, 1987) como en las lecturas de las identidades culturales y las áreas culturales como entidades cerradas, se ha puesto de manifiesto un exceso de cultura evidenciado en las exageraciones de la filosofía de Herder con su perspectiva esencialista que atribuye a la cultura un sentido central y un carácter orgánico con fronteras sistémicas claramente delimitadas. Al mismo tiempo difundida a través de los medios de comunicación, esa idea reificada de cultura ha estimulado diversos escenarios de revuelta o choque de particularismos, de tribalismos o supratribus (Barber, 1995). Algunos de estos conocidos escenarios subrayan dramáticamente la polarización entre un mundo cada vez más indiferenciado y homogéneo avanzando en una dirección única enfrentado por la Jihad y los fundamentalismos religiosos o étnicos (Barber, 1997; Huntington, 1996).

Como vimos, otros estudios sobre globalización y cultura, han examinado los contextos de los conflictos, estudiando específicamente las formas de mestizaje cultural y sobretodo los nuevos fenómenos de un mundo política y económicamente asimétrico en el cual los Estados Unidos cumplen un papel hegemónico pero a la vez es profundamente heterogéneo y multicéntrico. El punto de partida de una nueva reflexión sobre la circunstancia contemporánea es la seria consideración de la complejidad global, no pensada simplemente como un espacio de dominación total de un poder imperial clásico que simplemente equipara una noción mal definida de globalización con un adjetivo puramente ideológico de neoliberalismo económico.

El concepto de *Ecumene Global*, retomado en las ciencias sociales de comienzos de siglo por Alfred Kroeber ha sido redefinido (Hannerz, 1996) para pensar la problemática del poder hegemónico dando un sentido más preciso y matizado de la complejidad global. El concepto de globo globalización o *modernité-monde* a reaparecido hace una década como foco de atención y estudios sobre la idea de globo se vienen multiplicando así como el interés creciente por la historia global. Se ha relacionado el fenómeno de la modernidad global con el concepto de Heidegger de lo “gigante”. Entre las características de lo “gigante” se encuentra la eliminación de las distancias remotas y la representación del cotidiano en mundos distantes. Lo “gigante” es lo incalculable, lo que escapa la representación. Peter Sloterdijk por su parte introduce la noción también heideggeriana de “lo monstruoso” para pensar la modernidad planetaria. En un nivel de análisis más estrictamente sociopolítico luego de

9/11 las nociones de Imperio, Imperialismo y hegemonía han cobrado nueva fuerza en el debate público y vienen siendo objeto de creciente atención.

Un aspecto decisivo de la globalización es la circulación con un alcance y una velocidad inédita del capital (corporativo, financiero) en una estructura transnacional posibilitada por la teletecnología dando origen a procesos en buena medida inéditos por lo menos en cuanto a escala e impacto. Considerada en sus consecuencias teóricas la globalización problematiza oposiciones clásicas de las ciencias sociales cómo moderno/tradicional (habitualmente lo moderno siendo pensado en singular y la tradición en plural), secular/religioso fe/ciencia, razón. La globalización a modificado la distancia entre elites, confundiendo las fronteras entre identificaciones imaginarias locales y nacionales. El concepto posee aspectos de separación entre tiempo y espacio y la interrelación entre eventos sociales a distancia en contexto locales (Giddens, 1991). En la oikoumene así constituida se pueden distinguir posiciones hegemónicas, centros y periferias distribuidas irregularmente y no siempre coincidiendo entre sí.

La caracterización de los proceso de globalización han estado íntimamente asociados con la apología o la crítica del fenómeno. Lo que se puede decir es que un proceso tan vasto y multidimensional resulta difícil de reducir a una consideración positiva o negativa tanto en sus variadas dimensiones económicas cómo en el terreno cultural. Los procesos de globalización han alterado radicalmente las relaciones entre subjetividad, localidad, identificación política y cultural así cómo los imaginarios sociales. Las

imágenes de la media a través de las fronteras nacionales que producen imágenes de bienestar que no pueden ser satisfechas por los *standards* nacionales de consumo y producción, discursos sobre derechos humanos que generan demandas de fuerzas sociales a su turno reprimidas con violencia estatal (Appadurai, 2000).

Los procesos migratorios y las diásporas — tomo ejemplos de la región mediterránea — han creado crecientes situaciones de marginación y conflictos de identidad así como permanentes umbrales de incertidumbre frente a las identidades locales. Desde el punto de vista analítico resulta cada vez más evidente la necesidad de distinguir con precisión entre localidad y comunidad cultural de origen. El nacionalismo es sin duda hoy una fuerza identificatoria poderosa pero en el caso de muchas diásporas (latinas, chinas, árabes) crecientemente divorciado de pertenencia territorial y estatal.

Estamos viviendo una globalización de las corrientes migratorias — alrededor de 150 millones de personas. Una fracción pequeña si se quiere de los seis mil millones de la población mundial pero de fuerte impacto cualitativo tanto por los efectos sobre las sociedades de recepción cómo por las características sociales y culturales de los migrantes. La migración que es un recurso cultural y económico es también una fuente dramática de conflicto.

La ONG son otra fuente de transnacionalización poderosa. La profusión de organizaciones no-gubernamentales a sido definida cómo un “global association revolution”. Se estima que existen hoy alrededor de 2 millones de ONGs en el mundo. El proceso de crecimiento de una sociedad civil

global es difícil de precisar pero está asociado al desprestigio de la política tradicional, al éxito de ciertos movimientos de tipo “gandhista” que impulsan una política paralela al sistema de partidos en Europa del Este y al proceso de redefinición del papel del Estado que hemos mencionado actualmente disminuido en su posición indiscutida de soberanía económica, política y cultural.

Muchos análisis han puesto de relieve (Derrida, 2002; Rosaldo, 2001) que la globalización es un fenómeno mucho menos universalmente distribuido que lo que aparece en apologías globalistas. En el momento en el cual la interpretaciones influyentes de la globalización insisten en la transparencia posibilitada por las teletecnologías, la apertura de fronteras y de mercados, igualdad de oportunidades etc. no a habido nunca en la historia de la humanidad, en cifras absolutas, tantas desigualdades, hambrunas, desastres ecológicos, epidemias etc. Menos del 5% de la humanidad posee hoy acceso a la internet con una presencia anglófona masiva en la red. Hasta el momento solamente ciertos países y clases se benefician agregando un grado más de exclusión a las ya existentes.

Estas observaciones ciertamente califican definiciones más generales y las lecturas más optimistas. Si bien es cierto que el mundo en su conjunto ha experimentado un proceso de compresión tiempo/espacio y las modificaciones tecnológicas en transporte y comunicación han permitido un aumento radical de la movilidad es cierto también que éste proceso es profundamente desigual. Además de las radicales diferencias en acceso a transporte aéreo y telecomunicación existen claramente vastas regiones del mundo casi totalmente fuera

de todas las especies de mapas, telecomunicaciones, mapas del comercio mundial y las finanzas, mapas del turismo global. Tales lugares poseen pocos circuitos conectados con otras áreas del mundo, solamente rutas de comunicación y transporte que pasan a través de esos nódulos centrales. Existe una integración vertical en la cual ciudades globales y centros regionales poseen interconexiones entre si pero no países y regiones de una misma área. Es una situación compleja que no puede ser reducida a modelos del mundo simplificados y requiere abundantes estudios de caso y exploraciones etnográficas.

El fenómeno se amplía si incorporamos el imaginario cómo dimensión de la praxis. En ese sentido la globalización puede entenderse cómo un proceso de apropiación y acceso irregular a la modernidad en la cual la oposición modernidad/tradición se encuentra considerablemente diluida. La nueva economía cultural mundial debe ser concebida en términos complejos, superpuestos, un orden que no puede ser conceptualizado en términos de un esquema estático y jerárquico de centros y periferias rígidas. Partiendo de la idea de que toda la oikoumene global se encuentra intervenida por una modernidad extensa puede considerarse que muchos de los conflictos en curso son luchas por la apropiación de la modernidad inclusive en el caso de los movimientos terroristas transnacionales de motivación etno-religiosa (Roy, 2002; Van de Veer, 2003).

Esta descripción que puede ser entendida cómo “postfordista” y postmoderna de la oikoumene global puesto que acentuó caos, desregulación y descentramiento, pareció ser desmentida por los eventos históricos recientes, notoria-

mente 9/11 y sus efectos más inmediatos, las guerras de Afganistán y la invasión de Irak. Vimos en esos casos la puesta en práctica de una acción política imperial de tipo clásico dirigida desde una superpotencia, ejecutada con carácter unilateral, ignorando ampliamente aliados y opinión pública justificando la acción en la herida abierta por el 9/11.

Puede ser que la obra que mejor sintetiza ésta posición sea la de Noam Chomsky, el gran disidente americano, figura moral relevante en la época de la guerra de Vietnam. Por ejemplo 9/11, y su más reciente libro ampliamente traducido *Hegemony or Survival. American Quest for Global Dominance* (2003) Chomsky posee una amplia audiencia sobre todo internacional, entre los movimientos antiglobalización, fue principal orador en el Foro Social Mundial de Porto Alegre y sus libros más recientes han sido traducidos en veintidós países, aunque es poco comentado en la gran prensa y las publicaciones especializadas.

Chomsky examina lo que llama la “Imperial Grand Strategy” de los Estados Unidos asumiendo una continuidad entre la política exterior americana durante el siglo pasado y la situación actual correlacionando de manera muy reductiva la política del gobierno y la administración americana con la economía global y la acción militar. El mismo Chomsky reconoce hacia el final de su libro que:

On the course of modern history there have been significant gains in human rights and democratic control of some sectors of life. These have rarely been the gift of enlightened leaders. They have typically been imposed on states and other power centers by popular struggle. An optimist might hold, perhaps realistically that history reveals a deepening appreciation for human rights, as well as

broadening of their range- not without sharp reversals, but the general tendency seems real (...) For the first time, concrete alliances have been taking shape at the grassroots level. These are impressive developments rich in opportunities. And they have had effects, in rhetorical and sometimes policy changes. There has been at least a restraining influence on state violence, though nothing like the “human right revolution in state practice that has been proclaimed by intellectual opinion in the west. (P. 236.)

Pese a sus reservas esa descripción apunta hacia otro lado de la globalización que es fundamental destacar especialmente si se desea pensar en focos de acción alternativa y espacios de resistencia. Vimos en la última década la emergencia dentro de identificación global de importantes movimientos sociales dentro de la sociedad civil como derechos de la mujer, derecho sexuales, movimientos de ampliación de la ciudadanía, nuevas reflexiones sobre pobreza y medio ambiente. En el contexto metropolitano la emergencia del multiculturalismo y de políticas de reconocimiento de identidad y una nueva discusión sobre la temática de la ciudadanía.

Existe una dimensión democratizante de la globalización, una más adecuada y rápida transmisión de los saberes, una media que crea mayores posibilidades de identificación y reflectividad y niveles de información más vastos. Se puede destacar entre otros muchos ejemplos un registro individualizado mayor del sufrimiento individualizado ejemplificado en las mini biografías de las víctimas de los atentados en un proceso que ha sido caracterizado como una “dereificación o humanización de todas las categorías sociales” como escribe Eli Zareski en su artículo sobre *Trauma y Dereifica-*

ción luego del 11 de setiembre. El movimiento expresado en la organizaciones no gubernamentales contradictorio y debatible en ciertos casos ha permitido ampliar las esferas públicas y la sociedad civil en el sentido de una cultura pública transnacional.

Así cómo la economía no puede ser definida ya dentro de los límites del Estado Nacional, una serie de tópicos globales se introducen en los debates al interior de la nación. En Brasil por ejemplo el tema ambiental, ampliación de la agenda de la ciudadanía, la cuestión racial y de las minorías indígenas e inclusive ciertos movimientos sociales más tradicionales han estado articulado con movimientos transnacionales creando un importante movimiento de globalización desde la base. Algunos de éstos movimientos han confluído con considerable impacto político en los Foros Mundiales de Porto Alegre y Mumbai.

En la oikoumene global Estados Unidos cumple hoy el rol hegemónico La hiperpotencia americana tal cómo la caracterizó Hubert Védrine predomina en todos los dominios (económico, militar, monetario, lingüístico y cultural.) El presupuesto del Pentágono — es cómo se sabe igual al presupuesto militar combinado de una docena de países y equivale a casi la mitad de los gastos de defensa de todos los países del mundo. Mientras la Union Europea invierte 170 billones de dólares Estados Unidos invierte casi el doble, 300 billones. A su vez el margen de inversión es aún considerable porque el actual no llega al 5.5 del PIB americano. Se ha observado que la base del poder militar americano proviene de la combinación de una productividad económica muy alta -en la última década especialmente- con una or-

ganización fiscal que le permite transformar rápidamente riqueza económica en gastos militares.

La posición hegemónica de los Estados Unidos es notoria en todos los aspectos, particularmente en el terreno tecnológico y militar.

Pero si se considera la conciencia Imperial y sobre todo sus costos para el contribuyente americano la situación es mucho menos evidente. Los Estados Unidos han desarrollado una ideología de misión y la conciencia de su excepcionalidad desde hace mucho tiempo, de hecho durante casi todo el siglo XX. En el período de Bill Clinton, que coincide con la fase económica de la globalización la hegemonía como política en el sentido de creación de consenso dominó la política exterior americana. Es el momento del ejercicio del *soft power* en el sentido especificado por Joseph Nye. Estados Unidos por su mayor peso político y militar se encuentran en la posición “natural” de ejercer la hegemonía una función solicitada por sus propios aliados como forma de asegurar una posición llave de equilibrio en el sistema mundial. Los europeos practicaron hacia Estados Unidos la política del “imperio por invitación” descrita por el historiador escandinavo Geir Lundestad. Una posición sostenida durante toda la guerra fría, en situaciones recientes como la crisis de los Balcanes y que se puso quizás por primera vez a prueba en las secuelas del 11 de setiembre.

La herida mortal al excepcionalismo americano provocado por el 11 de setiembre llevó al gobierno Bush a jugar su peso político y militar en un proyecto de control de situaciones de riesgo a escala planetaria. En los fundamentos de éste proyecto se esboza una nueva ideología americana basada

en la redefinición del papel de los Estados Unidos en el mundo. La expresión “imperio” siempre negada por Estados Unidos debido a su tradición y origen anticolonial parece con más frecuencia en el diseño y la opinión de algunos de sus principales ideólogos.

Puede a la vez ser considerada una expresión intelectual de un segmento de su “élite de poder” o en un sentido más profundo una teología política centrada en el sentido de misión y la tendencia a considerarse el portador del bien y la verdad universal una característica de la Norteamérica puritana y pionera practicante habitual de la guerra con buena conciencia. En Estados Unidos no existió nunca un conflicto entre Estado y religión cómo en Francia por ejemplo. El recurso al lenguaje religioso de resonancias bíblicas es habitual por parte del gobierno americano. Un ejemplo reciente es la consideración del terrorismo cómo el Mal absoluto en un proceso de nulificación de la categoría de enemigo, concepto político que implica una hostilidad que envuelve reconocimiento El terrorista en cambio, es el enemigo irreconocible, una especie de encarnación metafísica del Mal.

Después del 11 de setiembre los Estados Unidos, una potencia en posición hegemónica tuvo la posibilidad de transformarse de agresor en víctima y con esa justificación lanzar una política agresivamente unilateral invocando un defensa de su integridad nacional al haber sido víctimas de un ataque terrorista en su propio territorio. Se trata de un proyecto de dominación de naturaleza ideológica y económica, un nacionalismo universalizante, en la lógica decisorista del estado de excepción de Carl Schmitt o una política que aspira a defender a los Estados Unidos del ataque de fu-

erzas enemigas intentandolas ilusoriamente controlar por medio de la fuerza? El resultado de ésta política será la construcción de una hegemonía imperialista en una escala nunca antes vista en la historia, lo cual supone profundas transformaciones jurídico políticas e ideológicas en el interior mismo de Estados Unidos y un esfuerzo político militar a gran escala en el mundo? O nos encontramos en vísperas de un retroceso norteamericano en el Medio Oriente y una redefinición de las relaciones con otros centros de poder mundial cómo la Unión Europea y naciones emergentes cómo China, India y Brasil? No pueden existir opiniones definitivas para éstas y otras interrogantes del siglo XXI. El argumento de éste ensayo es que los fundamentalismos — imperiales u otros — no se encuentran en condiciones de hacer frente a los desafíos colectivos abiertos por las operaciones de una modernidad global en la cual todos los agentes de transformación se encuentran incluidos. En la oikoumene global se a venido constituyendo (junto a una circulación de capital que en ciertos casos a contribuido a destruir redes sociales y formas comunitarias y acelerado el declinio de los sistemas de estado de bienestar consolidados en la postguerra en Europa) una cultura pública mundial, lo que algunos llaman una sociedad civil internacional o transnacional. La modernidad híbrida en la que vivimos ha creado dimensiones de reflexividad que abre espacios de resistencia a los microfascismos cotidianos — racismos, xenofobia y etnofundamentalismos — que segregan las sociedades metropolitanas y periféricas y que van a transformarse en poderosas fuerza de resistencia y transformación de los nuevos proyectos imperiales.

El Terror y los Escenarios del Miedo

Tanto en la noción clásica de cultura originada en la construcción de las culturas nacionales europeas y que en otros contextos da origen al multiculturalismo y las políticas de identidad cultural, pero también en algunos escenarios cosmopolitas de culturas globales permanece un sentido de integración y organicidad, un carácter sistémico en la noción de cultura.

Por ese motivo en parte el argumento cultural se a transformado en una narrativa poderosa en la Era Global. Permite sintetizar rápidamente datos heterogéneos situándolos en una simple y reconocible clave explicativa. Asociado y en muchas ocasiones empleado cómo sustituto de la noción de religión, la cultura aparece cómo el motor evidente de diversos modos de acción política. Puede ser movilizado a veces por actores poderosos cómo Estados Nacionales para intentar unir el cuerpo nacional frente a diversas amenazas globales o externas vividas cómo exteriores al cuerpo nacional. En otros casos el culturalismo aparece cómo un argumento de segmentos de la sociedad civil movilizados contra estratos dominantes. Finalmente y en un sentido funcionalmente diferente, el referente a la cultura global es empleado a veces por una elite trasnacional cuyas cosmopolitismo elude en muchos casos la consideración de los contextos específicos y las dimensiones políticas de los conflictos.

Hace mucho tiempo se constataba que la noción de “culture is one of the two or three most complicated words in the english language” (Williams, p. 76). Desde el campo de la Antropología la disciplina que por lo menos en su versión norteamericana a hecho de la cultura su concepto favo-

rito, (Hannerz, 1996; Trouillot, 2001) el descontento en relación a su uso indiscriminado a sido constante al mismo tiempo que se reivindica su importancia para las ciencias sociales. Michel Rolph Trouillot por ej considera que “culture’s popular success is its own theoretical demise” Culture has also entered the lexicon of advertisers, politicians, business people and economic planners, up to the high echelons of the World Bank and the editorial pages of the New York Times. Culture now explains every thing: from political instability in Haiti to ethnic war in the Balkans, from labor difficulties on the Soho floors of Mexican maquiladoras to racial tensions in British schools and the difficulties of New York’s welfare recipients in the job market “La cultura explicó el milagro asiático de los 80’s y la crisis japonesa dos décadas más tarde (Trouillot, 2001).

Trouillot ejemplifica la inflación del concepto en la opinión pública con el dato de que la palabra en sus usos sociales aparece empleada más de 5 millones de veces en la internet y cae para 60 mil cuando es asociada a categorías como antropología y etnografía. Entre los inquietantes sentidos del uso retórico de la “cultura” está su empleo racista congelando la diferencia cultural para fundamentar políticas de exclusión (Todorov, 1987; Stolke, 1993).

La culturalización de los conflictos globales se encuentra asociado a las crisis de las narrativas globales del final de la Guerra Fría. La sustitución de influyentes narrativas ideológicas por narrativas culturales fue un esfuerzo de acomodación a y clasificación de datos disminuyendo niveles de incertidumbre. La sensación de caos e incertidumbre se origina en la dificultad para acceder a una representación coherente de la complejidad global, organizándola en cadena de

eventos previsible capaces de sintetizar una masiva y caótica circulación global de imágenes.

Asociada con religión y terrorismo la cultura proporciona una poderosa red de metáforas que permiten reducir los umbrales de incertidumbre en un mundo saturado de imágenes que aumentan la sensación de caos y peligro. Kokoschka volviendo a la metáfora del mundo híbrido de Gellner contemplado en un museo puede provocar el distanciamiento y el placer estético. Vivido provoca vértigo y paranoia. La producción de incertidumbre es parte esencial de nuestra presente circunstancia global. Subjetividades que viven en ambiente seguros consumen diariamente como espectadores imágenes globales de peligro asociadas a violencia, radicalismos y catástrofes. La falla o el empleo por parte de grupos enemigos o dementes individuales de sistemas tecnológicos de alta sensibilidad es un factor de pánico constante en segmentos considerables de las poblaciones de los países centrales. En ese sentido la amenaza terrorista, más que una precisa representación social es fundamentalmente la expresión de la angustia de la pérdida de control, la incertidumbre y la amenaza difusa.

9/11, atentado terrorista realizado por una red transnacional con una poderosa identificación local con Arabia Saudita e importantes ramificaciones en varios países occidentales incluidos tempranos contactos con agentes de seguridad de los propios Estados Unidos (Gunarotna, 2002) fue una acción altamente exitosa de “propaganda por la acción armada, uno de las técnicas clásicas del terror. Provocó una sucesión de crisis y acciones políticas precisamente por instalarse en parte en ese contexto de incertidumbre y peligro latente creando una epidemia de miedo. La violencia de

la guerra ya no tenía lugar en teatros de operaciones distantes sino en medio de una gran ciudad de Occidente.

No estoy subestimando ni negando la existencia de redes estructuradas por sectas político religiosas y su capacidad destructiva de vidas humanas ni inclusive la necesidad de que los Estados se defiendan de ataques dentro de un marco de la ley el respeto a la dignidad humana (Dworkin, 2004). Lo que quiero llamar la atención es para el hecho de que las tristes estadísticas mortuorias ponen en evidencia de que existen alrededor de 1000 muertes debidas al terrorismo actualmente en el mundo. Un profesor de estadística de la Universidad de Southern California compara el dato con los 15 mil muertes por accidentes de automóvil en America anualmente para concluir que “estadísticamente, el mayor peligro se encuentra en el conductor a su lado hablando en el celular” más que en un misterioso extranjero proveniente de una cultura poco conocida adepto a una religión sospechosa.

La ideología de la seguridad nacional, conocida en América Latina durante toda la Guerra Fría y cuyas consecuencias traumáticas viene siendo aún siendo heridas abiertas en sociedades postdictoriales cómo Argentina, Chile y Uruguay entre otros. La ideología del control securitario en curso incorpora un sueño de control tecnológico de lo accidental a través de un sistema de prevención y administración del riesgo que se alimenta a si mismo. La representación de áreas remotas y fronteras puramente en términos de seguridad y riesgo descontextualiza y abstrae conflictos sociales de carácter histórico que envuelven muchas regiones del mundo y se negocian a través de formas de acción violenta. La acción preventiva se transforma de un medio iluso-

rio de conquistar el futuro en una profecía que se cumple a sí misma produciendo modos imprevisibles de respuesta motivados por su propia acción. Los sistemas complejos de seguridad y control son parte decisiva en la producción de desorden global y otras consecuencias colaterales y no estructuras simplemente destinadas a reducir el desorden y aumentar la seguridad interna de las naciones metropolitanas. El enemigo elusivo y circunstancial amenaza transformarse en una obsesión permanente con consecuencias sobre la sociedad agredida peores que los daños materiales y físicos que el terror real pueda provocar.

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Turquie: un “désir d’Europe” qui dérange

Nilüfer Göle

L’entrée de la Turquie dans l’Union européenne a toujours été un sujet de controverse parmi les États membres, mais c’est depuis le Conseil européen de Copenhague, qui s’est réuni le 12 décembre 2002 pour se prononcer, entre autres, sur l’ouverture des négociations d’adhésion de la Turquie, qu’a été lancé un véritable débat public, aussi bien en France que dans d’autres pays européens. Le sujet de la controverse s’est alors déplacé du “dossier turc” proprement dit vers la question fondamentale de la définition de l’identité européenne et de sa singularité. Plus que les délicats problèmes inhérents à la société turque — la question kurde, les droits de l’homme, le contentieux égéen — qui faisaient obstacle à la candidature de ce pays, c’est le thème des frontières de l’Europe — géographiques, historiques, mais aussi religieuses et culturelles —, qui s’est trouvé au cœur du débat français. Pour la première fois peut-être, ce débat sur l’identité européenne est sorti des limites du cercle restreint des eurocrates de Bruxelles pour s’engager à une échelle nationale de l’opinion publique.

La nécessité imminente de se prononcer sur l’ouverture des négociations d’adhésion a en effet soulevé dans la cons-

science collective deux questions qui relèvent presque de l’ordre du tabou: l’altérité islamique, d’une part, l’identité religieuse de l’Europe, d’autre part. Si le consensus implicite qui régnait jusqu’alors et cultivait l’ambiguïté entre l’affirmation des valeurs laïques et l’héritage chrétien du projet européen n’a pas volé en éclats, il a dû cette fois être abordé sans équivoque et de manière explicite. Valéry Giscard d’Estaing, président de la Convention sur l’avenir de l’Europe chargée de formuler des propositions pour le projet de Constitution européenne, a affirmé dans un interview au *Monde* que la Turquie n’était pas “un pays européen” — sa capitale n’étant pas située en Europe — et que, faisant partie de ces pays qui, “pour des raisons tout à fait estimables, ont une autre culture, une autre approche, un autre mode de vie”, son adhésion signifierait *ipso facto* “la fin de l’Union européenne”.¹ En somme, à ses yeux, une telle différence était par nature incompatible avec la civilisation européenne et c’est par ce trait distinctif que le président a dessiné les frontières de l’Europe. Jacques Chirac, quant à lui, a plaidé la cause inverse.² Rappelant les principes de laïcité de l’Europe, il s’est étonné que l’on évoquât les “60 millions de musulmans turcs” sans jamais mentionner les “60 millions de chrétiens français”. Pour lui, la Turquie était un pays laïc qui avait, “toute sa place” dans une Europe dont les frontières ne devaient certainement pas être discutées en termes de différence religieuse. Au-delà des divergences publiquement argumentées de ces personnalités politiques, ce débat a démontré la persistance du désir trop souvent affirmé de dresser des barrières et de marquer la limite entre “un nous” qui définirait les Européens et “les autres”, dont l’altérité,

parce qu'elle se situe en l'occurrence dans le champ du religieux, invaliderait tout projet de communauté.

Du côté turc, en revanche, il n'y a pas eu de doutes, de résistances ou de critiques concernant l'adhésion à l'Union européenne. Indépendamment des clivages qui marquent le rapport de la tradition républicaine avec les courants islamiques, la classe politique et la société civile se sont retrouvées dans l'ensemble unies et mobilisées en faveur de l'intégration. Pour les Turcs, le débat était clos, cette candidature étant le point d'orgue d'un choix de civilisation qui existait depuis longtemps, bien avant le projet européen. Il semble toutefois que le décalage entre ce "désir d'Europe" de la Turquie et l'appréhension que suscite au sein de l'Union l'idée d'avoir ce pays comme partenaire à part entière s'inscrive dans une temporalité de longue durée.

L'histoire des relations entre l'Europe occidentale et les pays non occidentaux est en effet marquée par une asymétrie de désirs due à la prétention de l'Occident d'imposer son expérience de la modernité comme un principe universel. Certes, l'Europe occidentale n'est pas un ensemble parfaitement homogène sur les plans culturel et religieux. Il existe également bien des spécificités dans les processus de construction des États, dans l'élaboration des principes de nationalité et de citoyenneté ou dans l'application des valeurs, comme, par exemple, la laïcité. Mais il n'en est pas moins vrai que tous les pays de cet espace géographique ont partagé au cours de la même période et partagent encore aujourd'hui la même expérience de la modernité. Si l'on se place du point de vue des pays qui ne sont pas des "modèles" de cette modernité, il apparaît que la force du lien entre la

notion même de modernité et l'espace géographique dans lequel elle s'est épanouie est telle qu'elle justifie toute entreprise d'expansion et de diffusion de cette expérience par les pays dits modernes. La référence à ce que l'on peut appeler la "modernité occidentale" est intrinsèque à la construction historique de la modernité dans les pays musulmans, même si elle apparaît d'une manière sélective ou si certaines de ces caractéristiques sont débattues, voire négligées. Le sens de cette modernité peut changer au gré des humeurs idéologiques du temps, mais sa référence est omniprésente et demeure constitutive aussi bien par attraction — le désir de mimétisme — que par répulsion — la revendication d'une identité autre par un appel nationaliste ou religieux.

L'Europe: entre universalisme et eurocentrisme

S'il faut souligner l'influence de l'Europe — et de son modèle de la modernité — dans l'histoire et l'imaginaire des pays non occidentaux, en particulier musulmans, il faut aussi reconnaître que cette présence référentielle et coloniale a eu un impact sur les traditions politiques de ces pays, leurs liens communautaires et même leur univers affectif, dont la manifestation est par nature plus diffuse. Parler d'une civilisation distincte et inaltérée (qu'elle soit ottomane, persane ou encore islamique) est impossible, sauf à ignorer que ces pays ont été confrontés à la modernité des pays occidentaux tout au long du XIX^e siècle et au début du XX^e, soit par un processus de colonisation, soit par une occidentalisation volontariste (c'est-à-dire non imposée par une colonisation européenne) comme ce fut le cas en Turquie.

Aujourd'hui, la confrontation est due à la globalisation des échanges et aux phénomènes migratoires par lesquels les hommes, les produits de consommation, mais aussi les idées circulent dans d'autres espaces que l'espace européen. Dès lors, l'un des paradoxes de la modernité européenne apparaît, qui réside dans la contradiction entre la vocation universaliste et pluraliste de sa promesse de progrès et son eurocentrisme. La modernité a une capacité intrinsèque à se développer dans d'autres aires culturelles que son aire d'origine. Mais la dynamique même de son expansion provoque un phénomène d'indigénisation de certaines de ses valeurs comme la laïcité et, dans certains cas, l'égalité des sexes, dont l'interprétation et l'institutionnalisation spécifiques sont autant de détournements du sens originel de l'expérience fondatrice de l'Europe. La Turquie, pays le plus occidentalisé du monde musulman et le plus musulman parmi les pays candidats à l'Union européenne, vit — et fait émerger en Europe — cette tension qui consiste à vouloir concilier l'altérité islamique et les principes laïcs et égalitaristes de la citoyenneté européenne.

Occidentalisation par l'État, européanisation par le politique

La Turquie est un terrain privilégié pour aborder la complexité des relations entre l'Occident et l'Islam, dans la mesure où l'opposition entre l'un et l'autre a traversé l'histoire et façonné la vie politique turque. Dans son livre, *Le choc des civilisations*, Samuel Huntington,³ relevant la spécificité du cas turc, a bien du mal à trouver une place

appropriée à ce pays qui vient déranger ses cadres d'interprétation. Dans la perspective de ce conflit des civilisations, il présente l'islam et la modernité occidentale comme deux entités bien distinctes, séparées par le temps et par l'espace. Or la Turquie témoigne de la présence et de l'empreinte de la perspective européenne dans une société non occidentale et musulmane. À ce titre, elle illustre plutôt la proximité, le rapprochement, entre ces deux entités. On peut même affirmer que la Turquie s'est engagée par le passé dans un processus d'occidentalisation sans être colonisée par les pays occidentaux et qu'à l'instar des pays postcommunistes d'Europe centrale et des Balkans elle connaît aujourd'hui une dynamique d'eupéanisation sans faire partie de l'Union européenne.

La Turquie est en effet depuis longtemps sous l'influence de l'Occident. Les premières réformes remontent à l'époque du Tanzimat, cet ensemble de lois introduit par les sultans de 1839 à 1876 dans le but de moderniser l'armée et l'appareil bureaucratique, mais aussi d'ouvrir la voie vers la reconnaissance des droits civiques des minorités non musulmanes. Avec la formation des élites nationalistes, la République turque s'est éloignée du modèle de modernisation de l'Empire ottoman. Le kémalisme⁴ — devenu un terme générique — désigne le modèle volontariste et autoritaire d'une modernisation nationaliste et laïque. On est même allé jusqu'à parler d'un modèle turc de laïcité, avec sa cohérence propre, dans lequel la question centrale des droits de la femme ne peut qu'être en résonance avec le débat français sur la laïcité et sur le port du voile des femmes musulmanes. Le mot *laiklik*, adaptation turque du mot français, montre com-

bien la laïcité à la française — même si elle a été transformée, interprétée et instituée dans un contexte culturel musulman, donc différent — est une référence fondamentale, notamment en ce qui concerne le refus des signes et des pratiques religieuses dans l'espace public.

Malgré leur rôle indéniable, le positivisme et la laïcité à la française ne sont pas les seuls modèles à l'œuvre. L'héritage ottoman mais aussi l'absence de toute colonisation ont fait que la Turquie a entretenu des rapports privilégiés avec bien d'autres pays européens. A partir des réformes de 1839, dites Tanzimat, l'Empire ottoman a entretenu des rapports privilégiés (militaires, économiques mais aussi politiques) aussi bien avec Vienne que Venise ou Londres et dès les premières réformes qui allaient déboucher sur une monarchie constitutionnelle en 1876, l'empreinte de l'Europe a été plurielle (surtout dans la vie intellectuelle mais aussi dans les milieux militaires). Dès sa fondation en 1923, la Turquie républicaine a d'ailleurs adopté le code civil suisse, le code pénal italien, le code administratif français et le code commercial allemand.⁵

Cette orientation vers l'Occident comme référence historique de la modernisation politique et institutionnelle turque trouve aujourd'hui son prolongement dans la perspective de l'Union européenne. La candidature de la Turquie n'est pas une entreprise récente. Les traités de Rome entrent en vigueur le 1^{er} janvier 1958. Dès le 31 juillet 1959, la Turquie présente sa demande d'association à la Communauté économique européenne, alors appelée Marché commun. Ce processus se conclura en décembre 2004 par la décision des 25 sur l'ouverture des négociations d'adhésion.

Entre ces deux dates, plusieurs étapes ont jalonné le chemin de la Turquie vers l'Union: l'accord d'Ankara (12 septembre 1963), la demande officielle d'adhésion (14 avril 1987), l'Union douanière (1995) et la déclaration de l'éligibilité (1999).

