Culture of the Difference in Eurasia:
Azerbaijan—Past and Present
in the Dialogue of Civilizations

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Introduction

Latinity at the Quest for Difference in Eurasia

Candido Mendes

The Search for Long-Term Dialogue

The development of the Academy of Latinity has shown the levels of interlocution and research whereby the very notion of a cultural dialogue implies logical closures; the interplay of prejudices, as well as new breakthroughs over the contemporary horizon. The Academy began by a first response in the university milieu to the invitation made by President Khatami to the West, seized by the Khomeinian revolution, wars in Afghanistan and the permanence of the Palestinian issue. Our group went over to Teheran in 2002, in a very first breakthrough, opening the way for a deepening of the *vis-à-vis* with the Islamic world, allowing the successive dialogue with the Arab culture in Alexandria (2004) and the exchange with Turkish Islam in Ankara and Istanbul (2005).

It is difficult to think of a natural sequence in that trail, otherwise than, exactly by the one already suggested by the last meetings. Starting with the first interventions by Madina Tlostanova, the Academy saw itself required to this wider bearing, to the core of the Caucasus or Central Asia. Islam reasserts there its stock of historical gathering, beyond the result of Soviet modernization, through a vigorous prospective in the frame of globalization.

The issue would become even more thrilling, so much that the heritage of Western rationalization, coming from the apparatus and the socialist thrust found, at the same time, assets to avoid any fundamentalist return to the Islamic matrix. Stalin understood, by the way, the viability of this ascent, betting on the advance, itself, of a universal platform of changes, facing the Islamic borders of the Old Russian Empire, looking at the issue of Caucasian nationalities. The Azeri awakening nowadays becomes, furtherly, paradigmatic by the dual expressions of a cultural pluralism, of a delayed nation building process facing structurally different Empires.

Renan, the "Union and Progress" Committee, "Touranism"

The Caucasus, and specially Azerbaijan offer his unique opportunity in the Braudelian time length of a creative uprising collective identity after a rational involvement by the socialist endeavor, at an exposed rooting of the

Islamic culture, during the last half of the XX century. The region, hence, before the Soviet era an Islamic mediation through the Ottoman ruling and its late ideology, advanced by "pan-touranism." At the same time, nevertheless the national experience benefited, on these grounds, of an unexpected backlash by the rendering of the former Empire, in Istanbul, into Kemal Atatürks Turkey. Such a threshold changed drastically the international reference of the region, as seen in first modernization of the Ottoman Empire by the "Young Turks." It was at stake then a common sharing of Europe through the Balkans moving into the Caucasian latitudes. Renan left his imprint in the Committee "Union et Progrès," through Hilal or Hyseyn Zaid, betting on a multicultural Europe, more than in his Empire's confrontation and its worn out geopolitics, already at the time of Abdul-Hamid.

Indeed, at the end, the ideological evolutions of pan-touranism crumbled, through the last conversion of a Turkish collective identity into a late National State in a whole encompassing view of Western Modernity. The claims of the "Union et Progrès" movement of 1908 turned finally into three contradictory policies like "ottomanism" in internal policies, "pan-Islamism" in the relations with Arabs' and non-turks foreigners abroad, and "pan-Turkism" *vis-à-vis* Russia.

Atatürk's withdrawal, after the great opening toward Turkmenistan, in counterweighing to the loss of the Balkan world, left behind the ideology of "touranism." It would

anyway rebound in the historical leap of the Socialist Revolution. At the last jolt of the great sight, the "Young Turks," still thought of the gathering of Central Asia in the support to "Techkilat-I Mahsusa" organization, in frank subversive action among the *sehoussi* tribes.

The assets of Turkey-Europe

The debate of "Turkey in Europe" reprieves today, at full speed, with the force of decompression of a collective unconscious—and, beyond immediate geopolitical 'implication, in allegiance with the "old continent." Its games point out to a submissive world, to the rules of hegemonies, supported by a "civilization of fear" and the simulacra of collective identities at stake.

The poor refusal of Turkey's dialogue to the E.U. only calls to mind the Islamic classic rooting over the European map, and by the Arab presence in Andalusia, and by the Ottoman hold, stopped at the gates of Vienna, but without retreat until the early 20th century. It loons, in the post-September 11 world, and in the prospects of this literally reified future by the new 100-year wars, and permanent preemptive conflicts. We are only at the dawn of this change of horizons, such as seen before the twin tower catastrophe, in the frame of a "first world," that bet on its overtaking tensions, at that time, just between the United States and Europe.

It is not a matter of seeing, only, in which manner progresses and last-minute stops of the "old Continent," as an

independent player of globalization will currently find in the Turkish issue a differential to its advantage at the top of the hegemonic universe. A defense of the issue nowadays would be played at a full new scenario for the logics of the Oval Office.

We would take notice in what manner the former "Europe of the six," becoming the uncertain Federation, sees itself, today, surrounded by American hegemony when classical satellizations spin from the East of the Old Continent. The Constitution blockades, and recent clashes of the WTO in Hong Kong underscore a final resettlement of the great international decision balance. It will come in Eurasia to the potentialities of these new protagonisms, as the post-soviet era brings new mobilization between national reawakening of primary cultural backgrounds and emerging realignments on the global political map. The region benefits from these advantages of a reentry into the postponed scene of sovereignty may cause, on the balance of powers, too quickly frozen on the "Bushian" hegemonic frame.

A Turkey that goes back today to the Mediterranean and to a history retaken from the West carries, with it, this push from Eurasia, where it reassumes the flight of the late 19th century, of an Islam embedded in an Ottoman matrix. Thus, although, in terms of a modernity mediation exposed to the Soviet utopia and awakening of the national State, in the threshold of in the post-socialist reshaping of Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan or Georgia.

Hegemonic logics nowadays quite different from the Leninist endeavor, moves to the preemptive conflict to face terrorism, in this vicious circle between topical violence and anonymous merciless war. At the same time, democracy is branded as a stop to any difference, seem abhorrent to the incoming world system.

The Mediterranean and a Pluralist Identity
in the Caucasus

In fact, the Turkish European accreditation gave a full chance to this new large continental balances and a full entrance of multiculturalism in the long-range game of differences. It may be tested by a *media res* exercise, or an interlocution or a new *vis-à-vis*, speeded up post-September 11. A multiple view of the West, in its supple side, may be worked in Eurasia, starting with this Latinity that has responded to the Iranian dialogue, and that breaks in its polarity the "axis of evil" and trespasses western fundamentalism, in his hard side of preemptive wars and the Oval Room missionarism.

Turkey's final acceptation in the European ensemble will enable chances for an eventual new world power balance, through *dramatis personnae* capable of getting ahead of the limit-situation of the new "hundred-year war." Even the advance of American satellization of Eastern Europe will suppose a Turkish deployment, as a critical supporting example, so that the last awakening of a nation building process may expand to a retrieval of Islamic matrixes in an his-

toric freshness—as shown nowadays in the Balkans. The bringing in of a new imprint of difference becomes staggering relevant at a play, when the emergent rules of hegemony press for an identity subtraction, by the universe of simulacra and flat and irreversible alignment.

Islamic Return in Post-Utopia

One has not yet sufficiently distinguished the manner whereby the hegemonic world does not condescend with the old technological pastorals of progress. Born out of a situation of fear, the ruling system eliminates every chance of *vis-à-vis* with the peripheries. It is then a multi expropriation procedures that faces, contrary to the very primary awakening, the identitariam post Soviet quest. The resumption of an arcane experience is joined by the prospective assertion of a collectivity, whose historical "golden rule," is the nation, such as thought by the West. But it will not be able to advance, at the last moment of identity awakenings, threaten by hegemonic logic, if not by the reciprocity mirrors of outlooks, where Latinity keeps an interlocutive privilege, of pluralism and alert. The supple West is there, to obviate this demand, and witness the blunt imperative of difference, before the renewed weightiness of polarizations creates "readymade games" for this root of contemporaneity awakening, upstream of the fate of Eastern Europe, or of the national enactments of post-independence Africa.

Perhaps we are not aware in the West, and mostly in our Mediterranean basin, of the huge complexity, in the collec-

tivities of the Caspian bridge, of the resumption of their identity background, before the horizon open by the great socialist design. Nor, as far as that goes, when speaking of this backbone of the over-continent, this rationality *aegis* on the Caucasus where Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan not, only, come out of a historical density in the deepest swirls of cultures, but shared the greatest regional tension in their historic territorial reapportion.