Les conclusions de la présidence du Conseil européen de Copenhague de juin 1993 avaient introduit la conditionnalité démocratique, inédite jusque-là, qui secondait la reprise de l'acquis communautaire ajoutant des clauses relatives à la démocratisation et à la stabilisation des régimes politiques. En vertu de ces critères, la Turquie s'est engagée depuis 2002 à modifier certains articles de sa constitution et de ses lois. Ces réformes, qui comptent sept séries d'amendements légaux, visent à harmoniser les lois turques avec celles de l'Union européenne. Ainsi, le 3 août 2002, le Parlement turc a décrété l'abolition de la peine de mort (une première dans le monde musulman), la levée des obstacles juridiques à la libre expression, l'enseignement des langues locales, dont le kurde, et une nouvelle législation portant sur les fondations pieuses des minorités chrétiennes. Ces réformes sans précédent ouvrent un brèche dans l'hégémonie d'un nationalisme assimilateur et monoculturel hérité du modèle jacobin. Le plan des Nations Unies qui porte le nom de Kofi Annan a été approuvé par la Turquie et la partie turque de l'île, tandis que les chypriotes grecques ont rejeté massivement la réunification de l'île. Le 30 juillet 2003, le Parlement turc a adopté une nouvelle série de réformes visant à limiter l'influence politique du *Conseil national de sécurité* (souvent vu comme un conseil des militaires), réduisant ainsi l'autoritarisme politique qui perd une

de ses bases institutionnelles et juridiques. L'application de ces nouvelles lois exige bien évidemment un changement des mentalités et des pratiques, non seulement au sein des élites politiques, mais aussi de l'administration tout entière. Ces réformes sont considérées comme un point décisif dans l'histoire républicaine de la Turquie et elles illustrent à quel point la perspective européenne œuvre dans la vie politique turque, crée un encadrement juridique et engendre une dynamique de démocratisation soutenue par la société civile.

Mais ces changements ne témoignent pas seulement de la force du projet européen, ils sont également l'expression, du côté turc, d'un authentique "désir d'Europe", que les observateurs de l'Union questionnent, non sans méfiance, tant est grande l'inquiétude que provoque l'idée d'une communauté européenne qui n'aurait plus de limites. Le mot *désir* est pertinent dans le cas de la Turquie, car il désigne un sentiment puissant, partagé par une très grande partie de la société turque favorable à l'intégration européenne. En revanche, on ne peut guère prétendre que la réciproque soit vraie du côté de l'Union. "Et pourquoi pas la Russie, le Maroc?" a-t-on entendu lors du débat sur la candidature de la Turquie. La société turque, elle, pense en termes d'affranchissement, d'ouverture et d'"européanisation par le bas". C'est la mobilisation de la société civile autour du "Mouvement européen 2002", des ONGs, des groupes de pression comme l'association des hommes d'affaires turcs (Tusiad), mais aussi des partis politiques qui a sensibilisé l'opinion publique turque. Celle-ci, à son tour, a fait pression pour que le Parlement adopte et applique une série de réformes inédites afin de répondre aux critères politiques de Copenhague.

La Turquie entre deux Occidents

Un autre exemple de l'émergence du Parlement comme acteur central de la vie politique du pays a été le vote contre l'engagement de la Turquie dans la guerre en Irak. La motion du 1^{er} mars 2003 autorisant le déploiement des soldats américains sur le sol turc a été massivement rejetée (il manquait seulement trois bulletins pour obtenir la majorité absolue) au grand étonnement de l'opinion publique aussi bien turque qu'étrangère, consciente que ce vote pouvait nuire profondément aux relations avec les États-Unis. L'Union européenne a interprété ce refus du Parlement turc à sa manière: la Turquie fut soupçonnée de suivre un autre objectif, celui d'envahir le nord de l'Irak contre la population kurde et de vouloir déclencher une "guerre dans la guerre", pour reprendre la terminologie des commentateurs et politologues qui anticipaient avec certitude sur les événements. Ces craintes n'étaient pas sans fondement, mais cet état de suspicion a empêché l'Union européenne de reconnaître et de soutenir ce qui était un acte politique. Or la vertu démocratique de l'Union se mesure entre autres à sa capacité à être à l'écoute du politique, ce qu'elle n'a pas fait vis-à-vis de la décision du Parlement turc. Ce vote reflétait le sentiment d'une opinion publique partagée entre l'anxiété de rompre avec les États-Unis et le refus de s'engager dans une guerre qu'elle estimait injustifiée. C'est dans la lignée des manifestations pacifistes d'Europe, bien plus que sur l'affirmation d'une fraternité religieuse avec le peuple irakien, que se sont mobilisés les manifestants turcs. Durant cette guerre, la Turquie, plus que tout autre pays, s'est trouvée sur la ligne de fracture entre deux Occidents, l'Amérique et l'Europe. Au-

jour d'hui encore, elle oscille entre plusieurs lignes de politique internationale. Certes, elle ne veut pas rester en dehors de la reconstruction de la région et tient à rétablir des relations de confiance avec les États-Unis. Mais la mobilisation autour du projet européen devient prioritaire pour le parti actuellement au pouvoir. Elle lui permet non seulement de prendre ses distances avec l'islamisme politique, mais aussi d'échapper aux conflits politiques internes qui divisent les républicains laïcs et les démocrates conservateurs.

Musulmans démocrates ou républicains laïcs

C'est peut-être une ironie de l'histoire de trouver le Premier ministre et dirigeant du Parti de la justice et du développement (AKP) — au pouvoir depuis les élections du 3 novembre 2002 — parmi ceux qui ont lancé l'appel en faveur de l'adhésion. Tayyip Erdoğan n'a pas suivi l'exemple de son prédécesseur islamiste, Necmettin Erbakan, qui, en 1996, avait voulu inauguré sa politique étrangère en rendant visite à ses "frères musulmans", notamment le Libyen Kaddafi. Il s'est, au contraire, mobilisé en faveur du projet européen et s'est rendu, dès le début de sa prise de fonctions, dans les principales capitales européennes. *Le Monde* a bien saisi le paradoxe en titrant au lendemain des élections turques de 3 novembre 2002: "Ce parti dit islamiste qui fait le pari d'Europe". En effet, l'AKP est bien un parti ex-islamiste, conservateur, mais qui reprend l'héritage occidental de la Turquie, au lieu de le rejeter comme il l'a fait auparavant. Aujourd'hui, c'est la continuité avec le projet européen qui est le garant de son succès au pouvoir.

Les discussions autour de l'appellation du parti — pro-islamiste, islamiste modéré ou musulman démocrate — sont capitales et permettent de comprendre les enjeux qui président à la transformation de la mouvance islamique. Ce parti est apparu durant les deux dernières décennies comme l'expression d'un mouvement de protestation qui s'est manifesté dans tous les pays musulmans, et n'a donc pas épargné la Turquie laïque. Issu de la mouvance islamique, il est arrivé au pouvoir par le biais d'élections démocratiques et se démarque à la fois des groupes qui prônent le terrorisme et de la révolution islamique en Iran. La publication du livre *Conservateurs démocrates*,⁶ rédigé par les théoriciens du parti, révèle ce souci d'identité de l'AKP. C'est une configuration différente de l'islamisme, voire de l'ex-islamisme, qui reflète néanmoins les tensions profondes entre les protagonistes de la laïcité républicaine et ceux qui veulent faire réapparaître les signes et les références religieuses.

Lors de la fête nationale qui a célébré les 80 ans de la République turque, le 29 octobre 2003, le débat sur la laïcité et l'islam s'est radicalisé autour de la question du foulard. Le président de la République, M. Ahmet Necdet Sezer, se voulant le gardien des principes de la laïcité, a choisi de ne pas inviter les épouses des parlementaires de l'AKP, dont bon nombre portent le foulard, alors que les députés du Parti républicain du peuple étaient conviés avec leurs conjointes. L'attitude du président a été considérée comme un acte de discrimination. La fête a été boycottée par la majorité des députés de l'AKP, mais également critiquée par de nombreux commentateurs libéraux.

Ce n'est pourtant pas la première fois dans l'histoire turque que les principes de la laïcité républicaine se trouvent en conflit avec ceux de la représentativité démocratique. En Turquie, le port du foulard est interdit dans les universités et dans les administrations publiques (avec le renouveau du mouvement islamiste depuis le début des années 90), et cette interdiction pose les questions essentielles de la définition de l'espace public, de ses fondements laïcs et de ses frontières républicaines.

La question reste donc de savoir si la Turquie peut contenir et satisfaire les revendications islamiques dans le cadre d'une laïcité soutenue par les principes démocratiques et non garantie par l'armée. Cela exige une double transformation, celle de la laïcité et celle de sa contestation islamique. La perspective européenne peut-elle apporter les éléments qui permettront de dépasser cette tension et ce en faveur d'une démocratie pluraliste et non autoritaire? Peut-on concevoir un espace public européen qui gagnerait une certaine autonomie vis-à-vis des espaces publics nationaux? Ou, au contraire, allons-nous assister à l'affirmation des valeurs républicaines de la laïcité, de l'identification de l'espace public avec la république? Le projet d'adhésion à l'Union européenne a créé en Turquie une dynamique de démocratisation en permettant de dépasser la définition républicaine nationaliste de la citoyenneté. Pourtant, loin d'ouvrir des perspectives, le débat qui se tient aujourd'hui autour de la question du foulard à l'école, en Europe, et en particulier en France, bute sur les affirmations républicaines de la laïcité et ne peut que maintenir à distance les revendications islamiques.

L'islam terroriste et l'islam à visage humain

La série d'attentats qui ont eu lieu à Istanbul, les 15 et 20 novembre 2003, contre deux synagogues, le consulat général d'Angleterre et la banque HSBC, a relancé de manière dramatique la question de la place de la Turquie en Europe. Le choix des cibles peut être interprété comme une réaction aux accords de la Turquie avec Israël et à son alliance avec les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni, même si la Turquie — contrairement aux pays d'Europe centrale de la première vague d'adhésion qui se sont déclarés pro-atlantistes —, ne s'est pas engagée dans la guerre contre l'Irak. Mais, au-delà de cette lecture en termes de stratégie et de relations internationales, on peut également penser que l'objectif visé était l'autre version de l'islam que représente la Turquie, version que ne revendiquent ni al-Qaida, ni les protagonistes de la thèse du choc des civilisations. La Turquie possède la volonté de dépasser ce conflit. Elle en manifeste également les signes. Les actes terroristes ne signifient pas l'échec de l'islam modéré et de son articulation avec les valeurs de la démocratie dans un État de droit laïc. Bien au contraire. En voulant détruire cet islam à visage humain, cet islam alternatif au sein d'une société ouverte, le terrorisme islamiste n'a fait que révéler les caractères fondamentaux d'une Turquie qui se place comme un trait d'union entre deux civilisations. Si l'islamisme terroriste a voulu détruire les ponts qui relient la Turquie à l'Occident, il a voulu aussi faire table rase du passé. Ainsi, les attentats contre les deux synagogues d'Istanbul n'ont pas été seulement la condamnation des accords de la Turquie avec Israël, ils ont également — et surtout — sanctionné la présence d'une communauté juive,

héritage de l'Empire ottoman multiconfessionnel. Quant aux attentats contre la banque HSBC, ils n'étaient pas seulement dirigés contre les "intérêts britanniques", ainsi qu'une presse internationale l'a maladroitement affirmé, mais contre "l'intérêt" tout court, l'usure pratiquée par les banques, et toute une génération de jeunes Turcs, formés aux secteurs de la finance internationale. Derrière ces attentats, c'est toute la rhétorique islamiste qui œuvre au rappel des interdits religieux dans le monde moderne. La scène sur laquelle interviennent les islamistes est en effet une scène mondiale, même si les répercussions de leurs actes sont locales, comme le sont leurs sources de recrutement et leurs réseaux. Les terroristes d'Istanbul sont tous originaires d'une même ville du Sud-Est de la Turquie, Bingöl, issus de la même famille, et propriétaires d'un café internet.⁷ Ils agissent au nom de la communauté islamique (*umma*) dont l'idéal s'étend à l'échelle mondiale et légitime pleinement l'usage des technologies de la modernité globale au service d'une solidarité presque tribale. Face à eux, l'Occident peut-il continuer à se murer dans une logique nationale? La décision américaine d'une guerre contre l'Irak semble s'inscrire dans cette ligne purement étatique et nationale.

Dès lors, quelle place l'Union européenne est-elle capable de prendre pour dépasser ce clivage qui se joue à plusieurs échelles? La réponse à cette question dépend pour beaucoup de son rapport à l'altérité islamique. Les deux débats publics, l'un sur le foulard des jeunes musulmanes issues de l'immigration, l'autre sur la place de la Turquie en Europe, se cristallisent sur le problème de la présence de l'islam au sein de l'Union. Plus la Turquie se transforme et

devient un candidat éligible pour le projet européen, plus le débat glisse du “dossier turc” vers un questionnement propre à l’identité de l’Europe. En somme, la candidature de la Turquie dérange car elle révèle, sans le vouloir, les limites de l’universalisme européen, en questionnant le projet européen sur ses ambitions véritables et sur sa capacité en général à faire face à l’altérité musulmane.

Notes

1. *Le Monde*, 8 Novembre 2002.
2. Déclaration du 22 novembre 2002, faite à Prague (AFP). Pour les prises de position récentes, cf. *Le Monde*, 28 Avril 2004.
3. Samuel P. Huntington, *Le choc des civilisations*, traduit de l’anglais par Jean-Luc Fidel, Geneviève Joublain, Patrice Jorland *et al.*, Paris, Odile Jacob, 2000.
4. Selon le nom du fondateur de la République, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk.
5. Cf. Niyazi Berkes, *The Development of Secularism in Turkey*. Montréal, McGill Univ. Press, 1964.
6. Yalçın Akdoğan, *Muhafazakar Demokrasi* (en turc), Ankara, Ak Parti, 2003.
7. Nilüfer Göle, “Instantanés terroristes à Istanbul et nouvelle scénographie de l’islamisme”, *Cosmopolitiques*, éditions de l’aube, n. 6, 2004, p.110-20.



The Emerging Identitarian
Logics

Identities: National and Other^{*}

Samuel Huntington

The Concept of Identity

The “concept of identity,” it has been said, “is as indispensable as it is unclear.” It “is manifold, hard to define and evades many ordinary methods of measurement.” The twentieth century’s leading scholar of identity, Erik Erikson, termed the concept “all-pervasive” but also “vague” and “unfathomable.” The infuriating inescapability of identity is well demonstrated in the work of the distinguished social theorist Leon Wieseltier. In 1996 he published a book, *Against Identity*, denouncing and ridiculing the fascination of intellectuals with that concept. In 1998, he published another book, *Kaddish*, an eloquent, passionate, and explicit affirmation of his own Jewish identity. Identity, it appears, is like sin: however much we may oppose it, we cannot escape it.¹

Given its unavoidability, how do we define it? Scholars have various answers, which nonetheless converge on one central theme. Identity is an individual’s or a group’s sense

^{*} In: *The Challenges to America’s National Identities*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 21-33.

of self. It is a product of self-consciousness, that I or we possess distinct qualities as an entity that differentiates me from you and us from them. A new baby may have elements of an identity at birth in terms of a name, sex, parentage, and citizenship. These do not, however, become part of his or her identity until the baby becomes conscious of them and defines itself in terms of them. Identity, as one group of scholars phrased it, “refers to the images of individuality and distinctiveness (‘selfhood’) held and projected by an actor and formed (and modified over time) through relations with significant ‘others.’”² So long as people interact with others, they have no choice but to define themselves in relation to those others and identify their similarities with and differences from those others.

Identities are important because they shape the behavior of people. If I think of myself as a scholar, I will try to act like a scholar. But individuals also can change their identities. If I begin to act differently—as a polemicist, for instance—I will suffer “cognitive dissonance” and am likely to try to relieve the resulting anguish by stopping that behavior or by redefining myself from a scholar to a political advocate. Similarly, if a person inherits a partisan identity as a Democrat but increasingly finds him- or herself voting for Republican candidates, that person may well redefine him- or herself as a Republican.

Several key points concerning identities need to be made.

First, both individuals and groups have identities. Individuals, however, find and redefine their identities in groups. As social identity theory has shown, the need for

identity leads them even to seek identity in an arbitrarily and randomly constructed group. An individual may be a member of many groups and hence is able to shift identities. Group identity, on the other hand, usually involves a primary defining characteristic and is less fungible. I have identities as a political scientist and a member of the Harvard Department of Government. Conceivably, I could redefine myself as a historian or become a member of the Stanford Department of Political Science, if they were willing to accept this change in my identity. The Harvard Department of Government, however, cannot become a history department or move as an institution to Stanford. Its identity is much more fixed than mine. If the basis for the defining characteristic of a group disappears, perhaps because it achieves the goal it was created to achieve, the existence of the group is threatened, unless it can find another cause to motivate its members.

Second, identities are, overwhelmingly, constructed. People make their identity, under varying degrees of pressure, inducements, and freedom. In an oft-quoted phrase, Benedict Anderson described nations as “imagined communities.” Identities are imagined selves: they are what we think we are and what we want to be. Apart from ancestry (although that can be repudiated), gender (and people occasionally change that), and age (which may be denied but not changed by human action), people are relatively free to define their identities as they wish, although they may not be able to implement those identities in practice. They may inherit their ethnicity and race but these can be redefined or rejected, and the meaning and applicability of a term like “race” changes over time.

Third, individuals and to a lesser extent groups have multiple identities. These may be ascriptive, territorial, economic, cultural, political, social, and national. The relative salience of these identities to the individual or group can change from time to time and situation to situation, as can the extent to which these identities complement or conflict with each other. "Only extreme social situations," Karmela Liebkind observes, "such as battles in war, may temporarily eradicate all other group affiliations but one."³

Fourth, identities are defined by the self but they are the product of the interaction between the self and others. How others perceive an individual or group affects the self-definition of that individual or group. If one enters a new social situation and is perceived as an outsider who does not belong, one is likely to think of oneself that way. If a large majority of the people in a country think that members of a minority group are inherently backward and inferior, the minority group members may internalize that concept of themselves, at which point it becomes part of their identity. Alternatively, they may react against that characterization and define themselves in opposition to it. External sources of identity may come from the immediate environment, the broader society, or political authorities. Governments have, indeed, assigned racial or other identities to people.

People can aspire to an identity but not be able to achieve it unless they are welcomed by those who already have that identity. The crucial post-Cold War issue for East European peoples was whether the West would accept their identification of themselves as part of the West. Westerners have accepted Poles, Czechs, and Hungarians. They are less

likely to do that with some other Eastern European peoples who also want a Western identity. They have been quite reluctant to do so with the Turks, whose bureaucratic elites desperately want Turkey to be Western. As a result, Turks have been conflicted over whether they should think of themselves primarily as European, Western, Muslim, Middle Eastern, or even Central Asian.

Fifth, the relative salience of alternative identities for any individual or group is situational. In some situations, people stress that aspect of their identity that links them to the people with whom they are interacting. In other situations, people emphasize that aspect of their identity that distinguishes them from others. A female psychologist, is has been argued, in the company of a dozen male psychologists will think of herself as a woman; in the company of a dozen women who are not psychologists, she will think of herself as a psychologist.⁴ The salience of people's identity with their homeland typically increases when they travel abroad and observe the different ways of life of foreigners. In attempting to free themselves from Ottoman rule, Serbs stressed their Orthodox religion, while Muslim Albanians stressed their ethnicity and language. Similarly, the founders of Pakistan defined its identity in terms of their Muslim religion to justify independence from India. A few years later the Muslim Bangladeshi emphasized culture and language to legitimate their independence from their Pakistani co-religionists.

Identities may be narrow or broad, and the breadth of the most salient identity changes with the situation people are in. "You" and "I" become "we" when a "they" appears,

or, as an Arab saying has it, “My brother and I against our cousins, we and our cousins against the world.” As people increasingly interact with people of more distant and different cultures, they also broaden their identities. For French and Germans, their national identity loses salience in relation to their European identity, as Jonathan Mercer says, when there emerges a broader “sense of difference between ‘us’ and ‘them,’ or between the European and the Japanese identities.”⁵ Hence it is only natural that the processes of globalization should lead to the broader identities of religion and civilization assuming greater importance for individuals and peoples.

Others and Enemies

To define themselves, people need and other. Do they also need an enemy? Some people clearly do. “Oh, how wonderful it is to hate,” said Josef Goebbels. “Oh, what a relief to fight, to fight enemies who defend themselves, enemies who are awake,” said André Malraux. These are extreme articulations of a generally more subdued but widespread human need, as acknowledged by two of the twentieth century’s greatest minds. Writing to Sigmund Freud in 1933, Albert Einstein argued that every attempt to eliminate war had “ended in a lamentable breakdown... man has within him a lust for hatred and destruction.” Freud agreed: people are like animals, he wrote back, they solve problems through the use of force, and only an all-powerful world state could prevent this from happening. Humans, Freud argued, have only two types of instincts, “those which seek to

preserve and unite... and those which seek to destroy and kill." Both are essential and they operate in conjunction with each other. Hence, "there is no use in trying to get rid of men's aggressive inclinations."⁶

Other scholars of human psychology and human relations have made similar arguments. There is a need, Vamik Volkan has said, "to have enemies and allies." This tendency appears in early-mid-adolescence when "the other group comes to be definitely viewed as the enemy." The psyche is "the creator of the concept of the enemy... As long as the enemy group is kept at least at a psychological distance, it gives us aid and comfort, enhancing our cohesion and making comparisons with ourselves gratifying." Individuals need self-esteem, recognition, approbation, what Plato, as Francis Fukuyama reminded us, designated *thymos* and Adam Smith termed vanity. Conflict with the enemy reinforces these qualities in the group.⁷

The need of individuals for self-esteem leads them to believe that their group is better than other groups. Their sense of self rises and falls with the fortunes of the groups with which they identify and with the extent to which other people are excluded from their group. Ethnocentrism, as Mercer puts it, is "the logical corollary to egocentrism." Even when their group may be totally arbitrary, temporary, and "minimal," people still, as social identity theory predicts, discriminate in favor of their group as compared to another group. Hence in many situations people choose to sacrifice absolute gains in order to achieve relative gains. They prefer to be worse off absolutely but better off compared to someone they see as a rival rather than better off ab-

solutely but not as well off as that rival: “beating the outgroup is more important than sheer profit.” This preference has been repeatedly supported by evidence from psychological experiments and public opinion polls, not to mention common sense and everyday experience. To the bafflement of economists, Americans say that they would prefer to be worse off economically but ahead of the Japanese rather than better off and behind the Japanese.⁸

Recognition of difference does not necessarily generate competition, much less hate. Yet even people who have little psychological need to hate can become involved in processes leading to the creation of enemies. Identity requires differentiation. Differentiation necessitates comparison, the identification of the ways in which, “our” group differs from “their” group. Comparison, in turn, generates evaluation: Are the ways of our group better or worse than the ways of their group? Group egotism leads to justification: Our ways are better than their ways. Since the members of the other group are engaged in a similar process, conflicting justifications lead to competition. We have to demonstrate the superiority of our ways to their ways. Competition leads to antagonism and the broadening of what may have started as the perception of narrow differences into more intense and fundamental ones. Stereotypes are created, the opponent is demonized, the other is transmogrified into the enemy.

While the need for enemies explains the ubiquity of conflict between and within human societies, it does not explain the forms and locales of conflict. Competition and conflict can only occur between entities that are in the same universe or arena. In some sense, as Volkan put it, “the en-

emy” has to be “like us.”⁹ A soccer team may view another soccer team as its rival; it will not view a hockey team that way. The history department in one university will see history departments in other universities as its rivals for faculty, students, prestige within the discipline of history. It will not see the physics department in its own university in that light. It may, however, see the physics department as a rival for funding within their university. Competitors have to be playing on the same chessboard and most individuals and groups compete on several different chessboards. The chessboards have to be there but the players may change, and one game is succeeded by another. Hence, the likelihood of general or lasting peace among ethnic groups, states, or nations is remote. As human experience shows, the end of a hot or cold war creates the conditions for another. “A part of being human,” as a committee of psychiatrists put it, “has always been the search for an enemy to embody temporarily or permanently disavowed aspects of our selves.”¹⁰ Late-twentieth-century distinctiveness theory, social identity theory, sociobiology, and attribution theory all lend support to the conclusion that the roots of hate, rivalry, the need for enemies, personal and group violence, and war are ineluctably located in human psychology and the human condition.

Sources of Identity

People have an almost infinite number of possible sources of identity. These include ones that are primarily:

1. *Ascriptive*, such as age, ancestry, gender, kin (blood relatives), ethnicity (defined as extended kin), and race.
2. *Cultural*, such as clan, tribe, ethnicity (defined as a way of life), language, nationality, religion, civilization.
3. *Territorial*, such as neighborhood, village, town, city, province, state, section, country, geographical area, continent, hemisphere.
4. *Political*, such as faction, clique, leader, interest group, movement, cause, party, ideology, state.
5. *Economic*, such as job, occupation, profession, work group, employer, industry, economic sector, labor union, class.
6. *Social*, such as friends, club, team, colleagues, leisure group, status.

Any individual is likely to be involved in many of these groupings, but that does not necessarily mean that they are sources of his or her identity. A person may, for instance, find either his job or his country loathsome and totally reject it. In addition, relations among identities are complex. A differentiated relation exists when the identities are compatible in the abstract but at times, such as family identity and job identity, may impose conflicting demands on the individual. Other identities, such as territorial or cultural identities, are hierarchical in terms of their scope. Broader identities are inclusive of narrower identities, and the less inclusive identity, to a province, for instance, may or may not conflict with the more inclusive identity to a country. In addition, identities of the same sort may or may not be ex-

clusive. People may, for instance, assert dual nationality and claim to be both American and Italian, but it is difficult for them to assert dual religiosity and claim to be both Muslim and Catholic.

Identities also differ in their intensity. Intensity often varies inversely with scope; people identify more intensely with their family than with their political party, but this is not always the case. In addition, the salience of identities of all types varies with the interactions between the individual or group and its environment.

Narrower and broader identities in a single hierarchy may either reinforce or conflict with each other. In a famous phrase, Edmund Burke argued that “To be attached to the subdivision, to love the little platoon we belong to in society, is the first principle (the germ, as it were) of public affections. The love to the whole is not extinguished by this subordinate partiality.” The “little platoon” phenomenon is key to military success. Armies win battles because their soldiers intensely identify with their immediate comrades in arms. Failure to promote small unit cohesion, as the U.S. Army learned in Vietnam, can lead to military disaster. At times, however, subordinate loyalties conflict with and perhaps displace broader ones, as with territorial movements for autonomy or independence. Hierarchical identities co-exist uneasily with each other.

The False Dichotomy

Nations, nationalism, and national identity are, in large part, the product of the tumultuous course of European his-

tory from the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries. War made the state and it also made nations. "No Nation, in the true sense of the word," the historian Michael Howard argues, "could be born without war... no self-conscious community could establish itself as a new and independent actor on the world scene without an armed conflict or the threat of one."¹¹ People developed their sense of national identity as they fought to differentiate themselves from other people with different language, religion, history, or location.

The French and the English and then the Dutch, Spanish, French, Swedes, Prussians, Germans, and Italians crystallized their national identities in the crucible of war. To survive and to succeed in the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, kings and princes increasingly had to mobilize the economic and demographic resources of their territories and eventually to create national armies to replace mercenary ones. In the process they promoted national consciousness and the confrontation of nation against nation. By the 1790s, as R.R. Palmer put it, "The wars of kings were over; the wars of peoples had begun."¹² Only in the mid-eighteenth century do the words "nations" and "*patrie*" enter into European languages. The emergence of British identity was prototypical. English identity was defined in wars against the French and the Scots. British identity subsequently emerged as "an invention forged above all by war. Time and time again, war with France brought Britons, whether they hailed from Wales or Scotland or England, into confrontation with an obviously hostile. Other and encouraged them to define themselves collectively against it. They defined

themselves as Protestants struggling for survival against the world's foremost Catholic power."¹³

Scholars generally posit two types of nationalism and national identity, which they variously label: civic and ethnic, political and cultural, revolutionary and tribalist, liberal and integral, rational-associational and organic-mystical, civic-territorial and ethnic-genealogical, or simply patriotism and nationalism.¹⁴ In each pairing, the first is seen as good, and the second as bad. The good, civic nationalism, assumes an open society based, at least in theory, on a social contract to which people of any race or ethnicity are able to subscribe and thus become citizens. Ethnic nationalism, in contrast, is exclusive, and membership in the nation is limited to those who share certain primordial, ethnic, or cultural characteristics. In the early nineteenth century, scholars argue, nationalism and efforts in European societies to create national identities were primarily of the civic variety. Nationalist movements affirmed the equality of citizens, thereby undermining class and status distinctions. Liberal nationalism challenged authoritarian multinacional empires. Subsequently, romanticism and other movements generated illiberal ethnic nationalism, glorifying the ethnic community over the individual, and reaching its apotheosis in Hitler's Germany.

The dichotomy between civic and ethnic nationalism, whatever the labels, is overly simple and cannot stand. In most of these pairings, the ethnic category is a catch-all for all forms of nationalism or national identity that are not clearly contractual, civic, and liberal. In particular, it combines two very different conceptions of national identity:

ethnic-racial, on the one hand, and cultural, on the other. The reader may or may not have noted that “nation” is missing from the list of some forty-eight possible sources of identity on p. 27. The reason is that while national identity was at times in the West the highest form of identity, it also has been a derived identity whose intensity comes from other sources. National identity usually but not always includes a territorial element and may also include one or more ascriptive (race, ethnicity), cultural (religion, language), and political (state, ideology) elements, as well as occasionally economic (farming) or social (networks) ones.

The principal theme of this book is the continuing centrality of Anglo-Protestant culture to American national identity. The term “culture,” however, has many meanings. Probably most often, it is used to refer to the cultural products of a society, including both its “high” culture of art, literature, and music and its “low” culture of popular entertainments and consumer preferences. Culture in this book means something different. It refers to a people’s language, religious beliefs, social and political values, assumptions as to what is right and wrong, appropriate and inappropriate, and to the objective institutions and behavioral patterns that reflect these subjective elements. To cite one example, discussed in Chapter 4: Overall, more Americans are in the labor force and work longer hours, have shorter vacations, get less in unemployment, disability, and retirement benefits, and retire later, than people in comparable societies. Overall, Americans also take greater pride in their work, tend to view leisure with ambivalence and at times guilt, disdain those who do not work, and see the work ethic as a key ele-

ment of what it means to be an American. It thus seems reasonable to conclude that this objective and subjective emphasis on work is one distinguishing characteristic of American culture, compared to those of other societies. This is the sense in which culture is used in this book.

The simple civic-ethnic duality conflates culture and ascriptive elements, which are very different. In developing his theory of ethnicity in the United States, Horace Kallen argued that however an immigrant may change, "he cannot change his grandfather." Hence ethnic identities are relatively permanent.¹⁵ Intermarriage undermines that argument, but even more important is the distinction between ancestry and culture. One cannot change one's grandparents, and in that sense one's ethnic heritage is given. Similarly, one cannot change one's skin color, although the perceptions of what that color means may change. One can, however, change one's culture. People convert from one religion to another, learn new languages, adopt new values and beliefs, identify with new symbols, and accommodate themselves to new ways of life. The culture of a younger generation often differs along many of these dimensions from that of the previous generation. At times the cultures of whole societies can change dramatically. Both before and after World War II, Germans and Japanese defined their national identities overwhelmingly in ascriptive, ethnic terms. Their defeat in that war, however, changed one central element of their cultures. The two most militaristic countries in the world in the 1930s were transformed into two of the most pacifist countries. Cultural identity is fungible; ethnicancestral identity is not. Hence a clear distinction has to be maintained between the two.

The relative importance of the elements of national identity varies with the historical experiences of the people. Often one source will tend to be preeminent. German identity includes linguistic and other cultural elements but was defined by a 1913 law ascriptively in terms of descent. Germans are people who have German parents. As a result, contemporary descendants of eighteenth-century German migrants to Russia are considered German. If they migrate to Germany, they automatically receive German citizenship although the German they speak, if they speak any, may be unintelligible to their compatriots, and their customs may seem alien to native Germans. In contrast, before 1999 third-generation descendants of Turkish immigrants to Germany, who grew up and were educated in Germany, worked in Germany, and spoke fluent colloquial German, faced serious obstacles to becoming German citizens.

In the former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, national identity was defined politically by their communist ideologies and communist regimes. These countries included peoples of different nationalities, which were defined culturally and accorded official recognition. For a century and a half after 1789, on the other hand, the French were divided politically into “two Frances” of *movement* and *l'ordre établi*, who differed fundamentally on whether France should accept or reject the results of the French Revolution. French identity was instead defined culturally. Immigrants who adopted French mores and ways of life and, most importantly, spoke French perfectly were accepted as French. In contrast to German law, French law provided that anyone born in France of foreign parents was automatically a

French citizen. By 1993, however, the French had become concerned about whether children of Muslim North African immigrants were being absorbed into French culture and changed the law to require French-born children of immigrants to apply for citizenship before their eighteenth birthday. This restriction was eased in 1998 to allow children born in France to foreign parents automatically to become French citizens at age eighteen if they had lived in France for five of the previous seven years.

The relative salience of different components of national identity may change. In the late twentieth century both Germans and French generally rejected the authoritarian components that had been part of their history and made democracy part of their self-concept. In France, the Revolution triumphed; in Germany, Nazism was expurgated. With the end of the Cold War, Russians became divided over their identity, with only a minority continuing to embrace communist ideology, some wanting a European identity, others espousing a cultural definition involving elements of Orthodoxy and pan-Slavism, and still others giving primacy to a territorial concept of Russia as primarily a Eurasian society. Germany, France, and the Soviet Union/Russia thus historically emphasized different components in their national identity, and the relative salience of some components shifted over time. The same is true for other countries, including America.

Notes

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2. Ronald L. Jepperson, Alexander Wendt, and Peter J. Katzenstein, "Norms, Identity, and Culture in National Security," in Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., *The Culture of National Security: Norms and Identity in World Politics* (New York, Columbia University Press, 1996), p. 59.
3. Liebkind, *Minority Identity and Identification Processes*, p. 51, citing Henri Tajfel, *Interindividual Behaviour and Intergroup Behaviour*, in Tajfel, ed., "Differentiation Between Social Groups Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations," *European Monograph in Social Psychology*, 14 (London, Academic Press, 1978), p. 27-60.
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5. *Ibid.*; Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, 49 (Spring 1995), p. 250.
6. Josef Goebbels, quoted in Jonathan Mercer, "Approaching Hate: The Cognitive Foundations of Discrimination," *CISAC* (Stanford University, January, 1994), p. 1; André Malraux, *Man's Fate* (New York, Random House, 1969), p. 3, cited by Robert D. Kaplan, "The Coming Anarchy," *Atlantic Monthly*, 273 (February 1994), p. 72; Albert Einstein and Sigmund Freud, "Why War?," in *The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud* (London, Hogart Press, 1964), p. 199-215.
7. Vamik D. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: A Developmental Approach," *Political Psychology*, 6 (June 1985), p. 219, 243, 247; Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to International Relationships* (Northvale, N.J., J.