Breaking up of Empires, Awakening of Nations

This great emerging protagonism concerns not only the cumulation of the various Christian, Islamic, Safavide or Ottoman holds, but about a shoving game, from Lenin to Stalin over a real territory reallocation between Azerbaijan and Armenia, leading already for example, after "Glasnost," to the Nagorno-Karabagh war. Massive Armenian immigrant displacements in Azerbaijan and vice-versa surpass the classical embattlement on territorial reapportionments and bloody severance. The cultural conflict in the Caucasus, at the turn of the new century, shows even the presence of cracking territorial logics and their continuity, with the abundance of acknowledged, chopped cultures, in Dagestan, of the Azeri founding soil, and this new national player after the Soviet collapse.

In this dimension therefore of the Eurasian West, as underscored by Madina Tlostanova one could not speak about unity, or transparency of this rerouting to Islam, even in Atatürk's Republic, and new political majorities of facing

the maintenance of the secular State. Or, even thereabouts, in the entire huge retrospective of great Europe, ensuring, by meeting deep democracy demands by the European Union, their Mediterranean buttresses extending over the great outflow, besides Anatolia.

Moreover, Azerbaijan show us exactly the contrary of inertias in its Islamic reception, by being the anthological case of almost instant passage or overcoming of "sunnism" or "shiitism," by making a "golden age" of this culture that springs out from its identity background. It is hard to find today in this late blaze of State-nations, coming out of the Soviet Union, at the same time such threats in the return to their cultural territory.

Indeed, post-soviet mediation was done almost at the level of reestablishing players of a personality, like Heidar Alyaiev, precisely the only Caucasian representative at the former Soviet power center. It was preceded by the martyrdom, in 1923, of Nazarimov asserting together with their communist orthodoxy the defense of his national expression, after the independence effort, in 1919, of Mahmad Razuzalde. Moving further in view of Moscow centralism difficulties, the Azeri resumption prevailed over the strict planning of the Soviet State implementation.

Azeri Culture and the New Diasporas

Nowadays, Azerbaijan's identity acquires the power of a feat, at the same time, canonical and prospective, with a view to these successive breakups and recovery to its will of

difference, put in relief by the specificity of its culture. The country, had been, since 1919, exposed to the move forward by the "Committee of 26" in the radically of the full utopian conscription. Their summary execution, all undertows, all coming and going of western and White Russia invasions, showed how far the fall of czarism implied a revolutionary view of the idea of change and its inexorability. It is therefore in the same orthodoxy that Nazarimov struggled for Azeri identity, sharpened by a fight against territorial sectioning by Armenia, resumed at the 1989 "Glasnost" Diaspora, by a delayed awareness, at the cost of the nation building endeavor, in its Caucasian specificity. It also faces today the emergent logics of the hegemonic play, nevertheless still bounded to a geopolitical determination. This perspective is stressed by the new landscape of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, linking the Caspian to the Mediterranean. It not only forward the old "touranist" perspective, in the reverse way but brings in an almost "tectonic" new unbalance in the region to the advantage of Eurasia.

Beyond Pan-Turkism. Islam and Blown up Peripheries

The entire issue of "European Turkey," at the pace taken during the past months, outstrips Brussels horizons and their new federative perplexities. With this landscape the Caucasus benefits from a new ground to stand against

hegemonics, adding to their geopolitical set a reinforced multicultural approach, though the possible Mediterranean embrace, in the opposite way of Enver Pacha, and the "Young Turks" look to the historical vocation of the Anatolian platform.

Such a move universes an effective cultural embedding attentive to a common historic alignment regardless of a continental individualities, that the new Eurasian feature turned obsolete. These new protagonisms bread on the historic large span to face the machinery of hegemonics and its impeding virtualization of the collective subjectivities—national or regional—nowadays.

A large Mediterranean in its macro historic role comes out of a narrow sighted view of an European-Turkey. This gathering reconciles the pushes of modernity at the brink of Westernization—and at a moment of an impeding take over by its hegemony. Indeed the Ottoman world made the taking of Constantinople an effective "Roman" conquest and his stop at the Vienna gates came after a multisecular encroaching in the Balkans, succeeding the Byzantine Empire.

Latinity Watching over a Plural World

In such a context of a return to the Braudelian idea of a time of cultures Latinity has an overwhelming role in shaping a Western pluralism as required by the large Mediterranean scenario. Time has come also, in a context of utter acceleration of an impeding "end of history" to stress for an

Islamic World seen, usually from the West as just a prey to assimilationism, according to the gospel of progress. It is also in the National State articulations of the Middle East as in Turkey and Egypt then in such an strategic, area can take peace a counterweighing effect to an impeding satellization of Eastern Europe. In fact, the "Europe of the Twenty Five" shows an increasing lack of initiative—an "etherealization" in Toynbean terms—*vis-à-vis* the former strength of the "Europe of the Six."

The voice of the pre-September 11 "old continent" must play an agonistic role in the political balance, by relying further on historical loyalties, born in the Mediterranean basin, in view of the larger game, of the Eurasian border, starting with Slavic shoves. We cannot fail to remark to which extent the adoption of Turkey, in Brussels, shows to itself, a divide between a converted world to the Oval Office rules of the game or the openings, where, effectively, history wills may prevail over the prospect of an overwhelmed one-sided world, already running on its subliminal "fait accompli."

In such a context the Caucasus becomes a fundamental leverage. Starting with the present role of Azerbaijan, an Eurasian awakening brings the definitive results of a political option over the pseudo fatalities of history as a game done. The Azeri endeavor, past and present, can respond to that breakthrough.

Azerbaijan in Modern World: Realities and Strategic Priorities

Khalaf Khalafov

Dear ladies and gentlemen,
Dear conference participants,

Let me express my deep gratitude to the organizers of the conference, especially the President of Heydar Aliyev Foundation, Good Will ambassador of UNESCO Mrs. Mehriban Aliyeva for giving me a chance to participate in the work of the conference and organizing this event in high level.

Noting special importance of convening Latin Cultural Academy's XIII Conference in Azerbaijan I do believe that this event will serve for bringing closer the cultures and nations, intensification of inter-civilization and inter -religious dialogue, establishment of tolerance in international relations, strengthening of peace and tranquility, social welfare ideals.

Azerbaijan is known as historical place being perfect example of peaceful co-existence of different religious confessions, tolerant regard with regard to all representatives of all religious and nations. This tolerance is either a state policy or national treasure of our nation developed for centuries, even

we can say proudly that mutual respect and esteem for the representatives of other religions and nations is daily way of life. Azerbaijan State being adherent to the principles of religious, cultural and political tolerance, simultaneously endeavors propagation and promotion of these principles. It is gratifying that this attitude is always stressed with gratitude and sincerity by the representatives of nations who never met religious or national discrimination. At the same time, gathering eastern and western cultures and protecting national and religious values, Azerbaijan integrates to the West. To my opinion, hereafter Azerbaijan can give its contributions to the dialogue of Muslim and western culture.

After the restoration of its independence the Republic of Azerbaijan has directed the efforts to the form and reinforcement of main attributes of sovereign state and overall integration into international relations system. This way wasn't easy for our Republic, followed with different internal or external threats and dangers. However, as a result of the sagacious, purposeful and considered internal and external policy of the great national leader of our nation Heydar Aliyev, our country avoided from the threat of chaos, anarchy and civil war, and was directed to the path of stability and development. Azerbaijan is member and active participant of several international and regional organizations, and managed to establish strategic partnership and cooperative relations with the leading states of the world and is a key developed country of the region in which it is located. The successfully continuation of this policy gave an opportunity for the new stage in the devel-

opment of our country, and sustainable stability and so-cial-economic growth were provided. We are proud of the fact that the indications of development of Azerbaijan are as-tonishing. Last year the economic growth in the Republic of Azerbaijan was 26%. The above mentioned achievements are based on governmental projects and programs such as cre-ation of new jobs, reduction of poverty, social-economic development of regions, energy security, creation and im-provement of transport-industry infrastructure, involvement of investments to the non-oil sector, which were adopted in proper time and consistently implemented. Although favor-able geo-strategic position of our country makes Azerbaijan a place of conflict of various interests, balanced policy pursued by our state resulted in a lot of achievements. As you know, Azerbaijan has been not only an active participant, but also initiator of huge projects such as the construction of Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan, Baku–Tbilisi–Erzerum pipelines, Baku–Tbilisi–-Akhalkalaki-Kars new railway connection, restoration of Great Silk Way, which are of strategic impor-tance not only for our country and region, but also for interna-tional policy generally. Despite some threats and pressures, these projects are being implemented successfully.