- Aronson, 1994), p. 35; Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York, Free Press, 1992), p. 162-77.
8. Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," p. 242; Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies," p. 231; Dennis Wrong, *The Problem of Order, What Unites and Divides Society* (New York, Free Press, 1994), p. 203-4; *Economist*, 7 July 1990, p. 29. The form this discrimination takes way, however, be shaped by culture. Mercer, "Approaching Hate," p. 4-6,8,11, citing Margaret Wetherell, "Cross-Cultural Studies of Minimal Groups: Implications for the Social Identity Theory of Intergroup Relations," in Henri Tajfel, ed., *Social Identity and Intergroup Relations* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 220-21; Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York, Basic Books, 1984), p. 110-12; Michael A Hogg and Dominic Abrams, *Social Identifications: A Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations and Group Processes* (New York, Routledge, 1988), p. 49.
 9. Volkan, "The Need to Have Enemies and Allies," p. 243-44.
 10. Committee on International Relations, *Us and Them*, p. 19. See also Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*, p. 88, 94-95, 103.
 11. Michael Howard, "War and the Nation-State," *Daedalus*, 108 (Fall 1979), p. 102.
 12. R. R. Palmer, "Frederick the Great, Guibert, Bülow, From Dynastic to National War," in Peter Paret, ed., *Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton University Press, 1986), p. 18.
 13. Linda Colley, *Britons, Forging the Nation, 1707-1837* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1992), p. 5.
 14. For statements of these distinctions, see William B. Cohen, "Nationalism in Europe," in John Bodnar, *Bonds of Affection, Americans Define Their Patriotism* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1996), p. 323-38; Thomas M. Franck, "Tribe, Nation, World: Self-Identification in the Evolving International System," *Ethics and International Affairs*, 11 (1997), p. 151-69; Anthony D. Smith, *National Identity* (London, Penguin, 1991), p. 11-14, 79ff; Hans Kohn, *Nationalism, Its Meaning and History* (Princeton, Van Nos-

trand, 1965); Alan Patten, "The Autonomy Argument for Liberal Nationalism," *Nations and Nationalism*, 5 (January 1999), p. 1ff; Maurizio Viroli, *For Love of Country: An Essay on Patriotism and Nationalism* (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995), Introduction; Tom Nairn, "Breakwaters of 2000: From Ethnic to Civic Nationalism," *New Left Review*, 214 (November/December 1995) p. 91-103; Bernard Yack, "The Myth of the Civil Nation," *Critical Review*, 10 (Spring 1996), p. 193ff; Volkan, *The Need to Have Enemies and Allies*, p. 85, who summarizes Orwell's view as nationalism is "patriotism turned sour."

A 2003 sophisticated empirical study provides convincing evidence that national pride comes in two forms: "patriotism," which is defined in civic terms as "self-referential," noncompetitive love of country, and "beliefs in the *social system* and *values* of one's country", and "nationalism," defined as "inherently *comparative*"—and almost exclusively downwardly comparative." Rui J. P. de Figueiredo, Jr., and Zachary Elkins, "Are Patriots Bigots? An Inquiry into the Vices of In-Group Pride," *American Journal of Political Science*, 47 (January 2003), p. 171-88. This study does not provide evidence as to how those who are patriotic feel when they compare, as they must, their country to other countries. Nor does it come to grips with the fact that in a globalizing world intercountry interactions and comparisons are increasingly frequent and unavoidable. Annual surveys now regularly rate countries on the extent to which they are free, have a free press, are corrupt, are productive, are globalized, provide effective schooling, and on other dimensions. How much national pride does a "patriot" have if his country ranks badly on most of these?

15. Horace M. Kallen, *Culture and Democracy in the United States* (New York, Boni & Liveright, 1924), p. 94.

Deconstructing America: The Rise of Subnational Identities^{*}

Samuel Huntington

The Deconstructionist Movement

American national identity peaked politically with the rallying of Americans to their country and its cause in World War II. It peaked symbolically with President Kennedy's 1961 summons: "Ask not what your country can do for you—ask what you can do for your country." In the intervening decade and a half, the unifying impact of World War II, the confrontations of the early Cold War; the successful incorporation into American society of the pre-World War I immigrants and their children, the slow but steady progress toward ending racial discrimination, and unprecedented economic prosperity all combined to reinforce Americans' identification with their country. Americans were one nation of individuals with equal rights, who shared a primarily Anglo-Protestant core culture, and were dedicated to the liberal-democratic principles of the American Creed. This, at least, was the prevailing image Ameri-

^{*} *In: The Challenges to America's National Identities*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 141-58.

cans had of what their country should be, and the goal toward which, in some measure, it seemed to be moving.

In the 1960s powerful movements began to challenge the salience, the substance, and the desirability of this concept of America. America for them was not a national community of individuals sharing a common culture, history, and creed but a conglomerate of different races, ethnicities, and subnational cultures, in which individuals were defined by their group membership, not common nationality. The proponents of this view castigated the melting pot and tomato soup concepts of America that had prevailed earlier in the century and argued that America was instead a mosaic or salad of diverse peoples. Acknowledging his previous defeat, Horace Kallen claimed victory on his ninetieth birthday in 1972: "It takes about 50 years for an idea to break through and become vogue. No one likes an intruder, particularly when he is upsetting the commonplace." President Clinton hailed the liberation of Americans from their dominant European culture. Vice President Gore interpreted the nation's motto, *E pluribus unum* (chosen by Franklin, Jefferson, and Adams), to mean "out of one, many," and political theorist Michael Walzer, citing Kallen's vision of a "nation of nationalities," argued it should mean "Within one, many."¹

The deconstructionists promoted programs to enhance the status and influence of subnational racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. They encouraged immigrants to maintain their birth country cultures, granted them legal privileges denied to native-born Americans, and denounced the idea of Americanization as un-American. They pushed the rewrit-

ing of history syllabi and textbooks so as to refer to the “peoples” of the United States in place of the single people of the Constitution. They urged supplementing or substituting for national history the history of subnational groups. They downgraded the centrality of English in American life and pushed bilingual education and linguistic diversity. They advocated legal recognition of group rights and racial preferences over the individual rights central to the American Creed. They justified their actions by theories of multiculturalism and the idea that diversity rather than unity or community should be America’s overriding value. The combined effect of these efforts was to promote the deconstruction of the American identity that had been gradually created over three centuries and the ascendance of subnational identities.

The resulting controversies over racial preferences, bilingualism, multiculturalism, immigration, assimilation, national history standards, English as the official language, “Eurocentrism,” were in effect all battles in a single war over the nature of American national identity. On one side were substantial elements of America’s political, intellectual, and institutional elites, plus the leaders or aspiring leaders of the subnational groups whose interests were being promoted. Of central importance in this deconstruction coalition were government officials, particularly bureaucrats, judges, and educators. In the past, imperial and colonial governments provided resources to minority groups and encouraged people to identify with them, so as to enhance the government’s ability to divide and rule. The governments of nation-states, in contrast, attempted to promote the

unity of their people, the development of national consciousness, the suppression of subnational regional and ethnic loyalties, the universal use of the national language, and the allocation of benefits to those who conform to the national norm. Until the late twentieth century, American political and governmental leaders acted similarly. Then in the 1960s and 1970s they began to promote measures consciously designed to weaken America's cultural and creedal identity and to strengthen racial, ethnic, cultural, and other subnational identities. These efforts by a nation's leaders to deconstruct the nation they governed were, quite possibly, without precedent in human history.

Substantial elements of America's elites in academia, the media, business, and the professions joined governmental elites in these efforts. The deconstructionist coalition, however, did not include most Americans. In poll after poll and in several referenda, majorities of Americans rejected ideas and measures for weakening national identity and promoting subnational identities. They were often joined by substantial minorities, at times pluralities, and even majorities of the subnational groups these measures were designed to benefit. Overall, the American people remained deeply patriotic, nationalistic in their outlook, and committed to their national culture, creed, and identity. A major gap thus developed between portions of America's elite, on the one hand, and the bulk of the American people, on the other, over the fundamental issues of what America is and what America should be.

Several factors were responsible for the emergence of the deconstructionist movements. First, in some measure,

they were the American manifestation of the global rise of more limited subnational identities that were creating crises of national identity in countries throughout the world. These were, as we have seen, related to economic globalization and the expansion of transportation and communication, which generated in people the need to seek identity, support, and assurance in smaller groups. Second, the rise of subnational identities preceded the end of the Cold War but the easing of that conflict in the later decades of the century and its abrupt end in 1989 eliminated one powerful reason for giving preeminence to national identity and thus opened the way for people to find greater salience in other identities. Third, political calculations at times undoubtedly motivated elected officials and wouldbe elected officials to promote measures they assumed would appeal to significant political constituencies. President Nixon, for instance, endorsed Congressman Roman Pucinski's legislation on ethnic groups before the 1972 election and allegedly encouraged affirmative action in employment to promote conflict between blacks and working-class whites within the Democratic Party. Fourth, it clearly was in the interests of the leaders and aspiring leaders of minority groups to promote measures that would provide benefits for and enhance the status of their groups. Fifth, bureaucratic imperatives led government officials to interpret acts of Congress in ways that would make it easier for them to implement those acts, to expand the activities, power, and resources of their agencies, and to promote their own policy goals.

Sixth, liberal political beliefs fostered among academics, intellectuals, journalists, and others feelings of

sympathy and guilt concerning those whom they saw as the victims of exclusion, discrimination, and oppression. Racial groups and women became the focus of late-twentieth-century liberal activism much as the working class and the labor movement had been for early-twentieth-century liberals. The cults of multiculturalism and diversity took the place of left-wing, socialist, and working-class ideologies and sympathies.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the formal de-legitimation of race and ethnicity as components of national identity in the civil rights, voting rights, and immigration acts of 1964-1965 paradoxically legitimated their reappearance in subnational identities. So long as race and ethnicity were key components defining America, those who were not white and not northern European could challenge that definition only by seeming to be un-American. "Becoming white" and "Anglo-conformity" were the ways in which immigrants, blacks, and others made themselves Americans. With race and ethnicity formally exorcised, and culture downgraded, the way opened for minority groups to assert their own identities within a society now defined largely by its creed. No longer the means by which Americans differentiated themselves from other peoples, race, ethnicity, and, to some extent, culture became the grounds by which Americans differentiated themselves from each other.

The deconstructionist movement generated much controversy, political and intellectual. By the 1990s commentators were awarding victory to the deconstructionists. In 1992 Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., warned that the "ethnic upsurge," which had begun "as a gesture of protest against the

Anglocentric culture,” had become “a cult, and today it threatens to become a counter-revolution against the original theory of America as ‘one people’, a common culture, a single nation.” And in 1997 Harvard sociologist Nathan Glazer concluded “we are all multiculturalists now.”² Yet opposition to the counterrevolution quickly developed, and vigorous movements emerged committed to a more traditional concept of American identity. In the 1990s, bureaucrats and judges, including Supreme Court justices, who had earlier backed racial categorization and racial preferences, began to moderate and even reverse their views. Led by energetic entrepreneurs, movements developed forcing referenda votes on ending affirmative action and bilingual education. The efforts to rewrite American history and educational curricula were countered by new organizations of scholars and teachers.

September 11 gave a major boost to the supporters of America as one people with a common culture. Yet the deconstruction war did not end and it remained unresolved as to whether America was, would be, or should be a nation of individuals with equal rights and a common culture and creed or an association of racial, ethnic, and cultural subnational groups held together by the hopes for the material gains that can be provided by a healthy economy and a compliant government. Major battles in this war involved challenges to America’s Creed, its language, and its core culture.

The Challenge to the Creed

The core of the American Creed, as Myrdal said, involves the “ideals of the essential dignity of the individual

human being, of the fundamental equality of all men, and of certain inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and a fair opportunity.”³ Throughout America’s history, American political and social institutions and practices have fallen short of these goals. A gap has existed between ideal and reality. At times some Americans have found this gap intolerable and launched social and political movements promoting major reforms in institutions and practices so as to bring them more in accord with the values on which most Americans agree and which are, indeed, central to American national identity. “The history of reform” in America, as Ralph Waldo Emerson said, “is always identical; it is the comparison of the idea with the fact.”⁴

Myrdal described and invoked the Creed in order to highlight “an American dilemma,” the gap between its principles and the inequality, lack of civil rights, discrimination, and segregation to which black Americans were still subjected in the 1930s. Slavery and its legacies have historically been *the* American dilemma, the most blatant, profound, and evil violation of America’s values. Following the compromise of 1877, Americans attempted to ignore, deny, and explain away this dilemma. In the mid-twentieth century, however, several developments made this no longer possible: urbanization of blacks and their massive migration north; the impact of World War II and then the Cold War, which made racial discrimination a foreign policy liability; the changing attitudes of white Americans about race as they attempted to resolve the cognitive dissonance between their beliefs and reality; the efforts by the federal judiciary in the 1940s and 1950s to bring laws and institu-

tions affecting blacks into accord with the Fourteenth Amendment; the emergence in the late 1950s and 1960s of the boomer generation as a source of reform activists; and new assertiveness by the leaders of black organizations trying to achieve the equality that had been denied African-Americans.

As had been the case with previous reform movements, the principles of the American Creed were the single greatest resource of those pushing for the end of racial segregation and discrimination. The dignity of the individual, the right of all individuals to equal treatment and opportunity, regardless of race, were the recurring themes of the campaign. Without the principles of the Creed embedded in American identity, the campaign for equal treatment of blacks would, arguably, have gone nowhere. The case for eliminating race as a consideration in the actions of governments and other institutions rested squarely on the Creed's concept of equal rights for all. "Classifications and distinctions based on race or color," the leading black attorney Thurgood Marshall argued in 1948, "have no moral or legal validity in our society." Supreme Court justices in the early 1960s described the Constitution as "color-blind." The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in 1960, in a statement on higher education, concluded that "questions as to the applicant's race or color are clearly irrelevant and improper. They serve no legitimate purpose in helping the college to select its students."⁵

The Civil Rights Act of 1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were expressly designed to make American reality reflect American principles. Title VII of the former made it unlawful for an employer "(1) to fail or refuse to hire... any

individual... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or (2) to... classify his employees... in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities... because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." Senator Hubert Humphrey, the floor manager of the bill, assured the Senate that nothing in the bill gave courts or executive agencies the power "to require hiring, firing, or promotion of employees in order to meet a racial 'quota' or to achieve a certain racial balance... Title VII prohibits discrimination... [and] is designed to encourage hiring on the basis of ability and qualifications, not race or religion."⁶ The bill required a showing of intent to discriminate to make a practice unlawful, authorized employers to make appointments on the basis of seniority and merit, and gave employers the right to use ability tests, provided they were not designed to discriminate on the basis of race. Courts could provide relief only if they found that an employer intentionally engaged in an unlawful practice. The following year, the Voting Rights Act made it illegal to deny a citizen the right to vote because of race or color in the jurisdictions (mostly Southern states) covered by the act. The combined effect of these acts was to prohibit discrimination among races in employment, voting, public accommodations, public facilities, federal programs, and federally supported public education.⁷ The language of the laws and the intentions of their framer's could not have been clearer. In America's historic pattern, reformers had produced changes in institutions and practices so as to bring them into greater accord with the principles of America's Creed.

Yet almost immediately this momentous development was reversed. As soon as the Civil Rights Act was passed, black leaders such as Bayard Rustin stopped demanding rights common to all American citizens and instead began demanding governmental programs to provide material benefits to blacks as a distinct racial group, toward the goal of “achieving the fact of [economic] equality” with whites. To reach this goal as quickly as possible, federal administrators, later joined by judges, interpreted the reform statutes to mean the opposite of what they said and through these interpretations launched a frontal assault on the Creed’s principle of equal rights for all that had made the new laws possible. The common theme of these actions was to replace the prescription of nondiscrimination in those laws with “affirmative discrimination” (in Nathan Glazer’s phrase) in favor of blacks.⁸

By 1967, as Hugh Davis Graham observes in his exhaustive study *The Civil Rights Era*, the chairman, a majority of the commissioners, and the staff of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission created by the Civil Rights Act were “prepared to defy Title VII’s restrictions and attempt to build a body of case law that would justify its [the commission’s] focus on effects and its disregard of intent.” The administrators, as Glazer put it, “took statistical disparities as evidence of discrimination, and tried to pressure employers, public and private, into overcoming them by hiring on the basis of race, color, and national origin—exactly what the original Civil Rights Act of 1964 had forbidden.” Officials in the Department of Labor also acted to reverse the directives of president and Congress. In

March 1961 President Kennedy issued Executive Order 10,925 ordering government contractors to hire and treat employees “without regard to their race, creed, color, or national origin.”* President Johnson reaffirmed this requirement. In 1968-1970, however, the Department of Labor issued orders requiring government contractors when hiring workers to take into account the proportion of races in their geographic area of their business. Business were told to establish “a set of specific and result-oriented procedures” keyed to the problems and needs of members of minority groups. As Andrew Kull point out in his analysis *The Color-Blind Constitution*: “An executive order whose language required nondiscrimination—its literal command was still that government contractors ‘ensure that applicants be employed without regard to their race’... had been formally interpreted by the Labor Department to require the contrary.” The Labor Department’s actions also ran afoul of the nondiscrimination language of Title VII. “The policy of the U.S. Department of Labor by 1969 was thus to require what Congress had prohibited scarcely five years before.”⁹

In *Griggs v. Duke Power Co.* (401 U.S. 424, 1971), the first Title VII case to come before it, the Supreme Court similarly disregarded the statute’s language requiring proof of intent. It found that the employer in question had no “intention to discriminate against Negro employees,” but then

* The executive order also called for “affirmative action” in its original meaning: “The employer will not discriminate against any employee or applicant for employment because of race, creed, color, or national origin. The contractor will take *affirmative action* to ensure that applicants are employed and that employees are treated during employment, *without regard* to their race, creed, color or national origin.” Emphasis added.

it still outlawed the company's employment requirement of either a high school diploma or passing a standard general intelligence test. "As is clear both from the language of the statute and from some particularly unambiguous legislative history," Kull comments, "the Court derived from Title VII a legal requirement that the proponents of the law had expressly disclaimed." This decision was of farreaching importance. As Herman Belz argues in his book *Equality Transformed*, it "shifted civil rights policy to a group-rights, equality-of-result rationale that made the social consequences of employment practices, rather than their purposes, intent, or motivation, the decisive consideration in determining their lawfulness. The decision supplied a theoretical basis for preferential treatment as well as a practical incentive for extending race-conscious preference." Under the court's decision, "minority preference was practically required in order to protect against charges of disparate impact discrimination. The logical premise of disparate impact theory was group rights and equality of result... Contrary to the traditional concept of justice, under disparate impact theory employers were held accountable for societal discrimination, although they were not responsible for it." The court, Belz concludes, adopted "a theory of discrimination entirely contradictory to the requirements and intent of the Civil Rights Act."¹⁰

Something similar happened to the Voting Rights Act, which had been designed to prevent Southern states from denying or restricting the right of blacks to vote. In 1969, however, the Supreme Court interpreted that act not simply to protect the rights of individuals but to mandate systems of

representation that would insure the election of minority candidates. It thus gave judicial endorsement to what became the widespread practice of “racial gerrymandering” with district boundaries drawn to provide safe seats for blacks and Hispanics. “By the early 1970s,” Kull notes, “the federal government was thus in the anomalous position, by the standards of a decade before, of requiring state and local governments to gerrymander their election districts on racial lines.”¹¹

The elites in most major American institutions—government, business, the media, education—are white. In the last decades of the twentieth century substantial elements of these elites rejected the color-blind values of the American Creed and endorsed discrimination among races. “For many years,” Jack Citrin observed in 1996, “the white establishment embraced affirmative action and downplayed the moral costs of deviation from difference-blind principles.” The leading sociologist Seymour Martin Lipset reported in 1992 that “the heaviest support for preferential treatment seems to come from the liberal intelligentsia, the well-educated, the five to six percent of the population who have gone to graduate school, plus those who have majored in liberal arts in college. Support is also strong among the political elite, particularly Democrats but including many Republicans (though not many prominent officeholders).”¹² In the 1970s and 1980s, the principal newspapers and journals of opinion enthusiastically endorsed affirmative action and related programs to give racial minorities preference over whites. The Ford Foundation and other foundations provided tens of millions of dollars to encourage racial pref-

erence. With the approval of their faculties, colleges and universities competed for minority students through lower admission standards, race-designated scholarships, and other benefits.

Of central importance in the establishment of race-based programs was American business, motivated by marketing concerns and the desire to head off lawsuits and avoid bad publicity from boycotts organized by black and other minority groups. The “dirty little secret of affirmative action politics,” Richard Kahlenberg noted in 1996, “is that corporate America actually supports affirmative action.” That, however, was a fast-dissolving secret as corporations publicized their commitment to affirmative action policies and the hiring and promotion of minorities and women. In the early 1980s, Du Pont announced that 50 percent of its new appointments to professional and managerial positions would be minorities or women. Other corporations took comparable actions. In the major controversies, business corporations lined up in support of racial preferences, opposed the 1996 California initiative, Proposition 209, banning state racial preferences and the comparable initiative, Proposition I-200, in the state of Washington in 1998, while supporting the University of Michigan’s appeal of a district court’s order banning racial preference in its law school admissions.¹³

The differences between elites and the public over racial preferences were dramatically evident in the two state referenda. California’s Proposition 209, echoing the language of the Civil Rights Act, provided: “The state shall not discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any

individual or group on the basis of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment, public education, or public contracting.” When asked his view on it, Senator Joseph Lieberman said: “I can’t see how I could be opposed to it, because it is basically a statement of American values... and says... we shouldn’t discriminate in favor do somebody based on the group they represent.” The bulk of the California establishment, however, rejected these “American values.”¹⁴ Most political leaders (except for Governor Pete Wilson), college and university presidents, Hollywood celebrities, newspapers, TV station, union leaders, and many business leaders opposed the ban on racial preferences. They were joined by the Clinton administration, the Ford Foundation, and many national organizations. The opponents of the proposition spent far more than its supporters. Yet the California public approved it by a vote 54 percent to 46 percent.

Two years later in the state of Washington, the effort to ban racial preferences was also almost unanimously opposed by the state establishment, including the governor and other top political figures, the state’s major businesses, the principal media, including the *Seattle Times*, which provided free space for ads opposing the proposition, the heads of educational institutions, large numbers of intellectuals and commentators, and outside political figures such as Vice President Al Gore and the Reverend Jesse Jackson. Business was particularly prominent. The opposition campaign was led by Bill Gates, Sr., father of the Microsoft founder, and supported by Boeing, Starbucks, Weyerhaeuser, Costco, and Eddie Bauer. “The most significant obsta-

cle we faced in the Washington campaign,” observed Ward Connerly, the leading supporter of the proposition, “was not the media, or even the political personalities who attacked us... but the corporate world.”¹⁵ The proposition’s opponents spent three times as much as its supporters. Washington voters approved it by a margin of 58 percent to 42 percent.

Public opinion surveys show that the public generally approves of affirmative action in the original sense used in the directives of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson to mean actions to prevent discrimination and to help minorities to compete better for jobs and higher education by improving their family situations, schools, housing, and job training. The polls also have consistently shown a large majority of Americans opposing racial preferences in hiring, promotion, and college admissions, even if these are explicitly designed to correct the effects of past discrimination. Five times between 1977 and 1989, Seymour Martin Lipset reports, the Gallup Organization asked the question:

Some people say that to make up for past discrimination, women and minorities should be given preferential treatment in getting jobs and places in college. Others say that ability, as determined by test scores, should be the main consideration. Which point of view comes close to how you feel on the subject?

In these surveys 81 percent to 84 percent chose test-based ability and 10 percent to 11 percent chose preferential treatment. In two other polls in 1987 and 1990, Gallup asked whether people supported or opposed the proposition: “We should make every effort to improve the position of blacks and other minorities even if it means giving them

preferential treatment.” In these two polls, 71 percent and 72 percent of the public opposed this proposition, while 24 percent supported it, with blacks voting 66 percent against and 32 percent in favor.¹⁶ Similarly, a 1995 poll asking whether “hiring, promotion, and college admissions should be based strictly on merit and qualifications other than race or ethnicity” produced agreement from 86 percent of whites, 78 percent of Hispanics, 74 percent of Asians, and 68 percent of blacks. In another series of five polls between 1986 and 1994, asking people whether they were for or against “preferential hiring and promotion of blacks,” from 69 percent to 82 percent of the public said they were opposed. In a 1995 survey by *USA Weekend Magazine*, 90 percent of 248,000 American teenagers said they opposed “affirmative action in hiring and college admissions to make up for past discrimination.” Reviewing the evidence in 1996, Jack Citrin concludes that “In sum, with the issue framed as a choice between group equality or individual merit, affirmative action loses. A majority of Americans rejects explicit preferences, regardless of the particular group they are intended to assist.”¹⁷

In these polls, black attitudes on racial preferences varied with the nature of the question asked. In the 1989 Gallup poll on whether preferential treatment was warranted for women and minorities in hiring and college admissions or whether these should be determined by ability as revealed in tests, 56 percent of blacks chose ability and 14 percent racial preferences. In the five American National Election Studies polls between 1986 and 1994, asking people whether they were for or against “preferential hiring and promotion of

blacks,” from 23 percent to 46 percent of blacks expressed opposition.¹⁸ Overall, blacks and other minorities appeared to be ambivalent about racial preferences. This ambivalence disappears, however, in situations of intense political controversy, such as referenda contests, when leaders of racial organizations vigorously try to mobilize their voters in favor of preferences. In March 1995, for instance, 71 percent of whites, 54 percent of Asians, 52 percent of Hispanics, and 45 percent of blacks said they approved the proposed California Civil Rights Initiative. The initiative was voted on in November 1996 after eighteen months of an extraordinarily vigorous, massive, and at times vitriolic campaign to mobilize minority voters against it. According to exit polls, only 27 percent of blacks and 30 percent of Hispanics voted in favor of it, decreases of 18 percent and 22 percent from the views expressed eighteen months earlier.¹⁹ Working together, the leaders of the white establishment and of black organizations persuaded large majorities of black people to support racial preferences.

In the late 1980s broader opposition developed against preferences. Public disapproval, lawsuits by white job seekers and university applicants charging “reverse discrimination,” and a decade of Republican presidents nominating federal judges produced a shift in judicial decisions. The courts began to narrow the room for preferential treatment of blacks and other minorities. “Nineteen eighty-nine,” as Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom say, “was a year of second thoughts.” That year in *Richmond v. J.A. Croson* (488 U.S. 469), the Supreme Court reviewed a minority contract set-aside plan of the sort that at least thirty-six states and

more than 190 local governments had adopted. Writing for a six-justice majority, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor ruled against the Richmond ordinance, affirming the principles of the American Creed. Classifications based on race, she said, created "a danger of stigmatic harm. Unless they are strictly reserved for remedial settings, they may in fact promote notions of racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility." The court rejected the argument that "past societal discrimination alone can serve as the basis for rigid racial preferences" and declared that "the dream of a Nation of equal citizens in a society where race is irrelevant to personal opportunity and achievement would be lost in a mosaic of shifting preferences based on inherently unmeasurable claims of past wrongs."²⁰ The same year in another case, *Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio* (490 U.S. 642), the Supreme Court revised the disparate-impact test in had set forth in the *Griggs* case, which prompted Congress, controlled by Democrats, to pass legislation limiting the decision's impact.

The tide, however, was moving in the opposite direction. In 1993, in *Shaw v. Reno* (509 U.S. 657), Justice O'Connor on behalf of a 5-to-4 majority remanded to the district court a case concerning a North Carolina congressional district, running across the state along an interstate highway, so as to produce a majority black district. "Racial classifications of any sort," she wrote, "pose the risk of lasting harm to our society. They reinforce the belief, held by too many for too much of our history, that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin." Raceconscious districts "may balkanize us into competing racial factions...

and carry us further from the goal of a political system in which race no longer matters.” Then, in 1995, in *Adarand Contractors v. Pena* (515 U.S. 200), the court held that government regulations prescribing favorable treatment for minority contractors were inherently suspect. Writing for a 5-to-4 majority, Justice Antonin Scalia declared, “In the eyes of government we are just one race here. It is American.” Thirty years after Congress by huge majorities had written that principle into American law, the Supreme Court finally accepted it by a narrow majority. The Clinton administration, however, did not accept this affirmation of the American Creed. It devised various schemes to limit the court’s holding in *Adarand*, and as a result by 1996, as the Thernstroms put it, “a remarkable state of affairs had emerged: the Supreme Court and the U.S. Department of Justice were at war.”²¹

That “war” continued in the next administration, but the participants changed sides. In 2003 the Bush administration argued that race should be eliminated as a factor in admission to the University of Michigan undergraduate college and law school and that the goal of racial diversity should be pursued through other means. By a 6-to-3 vote the Supreme Court invalidated the automatic awarding of 20 points (out of a possible 150) to minority applicants to the college. In its most important decision on race and higher education since the *Bakke* case in 1978, however, the court approved the use of race in the law school admissions. Endorsing the reasoning of Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., in *Bakke*, the court by a 5-to-4 vote argued in an opinion by Justice O’Connor that the law school admission process “bears the hallmarks of a

narrowly tailored plan” and that “student body diversity is a compelling state interest that can justify the use of race in university admissions.” It also said that “a university admissions program must remain flexible enough to ensure that each applicant is evaluated as an individual and not in a way that makes an applicant’s race or ethnicity the defining feature of his or her application.” The court added that “Race-conscious admissions policies must be limited in time” and it expected “that twenty-five years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be necessary to further the interest approved today.”

Opponents of affirmative action had promoted the suits against the University of Michigan in the hope that, given the increasing judicial restraints on racial preferences in the 1990s, the court would outlaw any role for race in university admissions. The supporters of preferences feared that this could well be the case. The court’s law school decision, however, marked a pause in if not a reversal of the recent trend. It did not affirm the goal of a race-blind society, and it did not ban racial preferences but defined how they must be applied. Overall, it was judged, as a *New York Times* editorial hailed it, “A Win for Affirmative Action.” It was also a win for the American establishment. Hundreds of organizations filed briefs supporting Michigan, including major corporations such as General Motors, Microsoft, Boeing, American Express, and Shell, plus more than two dozen retired military officers and defense officials. Their views, of course, contrasted with those of the majorities of Americans consistently opposed to racial preferences, which were reiterated in the lead-up to the court’s decision. In 2001, 92 per-

cent of the public, including 88 percent of Hispanics and 86 percent of blacks, said race should not be used as a factor in college admissions or job hirings so as to give minorities more opportunity. A few months before the Supreme Court's decision, 68 percent of the public, including 56 percent of minorities, opposed preferences for blacks, with larger majorities opposing them for other minorities.²² Five justices thus sided with the establishment, four justices and the Bush administration with the public.

As the Michigan case demonstrated, Americans remain deeply divided over whether America should be race-blind or race-conscious and organized on the basis of equal rights for all or special rights for particular racial, ethnic, and cultural groups. It would be hard to overestimate the importance of this issue. For over two hundred years the creedal principle of equal rights for all without regard to race had been ignored and flouted in practice in American society, politics, and law. In the 1940s, the president, federal courts, and then Congress began to make federal and state law color-blind and used whatever powers they had to eliminate racial discrimination in America, culminating in the Civil Rights and Voting Rights acts. Yet nonelected officials immediately launched a counterreform, if not a counterrevolution (and, as President Clinton said, the civil rights effort was in some sense a revolution), to reintroduce racial discrimination into American practice. The justification for this momentous reversal, as Herman Belz says, "was the belief that group rights, racial proportionalism, and equality of result are correct principles of social organization that deserve to be established as the basis of civil rights policy."

This replacement of individual rights by group rights and of color-blind law by color-conscious law was never approved by the American people and received only intermittent, passive, and partial acceptance by American legislators. “What is extraordinary about this change,” the distinguished sociologist Daniel Bell commented, “is that, without public debate, an entirely new principle of rights has been introduced into the polity.” “Group rights and equality of condition,” Belz agrees, “were introduced into public opinion as a new public philosophy that distinguishes among individuals on racial and ethnic grounds and that ultimately denies the existence of a common good.” The implications of this view were cogently stated by the Thernstroms: “Racial classifications deliver the message that skin color matters—profoundly. They suggest that whites and blacks are not the same, that race and ethnicity are the qualities that really matter. They imply that individuals are defined by blood—not by character, social class, religious sentiments, age, or education. But categories appropriate to a caste system are a poor basis on which to build that community of equal citizens upon which democratic government depends.”²³

Notes

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Bifurcation: Two Languages and Two Cultures?*

Samuel Huntington

The continuing growth of Hispanic numbers and influence has led some Hispanic advocates to set forth two goals. The first is to prevent the assimilation of Hispanics into America's Anglo-Protestant society and culture, and instead create a large, autonomous, permanent, Spanish-speaking, social and cultural Hispanic community on American soil. Advocates, such as William Flores and Rina Benmayor, reject the idea of a "single national community," attack "cultural homogenization," and castigate the effort to promote the use of English as a manifestation of "xenophobia and cultural arrogance." They also attack multiculturalism and pluralism because these concepts relegate "different cultural identities" to "private lives" and assume that "in the public sphere, except in those sanctioned displays of ethnicity, we must put aside those identities and interact instead in a culturally neutral space as 'Americans.'" Hispanics, they argue, should not espouse an American identity but embrace an "emerging Latino identity and polit-

* In: *The Challenges to America's National Identities*, New York, Simon & Schuster, 2004, p. 316-35.

ical and social consciousness.” They should claim and are claiming a separate “cultural citizenship” involving “a distinct social space for Latinos in this country.”¹

The second goal of these Hispanic advocates follows from the first. It is to transform America as a whole into a bilingual, bicultural society. America should no longer have the core Anglo-Protestant culture plus the ethnic subcultures that it has had for three centuries. It should have two cultures, Hispanic and Anglo, and, most explicitly, two languages, Spanish and English. A choice must be made “about the future of America,” the Duke professor Ariel Dorfman declares: “Will this country speak two languages or merely one?” And his answer, of course, is that it should speak two. This is increasingly the case, not only in Miami and the southwest. “New York,” Flores and, Benmayor claim, already “is a bilingual city, as Spanish is daily currency in street life, in business, in public and social services, in schools, and in the home.”² “Nowadays,” Professor Ilan Stavans observes, “you can open a bank account, get medical care, watch soap operas, file your taxes, love and die in America without a single world ‘en inglés.’ In short, we are witnessing a reshaping of the nation’s linguistic identity.”³ The driving force behind this Hispanization, the Mexican influx, shows no signs of weakening.

On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox Quesada became the first opposition candidate to be elected president of Mexico in a relatively free and competitive election. Americans hailed this triumph of democracy south of their border. On July 4, 2000, in almost his first statement as president-elect, Fox advocated the end of controls on the movement of his peo-

ple north. In the past, “Mexico’s goal,” he said, “has been to open an escape valve, allowing 350,000 young people to cross the border each year and washing its hands of any responsibility.” The goal of the United States “has been to put up walls, police and soldiers to fight immigration. That can’t work.”⁴ Hence, he argued, the two countries must move toward an open border, allowing for the unrestricted movement of money, goods, and people. What he did not say is that without border controls, goods would flow in both directions, money flow south, and people flood north. A decade earlier Vicente Fox’s predecessor Carlos Salinas de Gortari had campaigned across the United States arguing for NAFTA because reducing trade barriers would reduce immigration: “You must take our goods or our people.” Vicente Fox says: “You must take both.”