Dear conference participants,

Having favorable geo-strategical position Azerbaijan at times is shown as Caucasus region, sometimes Caspian Ba-sin region. In reality our country is in two regions, and it is a

bridge connecting Europe and Asia. The word of bridge should be understood like political, economical space, also the place combined and crossed of cultural ties. The relations of Azerbaijan with the region countries based on friendly, close neighborhood and friendship, mutual confidence, and with other countries respect, cooperation and partnership principles. At the same time our country's internal and external policy begins from principles and norms of international law, contemporary and civil conduct rules, and international obligations.

We give special attention the development and strengthening of our relations with our neighbors like Turkey, Russia, Iran, Georgia. We endeavor keeping and deepening the relations in all spheres based on mutual effective cooperation, security and confidence, respect for and maintenance the sovereignty, territorial integrity, inviolability of borders. We attach special significance to the role of our partners like European Union, United States of America, Japan, and China in regional cooperation and international relations. Conforming of shown priority directions within cooperation are main factors for keeping peace in region, preservation of stability, strengthening of investment atmosphere.

Azerbaijan, who has been exposed repeatedly to terror acts by aggressive Armenia, has consistently demonstrated that we are in same front with the forces always struggling against the evil of the mankind. We have not heard the bitter results of the terror only by words. Azerbaijan was among the first countries, which joined the anti-terror coalition and

at present actively participates in the process of establishing peace and security within the international peacekeeping forces. Azerbaijan expresses solidarity with international community in overcoming existing dangers. It would be fair to emphasize the irreconcilable position of Azerbaijan against aggressive separatism, illicit trafficking in drugs, organized crime, corruption, transnational crime, illegal arm and human trafficking.

Dear conference participants,

Within the frame of foreign policy priorities of Azerbaijan, first of all I would like to draw your attention to the vital problem of Azerbaijani people and State—Armenia-Azerbaijan Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, which has begun as a result of unfair and groundless territorial claims and aggressive occupation by Armenia. Despite the fact that today 20% percent of Azerbaijan territories are under the occupation of Armenian armed forces and we have more than one million refugees and internally displaced persons, our country prefers to liberate its historical territories by peaceful means. In spite of the unconstructive policy of Armenia, we continue our peaceful policy hoping that potential of peace negotiations have not been exhausted. Off course, there is also a need for fair, objective and right position of the international community to the settlement of the conflict. Armenia can't deny the imperative principle of international law such as—the territory, which occupied by

force, could not be annexed. Azerbaijani people's strong will, inviolable position of our President and power of state will never give a chance to the ill wisher neighbor to realize their efforts.

After the gaining the independence Azerbaijan has chosen the path of democracy and during the past years proved its adherence to this principle. Azerbaijan has achieved noticeable achievements and progress in the way of democratic, secular state building based on the rule of law and ensuring of fundamental human rights and freedoms, has carried out huge reforms. There has been ensured the economic progress based on market economy for the sake of well-being and prosperity of our people. Along with its active participation in international organizations such as OSCE, Council of Europe year-by-year, Azerbaijan is strengthening cooperative and partnership relations with NATO, European Union and integrating to the euro-atlantic structures. Situating in the internationally important transport corridors our country actively participates in the realization of huge projects relating to the transport corridors. Strengthening of GUAM as a regional organization coincides with our integration policy into euro-atlantic organizations and we should continue our efforts. With its irreplaceable role in the development of international cooperation in the Caspian Sea, Azerbaijan has laid down the foundation for making this basin the space of peace, tranquility and cooperation. Memorable Heydar Aliyev`s oil strategy and Caspian policy will serve and make contribution to the prosperity and development of Azerbaijani people and to economy and world energy security for a long time.

Dear conference participants,

Since elapsed centuries the world nations have benefited from Latin culture and civilization. After the gaining and restoration of its independence twice in the XX century Azerbaijani people has adopted Latin based script and future culture, education and development have been tied to this alphabet. At present, the Republic of Azerbaijan is an observer country in the Organization of American States, our country establishes political, economical and cultural relations with Spain, Italy, Portugal and other countries which have Latin origin. In our foreign policy we attach great importance to the development of all-round cooperation with these countries. The economic development of our country, its worthy place in international arena, broadening of international relations, offer favorable facilities for the creating and strengthening of cooperative relations with the Latin American countries. For this purpose, first of all we intend to establish diplomatic representations, to intensify high level mutual visits and then to create juridical base for bilateral relations.

I do believe that participation in the conference of high ranking and distinguished guests from these countries will also give contribution to our intentions.

I wish you success in the work of the conference.

Thank you for attention.

1

The Latin Interlocution

New Mediterraneans?

François L'Yvonnet

> *"There is no longer civilization when the risk is absent and a challenge no longer gives its weight to a culture."*
>
> Michel de Certeau

■ One might, with Predrag Matvejevitch[1] (Russo-Croatian writer born in Bosnia-Herzegovina), stop at the several names of the Mediterranean, to establish that it has no real *proper* name, having nearly carried them all. "The Mediterranean several names, according to the countries of which banks it bathes," wrote geographer Mercator.

"Upper Sea," among the Egyptians. "Great" sea or Sea that is "behind," in the Bible. In the Iliad (that only knew the sea of Thrace and the Icarian) and the Odyssey (the sea is everywhere), in does not carry any particular name. Herodotus, who located it in the north, naturally called it "*Boreia thalassa*." "Hellenic Sea," to Thucydide (by hellenocentrism). The "sea that is near us," in *Phedon* by Plato. "Mare Nostrum," to Rome, because it bathed surrounding lands. Ibn Khaldun (as the Turks) called it "White Sea."

"*Mediterraneus*" qualified a space in the middle of the continent, which was distinguished and opposed to "*maritimus*." The noun "*mediterraneum*" indicated anyway what is in the middle of the lands. The word "Mediterranean" is adopted after Origenes (in *De Mediterraneo Mari*):

> The Great Sea (*mare Magnum*) is the one springing in the Ocean in the West and turns southward and reaches the North. It is called the Great Sea because, compared to it, the other seas are smaller. It is the Mediterranean because it bathes the surrounding lands (*mediam terram*) as far as the East, separating Europe, Africa and Asia.

To the question: "What is the Mediterranean?" Fernand Braudel answered:

> A thousand things at the same time. Not a landscape, but countless landscapes. Not a sea, but countless seas. Not civilizations, but civilizations piled up one on top of the other.

■ One must fend off the "geological" temptation, too dreamy, too exotic and too immeasurable… What is the point of digging "soil," other than to check that we are never the first occupants, that according to the word by Auguste Comte, all the dead people accompany us in our ancient task. One must keep from making an illusory reference to seas more or less "closed" of the globe, to the likewise unlikely names, on the shores of which different peoples thrived to state that it is about there of the evidence, new Mediterranean seas. Black, Caspian and why not Baltic or Caribbean, by a fortunate effect of the geographic determin-

ism, *bis repetita placent,* the "Latin" genius would benefit "intimate" seas. It would only be left to federate these small wonders to constitute a new universal republic.

If Latinity, such as we understand it can engender Mediterranean seas, it is less in the letter than in sprit. The Mediterranean is presented as a curious paradigm. It incarnates at the same time the pluralism: which it spreads out as far as Latin America, as far as the western coast of Africa, which it also provokes, and it is then the experience of a healthy *vis-à-vis* with something else, with the one facing us. The hegemonic world, relayed in the spirits by the media hold is a world without a face to face, a world without shores, nobody looks at anybody.

The "Mediterranean" is the "space/time" of the *vis-à-vis*, if Latinity is one of the deep dynamics. It is about making available, being in the opening, hanging on as close as possible to a native plurality, which offer someone else the possible fraying toward his own otherness, toward the expressions of a universal concrete.

What is being Latin, other than recognizing the other that is in us? Other than feeling that it is never enough to be oneself? It is also, engendering, in the Socratic manner, an experience of plurality among those from whom we take the language. There is an *irony* in Latinity, this act of splitting in two the other by splitting ourselves in two.

The Mediterranean is a space in perpetual tension (even risking bursting up), which performs a kind of balance between opposites: the *closed* and *open* (a see that is a long

strait between two seas, one nearly closed, the Black Sea, the other one open over faraway seas, The Atlantic). A world of endogenous germination that irradiates all points of the globe. The *same* and the *other* (a strong identity, recognizable among all, made of open, undefined appurtenances. Any attempt of reducing one and the other is an impoverishment). *One* is the *multiple*: the Mediterranean, in spite of splits and crises, in spite of clashes, it is at the same time homogenous (even if by its light, "But bringing up the light/Suppose a shadow of doleful half") and disparate (contrasting developments, different political regimes, unevenly explosive demography, dramas of savage migrations).