Immigration, Jorge Castañeda said, before becoming Fox’s foreign minister, “has not been a problem in binational relations but, rather, has been part of the solution to other, graver problems.” These graver problems are, of course, Mexico’s problems and, Castañeda argued, “forcing Mexico to deter its citizens from emigrating... will make social peace in the *barrios* and *pueblos* of Mexico untenable.”⁵ Mexico, in his view, should not try to solve its problems; it should export them.

If each year a million Mexican soldiers attempted to invade the United States and more than 150,000 of them succeeded, established themselves on American territory, and the Mexican government then demanded that the United States recognize the legality of this invasion, Americans would be outraged and would mobilize whatever resources

were necessary to expel the invaders and to establish the integrity of their borders. Yet an illegal demographic invasion of comparable dimensions occurs each year, the president of Mexico argues that it should be legalized, and, at least before September 11, American political leaders more or less ignored it or implicitly accepted elimination of the border as a long-term goal.

In the past, Americans have taken actions that drastically affected the identity of their country without realizing that they were doing so. As we have seen, the 1964 Civil Rights Act was explicitly intended to remove racial preferences and quotas, but federal officials administered it so as to produce exactly the opposite. The 1965 immigration law was not intended to produce a massive wave of immigration from Asia and Latin America, but it did. These changes came about as a result of inattention to possible consequences, bureaucratic arrogance and subterfuge, and political opportunism. Something similar is happening with respect to Hispanization. Without national debate or conscious decision, America is being transformed into what could be a very different society from what it has been.

When Americans talk about immigration and assimilation, they have tended to generalize about immigrants without discriminating among them. They have thus hidden from themselves the peculiar characteristics, challenge, and problems posed by Hispanic, primarily Mexican, immigration. By avoiding, at least until 2004, the issue of Mexican immigration and treating the overall relationship with their neighbor as if it did not differ from that with other countries, they also avoided the issue of whether America will con-

tinue to be a country with a single national language and a common Anglo-Protestant mainstream culture. To ignore that question, however, is also to answer it and acquiesce in the eventual transformation of Americans into two peoples with two languages and two cultures.

If this happens and America ceases to be a “Babel in reverse” in which almost 300 million people share one and only one common language, it could become divided into a large number of people who know English and little or no Spanish and hence are limited to America’s English world, a smaller number of people who know Spanish and little or no English, and hence can function only in the Hispanic community, and an indeterminate number of people fluent in both languages and hence much more able than the monolingualists to operate on a national basis. For over three hundred years, fluency in English has been a prerequisite to moving ahead in America. Now, however, fluency in both English and Spanish is becoming increasingly important for success in key sectors of business, academia, the media, and, most importantly, politics and government.

America appears to be moving in that direction through a process of creeping bilingualism. Hispanics numbered 38.8 million in June 2002, growing 9.8 percent since the 2000 census compared to 2.5 percent for Americans as a whole, and accounting for half of the American population growth in those two and one third years. The combination of sustained high immigration and high reproduction rates means their numbers and influence on American society will continue to increase. In 2000, 47 million people (18 percent of those age five and older) spoke a non-English language at home, 28.1 million of these spoke Spanish. The proportion

of Americans aged five and over speaking English less than “very well” grew from 4.8 percent in 1980 to 8.1 percent in 2000.⁶

The leaders of Hispanic organizations have been continuously active in promoting their language. Starting in the 1960s, Jack Citrin and his colleagues observe, “Hispanic activists articulated the concept of language rights as a constitutional entitlement.”⁷ They pressured government agencies and the courts to interpret laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of national origin to require education of children in the language of their parents. Bilingual education has become Spanish language education, with the demand for teachers fluent in Spanish leading California, New York, and other states actively to recruit teachers from Spain and Puerto Rico.⁸ With one carefully planned exception (*Lau v. California*), the principal court cases involving language rights have Spanish names: Gutiérrez, García, Yniguez, Jurado, Serna, Ríos, Hernández, Negrón, Soberal-Pérez, Castro.

Hispanic organizations have played a central role in persuading Congress to authorize cultural maintenance programs in bilingual education, with the result that children are slow to join mainstream classes. In New York in 1999, it was reported that “ninety percent of the students in Spanish bilingual programs fail to make it into mainstream classes after three years, as guidelines stipulate they should.”⁹ Many children have spent as many as nine years in these essentially Spanish language classes. This inevitably affects the speed and the extent to which they achieve command of English. Most second- and subsequent-generation Span-

ish-speaking immigrants acquire enough English to function in an English environment. As a result of the continuing huge inflow of migrants, however, Spanish speakers in New York, Miami, Los Angeles, and elsewhere are increasingly able to live normal lives without knowing English. Sixty-five percent of the children in bilingual education in New York City are in Spanish classes, and hence have little need or opportunity to use English in school. And apparently, unlike the mothers in Los Angeles, in New York, according to the *New York Times*, “Spanish-speaking parents [are] generally more receptive to having their children in such classes, and Chinese and Russian parents more resistant.”¹⁰ A person can, James Traub reported,

live in an all-Spanish-speaking world in New York. “I try to tell the kids at least to watch TV in English,” [the middle school teacher] Jose García said. “But these kids to home and speak Spanish; they watch TV and listen to music in Spanish; they go to the doctor, and the doctor speaks Spanish. You can go down the street here to the Chinese fruit store, and the Chinese grocer speaks Spanish.” Spanish-speaking children don’t ever have to break out of their enclosed world: New York has high schools that are virtually all Spanish and even a bilingual community college. Only when students leave school do they discover that their English isn’t up to the demands of the job market.¹¹

Bilingual education has been a euphemism for teaching students in Spanish and immersing them in Hispanic culture. The children of past generations of immigrants did not have such programs, became fluent in English, and absorbed America’s culture. The children of contemporary non-Hispanic immigrants by and large learn English and as-

similate into American society faster than those of Hispanic immigrants. Quite apart from the controversies over its impact on students' academic progress, bilingual education has clearly had a negative impact on the integration of Hispanic students into American society.

Hispanic leaders have actively pushed the desirability of all Americans being fluent in both English and at least one other language, meaning Spanish. A persuasive case can be made that in a shrinking world all Americans should know at least one important foreign language—Chinese, Japanese, Hindi, Russian, Arabic, Bahasa Malay, French, German, Spanish—so as to be able to understand one foreign culture and communicate with its people. It is quite different to argue that Americans should know a non-English language in order to communicate with their fellow Americans. Yet that is what the Spanish advocates have in mind. “English is not enough,” argues Osvaldo Soto, president of the Spanish American League Against Discrimination (SALAD). “We don’t want a monolingual society.”¹² The English Plus Information Clearing House, formed in 1987 by a coalition of Hispanic and other organizations, argued that all Americans should “acquire strong English language proficiency *plus* mastery of a second or multiple languages.”

In dual language programs students are taught in both English and Spanish on an alternating basis. Their purposes is to make Spanish the equal of English in American society. “The dual language approach,” two advocates argue, “has English-speaking children learn a new language while NES [non-English-speaking] children learn English. As children

learn the languages, they also learn about the two cultures involved. Thus, all children are acquiring a second language and facing similar problems. This minimizes the inferiority felt by members of the minority group.” In March 2000, in his speech “Excelencia para Todos—Excellence for All,” U.S. Secretary of Education Richard Riley endorsed dual language education and predicted that by 2050 one quarter of the U.S. population and a larger proportion of young people would be Spanish-speaking.¹³

The impetus toward bilingualism is supported not just by Hispanic groups but also by some liberal and civil rights organizations, church leaders, particularly Catholic ones, who see a growing constituency of communicants, and politicians, both Republican and Democratic, responding to the growing numbers and slowly rising naturalizations rates of Hispanic immigrants. Also of central importance are business concerns that appeal to the Hispanic market. Official English was opposed not only by “Univision, the Spanish-language television network that stood to lose viewers if students began learning English,” but also by Hallmark, “which owns the Spanish language broadcast network SIN” and hence saw official English “as a threat to their ability to serve customers who speak languages other than English.”¹⁴

The orientation of business to Hispanic customers means that they increasingly need bilingual employees. This was a central factor behind the 1980 official English referendum in Miami. As the sociologist Max Castro observes:

Probably the single most resented consequence of the ethnic transformation was the increasing number of jobs in Miami that required bilingual skills. In this arena bilingualism had real, not just

symbolic, consequences for non-Hispanic Miamians. But for many it also symbolized a reversal of the expectation that the newcomers must adjust to the dominant language and culture. Even worse, it conferred upon immigrants a labor market advantage based on a need that had been created by their own presence.¹⁵

Something similar occurred in the small town of Doraville, Georgia. The influx of Hispanics led the local supermarket owner to change his goods, signs, advertising, and language. It also forced him to change his employment policies. After making the switch, he said, “we wouldn’t hire anybody unless they were bilingual.” Then when it became difficult to find such people “we decided we had to hire people who are pretty much Spanish-only.” Bilingualism also affects earnings. Bilingual police officers and firemen in southwestern cities such as Phoenix and Las Vegas are paid more than those who only speak English. In Miami, one study found, families that spoke only Spanish had average incomes of \$18,000, English only families had average incomes of \$32,000, while bilingual families averaged \$50,376.¹⁶ For the first time in American history, increasing numbers of Americans will not be able to get the jobs or the pay they would otherwise get because they can speak to their countrymen only in English.*

In the debates over language policy, Senator S. I. Hayakawa highlighted the unique role of Hispanics in opposing English:

* At some point in the bilingualization process, incentives give way to sanctions: in April 2003 the Canadian government announced that it was dismissing, demoting, or transferring two hundred senior civil servants who had not become sufficiently bilingual in English and French. *New York Times*, 3 April 2003, p. A8.

Why is it that no Filipinos, no Koreans object to making English the official language? No Japanese have done so. And certainly not the Vietnamese, who are so damn happy to be here. They're learning English as fast as they can and winning spelling bees all across the country. But the Hispanics alone have maintained there is a problem. There [has been] considerable movement to make Spanish the second official language.¹⁷

The spread of Spanish as America's second language may or may not continue. If it does, this could, in due course, have significant consequences. In many states, those aspiring to political office might have to be fluent in both languages. Bilingual candidates for president and appointed national offices could have an advantage over English-only speakers. If dual-language education, that is, teaching children equally in English and Spanish, becomes prevalent in elementary and secondary schools, teachers would increasingly be expected to be bilingual. Government documents and forms could routinely be published in both languages. The use of both languages could become acceptable in congressional hearings and debates and in the general conduct of government business. Since most of those whose first language is Spanish will also probably have high fluency in English, English speakers lacking fluency in Spanish are likely to be at a disadvantage in the competition for jobs, promotions, and contracts.

In 1917 Theodore Roosevelt said: "We must have but one flag. We must also have but one language. That must be the language of the Declaration of Independence, of Washington's Farewell address, of Lincoln's Gettysburg speech and second inaugural." On June 14, 2000, President Clinton

said, "I very much hope that I'm the last President in American history who can't speak Spanish." On May 5, 2001, President Bush celebrated Mexico's Cinco de Mayo national holiday by inaugurating the practice of delivering the weekly presidential radio address to the American people in both English and Spanish.¹⁸ On March 1, 2002, the two candidates, Tony Sanchez and Victor Morales, for the Democratic nomination to be governor of Texas, held a formal public debate in Spanish. On September 4, 2003, the first debate among the Democratic candidates for president was conducted in both English and Spanish. Despite the opposition of large majorities of Americans, Spanish is joining the language of Washington, Jefferson, Lincoln, Roosevelts, and Kennedys as the language of America. If this trend continues, the cultural division between Hispanics and Anglos will replace the racial division between blacks and whites as the most serious cleavage in American society. A bifurcated America with two languages and two cultures will be fundamentally different from the America with one language and one core Anglo-Protestant culture that has existed for over three centuries.

Unrepresentative Democracy: Elites vs. The Public

The views of the public on issues of national identity differ significantly from those of many elites. These differences reflect the underlying contrast, spelled out in Chapter 10, between the high levels of national pride and commitment to the nation on the part of the public and the extent to which elites have been denationalized and favor transna-

2000, in which people were asked to identify themselves as liberal, moderate, or conservative. Consistently, about one quarter identified themselves as liberal, about one third as conservative, and 35 percent to 40 percent as moderate. The attitudes of elites were quite different. Surveys between 1979 and 1985 of elites in a dozen occupations and institutions asked the same question used in the public opinion surveys. The proportions of the elites in these groups identifying themselves as liberal were as follows, together with the public's choice in 1980.¹⁹

Public interest groups	91%
Television	75
Labor	73
Movies	67
Religion	59
Bureaucrats	56
Media	55
Judges	54
Congressional aides	52
Lawyers	47
<i>The public</i>	25
Business	14
Military	9

Apart from business and the military, these elites were almost twice to more than three times as liberal as the public as a whole. Another survey similarly found that on moral issues leaders are “consistently more liberal” than rank-and-file Americans. Governmental, nonprofit, and communications elites in particular are overwhelmingly liberal in their

outlooks. So also are academics. In a 1969 survey, 79 percent of faculty at high-quality schools considered themselves liberal compared to 45 percent of those at low-quality schools. In a 2001-2002 UCLA survey of 32,000 full-time faculty, 48 percent of faculty said they were “liberal” or “far left”, 18 percent said they were “conservative” or “far right.” The radical students of the 1960s, as Stanley Rothman had observed, had become tenured professors, particularly in elite institutions. “Social science faculties at elite institutions are overwhelmingly liberal and cosmopolitan or on the Left. Almost any form of civic loyalty or patriotism is considered reactionary.”²⁰

Liberalism tends to go with irreligiosity: In a 1969 study by Seymour Martin Lipset and Everett Ladd, the percentages of academics who identified themselves as liberal were as follows:²¹

Liberalism and Religion of Academics			
Religious Commitment	Religious Background		
	Jewish	Catholic	Protestant
Deeply Religious	48%	33%	31%
Largely Indifferent to Religion	75	56	50
Basically Opposed to Religion	82	73	71

These differences in ideology, religion, and nationalism generate differences on domestic and foreign policy issues related to national identity. As the analysis in Chapter 7 makes clear, elites and the public have differed fundamentally on the salience of two central elements of American identity, the Creed and the English language. There is, Jack

Citrin observes, a “gulf between elite advocacy of multiculturalism and stub-born mass support of assimilation to a common national identity.”²² The parallel gap between the nationalist public and cosmopolitan elites has its most dramatic impact the relation between American identity and foreign policy. As Citrin and his colleagues concluded in their 1994 study, “the dwindling of consensus about America’s international role follows from the waning of agreement on what it means to be an American, on the very character of American nationalism. The domestic underpinnings for the long post-World War II hegemony of cosmopolitan liberalism and internationalism have frayed, quite apart from the fact that the United States no longer confronts a powerful military adversary.”²³

Publics and elites have had similar views on many important foreign policy issues. Substantial and continuing differences, however, have existed on questions affecting American identity and the American role in the world.* The public is overwhelmingly concerned with the protection on military security, societal security, the domestic economy, and sovereignty. Foreign policy elites are more concerned with U.S. promotion of international security, peace, globalization, and the economic development of foreign nations than in the public. In 1998 the public and the leaders differed by 22 percent to 42 percent on thirty-four major foreign policy issues. The American public is also more pessimistic than its elites. In 1998, 58 percent of the public and only 23

* The quadrennial polls of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations starting in 1974 are an indispensable source of the views on foreign policy of both the public and foreign policy leaders. Unless otherwise cited the data here come from these reports.

percent of the leaders thought there would be more violence in the twenty-first century than in the twentieth, while 40 percent of the leaders and 19 percent of the public thought there would be less. Three years before September 11, 84 percent of the public but only 61 percent of the leaders saw international terrorism as a “critical threat” to the United States.

Public nationalism and elite transnationalism are evident on a variety of issues. In six polls from 1978 to 1998, 96 percent to 98 percent of the foreign policy elites favored the United States taking an active part in world affairs, but only 59 percent to 65 percent of the public did. With a few exceptions the public has been much more reluctant than the leaders to use U.S. military force to defend other countries against invasion. In 1998, for instance, minorities of the public ranging from 27 percent to 46 percent and majorities of the leaders ranging from 51 percent to 79 percent favored the use of military forces in response to hypothetical invasions of Saudi Arabia by Iraq, Israel by Arabs, South Korea by North Korea, Poland by Russia, and Taiwan by China. On the other hand, the public is more concerned with upheavals closer to home. In 1998, 38 percent of the public and only 18 percent of the leaders supported U.S. military intervention if the Cuban people attempted to overthrow Castro, and in 1990, 54 percent of the public and 20 percent of the leaders favored the use of U.S. military force if Mexico were threatened by revolution. While the public is reluctant to support U.S. military action to defend other countries against invasion, a substantial majority, 72 percent, said the United States should not act alone in international crises

without support from its allies, as compared to 48 percent of the leaders saying it should not do so. The public's backing for collaborative action was also reflected in their 57 percent approval of the United States taking part "in U.N. international peacekeeping forces in troubled parts of the world."

The public has been much less favorable than the leaders toward American economic involvement in the world. In 1998, 87 percent of foreign policy leaders and 54 percent of the public thought economic globalization was mostly good for the United States, while 12 percent of the leaders and 35 percent of the public thought is mostly bad or equally good and bad. In seven polls from 1974 to 1998, no more than 53 percent of the public and no less than 86 percent of the leaders supported giving economic aid to other nations. In four polls from 1980 to 1998, 50 percent to 64 percent of the public and 18 percent to 32 percent of the leaders favored cutting back economic aid. Similarly, in 1998, 82 percent of the leaders and only 25 percent of the public thought the United States should join other countries and "contribute more money to the IMF to meet world financial crises," while 51 percent of the public and 15 percent of the leaders thought the United States should not do this.

Despite the arguments of elites and government leaders in favor of reducing obstacles to international trade, the American public has remained stubbornly protectionist. In 1986, 66 percent of the public but only 31 percent of the leaders thought tariffs were necessary. In 1994, 40 percent of the public and 79 percent of the leaders were sympathetic to eliminating tariffs. In 1998, 40 percent of the public and 16

percent of the leaders thought that economic competition from low-wage countries was “a critical threat” to America. In the 1986, 1994, and 1998 polls, 79 percent to 84 percent of the public and 44 percent to 51 percent of the leaders thought that protecting American jobs should be a “very important goal” of the American government. In a 1998 multination poll, the American public ranked eighth among twenty-two peoples in its support for protection with 56 percent of Americans saying they thought protectionism best for the American economy, while 37 percent said free trade was. In April 2000, 48 percent of Americans said they thought international trade was bad for the American economy compared to 34 percent who viewed it positively.²⁴ During those years, both Democratic and Republican administrations pursued free trade policies reflecting elite preferences opposed by majorities or substantial pluralities of the American people.

Although Americans like to think of their country as a nation of immigrants, it seems probable that at no time in American history has a majority of Americans favored the expansion of immigration. This is clearly the case since the 1930s when survey evidence became available. In three 1938 and 1939 polls, 68 percent, 71 percent, and 83 percent of Americans opposed altering existing law to allow more European refugees into America. In subsequent years, the extent and intensity of public opposition to immigration varied with the state of the economy and the sources of immigrants, but high immigration has never been popular overall. In nineteen polls from 1945 to 2002, the proportion of the public favoring increased immigration never rose

above 14 percent and was less than 10 percent in fourteen polls. The proportion wanting less immigration was never less than 33 percent, rose to 65 percent to 66 percent in the 1980s and early 1990s, and dropped to 49 percent in 2002. In the 1990s, large majorities of the public ranked large numbers of immigrants and nuclear proliferation as “critical threats” to America, with international terrorism coming in a close third. In the 1995-1997 World Values Survey, the United States ranked fifth (behind the Philippines, Taiwan, South Africa, and Poland) out of forty-four countries in the proportion, 62.3 percent, of its population that wanted to prohibit or put strict limits on immigration.²⁵ The people of this “nation of immigrants” have been more hostile to immigration than those of most other countries.

Prior to World War II, American business, social, and political elites often opposed immigration, and, of course, were responsible for the 1921 and 1924 laws restricting it. In the late twentieth century, however, elite opposition decreased markedly. Adherents of neo-liberal economics, such as Julian Simon and the *Wall Street Journal*, argued that the free movement of people was as essential to globalization and economic growth as the free movement of goods, capital and technology. Business elites welcomed the depressing effect immigration would have on the wages of workers and the power of unions. Leading liberals supported immigration for humanitarian reasons and as a way of reducing the gross inequalities between rich and poor countries. Restrictions on the immigration of any particular nationality were viewed as politically incorrect, and efforts to limit immigration generally were at times thought to be inherently suspect as racist attempts to maintain white dom-

inance in America. By 2000 even the leadership of the AFL-CIO was modifying its previously staunch objections to immigration.²⁶

This shift in elite opinion produced a major gap between elite and public attitudes, and meant, of course, that government policy would continue to reflect the former rather than the latter. In the 1994 and 1998 Chicago Council polls, 74 percent and 57 percent of the public and 31 percent and 18 percent of foreign policy leaders thought that large numbers of immigrants were a “critical threat” to the United States. In these same years, 73 percent and 55 percent of the public and 28 percent and 21 percent of the leaders thought that reducing illegal immigration should be “a very important goal” for America. In a 1997 poll asking to what extent the federal government had been successful in achieving sixteen policy goals, “controlling illegal immigration” came in next to the last (reducing drug abuse), with 72 percent of the public saying it had been fairly or very *unsuccessful*.²⁷

The persistent and pervasive anti-immigration attitudes often reflect a door-closing approach: “It’s great we got in, but any more will be disastrous.” A 1993 *Newsweek* poll asked people whether immigration had been “a good thing or a bad thing for this country in the past.” Fifty-nine percent said a good thing and 31 percent a bad thing. Asked whether immigrations was “a good thing or a bad thing for this country today,” the proportions were exactly reversed: 29 percent good, 60 percent bad. The American public was thus divided almost equally: one third for past and present immigration, one third against past and present immigration, and one third doors-closers approving past immigration and

against it now. Immigrants often are door-closers too. A Latino National Political Survey in 1992 found that 65 percent of American citizens or legal residents of Mexican, Puerto Rican, and Cuban descent thought there were “too many immigrants in this country,” a skepticism also manifested in answers to a 1984 survey of Texas Mexican-Americans by Rodolfo de la Garza.²⁸


The differences between elites and the public produced a growing gap between the preferences of the public and policies embodied in law. One study of whether changes in public opinion on a wide range of issues were followed by comparable changes in public policy showed a steady decline from the 1970s when there was a 75 percent congruence between public opinion and government policy to 67 percent in 1984-1987, 40 percent in 1989-1992, and 37 percent in 1993-1994. “The evidence, overall,” the authors of this study concluded, “points to a persistent pattern since 1980: a generally low and at times declining level of responsiveness to public opinion especially during the first two years of the Clinton presidency.” Hence, they said, there is no basis for thinking that Clinton or other political leaders were “pandering to the public.” Another study showed that policy outcomes were consistent with the majority preferences of the public 63 percent of the time between 1960 and 1979 but dropped to 55 percent between 1980 and 1993. Somewhat similarly, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations reports that the number of issues on which public and elite views on foreign policy differed by more than 30 percent increased from nine in 1982 and six in 1986 to twenty-seven in 1990, fourteen in 1994, and fifteen in 1998.

The issues where the public-elite difference was 20 percent or more rose from twenty-six in 1994 to thirty-four in 1998. "A disturbing gap is growing," one analyst of these surveys concluded, "between what ordinary Americans believe is the proper role of the United States in world affairs and the views of leaders responsible for making foreign policy."²⁹ Governmental policy at the end of the twentieth century as deviating more and more from the preferences of the American public.

The failure of political leaders to "pander" to the public had predictable consequences. When government policies on important issues deviate sharply from the views of the public, one would expect the public to lose trust in government, to reduce its interest and participation in politics, and to turn to alternative means of policymaking not controlled by political elites. All three happened in the late twentieth century. All three undoubtedly had many causes, which social scientists have explored at length, and one trend, decline in trust, occurred in most industrialized democracies. Yet at least for the United States, it can be assumed that the growing gap between public preferences and government policies contributed to all three trends.

First, public confidence in and trust in government and the major private institutions of American society declined dramatically from the 1960s to the 1990s. The decline in trust in government is shown in Figure 11.1. As Robert Putnam, Susan Pharr, and Russell Dalton point out, on every question asked concerning confidence in their government, roughly two thirds of the public expressed confidence in the 1960s and only about one third in the 1990s. In April 1966,

Public Confidence in Government



Percent expressing "a great deal" of confidence in the executive branch and Congress. Source: Louis Harris Poll, 1996. Reprinted with permission from Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Philip D. Zelikow, David C. King, eds., *Why People Don't Trust Government* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press reprint, 1997), p. 207.

for instance, "with the Vietnam War raging and race riots in Cleveland, Chicago, and Atlanta, 66 percent of Americans *rejected* the view that 'the people running the country don't really care what happens to you.' In December 1997, in the midst of the longest period of peace and prosperity in more than two generations, 57 percent of Americans *endorsed* that same view."³⁰ Similar declines occurred over these decades in the degree that the public had confidence in major public and private institutions. Beginning in 1973, Americans were asked every year or two whether they had "a great deal," "some," or "hardly any" confidence in the leaders of

these institutions. Subtracting the “hardly any” responses from the “a great deal” responses produces a rough index of confidence. In 1973 the leaders of organized labor and television had negative indices of -10 and -3 respectively. All the others were positive, ranging from +8 for the press to +48 for medicine. By 2000 the confidence indices for the leaders of all these institutions, except two, had declined, most of them quite significantly. Five had negative indices. As might be expected, the changes were dramatic for the two policymaking branches of government, Congress dropping 25 points from +9 to -16 and the executive branch dropping 31 points from +11 to -20. In contrast, the two increases in confidence involved the nonelected institutions of government, the Supreme Court, rising from +16 to +19, and the military, from +16 to +28.³¹

Second, as many studies have shown, public participation and interest in the major governmental and private institutions of American society declined fairly consistently from the 1960s to the 1990s. Sixty-three percent of the adult population voted in 1960, but only 49 percent in 1996 and 51 percent in 2000. In addition, as Thomas Patterson observes, “Since 1960, participation has declined in virtually every area of election activity, from the volunteers who work on campaigns to the viewers who watch televised debates. The United States had 100 million fewer people in 1960 than it did in 2000 but, even so, more viewers tuned in to the October presidential debates in 1960 than did so in 2000.” In the 1970s, one in three taxpayers allocated a dollar from their tax payments to the fund created by Congress to support political campaigns. In 2000, one in eight did so.³²

The third consequence of the gap between leaders and the public was the dramatic proliferation of initiatives on major policy issues, including those relating to national identity. Initiatives had been an instrument of Progressive reform before World War I. Their use, however, then declined steadily from fifty per two-year election cycle to twenty in the early 1970s. As legislatures neglected the concerns of their constituents, initiatives regained popularity, beginning in June 1978, when 65 percent of California voters approved Proposition 13, drastically limiting taxes, despite the opposition of virtually all the state's political, business and media establishment. This started a tripling of initiatives to an average of sixty-one per two-year election cycle from the late 1970s to 1998. Fifty-five initiatives were voted on in 1998, sixty-nine in 2000, and forty-nine in 2002. As we have seen, elite attitudes on issues such as racial preferences and bilingual education were effectively challenged by economic and political entrepreneurs such as Ward Connerly and Ron Unz, who used the initiative process to compel referenda on these issues. Surveying this record, David Broder concluded, "The trust between governors and governed on which representative government depends has been badly depleted."³³

As the twentieth century ended, major gaps existed between America's elites and the general public over the salience of national identity compared to other identities and over the appropriate role for America in the world. Substantial elite elements were increasingly divorced from their country, and the American public was increasingly disillusioned with its government.

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Globalization and Identities

Alain Touraine

I

We have been accustomed during many years to identify megatrends, almost always based on technological innovations. These trends can be observed in most parts of a world which is becoming global. Economic processes and what we called civil society were dominating and explaining the world so completely that political and even more international problems seemed to have become marginal. This view prevailed completely during the long decade which began with the destruction of the Berlin wall and ended with the atentate against the towers of the World Trade Center in New York city.

Three short years after 9/11 it is clear that our vision of the world has completely changed. We passed from an economic to a strategic and military view of the world. Our confidence in science and development is running away while fear of new attacks nourish pessimistic forecast about an uncertain future and our consciousness to live in an unsustainable type of development.

Without these general transformation many different images have been elaborated even if they have in common

to give a clear priority to political, national and international processes. The most pessimistic approach announces an apocalyptic catastrophe because the pressure of non western political regime and forces will increase and that it has been demonstrated how easy is this to destroy vital elements of a society and to scare a population which was not used to bloody attacks on its territory.

But few people actually share this pessimistic view. Some more accept the opposite view is optimistic. The United States and their allies will finally take hold of terrorist individual and groups which represent only a small number of people. In Iraq a civil war can be avoided and in Palestine, the conflict has been already so long and violent that it is little likely that it provokes a worldwide crisis.

The real choices are between these two extreme views. They can be classified in three main subgroups.

The first one is made of the large number of people who think that the US can maintain its hegemony by changing elements of its environment, by solving the Israeli Palestinian conflict, by transforming Saudi Arabia and eliminating wahabete influence. These victories will be made possible by the strong attraction exerted by American economic and intellectual life for many young people and thanks to the almost total domination of American mass culture all over the world. Movies, songs and internet sites making possible of a worldwide market for Hollywood products. These positive conclusion is well documented by many studies on Iranian youth. A second approach is more pessimistic. It says that the US can no longer be the only superpower because resistance to its hegemony is now not only ideological or

economic but first of all cultural and more specifically religious. The US must be prepared to accept these multiple worlds and be prepared to resist attacks coming from various directions. More concretely US, like all other cultural poles must be as creative as possible but at the same time well protected against hostile ideas. This analysis has become extremely influential because of the impact of Samuel Huntington writings which are discussed all over the world. A moderate pessimism is associated here with to a defensive orientation and to strengthen national identity by linking it more tightly to spiritual or even more religious values.

These two approaches have become political forces and exert an influence on public opinion and decision makers. For foreigners and in particular for Europeans the most visible aspect of these approaches is the rupture of the US government with the multilateral system they had themselves built in UN and other international organizations. The gap between US and Europe is widening rapidly, partly because Americans support Israel decidedly while Europeans criticize American policies and defend Palestinians in their struggles to create a national state.

It is useless for me to introduce in few words a third possible approach because this paper will be first of all a presentation and critical assessment of this approach. Its starting point is the central importance it gives to the process of globalization but interpreting it in a specific way.

II

By globalization, I mean much more than the internationalization of production and trade of material and cultural

goods and services, I mean growing separation between economic activities which are organized at the world level and political and social institutions which function at only a more limited level, local, national or regional. The best way to characterize globalization is to consider it as an extreme form of capitalism, if we accept the classical definition of capitalistic development as a process of loosening all kinds of controls and limitation which were imposed at economic activities. Liberation of economic forces which gives them the capacities to control other sectors of social life so that economic rationality or other kinds of economic behaviors are out of reach of all kinds of social control. These process of separation between what we could call the objective world and the subjective universes leads to the elimination of all institutionalized frames of actions, norms and rules. If we try to imagine what the final point of this evolution could be we can describe a situation in which all social and political categories, norms and controls will have disappeared, a situation in which a totally deregulated economy had become wild and at the same time when an obsessive search for identity and homogeneity leads to aggressive "communalist regimes". Such conflicts would be much more dangerous than the sixteenth and seventeenth European religious wars. It is actually difficult for us to figure out what such a situation would be because during centuries we have given a central importance to all kinds of social controls, institutions, processes of socialization and methods of punishment. It is very difficult indeed to conceive of such "post social societies," while we can easily describe pre social societies, societies where political categories dominated so-

cial categories; for example during the first centuries of European modernization. And even more easily societies dominated by religious or cultural categories and corresponding to what has been called communities or as holistic systems. Most classical sociologists have opposed achievement to ascription, modernity to tradition and society to community. We can not easily imagine a movement back from society to community and with even more difficulty a situation where society and community would have jointly disappeared and where the only possible social relations would be as a commercial or military without any degree of integration between buyers and sellers. Such a complete separation between economics and cultures, between networks and identities corresponds to the most extreme form of crisis and “desocialization” we can imagine.

Many studies have described the transformation of an economic system which was based on technostructure, companies, innovations to a market economy, a networks economy in which communications are neither controlled not even elaborated by economic actors according to R. Reich’s brilliant description. At the level of public opinion, the main effect of these transformations is the rapid disappearance of loyalty to the company, the identification of individuals with their career. More and more often the Presidents of big companies are perceived by public opinion as speculators, and crooks or simply people we live outside any society.

It is more difficult but more urgent to describe the behavior of new actors who are defined in purely cultural, that is subjective, terms without any link with representative po-

litical institutions. We are dramatically conscious that representative democracy is weakened both by the triumph of globalization and by the predominance of communitarian values which consider themselves as superior to political individual rights and to citizenship itself. We will try in this paper to choose between two answers to these difficult problem: does the rupture between economic processes and cultural meanings lead to the triumph of closed and even totalitarian communities or on the contrary to the reign of violence and wildness. It is true that ayatollahs and gunmen are not exclusive from each other but in the present situation, the two outcomes are clearly different, and for all parts of the world including western Europe.

III

There are actually two very different answers to this question. The first answer describes a world which is divided into a certain number of cultural areas, within which a central city, has a role of attraction on marginal or relatively isolated social units which explains the general trends towards concentration of resources and division of the world into a small number of "civilizations" which maintain their own identity while participating more and more actively in economic or financial or even scientific networks. Is it a solution realistic? The example of north American western Europe as to major cultural areas has not been convincing until now because they had many more elements in common than specific separated and it is not cleared what kind of civilizations can maintain themselves as such, side by side by

the American civilization, even if this has received many advantages from its hegemonic position in many different fields. But what about other parts of the world? What do we mean when we speak for example of a Chinese civilization or of an African civilization? Today China is defined as much by the heritage of the Maoist revolution and by its rapid process of economic growth and by the absence of political liberalization by religious and cultural traditions. It is even more difficult to speak of an African civilization which can so easily be reduced to some practices and beliefs which are generally different from one culture to another one? Africa like the rest of the world is constantly invaded by non African mass culture and dominated by markets on which they have no real power. At the same time, the situation of African States is probably better defined by corruption or civil wars than by references to an African culture or even to the culture of some African regions. All countries are more directly determined in their decisions by US policies than by their own cultural history. Cultures are not like icebergs isolated from each other in a vast ocean. The power of domination, the American trade and arms lead most countries powerlessness. References to old cultural roots appear very often as instruments of propaganda for very limited social and economic and political rules.