The Mediterranean is the theater, less and les geographical, *stricto sensu*, more and more metaphorical of a narration of the possible. The Mediterranean is the lobby (the matrix, Edgar Morin would say) of an imaginary "Euro-Afro-Asian," which the most radical totalizations plays, those of unifying and reductive ideologies. Referring, here, to Latinity, is not to privilege the septentrion over the meridian, or to nourish on old empire dreams, It is, to the contrary, always moving back boundaries of the world, toward other nascent or reborn worlds. Other worlds, which try to assert their existence, in the reciprocal recognition, out of separatist withdrawals.

■ Latinity to us is a "style," as much as a "method." The 4 "d": *detour*, *dissidence*, *dissention* and *decentralizing*. Latinity must be the occasion of a *detour* (according to sinologist François Jullien who suggests to us making a *detour*

through China). The occasion for us to undo unilateral points of view, operate a *decentralization*. It is the price to pay for becoming available, for giving the measure of "growth of the several." The same François Jullien says one must create *dissension* (against the *consensus* that undermines the debate of ideas in aging democracies) and therefore make *dissidence* (in relation to a hegemonic nature world order, essentially Anglo-Saxon: Latinity is a manner of keeping alongside, there where a centrifuge force is exerted—which drives us away from the center). "Dissidence" or "counter conduct," in the Foucaldi meaning of the term. Dissidence challenges tradition, the "counter conduct" assumes it, but resorting to it.

"Latin" pluralism is remarkably illustrated by the relation that Romans maintained with their origin, conceived as the transplantation into a new soil of something that already existed, thus Aeneas leaving Troy behind (ransacked by the Greeks) toward Latin land. The experience is the one of the beginning, says very rightly Rémi Brague.[2]

"To the difference of the Greeks who put their point of honor of owing nothing to anyone, not having masters, the Romans willfully confess that they owe others."

Latinity would be this unique experience of the transmission of what belongs to no one in particular, and therefore would belong to everyone. The edict of Caracalla, which extended Roman citizenship to all free men of the Empire, draws a major part of its symbolic strength, from such "transmitting" gesture.

"Roman," proceeds Rémi Brague, is one who knows he is taken between a classicism to imitate and a barbarity to subjugate (a barbarity that is at first interior). "Being a Roman, he says, is perceiving oneself as a Greek in relation to what is barbarian, but also as a barbarian to what is Greek." Hence the very fertile idea of "Roman way." There is, in this respect, a Roman *mediation*, very hard to be bypassed, for those who say they are Latin.

■ The Mediterranean (Latin, ours, but also "hellenistic" Mediterraneans, of which Candido Mendes loves to speak) is put in rhythm by a time devoted to generating. The future is not on the side of the mouth, toward which the running water would go (this is what the image of the Heraclitean river suggests), but on side of the source, the gushing of what is properly forthcoming.

"The guilty past is back in a present that purports to be absolute," said Michel de Certeau[3]). One must relearn the past by inventing the present. To the concept of being, always prefer the concept of procedure. Of one thing, one might not ask "what is it" or "why is it?" but "how does it do it?".

To the question "*Where salvation will come from?*" Simone Weil replied: "*From the past only if we love it.*" There is a "progressive" illusion consisting of believing that salvation comes from the future… Thinking progress under domination of the idea of the future, has remained a prisoner of hope, of which the imaginary and the illusion (is the role of the idea of communism in Marx). On the other hand, one

may conceive progress, not as something that would bring us closer to a future (that not existing one can only have an imagined status, but as a phenomenon at the same time of the accumulation of the past and loyalty to the past. Hannah Arendt, in a completely different point of view, said some very compatible things: there is no progress if one does not conserve the past. What allows advancing, is not to cancel all that has taken place, The idea that salvation might come from the past, that is from *loyalty* (which one can oppose to *faith*), is our manner of conceiving Latinity. A projective loyalty. What is not closed to what will be, is the render possible here and now.

■ It would be necessary to speak about "tradition of the new" or "invention of tradition," against another tyranny, which took over from the "radiant future": the *tyranny of the present*.

A tyranny that is the measure of "real time," which is not historical or chronological time (which is local). The "real time," is world, full, uniform, unique time that accomplishes, according to Paul Virilio[4] (that we follow here) the three traditional attributes of the divine: the ubiquity, instantaneity and immediateness. This real time, potentially tyrannical, is a threat to democracy (there is an absolute power of absolute speed). Speed, which is power itself, "all power, he said, is *dromocratcale*" (from Greek *dromos*, the course), an d the entire society is "a society of a course" (with the will to control a territory with "des messengers, means of transportation and transmission"). There is therefore an entire eco-

nomy of speed—the speed that changes our view of the world, our "*Weltanschauung*." To each society, to each time its speed. So much that speeds were relative, they could be democratic, that is, shared (from the Greek battleship to the airplane, passing by the train and the car, each time there is a relative time that can be shared), today with the triumph of new technologies, with, I mention it again: "the absolute speed of electromagnetic waves, the question of the democratization of speed is asked." Cyberspace, with the speed of waves, constitutes a real threat to democracies. It is in fact a threat in its *temporality* itself, absolute speed forbidding, for example, all sort of decision.

In support of these speed-centered analyses (it is well said that speed is the number one analyzer of our societies), Virilio proposes a set of reflections on the time/space relations: in *cyclic time* of origins, in *sagittal time* (linear time, arrow, chronological history), succeeds "*dromospherc*" *time,* according to his expression, the one of light, a global time. Cyberworld, is electromagnetic simultaneity, "real time that carries it over real space," instantaneity that cancels the subtle game of distance and closeness that makes the close one as the faraway one. Now, as Virilio said, "the question of the faraway is of the close one, it is the question of the City." In other words, the one of democracy. He quotes, in this respect, a very nice verse by poet René Char: "Eliminating distancing kills."

The threat, are its terms themselves, it having in mind an Earth reduced by the retraction of the "mental chart," an

Earth lost by disappearance of the conscience of extension, the mental loss of a "*proper world"* in favor of a *virtual world*, a loss that goes with another loss "own body" in favor of the "spectral body," a ghostly and diaphanous figure. With this form of "chrono-totalitarian" globalization, there is the threat of great isolation. The world is lost as a distance, whence the feeling of imprisonment.

The distinction proposed by Virilio between the *territory*, which has depth, and the *middle* that risks unsettling the territory, depth disappearing "in favor of a computing exchange, is interesting."

■ But, the territory, Patrick Chamoiseau suggests, does not extend to be established in the center, the center that places durably *under relation* the outskirts, in the frame a growing immaterial in a more and more chaotic world (in the sense of the theory of chaos: a small spasm can produce a catastrophe in the scale of everything). Édouard Glissant speaks of a "Chaos-world." We prefer then the territory, the place that behaves in rhizome.

> The territory isolates there where the place, inhabited by diversity, tends to radiate in complex manner, in a sharing game, de solidarities and exchanges, the world would thus be constituted of an infinite constellation places that will elaborate unity without uniqueness.

To providing contacts, horizontally and centrally, which is what the territory induces, is opposed by placing *under* relation, vertical and decentralized. In order to point out this "world citizenship" (against "globalization"), Édouard Glis-

sant speaks of "Everybody," P. Chamoiseau of "open, unpredictable totality," providing contacts that is also a project aimed at installing an imaginary of *diversity* or *complexity.*

■ The "paradigmatic" Mediterranean—which carries diversity in it, of which Latin pluralism—is a "polycentered" place. These are the Mediterreaneans that open, when collective memories are restored, when they answer back, like an echo, cultures threatened of disappearance by a leveling globalization. It would be necessary to imagine a geography tailored to an axial configuration (concerned areas touching each other more by their "center" than by their border), made of nesting (actual and imaginary) and networks (at the same time held and covering).

What is at stake, through the "Mediterraneans," it a new cosmopolitism. He who owes something, certainly, to Stoics cosmopolitism. With Marcus-Aurelius, we have declared ourselves willingly "citizen of the world." He who likewise owes something to Kant's cosmopolitism and to the one of the Enlightenment. In the In the eighth proposition of *The idea of universal history to the cosmopolite point of view*, Kant tells us that what allows us to state history effectively leads humanity toward a cosmopolitical state of peace and law, is cosmopolitism in act of its century (recurrent theme of 18th century literature, exposed in the Academia and spread out in sitting rooms). Kant concluded that it is allowed to expect "a universal cosmopolitical state, such that in its bosom all original dispositions of the human species will be developed."

"Latin" cosmopolitism will be a "concrete" cosmopolitism (as we speak of a concrete universe). Kantian universality is further the one of the "subject" knowing in the simplicity and transparency of his decrees. An even more euro-centered universality.