The Latin American case has been extensively studied and discussed. Concepts like structural dualism, dependency, internal colonialism and many others, moderate or radical, indicate the necessity to give priority to historical patterns of modernization, dominated both by foreign capital and by the constant marginalization of the Indian popula-

tion. What is Latin American culture? Should we speak of an indo American, hispano America, ibero America or Latin America or should we speak separately not only in Brazil and spanish speaking countries of various groups of countries separately? And do we include the Caribbean region into Latin America, or maintain them separately but linked together like most international organizations do. Anyway most of the people who live in these countries and express their opinion and analysis about them give a strong priority to political and economic factor or cultural factor because these are complex almost contradictory between themselves. Are there any countries in the world which could be named Christian countries? to a certain extent Italy but probably more because of the presence of the Pope than because of all present tradition. Finally as a European I know that most people in Europe and outside like to speak about European culture. What do they mean by that my first definition of Europe would be other country. That it has never been unified no politically nor economically nor culturally. The roman catholic world and the Byzantine world have been completely falling to each other. Protestant and catholic countries or regions have been enemies or in the best of the cases separate "pillar" of different national societies. And all stereotypes about each European countries reveals immediately their weakness and we are satisfied to say that the level of communication in all aspect of public and private life has increased very much among European countries thanks to the strong and during process of construction of European, economic and political system. But nobody believes that Europe can be one the pillar of an Atlantic alli-

ance because first of all Europe is extremely inferior to the United States in term of arms. And second because all Europeans fields are dependant of the United States and many European consider that is positive and other that it is negative but very few would analyze their continent situation in basically cultural terms. And when people opposed the old cultural tradition of Europe to the brutality or absence of tradition of a continent of immigrants they reveal their prejudices more than their ideas about what Europe as such should do.

The most complex case is certainly the case of Israel during a first phase of existence of the new Israeli state, before and after 1948 the legitimacy of Israel and the hopes put into its creation were basically cultural: it was a direct consequence of the shoah so that Israel was considered as the heir of a Diaspora or at least of a Diaspora in Europe which had been almost entirely destroyed by the nazi regime. But even this first period of time another image of Israel was equally important. Israel was considered as created by workers coming from different social categories sharing a philosophy of creative labor had been to a very large extent opposed to the domination of religious authorities over Israel. But progressively from war to war, from victory to defeat and from a lower level to a higher level of protest by Palestinian the central topic has no longer be the existence of Israel but the right of both Israel and the Palestinian to live in a national state and during the last ten years especially since the beginning of the second Intifada the national problem is recognized as a central one. So that Israel is better defined by its relationships with the Palestinian authority and population

than by its own values, and traditions. And numerous Arabs in Palestine and outside Palestine consider that the constant reference to the shoah is dangerous and should be stopped because there is no reason for Arabs to pay for the crimes of Europeans or even to highly self conscious Europeans like the nazi were.

A general conclusion can be applied to all cases. Each one of them combines at least three dimensions: the first one is its participation in a modernity which is defined by universalistic principle but combined with a plurality of paths of modernization; the second is the position in a web of conflict in a globalized world and especially these countries relationships with the United states; the last one is the reinterpretation more than the transmission—of a cultural heritage—create and forms of cultural control of social relations. This third component is becoming less and less important. It reaches a pick in the nineteenth century when so many countries were trying to become national state and legitimized their independantist movement by the necessity to maintain or revive a language, and create new institutions.

Cultures as civilizations can no more be defined entirely by themselves than nations. The main weaknesses of multiculturalist theories are a) that they believe that each culture is unified and homogenous and b) that this culture can not be defined out of internal social relations and external international relations. In one world it is not possible to define a civilization by itself; in a global world each of us depends at least as much on an international system of power on its own past.

IV

A special attention should be paid to a very special situation which can be observed in only few countries but which is interesting as examples not of cultural determinants of contemporary society but of the capacity for some countries as a consequence of their modernization and of the specific features of it to create a new culture. In the nineteenth century this was a case of the United States, heterogeneous country where Italian, Irish or German influences were strong but which created in a rapid way an American culture which has been diffused all over the world through mass medias. In our early twenty first century a conspicuous case is Brazil. In spite of the fact that many people in Brazil and outside emphasize the necessity for this country to be part of an integrated Latin America it seems that it appears that a specifically Brazilian culture has appeared and is clearly identified in many different parts of the world. The consequence is that Brazil is joining the club of the “big powers,” and will be able to discuss its own orientation with the most powerful countries because its cultural identity is now generally accepted. The same judgment can probably be applied to Australia. But the most interesting cases are small countries which are often quite successful economically, maintain Welfare policies and are very well integrated in world economy. Israel is one member of this group Finland, Iceland, and probably tomorrow one or two other former communist countries will be recognized as owners of specific culture. In some cases the construction of the specific culture is a strong argument for political independence or more concretely for a guarantee given by the main world

power to this country that its independence will be protected. One of the most difficult problem is Taiwan which hopes to gets its independence and not to be reintegrated into China Republic and which tries to build a culture which is different from continental China's culture.

We are now faced with the central problem. It is possible to give two opposite answers to the question which can be now formulated: populations and governments which resist to their complete subordination to global economy, do they mobilize national feelings or even nationalism to organize their resistance; or is it possible to find example of resistances which are based on culture more than on national or economic forces?

I do not personally believe that this cultural resistance based on culture more than on national forces corresponds to observable facts because there is no possibility to stop half-way the process of social decomposition which was born form the triumph of a global economy and hegemonic political system. When the United States moved from hegemony which was first of all a strategy of war as an answer to 9/11 and then to a second war which can any day be transformed into a civil war or into chaos in Iraq, a point of no return has been reached and we have entered into a world which is dominated not only by military operations but what is even more important, by the absolute hatred of the others, by the negation of the others in several cases we are beyond the war as some observers say not in a clash between cultures.

Let's consider two important cases. The first one is the evolution of the Islamist movements. After the fall of the

Shah in Iran and the success of Khomeini, an Islamic republic was founded which was directly defined in cultural and religious terms and similar attempts were launched in Afghanistan, in Sudan and in Algeria where the FIS won the election but was impeded the FLN to seize power. But rapidly these culturally defined states failed change their nature. Iran almost immediately because of the war with Iraq. Many observers explain these failures by the fact that “national bourgeoisie” abandoned these project to integrate itself into a worldwide economy because it was profitable for it. At the same time, western culture penetrated these countries, especially through internet so that the cultural control of the population actually disappeared.

The Turkish case is much more complex. After the Kemalist revolution which made illegal most public aspects of Islamic culture, some new Islamist movements gained ground again, especially in connection with nationalist movements in Kurdistan. Turkey has then invented and worked out a solution which combines the rule of an Islamic party with most elements of the Kemalist process of modernization. These fragile compromise is made workable because Turkey has decided to join European Union and is rapidly transforming many of its institutions to comply with European requirements.

We are now faced with the central problem. Various approaches to each other mainly because give opposite answers to the question which can be now formulated: What are the population or governments which oppose their culture, their subjectivity to the objective rationality of a global economy? A first answer emphasizes national dimensions

of their population which resist the domination of higher powers for accepting the opposite hypothesis we must find examples.

I do not believe that this process can actually be observed because there is no possibility to stop half way the process of social decomposition which was born from the triumph of a global economy and hegemonic political system. This can be more precisely formulated: When the United States, as I remind it at the beginning of this paper passed from an economic domination to the choice of a war, as an answer to 9/11 and then to a second war which can any day be transformed into a civil war or into chaos in Iraq, without mentioning that the tension is increasing with Iran which has been characterized himself as belonging to the world of evil a certain point of no return has been reached and we will observe, the development and maybe a radicalization of two complementary size of a processes of desocialisation and depolitization. We have already entered a world which is dominated by endless conflicts in which, even when some problems can be solved, the absolute hatred of the other, the negation of the other, makes impossible to find solutions.

To illustrate this solution, which corresponds to the second of the situation I have just mentioned, I briefly refer to two regional cases. The first, the most important one today is the evolution of the islamist movement. After the fall of the Shah in Iran or the success of Khomeini—probably perceived as a political leader as much as a religious figure—we observed a series of islamist republic from Iran to Afghanistan, from Sudan to Algeria at least if the elections

which were won by the FIS in this country has been respected by the FLN. This seems to be a perfect example of the creation of new political and economic societies which are linked together and dominated by a common religion and a common hatred for American imperialist domination. But rapidly, this solution lost strength. Some observers say because the national “bourgeoisie” preferred in a period of globalization to integrate into a worldwide economy then to transform itself into a national bourgeoisie limited to small internal markets and unable to find an equilibrium between religious populist and repressive regimes and an internationalized economy. The penetration of western culture, especially from internet, became a major fact of political change especially in Iran. The Turkish case is the most complex and that’s why its importance is decisive. In Turkey, Kemal Ataturk has wiped out Islamic culture. Islamic resistance after the end of this period grew up again together especially while Kurdistan which was a strong hold of a Muslim culture and social organization so that Turkey was faced with multiple movements in which hard-liners communist, local or religious leaders join their forces against the political of “laïcité” which was mainly supported by the army. But the evolution of Turkey during the last decade, in spite of political crisis, violent fight against the Kurdist movement and measures of repression in prisons which were unacceptable for a Europe which was asked to open its door to the country has invented and worked out a solution which combines Islam and the post communist process of modernization. Turkey can be just defined as an ambivalent country which is both western and Islamic, and which is not

satisfied with anyone of its type organization and behavior but which have avoided a civil war which has even progressed in most aspects of its internal life. The PPK has lost great part of its fighting capacity and the Turkish prisons slowly lose some of there terrible reputation.

We do not observe the formation of a culturally redefined country but on the contrary, how a country which gives a clear priority to its possible participation to the European Community and which is transforming itself economically at a rapid speed, without been exposed to a religious civil war.

At the same time, Iranian regime is rejected by large part of the population; in Afghanistan the Talibans after having defeated the soviet army have been almost eliminated; the Sudan is judged responsible for a mass-murder of a large part of the population by the Muslim in power in Khartoum and the impact of the FIS in Algeria decreases while a similar movement has been crashed in Tunisia. In Morocco, the king Hassan II had survived a dangerous atentate and has created populist Islamic regime and his son has maintained the same moderate policy which has avoided a major crisis.

But the downfall or loss of Islamic republics influence has led in many parts of the Arab world to military conflict, especially in Iraq which after the destruction of a non-religious didactureship it fell in a situation of political disorganization. Instead of observing the formation of a new Islamic republic in Iraq, we see that internal conflicts increase, especially between radical Sunnites groups and the chiites majority. The Sunnites will never accept a chiite re-

gime in Iraq which will create a tight alliance with Iran. Month after month, and in spite of American efforts which not all of them have failed, Iraq is entering more and more into chaos, violence and terrorism which much be defined here as the exact contrary of a culturally defined society. Terrorism—we know that this world is rejected by many people who consider the terrorist, especially the ones who sacrificed their own life to destroy enemy lives—as martyrs- terrorist are no longer soldiers of a war, they express the absence of political unit, of cultural unit, political program and economic resources which put together could make possible a new type of state, governed as a community in the name of religious values. So that, even if these people refer to religious value against the west, they do not act as members of a religious society.

The second example, is even more important because of its symbolic value, of his lasting symbolic value. Israel was created both as a homeland for the Jewish nation which has been identified strictly with its religion and as a Heimat for survivors of the Shoah but it was, at the same time the creation of a new kind of social democracy in which the central union, the Histadruth played the central role and in which kibbutz represented a non capitalistic kind of economic organization and defended and threatened frontiers. The Palestinian movement had passed trough a nationalist revolutionary period during which orthodox Christians played an important role as leaders of the most radical groups; much later the difficult creation of the Palestinian authority demonstrated the predominance of national over religious motivations. But since the beginning of the new

Intifada which followed the failure of the negotiation for peace which had began in Oslo, violence and terrorism led by subgroups linked with the Fatah or with the radical wing of Hamas and many others sub-groups are gaining ground every day. But again the problem is first of all a national one. In all Arab countries, the vast majority of the people who were asked in a survey: what is the main condition for the creation of a Palestinian state? answered: the destruction of Israel and the dissemination of the Jewish population in other countries. On the Israeli side, not only the colons, who have settled recently in the Gaza strip but a growing number of people no longer believe a solution is possible. The idea of a lasting war did not come from the most conservative sectors and if the Israeli government could accept the frontiers which has been accepted by both camps in the preceding decade and it is possible that the separation of two national states will be an alternative to a constant development of terrorism on both sides but on both sides the “good” solution is to eliminate the other.

Terrorism is violence separated from all kinds of political and military project and from cultural values. Terrorism can be very efficient; it can scare a large number of people all over the world but it does not; carry a positive project; it is a force of disintegration of an organized social or cultural movement; it is not a way of building a new collective action.

The case of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is so central that it has direct effects in many different countries. For example, in France a noticeable increase of antisemitic acts — and of anti arabic acts too — is a direct effect of the mid-

dle-east conflict while in the past Jewish and Arab population which in many cases lived near each other had not created nor been involved in violent conflicts. These examples, even if they are limited show clearly that the relationship between Islam and the Western world which had been first economic, because of oil then has become more heavily loaded with a cultural conflict now disintegrate themselves into violence, terrorism and the murder of hostages even when they had no links with the United States and its allies. They killed victims only to make impossible the search for an agreement

The second case, I would briefly mention here is the European, just to say that the short period during which some European hoped that the European Community could become a real nation state defined in cultural as well as economic terms is over. Such an idea was never popular except among German old people who maintained a highly understandable fear and hatred for a German national state. The meeting at Nice and the difficult elaboration of a constitutional treaty which should be ratified by all countries shows the predominance of national interests. Some countries insisted for mentioning the Christian origins of Europe in the preamble of the constitution. Other countries like France opposes it in the name of their own constitution. Anyway, Europe is massively considered by its inhabitants as an instrumental device necessary to be able to resist some how American hegemony and to get rid of internal conflicts; Europe is not conceived by European as a moral and a religious state comparable to United States. On the extreme Islamite side the main orientation is to world violence and Terrorism

is a main obstacle to the formation of a religiously based central conflict. In Europe cultural values and goals have a very limited importance, in spite of so many statements and speeches which oppose European culture and American culture or absence of culture. Such statements should not be taken too seriously, on either side of the Atlantic. The real conflict between the United States and Europe is not a moral or religious one, it results from American decision to abandon the multilateralism they had created and to rely only on one radical unilateralism.

V

I am convinced that western countries, the United States, Canada and Australia as well as Great Britain and France do not consider that their own solutions, could be applied to the whole world. Many people speak so constantly of multiculturalism but we don't know whether they refer to the integration of immigrants in good conditions as XIX and XXth century in America or for the more painful settlement of immigrants in Europe more recently. But all of them are looking for a combination of unit and diversity: *ex pluribus unum*, classical formula which suppose both the defense of cultural diversity and stronger institutions which maintains the unity of the nation, the republic and its citizenship.

A great merit of Samuel Huntington's book is to have come back to a realistic image of a world which can not be considered as living a process of formation of united states of the world. I try to show that the image of the world which is elaborated by S. Huntington is not satisfactory and corre-

sponds more to a central preoccupation for the defense of the United States more than affirming a satisfactory description of the processes which are transforming the whole world today. Because I maintain that the main factor of change is the widening gap between a global economic system and a plurality of cultures which can less and less become a basis for religious states and risk, on the contrary, to lead us to political violence in which terrorism gains ground against military actions which were still recently considered by the classical tradition of being part a national policy.

One of the most visible feature of today's world situation is a constant weakness of all institutional and political systems. In many parts of the world, corruption, nepotism and dangerous ideologies make impossible the success of any general project of government.

Many countries depend on more powerful countries, it is impossible for many agricultural productions to survive in the so-called third world because rich countries heavily support their own agriculture.

Maybe in the future it will be possible to interpret the present day situation as a step towards the decline of American empire because of the growing influence of religiously based states.

Because many of the countries which are supposed to be communities which are ruled by religious principles while a country like China belong to a different category. Moreover for non religious and cultural reasons represents a major problem of threat for the American empire, it is difficult to name a powerful country which defines itself by a religion view while everywhere in the world on the contrary we can

see that disorganization of societies as a consequence of globalization, fasters on one side the growing strength of economic and financial networks and what is even more dramatic, the growing impossibility to maintain a certain institutional integration for populations which are in a situation comparable to that of refugees in their own country.

Our most urgent duty is not to accept more or less diversity within our national states or regions; it is to construct or reconstruct a bridge between the economic world and the cultural worlds, between the universe of objectivity and the world of subjectivity, because both of them when they are separated from each other by the process of globalization become on both unable to control oneself.

The most important goal to reach is to reinstitutionalize economic life as many prominent economists have said, according to them, economic development can not be reached by the elementary recommendations of the Washington consensus. In spite of the fact that European and other countries are living a deep crisis of the welfare-state, which was created at the end of the second world war, we will not go out of the present day difficulties by following a policy which has already increased inequalities and all forms of exclusion in many parts of the world. A new European social model, to use Jacques Delors old expression, may be found and worked out. The same is true for the United States which have not succeed yet in creating a modern system health insurance a few years ago.

But the most difficult problem by far, is to reincorporate cultural values and economic instruments into the same political and institutional system. The attempts made to create

a decision making system and for instance to reach a higher degree of economic integration among Latin America states have failed. The conclusion is that solutions are no longer local or national and can be found only at a global level. Is it possible to fill at least partially the gap which is every year widening between a global economy which becomes wild and culturally defined societies which are hit by the process of decomposition which leads towards uncontrolled violence and self-destruction.

Who can succeed rebuilding institutions and societies? Who can impose on the United States and to "poor countries" to become partners in the reconstruction of institutionally controlled societies? Who is able to give a central importance to the reconstruction of citizenship in countries, in regions where the elements of decomposition are every year stronger and the elements of unity and integration weaker?

The first victim of the period which has been opened by 9/11 and then by the American military intervention is the United Nations. The system of the United Nations has lost its strength and the trust that so many people especially in America had put in it has disappeared.

The only possible solution can come from countries or regions which are at least directly involved in the present war of religions. But it is too big, too young, too busy building its new economy to play such a difficult international role. The least and realistic solution seems to be to hope that the European could finally play an active role.

When we say Europe it's difficult to know what we exactly mean. If we call Europe the Brussels Commission or the Council of the Chief of States, it seems almost impossi-

ble that a European institution allows its leaders to play such an important role, most of all because many members of the European Community would accept to define themselves as go-between let's say the united states and the Islamic world. As far as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is concerned it seems clear that the Israeli government is absolutely opposed to any role of the European Union because it has always considered the United States as its only secure friend. The Palestinian, even if they are supported by European public opinion, are certainly not willing to give the impression that they share with some European countries which support the United States the same preoccupation for an agreement between Israel and the Palestinian authority.

Should we just drop this idea which has been mentioned in few words, in a marginal way? This pessimistic answer is certainly the most realistic one but it is impossible to recognize it because once it has been dropped there is no barrier to a complete victory of violence and to the defeat of all instruments of political and social controls.

Europe is too big and too small to take useful initiatives but Europe can give a new life to the United Nations, a first step to transform the Security council so that the main countries and regions of the world would feel responsible for the whole world. The Europeans are probably the only one who can propose a transformation on United Nations not for them, but which would give stronger voice to countries like Brazil which must be associated to European initiative.

It is not the purpose of this paper to describe the possible diplomatic and institutional solutions but it has given some very shortly indications about possible ways of re-

constructing which could be useful in world affairs it is just to make clear that there is no spontaneous equilibrium between various cultural ideas. Relations of power are always more important than differences and we cannot recognize differences and make them compatible with a peaceful order if we do not eliminate first of all both hegemony and its dissolving consequences on most countries.

I must unfortunately conclude that the most pessimistic hypothesis is the most likely to correspond to the coming situation.

There is a real danger for all of us to enter into a world in which we all would be swallowed and destroyed by violence. Or we could easily imagine a Europe which would be paralyzed by its basic conflicts about its relationship with United and an American society accepting easily without these negative tendencies. The most conservative elements of the republican party defend a society which is deeply isolationist but the one which controls in New York, Boston, Washington, or on the contrary San Francisco and Los Angeles feel still responsible for the whole world, African American is still tempted by secession especially when they see a very large and rapidly growing Spanish speaking population becoming. More dramatically, we can already see in various parts, the world non-existing countries. In almost part of the world they are territories which are considered as states which have no participation in legal economy, which survive with resources coming from outside or from illegal activities, they are many countries in which: at midnight the government does not cover. It is painful to recognize that thirty years ago we didn't feel with the same anxiety this process of disintegration of the world.

I am very far from judging this evolution inevitable but I consider as necessary to accept the kind of analysis which leads to these gloomy predictions. I consider as more likely a designation of the parts of the world which are directly involved in global conflicts



Than a clash of civilizations that is the reason which are themselves consequences the basic dissociation a global economy and subjective politics why I give such a large importance to all processes of reconstruction of conditions which make possible to limit processes of designations which are progressing now.

But most of us we could agree on a much more elementary conclusion. We have entered not on 9/11 but much before a situation which has become conscious after 9/11: The world system is out of control. What used to be considered a society: network of relations between various sectors of collective life and the control of institutionalized political authority over social life is falling into pieces and not only in the poorest countries. How can we take part in the necessary reconstruction of political institutions, and trust again democratic rules. More concretely, we need to be more and more actively convinced of the necessity of a group like this one, which has been imagined by Candido Mendes and other people to dedicate its reflexion and initiative to reintegrating, reconstructing links as the top as well as the bottom of world order. Institutional controls which will allow us not to be engulfed in this violence.

Of Žižek, Huntington, and Beyond: Eurocentrism and Americanism against the Barbarian Threats

Nelson Maldonado-Torres

The end of the Cold War signaled not only a dramatic change in global politics, but in the academy as well. Two of the academic disciplines or perspectives which were deeply affected by the change were Marxism and Area Studies. The collapse of the Soviet Union confirmed for many the suspicions of leftist pessimism: that capitalism would at some point rule uncontested and that no other alternative was possible. After almost fifty years of international relations that were to a great extent defined by Cold War politics and ideologies, the world adopted a different configuration. Now nations did not appear to be defined primarily by competing ideologies. The mapping of the world in terms of capitalist nations and communist projects lost its coordinates. With such drastic changes in world affairs what we have seen after 1989 in respect to Marxism and Area Studies is, as it were, two epistemic frameworks desperately looking for an object of study and for a viable approach to new realities.

Marxism and Area Studies have spawned and influenced many academic innovative and fruitful academic approaches. Some of these, like postcolonial studies or world-system

analysis, represent efforts to question the modernist and colonial presuppositions of Area Studies and Marxism. But there are many who adhere more strictly to the codes of the epistemic frameworks in question. Most interesting today is the commonalities between some of those who attempt to revive Area Studies and Marxism. This essay explores the re-enactment of modern/colonial and Eurocentric mentalities in the reshaping of Marxism and Area Studies. I wish to analyze the intriguing connection and (from a certain point of view) unsuspected alliance between certain strain of Marxism and patriotic Americanism in post-Cold War times. My analysis will focus on the recent work of the Lacanian-Marxist Slavoj Žižek and that of the Area Studies scholar Samuel Huntington. Both, Žižek and Huntington attempt to re-construct the basic coordinates of their epistemic frameworks by identifying and opposing a series of enemies or “challenges”: deconstruction, multiculturalism, and ethnic identity politics. They wish to make a transition from liberal multiculturalism and identity politics to leftist Eurocentrism and populist Americanism. Even though Marxism and Area Studies for a long time served opposite camps of an ideological battle (Marxism mainly identified with perspectives which legitimized the claims of communist regimes, and Area Studies mainly oriented by the needs of U.S. defense, developmentalism and modernization theory) they attempt to define themselves today in opposition to common enemies, which leads them to adopt similar perspectives and to assert that which they share in common. They confront the same enemies and use those enemies to justify a culturalist Eurocentered and Christiancentered view of the world that

reintroduces many of the colonial and racist premises fought against by the forms of analysis and disciplines that they disavow or ignore. Regressive postures pose themselves today as beacons of innovation and critique. This is not unique to the academic realm, but it is still necessary to examine it in its own terms and attempt to articulate alternatives to them.

I will first reflect briefly on the links between Marxism and Area Studies. This will provide the basis for a discussion of the “regressive” turn in Žižek and Huntington’s recent works. I argue that while both Žižek and Huntington disavow ethnic identity politics, they have an identity politics of their own which becomes most obvious in their respective defense of Eurocentrism and Americanism. Following Immanuel Wallerstein analysis of Ethnic Studies as an unintended consequence of Area Studies scholarship, I consider the extent to which the new expressions of Eurocentrism and Americanism are unintended consequence of Ethnic Studies scholarship. This possibility poses the challenge to rethink Ethnic Studies as a decolonial and transmodern enterprise, in which decolonizing views and projects such as women’s studies, post-colonial studies, world-system analysis, and the philosophy of liberation come together and challenge each other in productive ways. As I have proposed elsewhere, I believe that the *damné* rather than the people, the proletariat, or the multitude, become the primordial object of investigation for these decolonial and transmodern sciences.¹ In the final section of this essay I include a brief reflection on the meaning of damnation and its significance for intellectual activity today.

Marxism and Area Studies

Marxism was born, both as an ideology and as epistemic framework in the second half of the nineteenth century. Marxism was distinguished from conservatism and liberalism in that it posited the need for a radical restructuring of society through revolutionary change.² Marxism inspired the October Revolution in 1917 and stood as the backbone of the socialist project in the Soviet Union from its beginning to its drastic end in 1989. While Marxism became the ideology and the epistemic framework that inspired resistance to capitalism and opposition to the Western block formed after the Second World War, Area Studies came to represent somewhat the opposite: it was the means by which the now hegemonic United States would collect information about different regions of the world in order to guarantee its security as well as to promote democracy and capitalist enterprise. While Marxism assumed that radical revolutionary change toward a communist form of social organization was possible, necessary and desirable; Area Studies approached different regions of the world through the lenses of development and modernization, thus positing the idea that capitalism could flourish globally and that the United States represented the epigone of democracy (the model toward which other societies could aspire).

Both Marxism and Area Studies were deeply challenged in the 1960's. Marxism was contested on the grounds of an apparent economicism, its reconciliation with totalitarianism, and its teleological character. Marxism was also questioned for its participation in a modern concept of rea-

son that disavows the relevance of race and gender perspectives in the production of knowledge. Area Studies, on its part, entered into a deep ethical crisis in the 1960's in large part due to the scandalous revelation of its uses to address problems of insurgency in different countries, something which made obvious the link between the field and the imperial ambitions of the United States.³ Marxism and Area Studies were in some ways the *prima donnas* of the Cold War: two forms of scholarship for the most part pictured the world in the image needed for the assertion of power by two hegemonies, the Soviet Union and the United States. Marxism and Area Studies were not certainly unique to these two countries, or were completely separate from each other, but their epistemic premises reflected two different ideological options which were to some extent ingrained and represented by dominant ideologies in the so-called First and Second Worlds.

The differences between Marxism and Area Studies—the first giving primacy to the revolution of the proletariat, the other to the capitalist modernization of the world—should not lead one to think that the two are completely opposed. I am not only referring to that Marxism has clearly shown interest in global affairs since its inception, and that Area Studies, particularly after its crisis in the 1960's, received an influx of Marxist perspectives. The possibility of such contact points to a deeper commonality, which makes itself evident in their responses to their respective crises. It is no accidental that Marxism and Area Studies suffered a crisis at the same time. What was put in question in the 1960's was

something that they both share. I am referring here to a modern/colonial horizon of thought.⁴ Modernity/coloniality refers to the linkages between the project of modernity and the logic of coloniality.⁵ Modernity/coloniality makes reference to the way in which time, space, and knowledge have been conceptualized and understood in modernity through an unquestioned assertion of what Anibal Quijano refers to as the coloniality of power, which includes Eurocentrism as one of its outcomes.⁶ Eurocentrism refers to an epistemic perspective that interprets the world through a very limited lenses which focus on a very selective and ideologically charged view of European history and experiences. Eurocentrism posits Europe as the site where the relevant questions about humanity's past, presence, are raised and best elucidated. Eurocentrism shuts down the possibility of questioning, and thus, of theorizing, to non-European subjects. Even though, as Immanuel Wallerstein has sharply pointed out, the three ideologies of modernity (conservatism, liberalism, and Marxism) give expression to different conceptions of the speed and the extent of change in modern societies,⁷ when it comes down to the questioning of Eurocentrism, the three ideologies are fundamentally conservative. This is precisely what has become very obvious after the end of the Cold War when Marxists like Slavoj Žižek, for instance, attempt to rescue Marxism through an appeal to orthodoxy. I will explore in this essay the connections of apparent contraries in post-Cold War times. More specifically, I will elaborate on the linkages and connections between Marxism and Area Studies, as they appear in recent elaborations by the Marxist

Slavoj Žižek and the Area Studies scholar Samuel Huntington. I aim to make evident the reliance of the two projects on a similar conservative agenda that relies on a problematic geo-political conception of knowledge.

The Regressive Marxism of Slavoj Žižek⁸

Re-rooting communist hope in Western Christianity became very important for the European left after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Without being able to find a home in the Soviet Union or the traditional communist party, there were not too many choices opened to maintain alive the communist project. There was thus the need for a reconciliation of the European Marxist left with Europe and with Western Christianity. By the time in which such need became urgent, the very idea of Europe had been strongly contested by scholars who, following Fanon's insight about the roots of Europe, turned to criticize heavily the project of European civilization. Like anyone desperately in the search for roots, the left has tended to turn increasingly reactionary, to the point of embracing orthodoxy as an emblem of criticism.⁹ Such is the main topic of Slavoj Žižek's most recent work, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*.

The Puppet and the Dwarf is the latest installment of Slavoj Žižek's intriguing saga of ideology critique and materialist reading of Christianity. Once more the same protagonists return: Paganism, Judaism, and Christianity; Christ, Paul, and Lenin; Hegel and Lacan. The plot also preserves its center and focus. Like in *The Fragile Absolute* and *Belief* we find a hard-core materialist fighting the "massive onsla-

ught of obscurantism” in contemporary philosophy and popular culture. The arch-enemies also remain the same: New Age and Oriental Spirituality, Lévinasian philosophy of Otherness, Derridean deconstruction, the post-secular turn in continental philosophy, and subaltern identity politics. Žižek aims to create a “short circuit” in the circulation of these ideologies and philosophies by revealing their ultimate rendition, if not outright complicity, with the logic of capital and with an ideal of the human which is decrepit, paralyzing, and ultimately, inhuman.

The Puppet is an extension as well as a confession of sorts. The core of the book is formed by an engagement with G. K. Chesterton’s 1908 book *Orthodoxy*. If in *The Fragile Absolute* Žižek outlines the scope of his project in terms of a defense of the ties between Marxism and Christianity, *The Puppet* makes clear that he is willing to go to the very end with this project—up to the point of embracing orthodoxy as a banner for radical critique. Like Žižek today, Chesterton fought in his time against the onslaught of then new spiritualisms. Chesterton responded to the “heresies” of his day with an uncompromising orthodox position according to which the solution for the crises of the age is only found within the coordinates of Christian doctrine. When all is said and done, Chesterton argued, the searcher discovers that he arrives at exactly the same place from which he departs, in his case, to Christianity. Žižek’s confession is that his so-called post-deconstructionist approach cannot but take a similar route. It is from here that he will enthusiastically endorse orthodoxy as a project.

Žižek's *Puppet and the Dwarf* represents the highest expression of the anxiety for roots that has characterized the leftist project in Europe and the United States as well.¹⁰ His search for roots is not totally different from that of the German thinker Martin Heidegger. Like in Heidegger, there is in Žižek's project an extreme critique of Western modernity and an equal attempt to save the West at the same time. The difference is that where Heidegger turned to fascism and Germancentrism, Žižek vindicates Marxism, Eurocentrism, and an orthodox version of Western Christianity.¹¹ This difference, however, only grounds the highest commonality between Heidegger and Žižek: their epistemic racism. For while Heidegger could not think about genuine philosophy out of the German language, Žižek cannot see political radicalism out of the Marxist-Christian diad. As he puts it in *The Puppet and the Dwarf*:

My claim here is not merely that I am a materialist through and through, and that the subversive kernel of Christianity is accessible also to a materialist approach; my thesis is much stronger: this kernel is accessible *only* to a materialist approach—and vice versa: to become a true dialectical materialist, one should go through the Christian experience.¹²

Žižek's conservatism is radical, and because of that, it challenges the complacency of conservatives and non-conservatives alike. The radicalism, however, does not hide the amount of epistemic racism; just like Heidegger's suggestive analyses of the problem of technology and nihilism did not hide it either. This racism is evinced in the above passage. Since it does not surface in Žižek's work that there could be truly radical political options beyond the horizons of dia-

lectual materialism then it follows that Christianity is the one and only source of true radicalism. This explains, among many other things, his view of Buddhism. Žižek's views about Christianity and the left gives him license to engage in a new form of Orientalism that knows no boundaries. After a few pages dedicated to the analysis of the statements of a few Zen Buddhists and a portion of the *Bhagavad Gita*, Žižek assumes enough authority to observe:

This means that Buddhist (or Hindu, for that matter) all-encompassing Compassion has to be opposed to Christian intolerance, violent Love. The Buddhist stance is ultimately one of Indifference, of quenching all passions that strive to establish differences; while Christian love is a violent passion to introduce Difference, a gap in the order of being, to privilege and elevate some object at expense of others.¹³

Žižek reifies Buddhism and Christianity and then assigns them intrinsic logics that help to discriminate one from the other just as easily as Heidegger was able to differentiate between philosophical and non-philosophical languages. For Žižek, Oriental spirituality is indifferent to the world and its logic of non-distinction leads its adherent to become complicit with military powers, if not even openly endorse them. Monotheists, are, on the contrary, either tolerant of differences or intolerant of love.¹⁴ The search for roots inhibits the capacity for careful examination of the ways in which that which we call religion never operates in a vacuum. The extremism of Žižek's epistemic racism is manifest in that while he dismisses "Oriental spirituality" because of its affiliations with militarism, he keeps Hegel in his sanctuary even though Hegel remains one of the strongest supporters of war in the Western world.¹⁵

The Populist Patriotism of Samuel Huntington¹⁶

Samuel Huntington is famous for his proposal in his 1996 *The Clash of Civilizations* that international relations after the Cold War were no longer based on ideological differences, but on cultural ones. For many scholars, 1989 came to represent the emergence of something new, a leap into a new stage of history that could very well represent its own conclusion (Fukuyama). After decades in which the United States and the Soviet Union terrorized the world with threats of imminent nuclear destruction, imperial control over many territories, interventions and collaborations which helped to implant military anti-democratic regimes in many parts of the world a cadre of scholars acted as if the fall of the Berlin Wall meant the definitive end of an age marked by the concentration of military power in two blocks. Instead of making an assessment of the effects of the Cold War in the psyches, cultures, political regimes, and social configurations of peoples living in countries where there was direct or indirect influence by the two super powers, Area Studies scholars like Huntington shifted the analyses of international relations from ideological tension to cultural ones. This shift implied the denial of long term effects of Cold War political and ideological factors into the global dynamics of power. This move not only fails to address the trauma of the Cold War and its effects in peoples around the world, but also the question of what it meant for them that there suddenly was only one uncontested hegemon standing. Huntington's *The Clash of Civilizations* demonstrates the impossibility of one scholar to articulate questions from different perspectives and the will to main-

tain as legitimate only one referent: that of the uncontested hegemon.