There was a time when cosmopolitism could pass as a weapon against nationalism (indeed patriotism). Heinrich Heine prophesized that this one would be in all the spirits of Europe. Ulrich Beck[5] precisely remarks that reality has become today cosmopolitical. And gives two examples: the terrorist threat knows no border and the war in Iraq, which for the first time was treated as an internal political event.

With this paradox: resistance to globalization entails a political globalization.

To the central prison territory theory of identity, of society and politics, Ulrich Beck opposes the five principles of a "cosmopolitical optics" (whose adoption would be the necessary condition for conceptual reconstruction of perception):

1. The one of the experience of world society crisis, which is to say, interdependence perceived through global risks and civilizing destiny communities.
2. The principle of recognizing differences in the midst of world society and conflicts resulting thereof.
3. The principle of cosmopolitical empathy and change of perspective (with a virtual interchangeability of situations).

4. The principle of non-livability of a world society with
   no borders (and consequently redrawing new ones).
5. The principle of mixing local, national, ethnical, reli-
   gious and cosmopolitical cultures and traditions.

Cosmopolitism formulation takes from Beck the bearings
of a curious manifest where Kantian universalist inspiration
conjugates its effects with "realistic" strange frivolities.

> What is this Enlightenment?—he writes—Have the courage to
> adopt cosmopolitical optics, which is to say, claim multiple identi-
> ties: of living in the fashion prescribed by the language, the color of
> your skin, your nationality, or your religion, while being aware of
> the fact that, in the radical insecurity of the world that is ours, all
> men are at the same time equal and different.[6]

Perhaps this declaration of the sense of the world is miss-
ing. "Collective" risk, "global" risk, the fact of having gone
aboard the same boat—(it is not about underestimating
them)—it would be to become aware of prospective con-
science. Latinity brings along, perhaps, strong of this history,
a tragic dimension. Tragic is all that resists reconciliation (the
one of opposites), good feelings and blissful optimism.

In the heart of this Latin adventure there is, a shared
feeling of fatality. "The fatal event is not the one that can be
explained by causes, it is the one that, at a given time, con-
tradicts all casualties" (Baudrillard). There a sort of sensi-
tivity, private attention, to the always possible turnaround of
things (from positive to negative). It is no point abandoning
haphazardly or the need, but to meet the challenge of this
destiny.

■ Leibniz, in the preface to his *Theodicy*, distinguishes *fatum mahumetanum* (supposed destiny to the Turkish, "because it is attributed to Turks not to avoid dangers, and not even leave places infected by the plague." The *fatum stoïcum* (which is not as black as it is made: "men were not diverted from caring for their business, but it tended to give tranquility in respect to events"). The *fatum christianum* (God is a good master, in whose hands we can abandon ourselves). We would willingly add a "*fatum baudrillardum*," which is not far from being "*latinum*." What does Jean Baudrillard say? Destiny has a spherical shape, "the more you move away from a point the more you get close to it."

Baudrillard (but also Clément Rosset) loves to illustrate his analysis by the beautiful Persian satire ascribed to Farid al-Din Attar (12th century):

One morning, the caliph of Baghdad ran into his vizier who qui se threw himself on his knees, pale and trembling:

— I beg you, Sire, Seigneur, let me leave town today!

— And why is this?

— This morning, as I was crossing the square to come to the palace, a woman hit me in the crowd. I turned around and I recognized death… She looked hard at me. Sire, she is looking for me...

— Are you sure it was death?

— Yes, Sire, she was dressed in black with a red scarf. Her look was frightening. Believe me Sire, she is looking for me, let me leave right now, I shall take my fastest horse, and if I do not stop, I'll be able to be in Samarkand this evening!

The caliph, who loved his vizier, let him leave. The latter disappeared in a cloud of dust…

> Wondering, the caliph left the palace in disguise, as he had often done. On the market place, he saw death and advanced toward her:
> — I have a question to ask you: my vizier is a young and healthy man. Why did you terrorize him this morning giving him a threatening look?
> — It was not a threatening look, it was an astonished look. I did not expect at all to see him here, in Baghdad… I have an appointment with him this evening, in Samarkand!

Baudrillard conceives destiny as the principle of reversibility in act. It is necessary to oppose *destination* (which has a clear purpose, what classical philosophies of history thought each one in its fashion, and preceding geographies), *predestination* (without religious connotation). Such moment of time is predestined to such other, "as in a poem where one has the impression that words have always had the vocation of meeting again." All coincidences, he adds, are sort of predestinated.

Coincidence, and not "causal" necessity, which we run into here in Bakou, among old cultures (Donald H. Rumsfeld spoke of the "old world," scornfully), which are at the same time ignored, and co-engendered by secular circulation (why not say millenary) of goods, ideas and men.

Latin pluralism is a plentiful (and fragile) multiplicity of destinies that belong to us to be left open. These the inexhaustible virtualities of *Unita multiplex.*

■ At last, we will call to mind the luminous idea of Bergson (of which Baudrillard has made a very "personal" usage as usual). In *The Possible and the Real* (retaken in *The Thought and the Changing*[7]), Bergson denounces a misunderstand-

ing, rather an error. The idea that the possible would be *less* than the real and that for this reason the possibility of things would precede their existence:

> They would thus be representable in advance; they might not be thoughts before being accomplished. But it is the opposite that is true. (…) If we consider the whole of concrete reality or all simply the world of life, (…) we find that there is no more, and no less, in the possibility of each one of the successive states in their reality.

And farther to add:

> I believe we will end up finding it evident that the artist created from the at the same time from the real when he executes his work.

This is very precisely one of the major features of this "destinal" Latinity: creating from the possible (political, geopolitical, cultural, indeed brotherly) at the same time as from the real.

Notes

1. *La Méditerranée et l'Europe*, Fayard, 2005 (Lessons given at the Collège de France in 1997).
2. *Europe, la voie romaine*, Gallimard, coll. Folio, 1999 (particularly, chapter II).
3. *L'étranger ou l'union dans la différence*, Seuil, 2005 (particularly, chapter III).
4. *La vitesse de libération*, Galilée, 1995.
5. *Qu'est-ce que le cosmopolitisme?* Aubier, 2006.
6. In an epigraph of his book *Qu'est-ce que le cosmopolitisme?*
7. *In Œuvres*, édition du Centenaire, Presse Universitaire de France, 1959, p. 1331, sq.

Latinity among Nations and Civilizations

Alain Touraine

For a long time, the history of the world has been largely the inner history of the western world and particularly its great powers. Among the most important States and societies today, many have belonged to the British Empire, or more often in the twentieth century to the United States, without underestimating the importance of other colonial empires. Russia, Turkey, Japan have likewise created colonial empires. In modern history, what has most escaped these empires and these dominions has been the action of great nomad populations, mainly coming from Central Asia and conquering India, Western Asia and Turkey, until this one, it is turn, penetrated the heart of Europe. One must evidently also acknowledge that not a few populations juridically depending on a great European power, have lived a largely independent social and cultural reality, this has largely been the case of Indian populations in so-called Latin America.

The most important fact early in this century is that the western world, while advancing on nearly all grounds: from science to health, from arts to architecture, is increasingly run over by other worlds, other modes of modernization.

This judgment can only be understood if we briefly define what one can call the western model of modernization that has exercised for a long time a strong hold on nearly the whole world and of which I assert here that it has lost and loses everyday more and more of its monopoly.

In a few words, we must remember that opposite ensembles like China and the Arab World, which had often achieved the highest level of civilization, but did not care first of all about their unity and their integration, Western Europe has created a kind of society and chiefly completely different States and ruling elites. The great countries of Europe have concentrated their resources in the hand of one ruling elite: knowledge, power, money, education. The model has also created as a compensation the inferiority of other categories pushed as for as possible. Which explains that all explanation systems are deservedly speaking of the importance and classes or further the elites by the way of the western world. Salaried workers, colonized peoples, women and children, to a great extent have been defined by this inferiority rather than by their feature.

This strong polarization has been best represented by the image of the steam machine, whose energy production is as great as the potential difference between the hot pole and the cold pole. The western modernization model has pushed this potential difference to the maximum. But the extremely brutal character at the same time effective of western modernization could not work because several kinds of institutions have been developed that have prevented the explosion

of opposing poles. The first kind of institution that has pre-
vented this explosion is evidently the series of measures, re-
pressive or not, which are called social control instrument.
But unlike other parts of the world, the western system has
mostly stressed repression, rather than the search for confor-
mity. Perhaps Michael Foucault's book *Surveiller et punir*
was interpreted as a general definition of western society; it
leaves no less than it had the obsession with confinement,
surveillance, and further more directly repression. This one
is less exercised in the name of religious or political princi-
ples, that in the name of society itself and its ability for inte-
gration, adaptation to change, and mobilization.