After three decades witnessing the dramatic transformation of Area Studies and the challenge to them by fields such as postcolonial studies and ethnic studies, Huntington attempts to restore Area Studies to its original vocation of intellectual overseer in the interest of power.¹⁷ His latest book, *Who are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity* continues his crusade, but this time shifts from international threats to the United States and Western civilization, to the threats that are found in its midst. Just like 1989 motivates *The Clash of Civilizations*, the events of September 11 stand at the background of Huntington's most recent efforts. And just like before, he engages into a very selective kind of scholarship that seeks to effectively erase the questions and concerns that emerge from marginalized and racialized social positions.

Huntington's point of departure is the upsurge of patriotism that occurred after the attacks on the World Trade Center. His main concern is to look for ways in which people would feel motivated to sustain it after they cease to feel threatened by "terrorism." Huntington fears that as people resume their normal lives they will also allow their national identity to decrease in relevance. Huntington's strategy for opposing this trend could not be more straightforward: he identifies other enemies. Multiculturalism, deconstruction, sub-national and transnational identities, immigration, and most particularly the growing Hispanic presence in the United States become in his book the set of others that are to join Osama bin Laden and Al Qaeda in reminding U.S. Ameri-

cans of the need to commit themselves strongly to national values. Mexicans join Arab Muslims in representing a threat to the United States. Their culture and values lead them either to attack the United States or to resist assimilation, and thus, to threaten the linguistic unity of the nation. Huntington reminds the U.S. American public that they should not only be weary of armed terrorism but of cultural terrorism as well. Mexicans in the U.S. and Hispanics at large appear in his text as no less than cultural terrorists.

In an incisive review of Samuel Huntington's *Who are We?: The Challenges to America's National Identity*, David Montejano, a historian of the U.S. Southwest, points to what he describes as a "intelligence failure" in Huntington's work (Montejano, 2004). Huntington assumes that Hispanic culture is homogeneous and monolithic. He seems "unaware that transnationalism, bilingualism, biculturalism, and a concentrated Mexican presence have been facts of border life since the region was annexed over 150 years ago."¹⁸ For Montejano, "it is apparent that this Harvard professor has just taken note of the Southwest and its large Mexican presence." Montejano is right. Huntington seems to know much about numbers and statistics, but, ironically, he does not know much or express much interest about the culture of the people that he classifies as a menace. This would be paramount for a book that takes culture as the prime unit of analysis. Instead of investigating the manifold forms of the cultures that he allegedly wishes to investigate, he assumes that one can easily define two distinct and separate Anglo and Hispanic cultures.

As it occurred with the federal intelligence agencies that lost track of the attackers of September 11, it is not too difficult to detect that Huntington's own "intelligence failure" is not merely due to lack of expertise in an area, or simply to lack of information. The "intelligence failure" in his book seems to be mainly due to a problem in the production of knowledge. Huntington's patriotic populist intellectual positioning fits well with the traditional model of Area Studies scholarship. His patriotic intellectualism is the translation of his persona as an Area Studies scholar into the field of national matters. This shift in some ways completes the mission of an Area Studies scholar: defense from threats to the nation should include the location of both external and internal enemies.

Who are We? attempts to recover a lost territory for Area Studies. As Immanuel Wallerstein has pointed out, the crisis of modernization theory and Area Studies in the 1960's not only led to a questioning of loyalty to United States foreign policy, but also laid the ground for a different kind of area studies: the study of what could be rendered as the "Third World within" the United States. This is primarily ethnic studies, but women's studies as well. Wallerstein refers to Ethnic Studies and Women Studies variants of Area Studies because

they too tended to group scholars from multiple traditional disciplines (...), they too insisted that their subject matter could neither be studied ahistorically (pre-1945 ethnography and Oriental studies) nor be studied by simple application of nomothetic universalizing social science.¹⁹

The similarities between Area Studies and Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies did not hide their differences. As Wallerstein notes:

But these academic enterprises as social movements followed an inverse path from that of 1945-1970 area studies. Area studies, as we have seen, was a top-down enterprise. (...) Women's studies and the multiple variants of "ethnic" studies had bottom-up origins. They represented the (largely post-1968) revolt of those whom the university had "forgotten." Theirs was a claim to be heard, and to be heard not merely as describers of particular groups that were marginal, but as revisers of the central theoretical premises of social science. (227)

Wallerstein claims that by "first of all undermining the plausibility of traditional ethnography and Oriental studies, then by forcing the 'Western' disciplines to take into account a larger range of data, and finally by questioning the sacrosanct division of the disciplines" Area Studies laid the groundwork for the emergence of Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies. Clearly Wallerstein does not mean by this that Area Studies is the necessary and sufficient cause of Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies, but only that it facilitated its emergence in the academy. In retrospect one could add that Area Studies may have helped Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies as much as it disabled them, since it provided the mold for their less politicized incorporation into the academy.

Ethnic Studies traditionally focuses on the study and analysis of the histories and identities of ethnic and racialized groups. At its beginnings Area Studies took national identity as well as the glory and superiority of Western cul-

ture for granted and then went to map the world according to those premises. The emergence of Ethnic Studies interrupted the fluidity and acceptability of those assumptions. For the last thirty years traditional Area Studies has been assailed from the inside through postcolonial variants of Area Studies, and from the outside from views of nation that are contested in Ethnic Studies scholarship. Two decades of republican counter-revolutions and the relative success of multicultural initiatives stand in the background of a shift in Area Studies scholarship that occurred after the end of the Cold War and the attacks of September 11, 2001. Huntington's work stands at the forefront of these changes. While *The Clash of Civilizations* seeks to undo the effects of post-colonial studies scholarship, *Who are We?* takes directly on Ethnic Studies.

The relation of *Who are We?* to Ethnic Studies is not altogether obvious precisely because there is no reference to scholarship done in this field. Huntington aims to take over areas and themes in which Ethnic Studies scholarship has been doing advances for the last three decades without reference to it. Montejano's assessment of Huntington's efforts as a "failure of intelligence" points to this radical dismissal of Ethnic Studies scholarship. With all his emphasis on culture Huntington equally dismisses scholarship in the area of cultural studies. Similar to Žižek, instead of tying together reflections on culture with reflections on power, Huntington relies on concepts of religion and culture that were prevalent in evangelical religious studies at the beginning of the twentieth century. Vijay Prashad has commented on the links between Area Studies and the Christian establishment in the United States. As Prashad indicates:

Area Studies emerges in the early part of this century mostly as part of U.S. evangelism: K.S. Latourette at Yale helped kick-start East Asian studies (his 1929 book is *History of the Christian Missions in China*); H.E. Bolton at Berkeley pioneered Latin American Studies (his 1936 book is *The Rim of Christendom: A Biography of Eusebio Francisco Kino, Pacific Coast Pioneer*); A.C. Coolidge at Harvard worked out the contours of Slavic Studies (his big book of 1908 is entitled *The United States as World Power*). In its infancy, the Church and Washington held sway over Area Studies. Our evangelical imperials of today want to return to this period.²⁰

Huntington, like Žižek, revives early twentieth century culturalist perspectives used in Christiancentered and Eurocentric religious studies scholarship in order to oppose what they perceive as the barbarian threats of the day. If there is an example of regressive scholarship today Huntington competes with Žižek in setting the mark.

The appeal to religion and the aura of early twentieth-century religious studies in Huntington's raises other suspicions. As William D. Hart indicates, the emergence of religious studies can be traced back to the effort by White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites to secure a place for the teaching of religious values in academic settings that became more and more secular. These elites wanted to guarantee that their youth had access to an Anglo-Saxon Protestant view of themselves and their world. That is why most departments of religious studies still until today are largely dominated by the study of Christianity. The strategy of the White Anglo Saxon patriotic and protestant elites in forming and endorsing religious studies was that of securing power in circumstances where the centrality of their faith in public affairs was contested. Huntington's redeployment of

Area Studies follows a similar, but much more alarming logic. Witnessing the increase of non-Anglo Saxon Protestants in the country he lists possible responses to it, which include the temptation of genocide. Since he believes that war and conflict are part of the very psychological make up of human beings (26), such behavior appears rather as a natural outcome of conditions of cultural menace and displacement. Huntington's does not endorse this option, but does not interrogate critically the bases for such behavior either. This would have led him to a critical exploration of the very formation of national identity itself. Instead, he leaves the alternatives open, and clearly suggest to immigrants that they better assimilate rather than face such possibilities. If post-1965 immigrants assimilate in the ways that Huntington envisions, clearly enough he would triumph, since the worldview that guarantees the power of White Anglo-Saxon Protestant elites would be guaranteed even if they become a minority group in the future. *Who are We?* is a twofold attack on minorities and immigrants from non-European countries. One is more immediate and it concerns policies that seek to reduce their numbers. In this Huntington joins other voices with similar claims in the last decade. The other is more "pre-emptive" as it seeks to guarantee that the current structure of power in the United States and the predominant view of self and others in this country remain untouched even when the current elites are no longer the majority. From here that his work attempts to redefine the terms for reflection on topics that have been dealt with intensely in the last thirty years by disciplines and programs such as ethnic studies.

Huntington's failure to take Ethnic Studies scholarship into account in his exploration of national identity is not accidental. Huntington's dismissal of Ethnic Studies scholarship points to a more dangerous side of his work: the dismissal of the problems and questions that Ethnic Studies scholarship attempts to address. First in a long list, is that Huntington repeats the vicious attempt to depict "America" as a *tabula rasa*. He argues that Anglo-Saxon Protestants who arrived in the seventeenth century, which Huntington regards as the true Native Americans, should be considered as settlers and not immigrants. They created a new society where there was nothing before. They were not accountable to other people or nations, like current immigrants are. There is not one indication in the book of inquiry into the ways in which indigenous peoples perceived the arrival of the Anglo-Saxon Protestants or the ways in which they have conceptualized the rights for land and existence in the last three hundred years. If Huntington's own book is an example of the Anglo-Saxon Protestant American culture that he defends, then one must conclude that such culture is highly narcissistic, non-dialogical, and dismissive of claims for justice. But the book, rather than simply the expression of a culture is the outcome of a decision or a project. In this case, it concerns a choice for the primacy of cultural determination over justice and responsibility. Such choices sustain themselves even in the face of contradictions. While on the one hand, Huntington records how the racialization, segregation, and extermination of indigenous peoples extinguished the possibility of a multicultural society in the early stages of "American" history (p. 53), he only complains

about the appearance of multiculturalism three hundred years later (p. 171ff). Would he be consistent, instead of criticizing liberal conceptions of multiculturalism because they are too radical, he would question them because they are not radical enough. Instead, Huntington engages into a patriotic populism that takes popular opinion as the definitive mark of legitimate claims for justice and social change. Would this be the mark of authentic being in the world changes in society like the elimination of segregation would have never taken place.

Huntington's denial of central problems and questions in Ethnic Studies scholarship is partly rooted in that for him the Civil War and the Civil Rights movement did away with national definitions in terms of race and ethnicity. Since then, he believes, the United States is an openly multi-racial and multi-ethnic people. Such an opening, he adds, can be attributed to virtues of the American cultural creed and to Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture. Huntington does not interrogate the extent to which the Creed or the Protestant culture that he celebrates could have had any role in the affirmation of the injustices that women and racialized groups have suffered in the United States. Consider only Christian depictions of blacks, Jews, and Manifest Destiny. Huntington notes that Americans see themselves as chosen people. But he does not explore the extent to which notions of "divine election" have led to genocide and enslavement. Huntington considers liberty and individual rights to be at the center of the American Creed. Yet, he does not raise the question of whether such values could by themselves provide an adequate measure to justice. For him, the American Creed and

the Anglo-Saxon cultural core of U.S. American society provide corrective to all evils and to any excesses. He therefore conceives the Civil Rights movement as a fundamental expression of American values, thus discounting the relevance of intercultural dialogue (think of Gandhi, for example) and denying the importance of the ties to other movements by subalternized and racialized peoples all over the world. Huntington is certainly not interested in exploring the extent to which ideas, concepts, and practices from other cultures and other societies inspired fundamental change in U.S. American society. That is why he limits his discussion of the “Hispanic challenge” to numbers and statistics, and fails to analyze the nature of the bilingual and bicultural creations of border peoples as well as the unique forms of critical theories and views of subjectivity, society, and human conviviality that emerge in such places.

The most curious aspect of Huntington and Žižek’s work is that while they disavow ethnic identity politics, they deploy a very strong identity politics of their own: either Eurocentrism or Americanism should be saved at all costs. Huntington’s call to defend American national identity, which he depicts as essentially Anglo and Protestant, against immigrant threats and multiculturalism appears paradoxical. Claims to protect a culture are typically deployed with marginal peoples as the referent, not mainstream culture. In some ways Huntington combats Ethnic Studies both by dismissing them but also by enacting some of its most problematic expressions: e.g., affirmation of cultural nationalisms and the complicity with identity politics. Ironically, if Area Studies laid the groundwork for Ethnic Studies, the most

problematic and limiting expressions of Ethnic Studies along with multiculturalism laid the groundwork for a new culturalist deployment of Area Studies in the traditional spirit of defending the nation from foreign threats. Fortunately, Ethnic Studies takes seriously efforts to undo negative elements in the legacies of colonial identities and cultures. From here that the current situation demands a reaffirmation of the strongest and more refined perspectives and methods in Ethnic Studies. I propose that Ethnic Studies and Women's Studies could come together under the umbrella of Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives.²¹ I will spell out some coordinates of decolonial intellectual work with reference to the work of Frantz Fanon and Sylvia Wynter in the next section. Before doing that, I would like to provide an example of what I have in mind by something like Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives.

Consider, for instance, Gloria Anzaldúa's work. Instead of uncritically affirming culture and the immediate desires for recognition, she explores both self and world in search for the guiding lights or beacons that will allow her to claim her humanity. She articulates not an Anglo or a Hispanic response, but a human response based on her experience in the border of two peoples and cultures. Her border epistemology, which Huntington probably ignores even though it was produced in his own "America," leads her to examine critically Anglo, Hispanic, and indigenous cultures. Accountability, justice, the importance of memory, and a deep sense of ethical responsibility toward other human beings guide her examination and recreation of culture. It is not a matter of rejecting culture for an ideology or abstract Creed. It is

not a matter of narcissistically or romantically glorifying a culture, such as indigenous, “American,” or European culture, or of vilifying any of them in a purely reactionary way. It is rather a matter of maturely confronting the cultural sources in which one is immersed. Anzaldúa finds valuable sets of ideas and values in the different cultures in which she is immersed, as well as problems. As she puts it, “hay culturas que matan,” there are cultures and elements in cultures that kill.²² Anzaldúa wishes something very different from a romantic and narcissistic relation with culture; what she wants is to become an actional and responsible self. In her case, a full and complete Lesbian woman of color.

Is there something that Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture could learn from border epistemology? If we follow Huntington, apparently not. At least he does not even raise the question. In his text it is as if Anglo-Saxon Protestant culture could enrich other cultures, but it is in no need of anything and it cannot be penetrated. In this it has the character of a penis. It can penetrate all the cultures that find a place in this country, but there is no need for it to be touched in its core, or at least that is what should by all means be avoided or even recognized. Such resistance suggests a grave case of cultural racism and symbolic homophobia. This is the position of the Master, who can maintain its place as long as it can give to others without ever being changed. Huntington’s world is full of such cultures. His view of civilizational conflict betrays a perverted sadistic dream of a violent encounter between impenetrable cultures whose permanent temptation is to fight. In lack of peace, the ultimate victor is that culture which could penetrate the others without being itself pene-

trated. If one followed this psychoanalytical examination to its logical conclusion one would have to say that both *The Clash of Civilizations* and *Who are We?* are haunted by the ghost of a deeply violent, destructive, and perverted but repressed homosexual sadist intellectual posture. Anzaldúa's alternative depiction of ethics, erotics, and culture clearly has today as much relevance as ever.

Who are We? attempts the most amazing feat in revisionist historiography: after three hundred years during which White Anglo Saxon Protestants in the United States have enslaved, colonized, and conquered indigenous peoples, blacks, Mexicans, Puerto Ricans, Filipinos and other "minority" groups, as well as helped maintain a global structure of power that is fundamentally unfair, the text wants to make it appear as if other groups, such as Hispanics, are a menace. Huntington subverts the tables of any decent account of history and accountability. Doesn't this effort exactly obey the racist logic to which these groups have been exposed from the very birth of modernity in the Americas? The temptation for Hispanics is, of course, to attempt to achieve recognition in face of subjects who adhere to this Anglo Saxon Protestant view of the world. The temptation would be to prove to people like Huntington that they have what it takes to be Americans. Instead of legitimating the terms of assimilation, the challenge for Hispanics is to redefine the terms of the debate, to bring accountability to the national scene, to help in rescuing memory of displaced peoples, and to attempt to understand the claims of indigenous peoples and descendents of slaves in this country. The challenge to Hispanics consists in resisting the temptation to

reproduce mainstream standards and cultural values uncritically. Hispanics risk wanting to assimilate to Anglo Saxon Protestant culture at the cost of becoming a real “challenge” to everyone else but to White Anglo Saxon protestants and elites in this country. Would they attempt to join others in the consistent decolonization of space, knowledge, and consciousness in this nation and other parts of the world? Only time will tell.

Decolonization or apartheid?²³ Here resides the veritable “challenge:” a possible challenge as well as a possibility in respect to the decolonization of culture, knowledge, and society in the United States.²⁴ This challenge requires a response from intellectuals and the diverse sciences. It would be grave to repeat the history of the nineteenth century where it was assumed that nationalization could be achieved or advanced without decolonization. And if the social and human sciences were shaped by both Church and state in the process of their constitution, then it is necessary to enquire now the extent to which such disciplines and scientific perspectives should be reshaped and reoriented. A critical examination of the presuppositions of our sciences and our intellectual perspectives, as well as a revision and replacement of basic concepts and ideas are needed. This is a fundamental task of Ethnic Studies and its avatars: decolonial and transmodern sciences.

Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives²⁵

Elsewhere I have articulated the idea of a weak utopian project as bringing about the Death of European Man.²⁶ I

think that the peculiar intricacies between “estadounidense” patriotism, Eurocentrism, the propensity to war, and the continued subordination of the theoretical contributions of peoples from the south call for a reformulation of this idea. Today, after the post-1989 and post-September 11 patriotism we shall call more directly simply for the Death of American Man. By American Man I mean a concept or figure, a particular way of being-in-the-world, or else, the very subject of an episteme that gives continuity to an imperial order of things under the rubrics of liberty and the idea of a Manifest Destiny that needs to be accomplished. American Man, as its predecessor and still companion European Man, are unified under an even more abstract concept, Imperial Man. Imperial gestures and types of behavior are certainly not unique to Europe or “America.” A radical critique and denunciation of Latin American Man, and of ethno-class continental Man in general, is what I aim at in my critique. “Man,” refers here to an ideal of humanity, and not to concrete human beings. It is that ideal which must die in order for the human to be born.

It should be clear, that I am talking here about epistemological and semiotic struggle, which takes the form of critical analysis and the invention and sharing of ideas that allow humans to preserve their humanity. A subversive act is that which help us to deflate imperial and continental concepts of Man, such as, for instance, referring to “Americans” in a way that designates their own particular provinciality rather than by a concept through which they appropriate the whole extent of the so-called “New World.” That is what I mean to do by using “estadounidense” instead of American to refer

to the citizens of the United States. “Estadounidense” should be one of the first words that U.S. Americans learn from Spanish. It would avoid many misunderstandings. “Estadounidense” could be considered a *gift* from Spanish and Hispanic culture to the Anglo Saxon Protestant culture that Huntington reifies and seeks to protect. As I have argued elsewhere, unfortunately, receptivity and hospitality are two fundamental modes of humanity that those who occupy and assume the position of Master most resist. The reception of decolonizing gifts is the ultimate test for determining the presence of coloniality. In Huntington’s text preservation acquires primacy over reception. Evasion of accountability and commitment with coloniality cannot be justified by conservative arguments that seek to preserve culture. Quite the contrary, to paraphrase a Kantian maxim about the relation between religion and reason, preservation can be justified within the limits of decolonization alone. And decolonization is hardly to be found in either Žižek or Huntington’s texts.

Žižek and Huntington criticize multiculturalism and other expressions of decolonizing movements that found expression in the 1960’s. They focused on the more ambivalently and less consistently decolonial expressions found in liberal multiculturalism and identity politics. They don’t examine the extent to which many of the struggles of the sixties and their outcomes have put into question imperial conceptions of the human. They have partly done so by going against the grain from within but also by proposing alternative futures, utopias, or ways of being human. Fanon referred to colonized and racialized peoples as the *damnés*

or condemned of the earth. Following Fanon, Sylvia Wynter proposed the category of the *damné* to refer to the liminal subjects of Western modernity, including many of those subjects who rebelled in the sixties.²⁷ I will now clarify the concept of the *damné* and articulate the alternative ideal of being human to which it refers. The *damnés*, different from the people, the proletariat, or the multitude, can be taken as the primordial object of Decolonial Studies and Transmodern Perspectives.

The *damné* is not only a victim. The *damné* is a category that enunciates the condition of subjects who are locked in a position of subordination. The *damné* lives in a hell from which quite literally there is no escape. When history passes and the dialectic advances the *damnés* usually remain as recipients of still new orders of injustice, degradation, dehumanization, and suffering. The *damné* is, as it were, a liminal subject at the second or third degree. It is often the liminal of the liminal or the almost permanently liminal subject. From her perspective the dialectic seems almost frozen. In the far side of oppression, domination, and coloniality there is thus no such thing as a dialectic of the subaltern. What begins to emerge at the extreme point of irritation, frustration, and desire for conceptual and material transformation is a renewed sense of agency that seeks *an-other* understanding of the human.²⁸ This is the meaning that I propose for Fanon's often misunderstood words:

Leave this Europe where they are never done talking of Man, yet murder men everywhere they find them, at the corner of everyone of their streets, in all the corners of the globe.... So, my brothers, how is it that we do not understand that we have better things to do

than to follow that same Europe? . . . For Europe, for ourselves, and for humanity, comrades, we must turn over a new leaf, we must work out new concepts, and try to set afoot a new man.”²⁹

Fanon proposes post-colonial agency as an antidote to the Non-dialectics of Damnation. The concept of agency that Fanon proposes is intrinsically tied to the confrontation with the realities of damnation. That is to say, what stands as the background of his conception of agency is not the achievement of a modern bourgeois or socialist revolution or the ethereal insights of any given classical text in political theory. What informs his understanding of agency is an acute perception of coloniality and what is needed to overcome its pernicious effects.³⁰

As Fanon’s work suggest, and as the very etymology of the term *damné* makes clear, the damned is the one who wants to give but who can’t give because what he possesses has been taken from him.³¹ The *damnés* are the subjects who by virtue of their gender or skin colour are not seen as subjects who can participate in generous intersubjective contact with others. Fanon’s characterization of the *damné* includes not only systematic and long-standing dehumanization, but also a particular kind of desire to establish generous human contact. In her most consistent attempts to elevate herself beyond the struggle for recognition that takes place within the dialectics of lordship and bondsman, the colonized, wretched or condemned, engages in a struggle for non-sexist human fraternity that involves, both self-critique and an ethics of receptive generosity.³² When Fanon referred to the colonized as the *damné* he was not only describing a situation but also raising a challenge to colonized subjects.

This challenge was to set afoot a new ideal of the human, one that would take us beyond the limits of modernity/coloniality as incarnated in its European expressions and elsewhere.

For Fanon it was clear that the utopia of the colonized would remain within the horizons of modernity/coloniality and its masculine charged ethno-class conception of the human if it were based on rights of possession. Beyond obtaining property rights or social equality the utopia of the *damné* consists in giving birth to a world where human subjects could give themselves as who they are to others while others would recognize them as givers. The *damné* does not merely desire to possess (to have or to be), but to give and receive as well. Fanon pointed out that what the master resists most is not a formal recognition of rights or the equal division of property. Concession of property rights does not end racism. What the master resists most is to recognize the slave as someone who can give something to him. This alone challenges his status as absolute owner and absolute giver. The radical suspension of this privilege is what I have in mind when I call for the Death of Imperial Man, both in its European and American expressions. Calling for the Death of European and American Man means to divorce ourselves from the ideas, feelings, and actions that inhibit the generous transaction of gifts. This is a call to engage in a praxis of liberation which is also an ethics of risk and of generous encounter articulated from the position of the *damné*. Against the utopia of neo-liberalism, which functions as a reification of economism to the point of making authentic livelihood a

constant preparation for a war against terror, it is possible to conceive and fight for a non-imperial, non-sexist, and non-racist way of engaging with different subjects, with different cultures, and with different ways of thinking. The “negative intellectual” should be opposed by a “decolonizing intellectual,” by someone who is “neither patriot nor universal cosmopolitan” and who promotes epistemic and cultural decolonization.³³ This “decolonizing intellectual” must be ready to engage in a project of epistemic and material decolonization that cannot be limited to the standards or viewpoints of the Parisians of 1968. The task is particularly difficult now, since the U.S. mainland has been attacked. Many “estadounidenses” relate the current events to Pearl Harbor and not to Vietnam. They are thirst for revenge and armed conflict. It is thus probably harder today than it was in the sixties to oppose the war machine. This is all the more so as the left turns every time more to the right, as both right and left insist on their typical Eurocentric monolingualism, and as those on the right use nationalist discourses, flags, and the menace of terror to justify a policy of *ideological pre-emptive strikes*. The monolingual Eurocentric left becomes complicit with this policy when it is only willing to find alternatives in text of classical political theory and when it assumes that non-Western, non-Christian, and subaltern responses to liberalism and the modern episteme can never escape fundamentalism or vicious forms of identity politics. The fight is thus difficult, but it must be fought. The decolonizing intellectual must learn how to fight it in solidarity with those whose voices have been occluded by the

modern episteme and by the more recent terrorist discourse against fundamentalism and terror. The decolonizing intellectual must be able to formulate alternatives utopias and find sources of hope in the midst of war.

Notes

1. See Nelson Maldonado Torres, "The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge: Modernity, Empire, Coloniality," *City* 8, no. 1 (2004): 44. For articulations of the concept of *damné* see Nelson Maldonado Torres, "From Vietnam to Afghanistan, or Searching for Utopia in the Midst of War," [Rio de Janeiro (Brazil): Educam, 2003]. An account of the similarities and contrasts between the concepts of *dasein*, *damné*, people, and multitude is forthcoming in Nelson Maldonado Torres, "On the Coloniality of Being," in *Coloniality, Transmodernity, and Border Thinking*, ed. Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar (forthcoming).
2. Immanuel Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science: The Limits of Nineteenth-Century Paradigms* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1991).
3. Immanuel Wallerstein, "The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies," in *The Cold War and the University: Toward an Intellectual History of the Postwar Years*, ed. Noam Chomsky et al. (New York: The New Press, 1997), 15-232.
4. Walter D. Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2000).
5. Walter D. Mignolo, "La Retórica de la Modernidad y la Lógica de la Colonialidad," in *Coloniality, Transmodernity, and Border Thinking*, ed. Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar (proyectado a publicarse en el 2004).
6. Anibal Quijano, "Coloniality of Power, Eurocentrism, and Latin America," *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 1, n. 3 (2000): 533-80.
7. Wallerstein, *Unthinking Social Science*.

8. This section is based on Nelson Maldonado Torres, "The Regressive Kernel of Orthodoxy. A Review of Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*," *Radical Philosophy Review*, v. 6, n. 1 (2003), Maldonado Torres, "Topology of Being."
9. See the chapter "The 'Thrilling Romance of Orthodoxy'," in Slavoj Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf: The Perverse Core of Christianity* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2003), 34-57. Žižek's views on orthodoxy are related to his conversations with John Milbank and other thinkers of the radical orthodoxy project. For a general view on the project of radical orthodoxy see John Milbank, Catherine Pickstock, and Graham Ward, eds., *Radical Orthodoxy: A New Theology* (London: Routledge, 1999).
10. In the United States it has been more patriotism, than Christianity itself, which has served as the bedrock for pragmatist liberals of leftist leanings like Richard Rorty and Cornel West. See particularly Richard Rorty, *Achieving Our Country: Leftist Thought in Twentieth-Century America* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998), Cornel West, *The American Evasion of Philosophy: A Genealogy of Pragmatism* (Madison, Wisc.: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1989). I critically analyze these trends in "Toward a Critique of Continental Reason" (forthcoming in *Companion to African-American Studies*, Blackwell, 2004).
11. See, especially, Slavoj Žižek, *The Fragile Absolute or, Why is the Christian Legacy Worth Fighting for?* (London: Verso, 2000), and Slavoj Žižek, "A Leftist Plea for 'Eurocentrism'," *Critical Inquiry*, n. 24 (1998).
12. Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 6. This thesis complements ideas that Žižek had already explored in "The Politics of Truth, or Alain Badiou as Reader of Paul," *The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology* (London: Verso, 1999), 127-70.
13. Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 33.
14. Žižek writes "[T]rue monotheists are tolerant: for them, others are not objects of hatred, but simply people who, although they are not enlightened by the true belief, should nonetheless be respected, sin-

- ce they are not inherently evil” (Žižek, *The Puppet and the Dwarf*, 27).
15. Žižek’s double standard concerning his critique of the “Orient” and the soft treatments of figures like Hegel become clear in reflections on Zen Buddhism in *The Puppet and the Dwarf* and his defense of Hegel in Slavoj Žižek, “I Plead Guilty—But Where is the Judgment?,” *Nepantla: Views from South*, n. 3 (2002). See also William D. Hart’s critical engagements with Žižek in William D. Hart, “Slavoj Žižek and the Imperial/Colonial Model of Religion,” *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 3, n. 3 (2002). See also Hart’s rejoinder in William D. Hart, “Can a Judgment be Read? A Response to Žižek,” *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 4, n. 1 (2003).
 16. Portions of this analysis are forthcoming in the newsletter of the Center for Latino Policy Research at the University of California, Berkeley.
 17. See Wallerstein, “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies.”
 18. David Montejano, “Patriotic Reading for Anglo-Saxon Protestants.” Forthcoming in *The Texas Observer*.
 19. Wallerstein, “The Unintended Consequences of Cold War Area Studies,” 227.
 20. Vijay Prashad, “Confronting the Evangelical Imperialists,” *Counterpunch* (consulted on September 15, 2004), 2003.
 21. I owe the idea of decolonial studies to my colleague Laura Pérez. For reflections on transmodernity see Enrique Dussel, “Modernity, Eurocentrism, and Trans-Modernity: In Dialogue with Charles Taylor,” in *The Underside of Modernity: Apel, Ricoeur, Rorty, Taylor, and the Philosophy of Liberation*, ed. Eduardo Mendieta (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities, 1996), Enrique Dussel, “World System and ‘Trans’-Modernity,” *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 3, n. 2 (2002).
 22. See Gloria Anzaldúa, *Borderlands — La Frontera: The New Mestiza* (San Francisco: Aunt Lute Books, 1991).
 23. Ramón Grosfoguel used this term in the call for papers for the conference Latin@s in the World-System at UC-Berkeley (April 21-3, 2004).

24. Figuring out the meaning and possibilities of the decolonization of the United States is one of the main topics in the forthcoming anthology, *Latin@s in the World System*, ed. Ramón Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres, and José David Saldívar. The anthology is based on a conference with the same title that took place at the University of California, Berkeley on April 21-3, 2004.
25. A previous less extensive version of this part appears in Maldonado Torres, "From Vietnam to Afghanistan, or Searching for Utopia in the Midst of War."
26. Nelson Maldonado Torres, "Post-Imperial Reflections on Crisis, Knowledge, and Utopia: Transgresstopic Critical Hermeneutics and the 'Death of European Man'," *Review: A Journal of the Fernand Braudel Center for the Study of Economies, Historical Systems, and Civilizations*, v. 25, n. 3 (2002).
27. See Paget Henry, *Caliban's Reason*, 136. Henry's discussion is based on a paper that Wynter delivered at Wellesley College: "After the New Class: James, *les damnés* and the Autonomy of Human Cognition" (April 19-21, 1991).
28. I follow Walter D. Mignolo in giving the adjective "an-other" both the sense of disruption from the genealogy of European thought and the opening to a diversity of views that emerge from the perspectives of histories marked by the colonial experience. The difference between what Mignolo refers to as "an-other paradigm" and a genealogy of critical movements and thought like the one proposed by Watts is evinced in that while for Watts the political thinking of the Zapatista movement is explained by tracing it back to Paris, Mignolo interprets it in the context of similar uprisings by colonized peoples, like those of many indigenous movements in South America and other struggles in Africa, the United States, and elsewhere. Mignolo does not argue that the Zapatista uprising is not related to Paris in any way. His point is rather that the coordinates of the movement are best explained in relation to struggles that do not assume Paris as their center. See Walter D. Mignolo "Prefacio a la edición castellana. Un 'Paradigma Otro': Colonialidad Global, Pensamiento Fronterizo y Cosmopolitanismo Crítico" (Preface to the Spanish

edition. "An-other paradigm:" global coloniality, border thinking, and critical cosmopolitanism), *Historias Locales/Diseños Globales: Colonialidad, Conocimientos Subalternos y Pensamiento Fronterizo*, trans. Juan María Madariaga y Cristina Vega Solís (Madrid: Ediciones Akal, 2003), 22. For a more comprehensive analysis of the Zapatista movement see Walter Mignolo "The Zapatista's Theoretical Revolution: Its Historical, Ethical, and Political Consequences," *Review*, v. 25, n. 3 (2002): 245-75. For an expanded exposition of some of the main arguments in these essays see Walter Mignolo, *Local Histories/Global Designs: Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges, and Border Thinking* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).

29. Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth*, 311-12, 316.
30. The following exposition is based on the fourth chapter of my doctoral dissertation entitled "Recognition from Below: The Meaning of the Cry and the Gift of the Self in the Struggle for Recognition." See Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "Thinking from the Limits of Being: Lévinas, Fanon, Dussel and the Cry of Ethical Revolt," Ph.D. Diss., Brown University, May 2002, 155-213. A brief version of the argument appears in Nelson Maldonado-Torres, "The Cry of the Self as a Call from the Other: The Paradoxical Loving Subjectivity of Frantz Fanon," *Listening: Journal of Religion and Culture*, v. 36, n. 1 (2001): 46-60.
31. See Emile Benveniste, "Gift and Exchange in the Indo-European Vocabulary," In *The Logic of the Gift: Toward an Ethic of Generosity*, edited by Alan D. Schrift, translated by Mary Elisabeth Meek (New York: Routledge, 1997), 33-42.
32. For an elegant and creative exposition and analysis of the ethics of reciprocity see Romand Coles, *Rethinking Generosity: Critical Theory and the Politics of Caritas* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1997). For a development of these ideas in connection with the work of feminists of colour see Romand Coles "Contesting Cosmopolitan Currencies: The Nepantlist Rose in the Cross(ing) of the Present," *Nepantla: Views from South*, v. 4, n. 1 (2003), 5-40.

Important in this regard is also Chela Sandoval, *Methodology of the Oppressed*.

33. Immanuel Wallerstein, "Neither Patriotism nor Cosmopolitanism," in *For Love of Country: Debating the Limits of Patriotism*, ed. Joshua Cohen (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).



Identity and Representation
in the Age of Hegemony

La question de l'Autre en temps d'hégémonie

Nelson Vallejo-Gomez

*Au lieu donc de l'effacer, la démocratie dévoile
la dimension de l'Autre dans l'expérience de la vie.*

CLAUDE LEFORT

Le bon sens pratique devrait toujours prévaloir dès que l'on pose la question de l'Autre. Car à l'évidence, il y a interdépendance les uns aux autres. Il n'est guère nécessaire de présupposer dans ce questionnement un lien naturel de sociabilité préexistant ou une certitude subjective absolue, sauf à passer en revue des paradoxes et des jeux dialectiques. Dès lors, l'expérience de l'Autre est là, au jour le jour, et pour ainsi dire "sous la main". C'est une donnée de fait qu'un être raisonnable, poli et discret saisit d'emblée. Il l'intègre comme une chose immédiate, inexplicable et inintelligible, qu'il s'agisse de ses proches dans l'ordre des sentiments ou du prochain dans l'ordre du droit, de la morale et de l'éthique. Le passage de l'Un à l'Autre n'est pas naturel. Mais le pivotement de la double identité ou unité complexe du moi comme pouvant être simultanément, par la faculté de l'imagination, identique et différent, un et multiple, ne l'est pas davantage. Nous ne manquerons pas de le souligner tout

au long de ces aperçus pour retenir la leçon d'un lien juridique naturel dans le rapport à l'Autre et rappeler l'humanisme juridique dans l'héritage de la Latinité.

Il n'en reste pas moins que nous ne sommes pas toujours des êtres raisonnables, polis et discrets. Loin s'en faut. La difficulté est alors de revisiter, en temps d'hégémonie, les conditions de possibilité de l'expérience de l'Autre, et derechef du Moi. Notre objectif est de pointer l'urgence, pour la géopolitique, d'intégrer ce questionnement comme une donnée essentielle de dignité dans les relations internationales et dans la recherche des solutions justes pour les guerres en cours. Les questions posées par les grands philosophes demeurent en filigrane: comment, dans tel objet à posséder et consommer, déceler avant toute pulsion autophage de la *subjectivité absente*? Comment percevoir dans tel corps sous la mire d'une mitrailleuse la présence d'une conscience, d'un *alter ego*, d'un Autre que moi, en tant que tel et non pas seulement relatif à moi et à ma volonté de puissance déchaînée? Qu'en est-il de l'évidente étrangeté de l'Autre dans les rapports de force qui n'ont rien à voir avec un "job" de mercenaire? Comment résoudre le solipsisme théorique ou métaphysique — qui affirme une solitude irréductible de ma conscience — et comment tenir compte du solipsisme pratique nécessaire à l'identification de toute prise de conscience?

Les différentes formulations de la question de l'Autre nourrissent en Occident un corpus de Platon à Levinas, en passant par Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Fichte, Husserl, Heidegger et j'en passe, poètes et visionnaires. La question dessine aussitôt sur la scène du discours qui nous occupe une

triade fondamentale qu'il convient toujours de repenser dans les relations intersubjectives et, surtout, dans les relations internationales: la triade Droit/Liberté/Autruï. Elle met aussi en jeu le statut de la conscience, la subjectivité et la relation à l'Autre, le passage de l'intersubjectivité passionnelle à la relation morale et la porte étroite qui mène du proche au prochain, et qui fait comprendre pourquoi il sera toujours très difficile de renier les siens proches pour aimer son prochain, c'est-à-dire son lointain. Il nous faudra être également attentifs à l'apparition en nous-mêmes d'une sorte d'illumination, qui nous donne à saisir une conscience en kaléidoscope et dans laquelle tenir le cap entre deux précipices — l'objectivation réifiant et la subjectivité folle — est toujours un pari risqué, une question de prudence, de sérénité et de dignité.

Si, en temps d'hégémonie, la question de l'Autre mérite d'être reposée, c'est qu'à travers ce questionnement émerge la problématique de la liberté, tant du point de vue transcendantal que du point de vue concret, pratique et derechef, juridique. C'est aussi qu'à la réponse donnée l'on saura évaluer la place réservée au dialogue émulateur avec celui qui n'est pas moi, mesurer l'ouverture de la conscience ou le pivotement de mentalité dont on est capable pour aborder la différence culturelle, identifier le rôle de la *finalité* comme marque indéniable de rationalité ou *critère d'humanité* dans le rapport à Autruï. Car, ce qui relie les personnes, en tant que fondement, ne relève pas de réseaux pipelines, de flux financiers ou d'Internet. Et faire l'expérience d'Autruï, en avoir le sentiment, met en évidence que l'Autre autant que moi existe *comme fin en soi* et non seulement *comme moyen*.

L'apport décisif de la théorie kantienne, formulée en 1785, reprenant une tradition latine et humaniste forgée depuis l'Antiquité sur la voie greco-romaine et judéo-chrétienne, c'est l'idée que la moralité ne peut se fonder sur un sentiment (égoïste ou altruiste) mais sur la forme même de la loi pratique, à savoir: "*Agis de telle sorte que tu traites l'humanité aussi bien dans ta personne que dans la personne de tout autre toujours en même temps comme une fin, et jamais simplement comme un moyen.*"¹ Le fondement ou le présupposé transcendantal de cette loi pratique (impératif catégorique possible ou impératif catégorique pratique): c'est que l'on se suppose soi-même une nature raisonnable qui possède une valeur comme fin en soi et que l'on est capable de faire également la différence qualitative entre les êtres naturels et les êtres raisonnables. Les premiers sont des choses dépourvues de raison et n'ayant qu'une valeur relative en tant que moyens; les deuxièmes sont des personnes qui ont un caractère dont la valeur est de se donner à soi-même une valeur supérieure à soi-même, c'est-à-dire pourvue d'une volonté capable de légiférer de manière universelle, c'est-à-dire, comme étant en même temps législatrice et au demeurant comme soumise à la loi précisément parce que pouvant légiférer. Dans cette *relation juridique*, où la volonté est à la fois agent et patient (déterminante et déterminée par rapport à la loi) émerge la dyade altérité/identité qui fait du moi une *Personne*. Autant dire que cette loi pratique subit des interprétations assez curieuses, y compris au sein même des gouvernements qui se réclament de la démocratie et des droits de l'homme, et qui corrompent la puissance d'une administration en légiférant sur la base

d'une jurisprudence partisane pétrolière, cocaïnière et capitaliste. L'idée de *Personne* — ce qui est au sens latin à la fois quelqu'un et l'absence de quelqu'un — montre bien l'ambiguïté du *Je moral* ou l'Unité complexe de cette dyade: identité dans la loi universelle (aucun n'est personne) et altérité par l'auto-nomie à laquelle répond cette loi (chacun est une personne). La loi morale en moi me constitue comme personne ou sujet de la moralité en tant qu'elle ne m'est pas imposée de l'extérieur, mais précisément en tant que je suis capable de me la donner à moi-même, ce qui s'appelle justement l'auto (soi-même) — nomie (nomos, la loi) de la personne.

L'humanisme juridique ou les héritages de la latinité

De même que la morale ne peut se fonder sur un sentiment, une affection ou un intérêt partisan, les tenants d'une géopolitique multipolaire, fidèles à cet héritage de la Latinité, s'invitent mutuellement à faire de la loi une force et à résister à la tentation de la volonté de puissance qui voudrait faire de la force le fondement de la loi. Cette volonté corrompue ouvre la boîte de Pandore, au profit des marchands de la mort et des seigneurs de la guerre. Une loi, dont le fondement est l'épée et non pas la balance, est un trou noir, parce qu'elle est en réalité une surenchère insatiable de puissance et source constante de conflits et de vengeances. Une force néo-colonialiste, alliant chars et missiles et érigée en législateur tout puissant, tantôt provoque, en retour, une révolution avec déclaration universelle sur les grandes valeurs, tantôt nourrit une guérilla larvée négociant à l'usure le

chaos pour satisfaire de micro-pouvoirs, jouant sur tous les tableaux et minant les fondements de tous les signes et symboles.

C'est aussi ce même héritage de Latinité qui avait inspiré Henri Dunant, touché en son humanité par l'horreur dantesque de l'agonie des milliers de blessés de la bataille de Solferino, à susciter en 1864 la création d'un emblème qui garantirait l'accès aux blessés de guerre, sans distinction d'uniforme ni bannière. Cet élan humaniste donna naissance à la Croix-Rouge. L'impératif catégorique pratique ou loi morale pratique de la Convention de 1864, après l'indicible des atrocités nazies durant la seconde guerre mondiale, se retrouve dans les Conventions de Genève adoptées en août 1949 par 64 pays et complétées en 1977 par deux protocoles relatifs au renforcement de la protection des victimes des conflits internationaux et à la définition de "*conflits armés non internationaux*". Bien que reposant, à l'origine, sur le principe de l'adhésion volontaire des Etats, ces quatre Conventions ont été reconnues par l'ONU depuis 1980 comme faisant partie du Droit International Coutumier. C'est aujourd'hui l'élément clef du Droit International Humanitaire (DIH). La torture, à laquelle on a récemment ajouté de la pornographie et de l'Internet — photos numériques et vidéo, qui témoigne chez les tortionnaires de bêtise et de frivolité, c'est-à-dire, d'absence de pensée et de vie spirituelle, est la pierre angulaire où émerge à nouveau la loi morale pratique de l'humanisme latin. Ces Conventions la prohibent absolument. Cette interdiction figure dans la Déclaration universelle des droits de l'homme adoptée par l'ONU en 1948, reprenant l'esprit de celle adoptée en 1789 à Paris

par la Convention révolutionnaire. De plus “*Aucune circonstance exceptionnelle ne peut être invoquée comme justification de la torture*”, précise de surcroît une convention internationale de 1984 (ratifiée par une centaine d’Etats). Quitte à se répéter, tellement l’homme est un animal oublieux, cette interdiction a également fait l’objet de conventions régionales et figure dans les législations internes, y compris celles des Etats-Unis d’Amérique. Les infractions graves aux Conventions de Genève sont des crimes de guerre qui restent souvent, hélas, impunis, parce que soumis à des “raisons d’Etat”. L’horreur nazie donnera lieu à la définition de deux autres catégories de crimes, tellement l’assassin peut s’avérer aussi un être plein d’imagination. Celle des crimes contre l’humanité figure dans le statut du tribunal de Nuremberg du 8 août 1945, reconnue l’année suivante par l’ONU comme un élément de Droit International. Le crime de génocide est défini dans une convention de décembre 1948, qui appelle à la création d’une instance internationale pour le réprimer. Il faudra attendre exactement un demi-siècle, la fin de la guerre froide, pour qu’une telle instance soit créée par le traité de Rome de 1998: la Cour Pénale Internationale (CPI). Bien évidemment, il reste encore quelques grands pays qui trouvent leur intérêt à ne pas y adhérer!

La question kaléidoscope et la phénoménologie de la domination

Pour un esprit nourri à la dialectique classique et aux sources des *Lumières*, il va presque sans dire que le droit est

injuste sans liberté, et qu'il est vide ou simple *habeas corpus* en l'absence d'Autrui. Cependant, ces concepts doivent être réfléchis à la lumière et dans le fracas du contemporain, car ils ne se voient ni ne s'entendent de la même façon qu'au temps jadis. Par exemple, la pétro-guerre entreprise çà et là par l'empire mou nécessite, en vue d'une honnête compréhension ou d'un équilibre différentiel des concepts, une critique de la raison pure, une théorie du droit et une théorie de la morale. Car l'on y galvaude les concepts de "justice", "liberté", "émancipation" et j'en passe. Les pétro et narco-guerres sont bien là: comme pour rappeler l'urgence de repenser la question de l'Autre à l'aune de la morale et du droit, voire du *droit moral* ou du *droit humanitaire*. Aussi, y a-t-il une belle leçon à tirer du contemporain géopolitique pour tous ceux qui sont ou non directement branchés sur les pipelines ou sur le profit des seringues. Ils ont l'obligation morale de dire *j'accuse* et de répondre à la question qui nous occupe par la dignité simple en tout un chacun et par la conviction saine que, par-delà les croyances et convictions des uns et des autres, une *conscience universelle* sur l'essentielle humanité se fait vraiment jour. C'est l'espérance de voir s'accroître un processus juridique comparatif entre les peuples, les nations et surtout entre les Etats, qui donne vie et sens à l'altérité et à la diversité et que l'on retrouverait sur une *Charte universelle du droit humanitaire*. Une Charte d'un genre nouveau, qui ne soit pas érigée pour le temps de guerre ou pour le temps de paix qui prépare la guerre, mais pour civiliser la planète et pour sortir l'humanité de son âge de fer planétaire, comme dirait Edgar Morin.²

À la manière d'un kaléidoscope, la question de l'Autre en temps d'hégémonie fait aussi émerger la problématique

de l'hégémonisme totalitaire comme une sorte de nouvelle conséquence nécessaire du déploiement de la technique, à l'ère d'Internet et du terrorisme mondialisé. Nul doute qu'il conviendrait de se livrer à une sorte de phénoménologie de la domination, voire du néo-colonialisme pétrolier pour comprendre comment l'hégémonie totalitaire est au déploiement du terrorisme contemporain ce que l'Etat totalitaire est au déploiement de la technique dans la critique que l'on faisait autrefois de la modernité. La question du statut de la conscience s'y trouve en filigrane, notamment dans la formulation cartésienne d'un sujet qui, fort de sa propre certitude, réifie la nature pour la coloniser, en devenant *comme maître et possesseur*. Cette volonté du sujet absolu et colonisateur de la nature en sa totalité s'accompagne inévitablement de violence et de terreur. Autant dire que lorsque l'on retrouve un tel paradigme mental dans les décisions prises par ceux qui ont en charge les affaires du monde, guerre et paix n'ont plus de sens, et toute indignation morale est ici soupçonnée de trahison ou de faiblesse. En réalité, *the time is money*. Les affaires se suivent et se ressemblent. Les Seigneurs de la guerre qui s'accaparent les pouvoirs de domination sont les sinistres personnages toujours présents, quoique plus au moins dissimulés, d'une époque où il s'agit avant tout d'organiser l'exploitation technique de sources énergétiques, pétrole et nucléaire en particulier; car lorsque la volonté d'exploitation et de maîtrise de ces sources devient le principe de la politique internationale, quand tout doit être subordonné aux efforts pour garantir l'omnipotence de l'argent et la sûreté des coffres forts dans les paradis fiscaux, il faut mettre en place et équiper des hommes

affectés au travail de guerre, des hommes qui ont pouvoir de décision et qui surveillent tous les secteurs où la consommation épuisante est à assurer et à pourvoir, des hommes pris dans l’engrenage de la terreur et de l’horreur, des hommes pour l’usure et la mort des hommes eux-mêmes. Le terrorisme est la nouvelle “guerre mondiale” et son aspect totalitaire est la conséquence de l’abandon où se trouvent les questions de l’Autre, du droit et de la liberté. L’époque du capitalisme internetisé et des flux financiers répudie les questions essentielles. Certes, des considérations inactuelles montreraient que nous-autres contemporains, nous n’avons pas le monopole de la frivolité, mais nul n’est sensé ignorer l’inédit d’une époque caractérisée par une appropriation instantanée de la multiplicité des temporalités, qui mine les saisons et qui mène à la mort du temps. Il est urgent de réfléchir sur le processus d’autophagie conduit par un capitalisme internetisé qui s’insinue dans toutes les modalités de l’être, vidant celui-ci de sa substance et grossissant toujours à la manière de la grenouille qui se voulait plus grosse que le bœuf. Le monde appelle d’urgence des mécanismes de régulation basés sur les questions essentielles et guidés par une morale pratique possible. Au lieu de quoi, on s’ingénue à poursuivre la complication des mécanismes technocratiques et bureaucratiques, où Monsieur l’Expert règne en maître et valet du Capitalisme autophage.

Le double solipsisme et la conscience kaléidoscope

Les philosophes emploient une double approche dans le traitement de la question de l’Autre. D’un côté, l’approche

dite théorique de la démarche cartésienne, dans laquelle l'accès à l'Autre — à une autre conscience — s'opère à travers la certitude de ma propre existence comme chose pensante, comme intériorité validée in extremis grâce aux chiquenaudes instantanées d'un *deus ex machina* qui m'assure une création continue. Dès lors, sûr de moi et bien au chaud dans cette forteresse intérieure, j'aborde sans inquiétude métaphysique majeure la question de savoir si ces "chapeaux" qui passent sous ma fenêtre sont bel et bien les signes distinctifs de quelque sujet ou humanité, ayant en définitive le même destin ultime de créature divine que moi. L'Autre m'apparaît alors comme extériorité et comme incertitude. Cependant, faire de l'intériorité le point de départ de la question de l'Autre rend inconcevable une autre conscience que la sienne, et toute conception de soi, de la personnalité et du sujet s'avère *solipsiste*, autrement dit, il n'y aurait pour seul réalité que le sujet pensant, au sens où il y aurait impossibilité de rendre compte rationnellement de l'expérience d'un Autre que moi.

Pour sortir de l'impasse confortable du solipsisme, il faut montrer que le sujet n'est pas réellement à lui-même son point de départ, autrement dit que le sujet ne se constitue que dans et par son rapport à l'Autre. La psychogénèse et la phénoménologie s'accordent pour souligner que l'égoïsme infantin et la corporéité pré-communicationnelle ne procèdent pas d'une saisie distincte du moi, mais de ce que, s'ignorant comme moi, le nourrisson ne perçoit que lui dans ce qui l'entoure. Il y a donc en chacun de nous un petit moi ou petit bébé qui est "*d'autant plus impérieux qu'il ignore ses propres limites*", comme dirait Merleau-Ponty.³ Hélas,

partout la présence insinuante de la diversité, de la multiplicité, du froid, de la soif, de l'indifférence, bref, de l'Autre, se charge de faire grandir ce petit bébé et de le mettre à sa place.

Une réfutation radicale du solipsisme théorique est d'inscrire, au cœur même de la subjectivité, l'altérité, au moyen d'une redéfinition de la conscience en soi ou dans un rapport au corps. Il convient alors de montrer que l'émergence de la conscience de soi est contemporaine de — et corrélée à — la reconnaissance de l'Autre. C'est le sens de l'entreprise fichtéenne que de déduire a priori la nécessité de l'existence d'autres consciences que la mienne, dès que la mienne se pose. Tirant toutes les conséquences de la leçon cartésienne, d'après laquelle l'expérimentation de l'Autre n'est jamais concluante, suffisante peut-être, nécessaire jamais, Fichte établit l'existence d'Autrui a priori, c'est-à-dire sans recourir à l'expérience que nous pouvons avoir des autres, mais en déduisant leur existence à titre de condition nécessaire de la conscience de soi. C'est la question de l'*intersubjectivité* qui se fait jour, à travers celle de mon auto-détermination, mais aussi avec celle très ancienne de ma finitude et celle plus récente de ma propre liberté. Le deuxième théorème du *Fondement du droit naturel*, selon Fichte, dit: "*L'être raisonnable, fini, ne peut pas s'attribuer à lui-même une causalité libre dans le monde sensible sans l'attribuer aussi à d'autres, par conséquent sans admettre aussi d'autres êtres raisonnables finis hors de lui.*"⁴ La réponse de Fichte à la question de l'Autre fait de moi et de l'Autre les deux caractères constitutifs de toute prise de conscience. Cette relation d'intersubjectivité est, pour

Fichte, un fondement du droit naturel: c'est une relation juridique pratique entre deux auto-nomies, entre deux moi ayant chacun une conscience de soi, entre deux finitudes et entre deux libertés. Y émerge aussitôt la problématique d'une liberté paradoxale. Comment limiter la liberté sans l'annuler? La solution est que la limitation elle-même ne soit pas comprise comme empêchement ou comme entrave à la libre causalité du moi, mais comme une *provocation* ou comme un *appel* à l'éveil et à l'action de cette libre causalité. Telle est la définition moderne de la liberté, que l'on peut rapprocher du troisième principe pratique de la volonté d'après Kant, à savoir: "*l'Idée de la volonté de tout être raisonnable comme volonté légiférant de manière universelle.*" Le propre de la législation universelle ou législation pratique de la volonté réside ici, toujours à la manière kantienne, dans le fait que la volonté n'est pas purement et simplement soumise à la loi, mais qu'elle lui "*est soumise de telle manière qu'il faut la considérer en même temps comme législatrice et au demeurant comme n'étant soumise à la loi (dont elle peut se tenir elle-même pour l'auteur) que précisément pour cette raison*".⁵ La synthèse de deux caractères (moi/liberté et Autre/limitation) ou l'illumination de ce que j'ai appelé plus haut une *conscience kaléidoscope* n'est possible que si l'Autre-objet est lui-même un appel à la liberté du sujet, une sorte d'autodétermination du sujet à l'autodétermination. Dans la grande tradition humaniste des *Lumières*, Fichte cisèle cette phrase riche de sens pour notre propos: "*L'Appel est la matière de l'action causale, et une causalité libre de l'être raisonnable, à quoi il invite, est son but final.*"⁶ Dès lors, l'on peut constater que l'objet de la li-

berté, l'Autre donc, n'est pas donné extérieurement ni présentement — puisque la spontanéité mienne est simultanément intérieure — mais comme à venir, ou comme destination. Réinscrivant l'être dans le temps, cela fera dire à Husserl, après Fichte, que notre esprit est doté d'une sorte d'*ouverture* de conscience, au sens matériel et temporel de toute ouverture, c'est-à-dire "*une aperception assimilante*" qui n'est pas un raisonnement par analogie, ni un acte de pensée immanent ou transcendantal, mais une certaine *réduction phénoménologique* datable ou repérable à chaque fois, puisque contenant une "*intentionnalité qui renvoie à une 'création première où l'objet d'un sens analogue s'est constitué pour la première fois*". En fin de compte, conclue Husserl, nous en arrivons à une "*distinction radicale*" entre aperceptions des objets et "*aperceptions qui apparaissent avec le sens d'alter-ego*".⁷ Bien évidemment, on subodore que cette sorte d'ouverture d'esprit fait apparaître une connivence intersubjective, étant donné que seul peut m'appeler ainsi à la liberté, ou seul peut m'interpeller en altérité un être qui me sait capable de répondre à son appel. Autrement dit, seul un sujet peut avoir ainsi le concept de l'altérité comme d'un Autre sujet. Kant aurait ajouté au sujet l'adjectif moderne et progressiste de *raisonnable*, Nietzsche ou Cioran auraient éclaté de rire devant tant de bonne volonté sous laquelle se masque souvent l'irraisonnable. Il n'en demeure pas moins que la subjectivité nécessite une reconnaissance réciproque des libertés, comme condition de possibilité de cette sorte de subjectivité. A la manière de l'humanisme latin, Fichte inscrit les formules célèbres selon lesquelles "*l'homme ne devient homme que*

parmi les hommes” et surtout celle-ci: “pas de Toi, pas de Moi, pas de Moi pas de Toi”. C’est aussi parmi les hommes, hélas, que l’on éprouve tout l’écœurement du soi et que l’on saisit tout embrouillement du Toi et Moi. Heureusement il y a partout et nulle part un bon dieu pour rachat de l’un et pour repos de l’Autre.

Le même souci fichtéen de la reconnaissance des consciences comme condition à l’expression de la subjectivité raisonnable et à la finalité d’être humain inspire Hegel à la même époque qui montre dans sa *Phénoménologie de l’esprit* que “la conscience de soi est en soi et pour soi en ce que, et par le fait qu’elle est en soi et pour soi pour un autre; c’est-à-dire qu’elle n’est qu’en tant que quelques chose de reconnu”.⁸

Reste que si le solipsisme théorique peut être ainsi réfuté, le solipsisme pratique demeure en ce que tout un chacun s’éprouve sujet unique dans l’expérience du doute, de la décision, du langage et de la peur, notamment devant le mourir. Merleau-Ponty disait que même si je suis dépassé de tous côtés par mes propres actes, noyé dans la généralité, “je suis cependant celui par qui ils sont vécus”.⁹ J’aime beaucoup rappeler dans ces jeux subjectifs la contre ruse cartésienne de la *Méditation seconde*, à caractère existentialiste avant-coureur, où figure déjà une prise de conscience de l’irréductibilité du moi-sujet. Descartes, à propos du “dieu trompeur” ou malin géni très rusé qui emploie toute son industrie à le tromper toujours et à argumenter l’inexistence du sujet, renverse l’argumentaire et trouve cette formule géniale: “Il n’y a donc point de doute que je suis, s’il me trompe; et qu’il me trompe tant qu’il voudra, il ne saurait jamais

faire que ne je sois rien, tant que je penserai être quelque chose.”¹⁰ Bien entendu, ce simple constat existentiel ne suffit pas à un grand esprit et quelques lignes plus loin, Descartes repose tout le programme du fondement cognitif: “*Mais je ne connais pas encore ce que je suis...*” On y est toujours, comme depuis la naissance de la nuit des temps.

L’altérité comme relation juridique pratique

Je garderai pour la question de l’Autre en temps d’hégémonie les leçons rappelée ici de Kant, de Fichte et de Hegel, relatives à la dynamique du rapport à l’Autre. Il s’agit d’une relation de pluralité que l’on pourrait contractualiser. Deux idées fondamentales supportent la solution de Fichte à la question de l’Autre: l’idée que l’intersubjectivité est une condition nécessaire et suffisante à la subjectivité et l’idée que l’intersubjectivité passe par l’établissement d’un *lien d’ordre pratique* et pas seulement d’ordre théorique avec l’Autre (même dispositif que pour la loi morale pratique chez Kant). C’est évidemment une pétition de principe ou une déduction a priori de la nécessité du rapport avec une autre conscience, à partir de la définition de l’expérience de soi comme “*libre causalité finie*”. La reprise en compte de la finitude humaine et de la limitation de ma liberté, la reconnaissance des consciences, la libre identification réciproque, cela représente une dimension pratique d’ordre de la régulation et une relation juridique naturelle nécessaire au questionnement de l’Autre. De là émerge le concept de droit naturel, compris dans sa dimension négative comme limitation de ma liberté par la liberté de l’Autre, comme une sorte

de signature propre à chacun de nous, comme une carte psychogénétique.

Au-delà de la relation juridique pratique au sein de l'altérité, demeure en suspens la question de savoir quelle serait, en temps d'hégémonie, l'articulation entre la libre causalité réciproque et les situations de domination ou d'assujettissement des consciences. L'on pourrait s'inspirer de deux postures pour l'esquisse d'une réponse: celle de l'inclusion de la conscience de l'Autre dans ma propre conscience à travers la célèbre dialectique hégélienne du désir de reconnaissance ou dialectique du maître et de l'esclave, et celle de l'ouverture de ma conscience à l'Autre à travers le questionnement éthique de ma propre conscience, dans un face-à-face où le *visage d'autrui* est un *appel à ma propre responsabilité* (l'image du *visage d'autrui* est d'Emmanuel Levinas¹¹).

Hegel explique l'inclusion des consciences à travers la *structure multiple* de la reconnaissance ou les *différentes formes* de conscience en tant que dialectique du désir. Tandis que la conscience est concentrée sur son objet, la conscience de soi se prend elle-même pour objet. Il s'y produit un double processus d'assimilation et de négation de l'objet. Le désir — en tant que conscience de soi — ne trouve satisfaction à nier l'objet que si celui-ci résiste. Or, résister de façon dynamique, ingénieuse et innovante est le propre d'un sujet raisonnable. Il apparaît en conséquence que la conscience de soi est la première figure de la reconnaissance en tant que lutte mutuelle d'auto-reconnaissance. De ce fait, ce n'est pas tant connaître l'Autre ou me connaître moi dont il s'agit, au sens cartésien, mais élucider la façon dont j'entre

dans un rapport de désir et de reconnaissance d'être même avec l'Autre. Avant d'être quelque chose, le désir doit être constitué comme tel. Il est d'abord "*désir du désir*" (l'image est d'Alexandre Kojève¹²), c'est-à-dire désir d'être reconnu comme tel et non pas comme quelque chose ou comme l'attribut de quelque chose. A l'évidence, dans le champ de l'extériorité et de la relation à l'Autre, nous désirons tous être reconnus d'abord comme une singularité. Le paradoxe est que ce désir veut être singulier dans et par le général. A l'évidence aussi, la dialectique hégélienne du maître et de l'esclave développe du ressentiment et de la haine pour l'Autre, car la reconnaissance n'y est pas un don généreux ou le simple constat de la dignité propre à tout être humain, mais une lutte à mort. Régler le désir de soi et des Autres ou la dynamique de l'ouverture à l'Autre sur la reconnaissance ou l'attente d'une prime en retour mène à une surenchère capitaliste. En termes guerriers cela se traduit par: qui n'est pas avec moi est contre moi. Je plaide ici pour la simple reconnaissance de la dignité de l'Autre de façon généreuse et désintéressée. On peut aussitôt penser que toute "dignité" se mérite. Mais que suis-je et qui suis-je, moi, pour m'élever en juge de morale, refuser à l'Autre sa dignité propre et lui jeter la première pierre? Le rapport éthique à l'Autre n'est pas à l'évidence un rapport d'expertise.

Pour expérimenter l'Autre dans une *ouverture des consciences* et sans autre-phagie ou inclusion de la conscience de l'Autre dans l'unicité de la mienne, le concept husserlien d'*intentionnalité* permet de comprendre de façon phénoménologique, c'est-à-dire corporelle, et non plus théorique ou métaphysique, que la conscience est avant tout ouverture au

monde, à la corporéité de soi-même et de l'Autre. Dès lors, la condition de possibilité de l'expérience de l'Autre et de sa conscience différente de la mienne, c'est que ma conscience ne soit pas définie comme pure identité à soi, mais d'ores et déjà comme ouverture au monde. Le présupposé central de la réponse husserlienne à la question de l'Autre est dans le fait d'un double déplacement par rapport à l'opposition cartésienne de l'âme et du corps, c'est-à-dire de moi et de l'Autre: d'une part, Husserl introduit une sorte de corrélation étroite entre la conscience et le monde, entre ce qui pense et ce qui est pensé — Bergson disait à la même époque qu'entre le monde et moi, il n'y a pas une différence de nature mais de degré — parce que d'un côté la conscience n'existe que comme *conscience de quelque chose* — dans l'intention d'une projection vers —, et de l'autre, l'objet n'est tel que dans cette corrélation constitutive par la conscience qui opère la signification ou l'objectivation. D'autre part, cette corrélation conscience/monde est située dans le champs d'une réduction phénoménologique — c'est la célèbre épokhé husserlienne — qui consiste à suspendre le jugement sur l'existence du monde en tant que tel lors de cette corrélation. L'objet devient alors transcendant à la conscience — puisqu'il n'est pas moi on y évite le solipsisme théorique —, mais cette transcendance peut être dite immanente, puisque le sens de l'objet est conscient — donné par la corrélation monde/conscience.

L'approche pratique de la question de l'autre présente l'intérêt d'éviter le point de départ cartésien de la conscience isolée ou du moi souverain, en posant d'emblée le moi moral comme pris dans la double dimension égoïsme/al-

truisme, altérité/identité. Le problème n'est plus dès lors l'accès à l'Autre comme alter ego, puisque l'autre est posé d'emblée comme existant, mais *la construction d'un rapport à l'autre* entre notre double dimension et notre humanité commune. Plus qu'une *construction* mentale, il en irait donc comme d'un *processus éducatif* pour comprendre que l'Autre n'est pas un objet dont on serait *maître et possesseur*.

Disons pour conclure que la réponse à la question de l'Autre en temps d'hégémonie, qu'elle s'appuie sur une expérience altruiste ou sur une relation morale entre l'humanité propre à chacun de nous, ne peut en aucun cas faire l'économie d'une orientation de l'action de tout être conscient en vue d'un intérêt qui se doit aussi d'intégrer l'intérêt général. Mais la question renvoie à celle de savoir ce qui donc au fond unit l'homme à l'homme.

Notes

1. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). *Métaphysique des mœurs (1785)*, — *Deuxième section*. Trad. V. Delbos. Paris, Ed. Vrin, 1980, p. 105
2. cf. Edgar Morin. *Pour sortir du XX siècle*. Paris, Ed. du Seuil, 1984.
3. Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1908-1961). *Les relations avec autrui chez l'enfant*. Cours de Sorbonne, Paris, 1953, p. 26.
4. J.-G. Fichte (1762-1814). *Fondement du droit naturel selon les principes de la doctrine de la sciences*. Trad. A. Renaut. Paris, PUF, Quadrige, 1998, p. 46-55.
5. Kant, *idem*.
6. Fichte, *idem*.
7. Edmond Husserl (1859-1938). *Méditations cartésiennes*. Trad. par Mlle. Peiffer et M. Levinas. Paris, Ed. J. Vrin, 1980, p. 93-5.

8. G.W.F. Hegel (1770-1831). *La phénoménologie de l'esprit*. Trad. J. Hyppolite. Paris, Ed. Aubier, 1977, t. 1, de la *Conscience de soi*, p. 145 ssq.
9. Maurice Merleau-Ponty. *Phénoménologie de la perception*. Paris, Ed. Tel Gallimard, 1992, chap. IV, p. 398 ssq.
10. René Descartes (1596-1650). *Oeuvres et lettres*. Ed. La Pléiade. Paris, 1953, p. 275
11. Cf. Emmanuel Levinas (1905-1997). *Le Temps et l'Autre*. Paris, Ed. PUF, Quadrige, 1998, et *Humanisme de l'autre homme*. Paris, Ed. Fata Morgana, 1972.
12. Cf. Alexandre Kojève. *Introduction à la lecture de Hegel*. Paris, Ed. Gallimard. 1947.

Huntington's Fears: "Latinidad" in the Horizon of the Modern/Colonial World¹

Walter D. Mignolo

I. Huntington's Maps of Fear

Latinidad has a long history before entering with force into the everyday life of the US in the twentieth century, and disrupting the US national imaginary in which the State and the nation are equated with Anglicidad. Huntington's national identity-politics in his recent *Who Are We*² complements his previous global one. While in the *Clash of Civilizations?* (1993)³ Huntington drew the line between the West and the rest of the world to assert the identity of the West in the global distribution of civilization, in *Who Are We?* (2004), he placed the accent on the continental distribution of identities. Underneath Huntington's thesis and fears (or the exploitation of fear to defend a modern idea of Western Civilization and of the nation-state) there is a loud rumor that comes from the historical foundation of the modern/colonial world. The repressed rumor in the *Clash of Civilizations* comes from the final victory of Christians over the Moors in 1492 and the triumph of the Church—that is, of Latinidad. The sixteenth century was the century of consolidation of Christian Latinidad.