It would be unfair to give these control instruments a
predominating importance. All in all, Western Europe has
followed another path, by creating mediation and represen-
tation institutions. Dominated categories had the possibility
of being liberated, often in violent manner, sometimes in ne-
gotiated manner indeed even prepared in advance by law.
The western world has been, at least as much as the world of
power, and the initiative, the one of right topped by the de-
velopment and independence of the judicial system to the
point that major western countries have overdeveloped in-
stitutions in charge of defending individuals and citizens
against the State itself.

This brief description does not go back to the descrip-
tion given by classical sociology and the presents society as
a system whose main functions are setting goals, means for
achieving them, formation of new members and repression

of deviant ones. It is even a contrary image that one must have of society, the one I have just indicated and that rests on extreme inner tensions at the same time that on creation action of an outstanding conquest capability, which had indeed given conquering countries a quick supremacy, backed by their weapons, their science, their administrations and by the output of their investments. But it is about a quite complex system, which allies resource concentration to conflict management and liberation of the spirit products

It is harder to define this "holding together" of the elements of this system. The most current explanation is the creation of the national State, taking the place of absolute monarchies and also of city-States, which has given political unities "sovereignty" exercised inside itself becoming legitimacy even more than on outside rivals.

This brief presentation is sufficient to introduce a general hypothesis: one of decomposition, or weakening or further overflow of this modernization mode by others. More precisely, the hypothesis introduced here is that this western modernization model has been jointly overflowed by two other types of modernization: on the one hand an extreme capitalism that breaks away from all institutions and social life rules and particularly overflowing national States, as completely as the one that overflows or at least weakens the National State.

The other overflow comes from a completely opposed horizon: it is about moving great ensembles that had remained motionless at the time when the west rolled off, car-

ing about their integration and their balance more than about the foreign world by knowledge and weapons. China is an example of this new development that already weighs heavier on the whole world. Whereas the west has dealt with its dynamism and its conflicts by a growing inner differentiation, which goes farther that the famous separation of powers, in other models, we watch the contrary to a unifying mobilization process, on the direction of single more total center or even totalitarian of power.

Little does it matter here that this center is political, ethnic or religious nature, it is really about a general resource mobilization allowing making accelerated progress at a human cost that would not be bearable in other modernization models. One might make the hypothesis that in the vast Arab-Muslim ensemble centers are formed or even a general mobilization center, but its weakness prohibits transforming in industrialization and modernization bases and consequently devotes a large part of its resources to the struggle against the "foreigner" and particularly against the west, longtime colonizer, conqueror and missionary.

If we accept this hypothesis that must be—at least very briefly—presented, a question is imposed on the western world itself, but the answer brought to this question of the greatest importance to the whole world: what is the future, of the western world that has progressively lost, mostly in the twentieth century, its inner power, that is, the strength of its tensions and its internal struggles. Once this citizen movement has overthrown absolute monarchies the labor

movement has limited employers' authority, colonized are liberated and the tutelage that they suffered and that women have acquired thanks to the feminist movement freedoms and forms of equality that seemed rather a century off reach, the western world is not reduced to becoming a simple consumer world, taking advantage of for a time perhaps quite long, remarkably higher standard of living, freedom and creativity than the rest of the world, but has lost all dynamic principle, all investment and conquest capability. This question should be particularly asked in Europe but also in the United States being a part in central manner of the western modernization mode, they are also the center of an empire, which at first was of economic and technological nature and that we have named by convenience the globalization universe.

It is indeed first the formation of this new organization mode that we must be interested in. Because its novelty is often misunderstood and conceived in a too narrow manner. It is imagined that production and exchange internationalization and the growing influence of the financial system over the economy ensemble essentially constitutes what one calls globalization. However, all these phenomena were already predictably and well defined in the early twentieth century. They were then called imperialism, particularly among German thinkers, a word whose meaning ware very close to the one of globalization and also forebode the same ambiguities. Indeed, what is deeply new is that the economy global application separates it from the ensemble of social,

political, cultural institutions and even of private conducts in a large part of the world. This break of the economy and of what was called society, drags along its decomposition that tries to reduce itself to a set of initiative or even control management, whose capability for action is considerably weaker than the one of state-nations. It is often spoken about local government, corporatism, voluntary organization and quite a few other forms of limited, localized power often reduced to influence mechanisms, But nothing takes the place of the State as the unifying principle in the social ensemble.

Globalization therefore has, as a direct consequence and even as direction what we can call the end of economic-social ensembles under the authority of a national or local State. We have been accustomed, particularly by modern historian to speaking of economic-social ensembles, as if these two categories could be separated one from the other, that we have often hardly understood that this separation has been accomplished and continues to deepen since the early twentieth century, but in much since that totalitarian system to which I will slightly refer less visible manner have been undone and that the illusion even inside the west of the total modernization mode has resulted in bloody failures.

Globalization has increasingly isolated the United States from developed Europe, in fact, not from the economic and technological preeminence of the United States, but indeed that the latter, in the name of its power itself, became in charge of managing to its profit, world affaires by replacing, where applicable, weakened European National States. The

United States today appears as a blend of two sets of realities that are often in contradiction one with the other. The first is to push farther the capability for creating conflicts and conflict resolution mechanisms that characterize the western model; the other face is responding to the pressure by foreign pressure of mobilization of the same kind, centered on objectives at the same time religious and warlike, rather than economical and technological.

Whereas European countries to which we must add Japan, keep certain strength in production, consumption and communication order, none of these countries can claim a hegemonic role and even an important intervention in world affaires. We see it with particular clarity in the Middle East, where western Europe does not interfere in the struggle between Israelis and Palestinians, which is of central importance, but only finding Palestinian resistance, without having said a single word in the search for durable negotiations and solutions.

This duality of American society and State is so neat that it entails a growing ambivalence from others in the world toward the most powerful one among them. It is true that the United States has carried to the highest level the western model features; it is well as true that it has built its own hegemony, that they manage more and more according to religious, ideological or properly imperialist principles.

It is this search for hegemony that had led the most important countries to try to create new modernization mode that they introduced into a westernized world itself, to sev-

eral degrees, it is true, mobilization and action methods as we have seen and that we see in action outside Europe. We have spoken of totalitarianism in that case, and the most extreme case was of nazi Germany, because this country was in the very center of western modernization history, when it was insisted largely deservedly, on components or non-western of the soviet system that was imposed on the eastern half of Europe and at the same time a large part of Central Asia and even more in huge China, and in developing countries such as Vietnam, North Korea and others.

The victory of democracies over totalitarian systems marks the highest point of western history, its most glorious achievement, because it is principles of freedom and creativity that have outweighed countries such as Germany or the Soviet Union that had equal or superior material resources and technique. When we must speak of the western model weakening in light of more state-controlled and societal model, we must not forget that this western model has demonstrated in the course of the twentieth century its ability to give victory to the best of itself against the worst of itself.

Now we can, after these short indications, approach the question that it at the core of this reflection: what is the future, what are already the current trends of the European modernization model that has been extended and perennial not only in Europe, but in Europeanized territories, in first place Latin America but also certain more restricted spaces in Asia an Africa?. What may the resistance and initiative

force be in this European world in face of United States he-
gemony and on the other side, accelerated growth of a China
submitted to an absolute power?

The first answers suggesting observation of current Eu-
rope are pessimistic. European constitution that has driven so
many favorable effects also seems to have reduced the coun-
tries of the continent to be just members of economic interest
association. Europe, no more than the Euro itself, are not ca-
pable of competing with American power. European coun-
tries seem to be more concerned with reducing their social
security system deficits, or resuming an even modest eco-
nomic growth. European country inhabitants, as such, do not
take any responsibility or historical mission. This negative
observation should be rejected or contested, but one must
start by accepting it because it quite unarguably corresponds
to the mediocrity climate dominating European public life,
where traditional parties no longer seem to be opposed one to
the others, where labor unions in many countries have lost the
essential of their strength and mostly where general world
problems only arouse a televiewer interest. If we do not wish
to hold to this pessimistic but unarguably accurate finding,
we must try to build an image of what Europe might be and
what we could think and want.

But the first condition to reach such construction is to
leave the European framework itself. Which is not hard be-
cause certain countries such as Great Britain are closely as-
sociated with the United States and former communist
countries devote all their activities and their thinking to a

difficult integration into the European Union. The other countries have no unity, but something if left of the driving role that had been performed for such long time par the Franco-German couple. But it is wiser to forswear the European framework very branded by the economy and choose a more proactive approach and consequently more detached from economic and territorial realities. It is here that the idea of *Latinity* might intervene, such as developed particularly by Candido Mendes from Rio de Janeiro. The advantage of this notion is of being absolutely *artificial*, that is, not defending a culture, a tradition or a language. The Latinity idea is first of all the expression of part of Europe, or even its totality, of bestowing on itself a creative role in today's world. We must not then say in all logic the world of Latinity to such and such objective, It is fairer to say and mostly more interesting to acknowledge that it is the will to create an independent project for Europe playing an important role in a world system dominated by increasingly marked plurality of modernization models.

The Latinity idea is linked first of all to the idea of non-power. But what characterized Europe where Euro-Latin and Latin American Latinity is the awareness of not possessing power and not looking for exercising power at world level. The Latinity idea has even introduced a will to define a society or a culture by foreign finalities into political power world, such as economic hegemony. The first formulation presenting itself to the spirit and best corresponding to the frame of mind of Europeans and Latin Americans

wants to give priority to phenomena and internal social players over all political-military representations or further military religious that have acquired such importance in today's world.

Even the fact that no political power or no religious force corresponds to what we call Latinity means that it is defined by secularization and that can also call secularism, and by the assertion that the powers of the State and even of institutions must be subordinated to rules and values subordinating everything that is social and political to requirements that are at the same time of freedom, democracy and human rights ethics. This wishful subordination, of all that comes close to power, all that constitutes power seems to place Europe in a situation of dependence, indeed even of insignificance. It is for no other simple reason that world problems are not dominated by a society or an empire but by competition indeed even the warlike relation among several social and geopolitical zones.

The role of Europe is more precisely what we call here that Latinity should exercise constant pressure on both east and west, the north as well as the south in order to re-penetrate democracy, secularization and universalism in all parts of the world and chiefly the ones where power outweighs social institutions and the ones over rights and individual and group demands. The formulation of such a role does not lead at all to banalities and limited statements to principles with no concrete effects. What we name Latinity must be in charge of constant will to intervene in all parts of the world

to have democracy or secularization triumph, mostly where these principles are accepted in principle and respected in fact.

It is no longer acceptable, for example, for the Latinity world to accept nearly without protesting official conducts by the United States that are in overt contradiction to the principles that have just been expressed and that are equally the basis of American constitution. At the time when the Iraq war was launched, in nearly all European cities where were manifestations against the war. Such initiative is exemplary of what may constitute a European will, which we call here Latinity, and whether it tries to correspond to a certain number of countries that keep where they conquered true initiative and movement freedom in comparison with the United States.

But this demand cannot be separated from the one leading it, in parallel, to condemn the absence of public freedom, particularly in China, or in other countries. This leads to very concrete position taking, such as, for example, supporting the independence of Taiwan has in fact become a democracy. It is not about the Latin world and for the European world to defend no matter which minority in no matter which context, but to the contrary constantly redeeming a priority for the defense of what is more directly binding an ethical and political conception resting on defending the universal character of individual rights.

Such orientation would not be far from the one imputed to United Nations bodies by their founding texts. But what

brings the Latinity idea to the one of Europe is giving a concrete base to this United Nations universalism, which cannot be supported by a hegemonic power or holding a dominating position in international affaires. The weakness, one would say, of this position is the one into which the idea of intrusion right, drawn up by Bernard Kouchner has collided. It is certain that one cannot, in the name of human rights infringements, attack China or the United States, as one could eventually attack North Korea or condemn the Kuwait invasion that lead to the first war against Iraq.

But the essential cannot be situated on an international or planetary level. It is the interior of the world that takes the word in the name of Latinity or Europe that the essential of the work must be accomplished. The treatment of minorities, the search for equality of chances, creation of new forms of positive discrimination, all these principles should transform political life of concerned countries and at least override a French republican egalitarianism whose counter-effects are often demonstrated.

The "civilization clash" has prevented understanding over the last decades the action of those who want to transform society not only by denouncing inequalities and marginalizing and important part of the population but mostly by bringing innovating responses to liberty, equality and justice demands. The question that must be asked is therefore: are the countries where social groups or institutions claiming for Latinity even indeed the European idea ready to apply in their own operation, and therefore in their own

laws and regulations different principles from the ones ap-
plied up to the present, but have only received their first ex-
pression at European level? In other words, are we ready to
consider of core principles of our laws and our organization
forms the defense of liberties that often appear as coura-
geous but unrealistic in a past experience? Let us admit that
there are territories where the weight of the State and its rea-
son of state are less felt than in other parts of the world?
And, is it reasonable to think that a Europe that has seen the
birth of national States in his history has been dominated by
wars and conflicts among national States, has become not a
Switzerland at world scale but a place where new forms of
fighting failures of poor operation are tried, even crimes by
national and supranational institutions? This action turned
inside out is the most important one, the one of that must
give in concrete, territorial reality, to the Latinity or Europe
idea. But we cannot separate a second important function
that reducing as much as possible signs of conflicts.

Very heavy defeats have been followed by Europeans in
settling conflicts in Bosnia; what to say of the weakness, to
say the least, shown by several States in Rwanda genocide
prevention or in the efforts to limit massacres. It is not artifi-
cial at all to think of a time where politics is often focused on
war or oil supply, imagining that social and cultural prob-
lems, the defense of necessary universalist values to com-
munication and to the defense of identities and cultural
diversity can be combined. Nearly everywhere and in all do-
mains, the difficulty in matching opposites, which corre-

sponds to the creation of situations producing ambivalent reactions to resort to an increasingly used by sociologists.

One must show the practical importance as much as the theoretical collective space redefinition as being governed by other principles than those of war, economic competition or political and religious crusades. One speaks so much about civilian society that it loses its autonomy or its influence over the world of the State. Its disappearance has been announced, which to the contrary hold an increasingly central place to the extent that the old European modernization model yields its place to new models either on the American side or the Chinese side and other countries. We can answer that the main purpose is to achieve civilian society rebirth, but it is more explicit to speak about and democracy rebirth campaign, because it only exists in the extent where citizens and therefore civilian society have the capability to exercise determining control and influence over all activities of the States, from public administration to international war.

In conclusion, it is not by these specific, political, economic and social characters, that the Latinity idea must be defined, it is first of all by opposition to the competing modernization model that destroys separation of powers, secularization principles and respect for human rights that had held a central place in the political idea system on which the first democracies born in Europe or North America were built. Whatever the chances are of achieving concrete objectives, it is of extreme importance to hear the voices and intervening initiatives designed to limits forms of competition

or conflicts among large state-controlled blocks; it is indispensable to establish new societies not on production forces and organization rules but on individual and citizen defense demands in face of the State, economic systems and even political strategies of organized groups at all levels.

Is it not possible to include in today's and tomorrow's world political geography the existence of a society and an imaginary region, but whose definition is built on what constitutes the most courageous and most effective part of European modernization mode from *Philosophy of Enlightenment?*

It is not a question here to appeal to a Latinity, a Mediterranean, a west charged with all virtues that are powerless in the midst of giants that are divided in the modern world. It is less a still nostalgic question of a reinvented past without almost no relation to a reality that was as brutal as our present. It must be made perfectly clear that Latinity is a live, important idea that because it does not designate an imaginary country, which also means, and this reminder is of great importance, that Latinity citizens are not born inside State borders whose origins are linked to the Roman empire. They should be considered as Latin, that is, as relatively unreal, all intellectuals that are American or Ukrainian or even Chinese who attach a predominant importance to the theme of liberty and democracy, brief, who see social life from the bottom, in a century where leaders perceive from above, atop nuclear warheads, like the Chief of Staff and central governments, It is therefore an appeal to a gathering and no

longer the greatest capacity for protestations and collective propositions, which are addressed in this speech on Latinity. We easily guess that Latinity borders can increasingly extent broadly and incorporate in its imaginary borders men and women of goodwill and courage everywhere in the world.

◇ 2

Religion, Secularization, Modernization

Europe's Encounter with Islam: what Future?[*]

Nilüfer Göle

1. French "Exceptionalism"?

I have not expected that European Union was going to enter in my area of interest when I have moved from Istanbul to Paris in the year 2001. It is not that European project did not matter to me until then. It did; in a similar way that it mattered to the majority of my friends and colleagues, Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals, both from secularist and religious backgrounds. At that time, our interest in Europe was mainly a Turkey-centered concern; derived from a widely shared expectation and desire that the European Union would provide a political and juridical framework to enlarge, and to enforce the institutionalization of democratic rights and freedoms in Turkey. Europe was standing, in the minds of many progressive intellectuals, for a fulfilled prophecy of secular democracy, as a stable and fix point of reference to promote the transformation of other societies. One

was not expecting Europe to be transformed and shaped with its encounter with the issues that were related with "Islam."