Although the reformation and the counter-reformation created a schism in the very center of the Church, Catholics and Protestants could not escape their common roots: the moment when, in the third century AD, and under Constantine, the Roman Empire and Christianity came together in an alliance that established the brass tacks for the future of Western Christians and capitalist empires since the sixteenth century (e.g., Spain, England, and the U.S.) as well as the Eastern Christian Empire, Russia, in which Moscow was declared the "Third Rome" at the beginning of the sixteenth century. Eastern Christianity fell at the margins of Latin Christianity. Clearly enough, in the map that Huntington reproduced in the first and short version of his thesis (Huntington, 1996*a*, p. 8) the dividing line was traced, without equivocation, from the western margins of Russia, through the western sector of Belarussia, Ukraine, and Romania, to the southeast, separating Croatia from Bosnia and Serbia. The line that begins in the northeast frontier of Russia ends significantly in Montenegro, leaving Greece in no-one's land, since Greece remains as the historical foundation of Western civilization. If the line was not clear enough for the distracted reader, Huntington wrote at the top of the map, and to the left and right of the line: "Western Christianity circa 1500," and to the right: "Orthodox Christianity and Islam." Western Christians, circa 1500 are, as I already suggested, co-terminus with Latinidad. From mid-seventeenth century onward, and above all with the concentration of capital in Holland and England, a reconfiguration of imperial/colonial domination world order took place and power shifted toward Protestant Christians and Anglicidad.

While the article published in *Foreign Affairs* had as a title “The Clash of Civilizations?” with a question mark, the book’s title was assertive: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. And while the map just described illustrated the article, in the book version maps of the world in 1920, the 1960s, and post-1990 took the place of the dividing line “circa 1500.” One can see now that the rumor of the disinheritance that will become “The Hispanic Challenge” (in the article published by Huntington in *Foreign Policy*, a month or so before the publication of *Who Are We?* following a strategy similar to the article and debate on *The Clash of Civilizations* advanced in *Foreign Affairs* in 1993, and the publication of the debate, by the same journal, in 1995), is already there, in the shade of the maps introduced at the beginning of the book: the Braseros Program started around 1920; “Hispanics” as the fifth leg of the ethno-racial pentagon (Hollinger, 1995—a book that appeared the same year as Huntington’s *The Clash...*), emerged in “the 1960s” when massive immigration from South America (and the Third World) into the US began, causing the end of the Braseros program. In the 1960s there also took place a massive immigration of Puerto Ricans when US made of Puerto Rico a “showcase of developing underdeveloped countries”⁴ and the project needed to re-locate thousands of Puerto Ricans in order to clean house when the investing visitors arrived. And finally “the post 1990” not only witnessed the end of the Soviet Union, but most definitively the increasing numbers of immigrants from South America and Central America, many of them running away from countries under dictatorial regimes (that started in Chile in 1973)

in conjunction with the advance of neo-liberalism in the South. Southern immigration was a consequence of political repression and growing economic marginalization parallel to the growing concentration of capital in the hands of Southern elites, both of which were direct consequences of US imperial designs. That is to say, one of the consequences of military, political, and economic invasion of the South by the US government and corporations, was what Huntington conceptualized as "the Hispanic Challenge." The "Hispanic Challenge," in other words, is a direct consequence of the "Anglo Violence."

II. The Way "we" Were

The coalition of Christianity with Anglicity had significant consequences (from the late seventeenth century onward) for the remaking of the world order, for the geo-politics of knowledge and for the future destiny of Latinity, in Europe. First of all, while England was taking over the economic and political dimensions in the legacies of the Spanish Empire, Germany was taking the intellectual lead in re-conceptualizing the world (e.g., Kant and Hegel geo-political imaginaries) and France saw the opportunity to take the lead of the Latin world in the south of Europe. "Latinidad" began to be displaced from the center of Christianity and equated with Catholicism, while Protestantism was linked with the changes from mercantile capitalism (mainly controlled by Spanish and Portuguese imperialisms and grounded in silver and gold) to free-trade capitalism

(mainly controlled by England and France and grounded in Caribbean plantations and African slave labor).

French intelligentsia, state officers, and the Church were in a privileged position to exploit and use “Latinidad.” The very notion of “Latinidad” as a secular and imperial identity-politics served France’s imperial designs well. In the first place, the separation of Church and State put France in a leading position *vis-à-vis* the ascending and competing imperial powers, England and Germany mainly. Secondly, the secularization of “Latinidad” allowed the French State to put itself in a leading position *vis-à-vis* previous and weak imperial powers (Spain, Portugal, and Italy—strong in its intellectual role, though less of an imperial power). And third, when French State politics, supported by its intelligentsia, promoted “Latinidad” in the ex-Spanish colonies in South America that had recently gained independence, it was because of the imperial conflict caused by the expansion of the U.S. toward the south, after buying Louisiana from Napoleon (in the 1800s) and prevailing in the war against Mexico in 1848.

Thus, “Latinidad” served France to place itself in the new imperial world order, in Europe, and in the Americas. By the end of the nineteenth century, “Latinidad” became more and more accepted by the self-colonized Hispanic American Creoles—and “Latin” America as the name of a sub-continent became indistinguishable from the political project of the Creole elite (land-owners and plantation managers in complicity with the State) in their efforts to build nation-states out of the Spanish and Portuguese colonial ruins without realizing the differences between the consoli-

dation of nation-states in imperial countries (France, Germany, England) and would-be imperial countries with a clear vision of its future (U.S.), and the consolidation of "dependent" countries, like those of "Latin" America, living under the spell of their recent "independence." The independence of "Latin" American countries in the nineteenth century was a political mirage: France was leading the imaginary of "Latinidad"; England—which had, after 1776, lost its colonies in the US and the economic control of several Caribbean Islands—re-directed its colonial ambition toward Asia and Africa and controlled the markets in South America and the Caribbean; the U.S., as I already mentioned, moved the frontiers several miles toward the south and took away from Mexico a vast territory extending from today's Colorado to California; which has been a vast "Hispanic/Latin" territory since the beginning of the sixteenth century, when it was still occupied by indigenous people of the Americas for several thousands of years before the arrival of the Spaniards. "Latinos" in South America, that is, "Latin" Americans, were re-colonized by emerging empires while believing in their independence. Since 1848, and above all since 1898, as the result and consequence of the Hispanic-American war (in which Cuba and Puerto Rico were sandwiched), "Latins" in America (that is, Creoles from European descent; and Mestizos who only recognize the Spanish or Portuguese past of their double descent), inaugurated a new imperial category that will be re-produced in independent countries in Asia and Africa after WWII: "the beneficiary-colonized (and numerically minority) elite." Members of this elite seldom leave the country, and if

they or their children leave for a while, to study in Europe or the U.S. most likely they return. They do not have anything to gain from migrating to Europe and the U.S. because their milking-cows are not in the U.S. It is this very elite that contributed to generating more and more marginalized people in their respective countries; marginalization that became obvious, clear, and loud since the 1970s, when in the U.S. the civil society and the State began to notice that there are more immigrants coming from the south. Who were these new immigrants?—mostly Mestizos from lower classes, sons and daughters of the large European migrations from the second half of the nineteenth century on. Since the 1990s a small number of indigenous people from the Andes and Central America were identified in Los Angeles. But, as far as we know, people from African descent living in the Andes (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru) and the Caribbean Islands, who speak Spanish and Portuguese, form a significant number of the so-called “Hispanic Challenge.”

But then, what is “Latin” among Afro-Hispanics who practice Santería or Candomblé (instead of practicing Christianity) and of African—not European—descent? And what is “Latin” among the millions of indigenous people who have preserved traces of Christian symbols and rituals but without changing their basic religious beliefs? And what is “Latin” about people, though they speak Spanish, whose life and sensibility are crafted in Tojolabal, Aymara, Nahuatl, Quechua, Quichua, etc.? Not much, I believe, based on personal conversations with indigenous and Afro-leaders of social movements. Thus, in South America, “Latinidad” has several simultaneous functions in the imaginary of the mod-

ern/colonial world and in the structure of imperial/colonial domination. On the one hand, it served the goals of the beneficiary elite in the re-structuring of the modern/colonial world order after the U.S. and French Revolutions. The Creole elite linked with France, openly and with England in under-the-carpet negotiations of free trade and declared itself, in general, against the U.S. expansion toward the south. France took advantage of this moment and its circumstances.

The beneficiary elite was of course divided, as part of it remained faithful to the Spanish language, ideas, and traditions. They followed the lead of European "conservatives" (such as Donoso Cortés who, in 1852, published a book outlining the three major ideological frames after the French Revolution: Christianity, Liberalism, and Socialism (in its Saint-Simonian version, above all, but also of the early Marx). Colombia was one of the stronger defenders and followers of Hispanic traditions, as was Puerto Rico. In the Southern Cone, where Spanish influence was not strongly felt, the majority lined up with French ideas and against Spanish traditions. By the end of the nineteenth century, however, a line of dissent sprouted from the ruling "Latin" elite. Although antecedents could be traced to the third quarter of the nineteenth century, the most remarkable was the Cuban José Martí. Caught in New York, during the preliminaries of the Hispanic American war, he felt and witnessed at its highest, Anglo-white supremacy-racism against Latin and Catholic (and also Mestizos) in the South, who began to lose their "Latin" American whiteness to gain the color of U.S. "Latinidad." In this regard, and without forgetting

1848, it was in 1898 that white supremacy discourse was consolidated in the U.S. And there are good reasons why it was so. The Mexico-U.S. war was a war between nations; while the 1898 war was between empires, one in decay and the other on the rise. Hispanics on both sides of the Atlantic lost their whiteness then, one guilty of mixing with the Moors; and the other of mixing with Indians and Blacks. José Martí was and continues to be a canonical figure of “Latin” American dissenters and the foundational figure of Cuban identity. For Cubans, Martí comes before Marx. Marx provided Cubans a tool for the analysis of the logic of capitalism and a socialist (modern and Euro-centered) rhetoric to fight against it. Martí provides Cubans with the arms and tools to fight the coloniality of being infringed upon them by Spanish colonialism first and by U.S. after the 1898 Hispanic-American War.

The second pillar of dissenting figures is Peruvian José Carlos Mariátegui. There are some significant differences between him and Martí. When socialism entered “Latin” America at the end of the nineteenth century (with the wave of European immigrants) Mariátegui became very well acquainted with Marx and Marxism, while Martí was acting and thinking at the cross-road of a liberal imperialism on the rise (the US) and the legacies and emancipating ideals of liberalism inherited from the French Revolution. However, one could say that for Peruvians—and for different reasons—Mariátegui comes first and Marx second. Marx provided the Peruvian critical left (leaving aside the experience of Shining Path), with a tool for the analysis of the logic of industrial capitalism and to imagine beyond that and with a

socialist rhetoric to combat the rhetoric of liberal imperial modernity. However, Mariátegui's contribution comes not from applying Marx but from experiencing, sensing, and observing the colonial history of "Latin" America and of Peru. The crux of the matter here is the heavy legacy of Spanish Christian and Catholic colonialism, the deep-rooted, long-lasting, strong presence of indigenous history, language, knowledge, and ways of life and the first decades of the rise of U.S. imperialism after their victory in the Hispanic American War (Mariátegui's most influential writings date from 1920 to 1930 approximately).

Thus, the "Latino/a" in South America is mainly the history of the population from Spanish and Portuguese descent, Creoles and Mestizos who assumed European frames of mind and modes of living, followed in the periphery, the three major macro-narratives of the Enlightenment, in the background of the colonial period during the Renaissance (1500-1800). Creoles and Mestizos men built the nation-state and the economy, since the beginning of the nineteenth century following, in the margins, the guidelines of Liberal political theory (Botana, 1984)⁵ and of Conservatism (e.g., secular conservatism as well as the prolongation and adaptation of Catholicism to the secular changes; Donoso Cortés, 1852; 2000).⁶ José Martí battles all his life, from the age of 15, against Spanish colonialism in Cuba. Mariátegui faced both the legacies of Spanish colonialism engrained in the "republication" State, in Peru and in Latin America, and confronted the growing presence of the U.S. Although Mariátegui most often referred to Hispano-America and Martí to Nuestra America, the idea of "Latin"

America was floating. But it was floating not so much in the subjectivity of people who dwelled in the Spanish-speaking world of the Americas, as it was in the imperial rhetoric of French imperialism assumed by France's state men and the intelligentsia, as well as by their followers in the Spanish colonies or ex-colonies, for whom the transition from colonialism meant detaching from Spanish and Portuguese rules and to embrace British free-market economy and French post-Enlightenment thoughts. All that noise made indigenous people, as well as those of African descent, more and more invisible until the 1970s, a period in which Latino/as in the US began to make their presence felt. Today, the Creole, Mestizo, and immigrant population in South America and the Caribbean, who align themselves with the dissenting tradition inaugurated by José Martí and José Carlos Mariátegui, are already (or are likely to...) join forces with the indigenous movements, the emerging Afro-Andean movement, and with the long tradition of Afro-critical thoughts in the British and French Caribbean. Similarly, the strong presence of intellectual and activist women, toward the end of the 70s and 80s, like Domitila Vargas de Chungara in Bolivia and Rigoberta Menchú in Guatemala, began to break up the "Latinidad" as the logo of the culture, history, subjectivity and political goals a sub-continent that was founded in and by the Spanish colonization of the indigenous population, and the massive slave trade carried out by the Spanish, Portuguese, French, and the British.⁷ The "Latin" mentality of the nation-builders, imitators of European ideas and soldiers of British imperialism, since the nineteenth century (and since the 60s soldiers of U.S. imperialism), contributed

to burying the force of a history that Martí and Mariátegui began to uncover; that Domitila Vargas and Rigoberta Menchú⁸ put on the table from the perspective and experience of indigenous women; and that from CRL James to Sylvia Winters in the British Caribbean; and from the Haitian Revolution to Aimé Césaire and Frantz Fanon in the French Caribbean, *the embodied history of slavery began to surface*. There is a third line, the Latin American Marxist tradition, whose agents still have difficulty today in bridging a dialogue with indigenous and Afro-thoughts and activism (as demonstrated by the interventions of Carlos Regalado in the First Social Forum of the Americas, Quito, July 25-30, 2004) and with the variegated spectrum of indigenous and Afro-descendant women (as demonstrated by in the intervention of Liliana Hecker in the same Social Forum, Quito, July 25-30, 2004).

Interestingly enough, it is the dissenting line of thoughts, engrained in the colonial history of modernity, and in the Americas (inaugurated by Martí and Mariátegui, and continued by Césaire, Fanon, Sylvia Winters, Domitila de Chungara)—and not in the dissenting line grounded on Marxist thoughts—that make possible the productive dialogue between these complex traditions “beyond Latinidad” in South America and the Caribbean, and “Latino/as” in the U.S. that inaugurated a dissenting path based on the history of the U.S. with Mexico, Puerto Rico, and Cuba.

From this short story one aspect shall be underlined. “Hispanics,” as the official classification from the State administration has it, keeps the links with Europe although, as I would venture, 98% of “Hispanics” are from Latin Amer-

ica. On the contrary, when “Latino/as” des-identified with Hispanics, and made 1848 (the displacement of the U.S. frontier to the South), 1898 (Spanish-American [that is, U.S.] War involving Puerto Rico and Cuba, and to a lesser extent the Dominican Republic) and 1959 (Cuban Revolution—with the added complicity of the case), the links with Europe were cut: Latino/as in the U.S. are from “Latin” American—and not European—descent. The Gordian knot has been cut and an additional “element” has been added to the “Hispanic Challenge” to Anglo identity in the U.S.

III. Why Hispanics Are not White?

For four years now, I have been teaching an undergraduate seminar titled “Why Hispanics Are not White? Globalization and Latinidad.” One of the goals of the seminar is to help students understand that, on the one hand, “Latinidad” in the U.S. is not a national but a global issue that has been configured by the racial matrix that structures the imaginary of the modern/colonial world. How does it work? As I mentioned before, in 1995, historian David Hollinger analyzed “post-ethnic America” and the formation of what he aptly called “the ethno-racial pentagon”: Whites, Hispanics, Native Americans, African Americans and Asian Americans.⁹ By 2004 a new post-9/11 category emerged. This is not the place to go into details, but at the same time it should be kept in mind that the ethno-racial pentagon changed by the emergence of a new social actor in the global and national distribution of racism. Suffice it to say, then, that the ethno-racial hexagon was already pre-announced in 1995, the same year

of Hollinger's book, by the dividing line in Huntington's (in)famous article in *Foreign Affairs*.

Where is the ethno-racial pentagon coming from? It is well known that the "Hispanic" category as the fifth ethno-racial leg was introduced during Richard Nixon's administration, when the immigration from the Third World significantly increased in the U.S. as a consequence of growing dictatorial regimes and the lowering of the poverty line in Latin America as it was increasing in Europe as a consequence of decolonization of Asia and Africa. The restriction of immigration from South America put an end also to the Braseros program that started in the 1920s as a solution for labor supply during and immediately after WWI. The key and interesting point of the ethno-racial spectrum, once "Hispanics" category was introduced, was that Hispanics—on the one hand—were not considered Whites and—on the other—that Hispanics did not belong to the same "foundational" logic of the ethno-racial tetragon: Hispanics did not enter into the spectrum as a "colored race" (whites, blacks, brown or red [Native Americans] and yellow) but as a "darkening brown, religion and language"; that is, as Mestizos, Catholics, and the Spanish speaking. But let's go back in time and trace the history of the ethno-racial configuration, how it became the foundation of the modern/colonial world racial imaginary and how it was transformed to end up with Latinos/as in the colonial horizon of modernity that Huntington perceives as the "Hispanic Challenge."

Between 1500 and 1850 there was no "Latin" America. The territory that was named Tawantinsuyu, Abya-Yala,

Cemanahuac by the people who inhabited it was renamed by Spaniards as “Indias Occidentales.” (According to current theories they came from all over the Pacific coast of what the Europeans, in their Christian cosmology, named Asia but which was not yet recognized as such by the people who were living in the European-invented Asia.) “Indias Orientales” was the name of the area in possession of the Spanish in the Philippines and Molucas. Interestingly enough, the “arrival” of the Spaniards and Portuguese to the coast of Asia, navigating through the Magellan Strait, covered up and silenced the history of the people who, thousands of years before, crossed the Pacific toward the East and populated what—at the moment the Spanish arrived—had its own name. The Spanish and Portuguese, and then the Dutch, French, and British, all contributed to populate Indias Occidentales and the Caribbean Islands with a massive population of African slaves.

Today it is accepted that the earth is divided into six continents, but there are two ways of cutting the pie. In one case, the Americas is one continent (thus, we have Africa, America, Antarctica, Asia, Australia, and Europe). On the other, Europe and Asia are combined (Africa, Antarctica, Australia, Eurasia, North America, and South America). And you too can probably come up with another possible division. It doesn't matter how you do the division; the real issue is that all forms of the division come from a single and basic root: the Christian continental Triad. To make a long story short, the Christian T/O map that Isidore of Seville (570-636) attached to his famous work *Etymologiae* (The Etymologies). In the Christian T/O maps of the Middle

Ages, the earth was divided naturally into three parts and each of them was attributed to one of Noah's sons: Asia to Sem, Africa to Sham, and Europe to Japhet. Obviously, for the Chinese, Indians, Persians, for people in the Mughal and Ottoman empires in the fifteenth century, etc., such a tripartite division of the earth was either unknown or taken as the Christian way to conceive the world. The reason that America became the fourth continent was simply because those who did not know about it and "discovered" it were Christians, and for them the globe was divided into three continents.

In the sixteenth century, America was "incorporated" into the Christian cosmo-graphy and the globe now contained four continents; the Christian triad was thus transformed into the Christian tetragon. Interestingly enough, Bartolomé de Las Casas included, at the end of his *Apologetica Historia Sumaria* (c. 1552), a classification of "four kinds of barbarians." Las Casas did not equate types of barbarians with particular continents, but it is interesting to notice the transformation of the triad into the tetragon in a classification of "barbarians" that was mainly motivated by the Christian encounters with people they did not know, and who were not contemplated in their cosmological schemes. However, who truly translated Las Casas's tetragon (whether intentionally or not) and corresponded races to particular continents, was Immanuel Kant. Kant re-interpreted Las Casas's tetragon and made it more or less coincide with continents and with the skin color of people inhabiting them. Thus, for Kant, yellow people were in Asia; Blacks in Africa; Red (referring to the Indigenous

people) in America, and White people in Europe. Consequently, Europeans in America, as well as their descendants were considered whites in Kant's scheme. His tetragon lasted until the Nixon Era when Hispanics transformed the tetragon into a pentagon. As we know, "Hispanic" classification, issued officially from the State, managed to create a new category of racialized people within the frame of the Kantian tetragon.

Not all people classified by the State as Hispanics, were happy and thankful for such identification. For how come it is the privilege of the State to decide who people are? Why did the State use "Hispanic" as the category for people who came mainly from Latin America and not from Spain? Reasons for such decisions are not always given. But one can guess, based on the history of South America and the Spanish-speaking Caribbean Islands: that either the classification was decided because the officers of the Nixon administration were thinking of Spanish as the official language of most of the countries in South America (although there are as many speakers of Portuguese in Brazil than of Spanish in the totality of Spanish-speaking countries, including the corresponding Caribbean Islands), or a des-identification came from the emergence of political projects (ethnicity, gender, and sexuality) that, from the start, linked des-identification with liberation. And I say *liberation* here instead of *emancipation* for a very particular reason.

The reasons of the State were colonial reasons in identifying a vast and heterogeneous population in the U.S., based on the assumption that all of them speak Spanish and, therefore, if one speaks Spanish as the first language then

one must be Hispanic (in the same way that speakers of English are assumed to be Anglo—which is the identity politics outlined by Huntington). This is the same logic that the Spanish state applied when it decided that those who lived in the lands that the Spanish Crown and Church took by assault were “Indians.” Instead, the reasons that underlined the des-identification with, and de-linking from, the State category of “Hispanics” (and therefore, to be detached from the fifth leg of the ethno-racial pentagon), were for liberation and, consequently, for de-colonization. “Liberation” and “de-colonization” both carry a meaning that “emancipation” doesn’t. “Emancipation” entered the vocabulary of secular Europe in the eighteenth century, and the abstract idea was, in Kantian terms (which he equated with Enlightenment itself), was “man’s emergence from his self-imposed nonage. Nonage is the inability to use one’s own understanding without another guidance.” What Kant most certainly had in mind was the emancipation of a particular class, the European bourgeoisie, from the tutelage of the Church and of the Monarchy. But most likely he was also thinking about men and, deducing from his racial pre-judgments (Eze, 1997), white European men, particularly Germans, French, and British, who were for him at the center and the top of the species (see section four of his *Observations on the Beautiful and the Sublime*). But “emancipation” acquired a second meaning linked to the “civilizing mission” of the second wave of imperial expansion of England and France, after Napoleon. “Emancipation,” linked to the “civilizing mission” had deadly consequences since the European men became the “giver” who, in his civilizing mission, was helping the “primitives” (the term was introduced by Joseph Francis

Lafitau who died in 1740), just a few decades before the time Kant was writing), to enlighten and emancipate. The “civilizing mission” was then taken around the world (and still continues) under the presupposition that the further away you get from the heart of Europe (which for Kant and then Hegel was Germany, England, and France—and in that order), the less people are “prepared” to reach the beautiful and the sublime and, concurrently, to reach the highs of “European” rationality. “Emancipation,” at that point, slips into genocidal reason, as Enrique Dussel has convincingly argued (Dussel, 1992).¹⁰ The introduction of the concepts of “liberation and decolonization” came precisely from those “primitives” (mainly from the Haitian Revolution and the independence of African and Asian countries after WWII) and, although not using these words, from Martí and Mariategui’s project; and more recently, Indigenous social movements as well as Afro-Caribbean and Afro-Andean). Latinos/as since 1970 began their own projects of liberation and de-colonization thus joining, directly or indirectly, a global network of conceptual (and, therefore, social, political, economic) liberation and de-colonization.¹¹ The main difference between emancipation on the one hand and liberation/de-colonization on the other, is that emancipation is what the White Man “gives” while “liberation and de-colonization” are what the racially, sexually, and economically des-enfranchised—or, better yet, the “damnes” of Fanon (Maldonado-Torres, 2004)—want and have the right “to take.”

Thus seen, Latino/as in the U.S. (and in the colonial horizon of modernity) are not exactly the people labeled as “Hispanic” by the State. According to the U.S. Census Bu-

reau there are around forty million Hispanics, which is a number larger than the population of Colombia or Argentina (around 35 million in each country), and close to the combined population of Ecuador, Bolivia, and Chile. As is the case in all these countries, the Hispanic population is not homogenous in social status, political convictions, sense of self and the community. Not everybody in Bolivia, let's say, support the neo-liberal state, the Indigenous movements, or Marxist syndicalism. However, out of the struggle of Indian people for liberation and de-colonization (because the "generosity" of the State is still deep-rooted in the same logic of the "giver" that justified Christian salvation, Liberal emancipation, Neo-liberal freedom and democracy, Marxist socialist revolution and Islamic universalism), a series of projects for liberation and de-colonization emerged while rooted in the history of racialization and domination of the Indigenous experience, which doesn't assume a one-to-one relation between projects of decolonization rooted in Indian history and experience and Indigenous population. Part of the Indigenous population has joined the project of the Church (in a variety of different missions); others joined Marxist movements; still others work in complicity with peripheral Neo-liberal states. Same can be said about Latino/as. Latino/as project of liberation and decolonization does not necessarily "represent" the 35 million "Hispanics" of the national census!!!! It could or could not. On the one hand, it is up to those that had been classified as Hispanics to join Latino/as project of de-colonization as des-identification and liberation. It is not the task necessarily of Latino/as leaders, to preach the gospel as the Church, Marxists, Lib-

erals and Neo-liberals did and still do. Conversely, Latino/as contribution to decolonization in the U.S. and in their connection with other similar social movements around the world (for which the World Social Forum and the Social Forum of the Americas are becoming a place to “connect”), are not restricted to Latino/as. Here there are two common assumptions that must be dispelled.

One is that if a social movement and decolonizing project emerges from the historical experience of a racialized group it shall—of necessity—be limited to that racial(ized) group. Latino/as or Indigenous political projects are led by Latino/as and Indigenous people, but *not restricted to those who consider themselves Indigenous or Hispanics who see themselves as Latino/as*. I am sure that Huntington will be ready to embrace any non-Anglo volunteer who would like to join his identity-politic political project, in the same way that Neo-liberals will embrace anyone who is ready to accept their belief system as justification for action.

The second is that those who belong to a racialized group have no choice but identify themselves with the political projects of such groups. Thus, if you are Anglo and White, you cannot join a Black, Indigenous or Latino/as project and have no choice but to remain within the identity politics defended by Huntington. Both assumptions imply the need to un-couple political projects (which are elected and selected by the individual) from the social group “arranged” by the State by way of its language of classification, which serves to “manage” the population both nationally and globally. Latino/as, in this respect, are no longer a problem “just” of the U.S. but it is increasingly becoming a

global issue. In that respect, due attention shall be paid to the fact that in nine years, Huntington will have made a significant contribution to invent the Muslim as paramount "challenge" to the Western civilization and as he now is inventing the Latino/as as paramount "challenge" to the U.S.

IV. Back to Huntington's Fears

There is indeed good reason to expel Huntington's fears, whether they are deeply felt or strategically located. The emergence and growing presence of all kinds of Latino/as political and ethical projects present as good a reason to understand Huntington's fears as they help explain and understand the anonymous population he labels "Hispanics." And the real "fear" that Huntington would like to instill (paralleling the hegemony of fear we are living in) is perhaps returning to him as a boomerang, along with the hegemonic system of belief that underlies the rhetoric of neo-liberalism. For, what is at stake in Latino/as critical and political project is that *we* are moving away from the system of belief and the logic in which Huntington has cast both the "challenge" of civilization clashes (in the aftermath of the exhaustion of "civilizing mission" possibilities) and the "Hispanic challenge." We are *de-linking*. And we are *not* de-linking in the terms of Samir Amin who conceived the project several decades ago. Amin's de-linking was *no* more than a fracture; it was only a change of content but not an effort in building of an-other logic, which means telling of an altogether different story—an-*other* story.¹² Amin remained within the modern paradigm of the European enlightenment

and failed to understand that Marxism allows for a dissenting position within the same cosmology in which the dissent is thought out; but it cannot be truly a de-linking.

There is no point in entering Huntington's system and disputing his assertions and forecasts on his terms. It is always possible to make small changes in that mode but it only serves to maintain the existing rules. De-linking means that there are other games in town to play and *we* are no longer without alternative. We are no longer condemned to complaining while staying within the system, playing according to its set rules. The point now is that *other games* are starting to be played, *other rules* are being created and implemented. And that is more than a good reason for the fearsome State and "civil" society to take seriously the fears that Huntington has spelled out for *them*.

The recent events involving the denial of US visa to Tariq Ramadan is another case in point that contests, without entering the rule of the game, Huntington's propagation of fear. Ramadan is not an extremist engineer but a scholar who knows as well the Q'uran and Muslim thoughts, as he knows Western philosophy.¹³ His weapon is knowledge and his strategy is to play a different game. He, as the Latino/as in the U.S., is a Muslim scholar in the West who is contributing to build an-other logic beyond the trap of the cage in which Neo-liberalism and Islamic Fundamentalists (as well as Russians and Chechens) are trapped. Linking and connections between projects that attempt to de-link from hegemonic logic is the way to the future.

We have to recognize "Huntington's Challenge" but *we* shall not play into his logic and only contest his content. *We*

have to start (*we are starting*) from the fact that an-other-world is possible and that *we, engaged in Latino/as ethical, political, and epistemic project* (as well as constructive Islamic ones), have another soup to cook. To look at the future without fear and with courage, cutting the umbilical cord with all kinds of Huntingtons from the right and the left who still play in the post-Renaissance imperial and Christian logic as well as in their new secular, post-Enlightenment version, once again, from the left and from the right. Latino/as ethical, political and epistemic project is one among many, around the planet, working toward an-other world, an-other logic, an-other sensibility celebrating life and love instead of pre-announcing and enacting hatred and death.

Notes

1. The basic thesis of my argument here has been already advanced in previous publications. See, mainly, *Local Histories/Global Designs. Coloniality, Subaltern Knowledges and Border Thinking*. New Jersey: Princeton U.P., 2000; "The Larger Picture. Hispanics/Latinos (and Latino Studies) in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity," in Jorge J. E. Gracia and Pablo De Greiff, eds. *Hispanics/Latinos in the United States*. New York: Routledge, 2000, p. 99-124; "Coloniality at Large: The Western Hemisphere in the Colonial Horizon of Modernity." *The New Centennial Review*, v. 1, n. 2, p. 19-54, 2001.
2. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004. Of particular interest are Part II, on "American Identity" and Chapters 7 and 9, of Part III. The first is on "Challenges to American Identity" and the second on "Mexican Immigration and Hispanization." This chapter was published as an advance of the book under the title of "The Hispanic Challenge,"

Foreign Policy, March-April 2004, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?storyãid=2495>.

3. The article originally published in *Foreign Affairs* was reproduced with several responses as *The Clash of Civilizations? The Debate*. New York: Foreign Affairs, 1996. The book published a couple of years after the article is titled: *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1996.
4. Ramon Grosfoguel, *Colonial Subjects. Puerto Rican in a Global Perspective*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003.
5. *La Tradición Republicana. Alberdi, Sarmiento y las Ideas Políticas de su Tiempo*. Buenos Aires: Sudamericana, 1984
6. *Selected Works of Juan Donose Cortés*, translated and edited by Jeffrey P. Johnson. Westport: Greenwood Press, 2000.
7. There is by now an extensive bibliography in South America from the perspective of women, Creoles, Mestizas and a few immigrants based in different countries. Of all the work being done, the most interesting from my argument are the ones crossing gender and sexuality with racism. That is precisely where “Latinidad” as masculine and “white” category, began to break apart. See for instance one of the most important collections of articles in this respect is *Ser Mujer Indígena, Chola o Birlocha en la Bolivia Postcolonial de los Años 90*, edited by Silvia Rivera Cusicanqui. La Paz, Ministerio de Desarrollo Humano, 1996.
8. For instance, Sonia Saldívar-Hull, *Feminism on the Border. Chicana Politics and Literature*. Berkeley: The University of California Press, 2000, in which book Saldívar establishes links with women politics in Latin America.
9. *Postethnic America. Beyond Multiculturalism*. New York: Basic Book, 1995.
10. *The Invention of the Americas. Eclipse of ‘the Other’ and the Myth of Modernity* [1992]. Translated from Spanish by Michael D. Barber, New York: Continuum, 1995.
11. Although not directly related to my argument here, the case of the ex-Soviet Union colonies shall be mentioned. The “socialist revolution” had the same logic than the “bourgeois emancipation” alt-

hough with different logic. The socialist revolutionaries with good "conscience" carried their own civilizing mission with a different content: to civilize the colonies meant for them to "convert" (or impose) socialism, as much as the British civilizing mission attempted to "convert" (or impose) liberal ideas that were being thought out and implemented in Europe. For reasons that I cannot explain here, liberating and de-colonizing projects are not yet visible in either the ex-colonies or States that remained under the Kremlin administration. The case of Chechnya is a particular case that deserves much more than a footnote. For my purpose here it should be kept in mind that, beyond the eighty years of secularism under Soviet rule, Chechens are Muslims in their majority in a State in which Orthodox Christianity has a long history of complicity with imperialism, as long as Catholicism and Protestantism has in the West.

12. There are many instances already around the world in which what I am saying can be substantiated, although this is not the place to expand on it. See Mignolo, "The Geopolitics of Knowledge and the Colonial Difference," *SAQ*, v. 101, n. 1, p. 56-96 (Winter 2002); Catherine Walsh, "Interculturality and Coloniality of Power. An Other Thinking and Positioning from the Colonial Difference," in *Coloniality of Power, Transmodernity and Border Thinking*. Edited by Ramon Grosfoguel, Nelson Maldonado-Torres and José Saldívar. Durham: Duke University Press, forthcoming; Maldonado-Torres, "The Topology of Being and the Geopolitics of Knowledge. Modernity, Empire, Coloniality," in *City*, v. 8, n. 1, p. 29-56 (2004); and, of course, pioneering works such as Frantz Fanon, Abdelkhebir Khatibi, Sayyid Qutb, Gloria Anzaldúa etc.
13. See, for instance, his *Western Muslims and the Future of Islam*. London: Oxford U.P., 2004; and "Globalization.Muslim Resistances," Union Europea: Editions Tawhid, 2003.

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