I was working on contemporary islam and its emerging force and visibility in public life and Turkey was my privileged terrain of observation. Turkey provided a site for studying Islamic movements in a politically pluralistic and a secularist context. The pluralism implied a field of competing forces, among political parties, social movements and "truth regimes." Islamism had to compete among these different set of ideas and powers. It was not appropriate therefore to speak of "islamization" in Turkey, as it is widely framed for other Muslim-majority countries, in the sense that Islamism was increasingly taking over political power and gaining influence in all spheres of life and imposing itself as a single truth regime.

The study of Islam in Turkey differed from other Muslim-majority countries that are under a Monarchic authoritarian rule. In some respects the place of Islam in Turkey, because of the secular legislation and a pluralistic political sphere revealed some similarities with the European contexts of pluralism. Islamic claims, and namely that of young female students to wear a headscarf in university classes, caused a long-term public confrontation with those who were holding to republican principles of secularism and feminism. When the French "headscarf debate" that has already started in the 1989, but took a new momentum and magnitude in spring 2003, I was struck by the parallelisms with the

Turkish one. The similarities between the two headscarf de-
bates turned my attention therefore to the ways in which
French Republican values of secularism and feminism were
reshaped in relation to Islam and addressed against the cla-
ims for visibility of religion in the public sphere.

The Islamic headscarf debate was to be followed in
France by an equally passionate and nation-wide debate on
the Turkish presence in European Union and its conse-
quences on the European values and identity. It is by means
of these two debates that the presence of Islam (muslim mi-
grants within Europe and muslims outside Europe) were
brought into the forefront of public concern and carried into
the arena of public awareness, meaning that it entered into
the area of concern and debate for "all" citizens, and not re-
mained solely in the hands of the decision-makers. The
Islamic veiling and the Turkish candidacy have little in
common, sociologically speaking. They follow different
historical trajectories; the veiling issue is related with
phenomenon of migration, the public schools, and gender
equality. It is related with new forms of religious agency
stemming from contemporary islamist movements. The
Turkish membership on the other hand is an outcome of a
long-term history of westernization of Turkey. It is an out-
come of political determination as well as societal mobiliza-
tion to conform and frame Turkish society and its future
with that of European Union. The agency that underpins the
Turkish membership is a secular democratic one. The scales
of agencies are different; the Islamic veiling is a concern at a
national level, the Turkish candidacy is debated at an intra-

national at the European scale. But there are also some
bridges between the two; the Islamic veiling is debated
in Turkey as well. The question of Islam is also addressed to
Turkey, not only because it is a Muslim-majority country
but also the government in power (AK party) is related with
the islamist movements of the 1980s that were contesting
the Western notions of democracy. These movements re-
veal the tensions between secular and religious orientations
but also the ongoing debate and contestation over the defini-
tions of space. The public schools and Europe are becoming
"political spaces" to the extent that they become a battle-
ground for the redefinition of the frontiers of inclusion and
exclusion and for the contestation of established values. The
question of space points to the understanding and creating
of "commonness," whether it is instituted by the public
schools or European Union. Creating a common space with
those who are external to national and European culture be-
comes a question that the answer to which goes beyond the
one that is provided by the framework of "integration." The
intensity of the debate in the French public sphere illustrates
the importance of the question, not only for "outsiders,"
Muslims, but also and foremost for Europeans. The ways
that these two issues are anchored in public consciousness
and become part of the French and/or European public de-
bate that calls for a comparative attention.

To sum up, Islam makes it way in the public arena and
public consciousness of European countries. Islam, until re-
cently, not a major concern for those who are specialists of
"European studies," at most a policy issue confined to poli-

tics of immigration, moves more and more into the center of research, public and political agendas. It is difficult today to engage a reflection upon politics of European countries or that of European Union, without reflecting upon its encounter with Islam.

As a consequence, Europe as a subject matter imposed itself to me, but by a gateway that was familiar to me. Rather then having left behind me Turkey and Islam, I was going to face and experience their presence in Europe. I had the feeling that rather than merely me making a move to France, France too has made a displacement, coming closer to the issues that were considered until then to be outside the Western boundaries, and confined to the "middle eastern" culture and geography. One has the habit of measuring for instance the Turkish *laicité* in the mirror of the French one, and reading the deficiencies and gaps with the original one. In the actual situation, one was tempted to observe the French headscarf debate in the mirror of the Turkish one. The didactic aspect of secularism (teaching how to be civilized citizens), its tendency towards authoritarianism and exclusionary politics (if necessary with the help of the military) were well known attributes of the Turkish *laicité*. But there was also the feminist alliance with secular republicanism, an intrinsic feature of Turkish secularism that was going to become also a salient feature of the French secularism in its encounter with Islam. The comparison between the two headscarf debates helped to understand the French one in new ways. One can say that from the Turkish perspective,

the French *laicité* ceases to be an "exception" and the French headscarf debate presents itself as a *déjà-vu*. (Methodologically speaking, such a reversal of the perspective has important consequences on the social scientific narration of modernity, derived from experiences of the West, supposed to be in "advance" both in terms of temporality and knowledge.)

But in return, it became more and more difficult to translate and communicate the possible meanings of the French debate to the Turkish public. My interlocutors, especially those who were secularist, liberal, feminist and pro-European have found at first, comfort and affinity in the secularist reaction of the French public to ban the headscarf from the public schools. They have interpreted this radical stance as a proof of attachment to similar notions of *laicité* and in addition as a sign of French-Turkish alliance. One finds the same celebration of the victory for Turkish secularists when the European Court of Human rights in Strasbourg decided (November 10, 2005) to support Turkey's ban on women wearing headscarves in universities.

The decision of the European court marked the end of a judicial battle that has started in 1988 when a Turkish student, named Leyla Şahin who was barred from attending Istanbul University medical school because of her headscarf, has brought her case to the European court.[1] The European court decided to uphold Turkey's ban, on the arguments that Turkey treats men and women equally and that its constitution mandates a secular society. Furthermore, it said that the notion of secularism in Turkey, which is seeking to join the

European Union, was consistent with the values underpinning the European Convention on Human Rights.

However the majority of those French intellectuals, feminists, politicians or simple citizens did not think in similar terms with the European Court. And those who were against the headscarf in the public schools of France were also against the Turkish membership in the European Union. Only for a minority among them Turkish secularism seemed to matter. This was difficult for Turks to understand. It was difficult for Europe-oriented democrats that a strong public opinion was emerging in France, mobilized around the nationalist, secularist and feminist values, and in counter distinction with migrants and Turks who were perceived as Muslim "others."

One of the arguments that one would often hear consisted of saying (and/or hoping) that French republicanism, criticized for its ethnic, race, and religious blindness, was an exception and could not be generalized to other European countries. Although French were fond of their republican and secularist values that they considered as "French exceptionalism" in the sense and they were willing to see Europe as France universalism written large, French republicanism was not only ill adopted to deal with a multi-cultural social reality but also to deal with new realities of Europe in a global context. The French referendum vote against the European Constitution (May 29, 2005) can be taken symptomatic of this inward-looking dynamics in place. Although there was no single reason that can stand for the rejection of the constitu-

tion, it translated nevertheless the fear and the resentment of the French against neo-liberal globalization, enlargement of Europe, Turkish question and muslim migrants; all reasons that made French citizens fear that their future, whether economic and political, was no longer in their hands, and being no longer, in their daily lives, *chez soi*. Dutch society, although not driven by Republican ideals felt alike. Three days later after the referendum vote in France, Dutch also rejected the European Constitution.

The two countries that have voted against the European constitution were the two countries where Islam was most debated publicly. In Netherlands, politics of multiculturalism have led, in the eyes of many, to cultural separation, and have failed to integrate muslim migrants into Dutch society. And following Theo Van Gogh's assassination by a Moroccan-origin immigrant, the Dutch public opinion expressed a stronger sense of commitment and need for defending the national values on the lines of Western culture and its sense of freedom.

The German legislative elections (September 2005) have illustrated as well the extent to which issues around Islam, immigration and Turkish membership were becoming agenda setting issues for internal politics. The leaders of the "Christian Democrat Movement" (Angela Merkel and Edmund Stoiber) have captured the public attention and sympathy by pronouncing their view overtly against the Turkish membership in EU. Similarly in France, politicians who were orienting their politics on issues of security and

taking a stand against Turkish membership (such as the actual minister of interior Nicolas Sarkozy, but also a marginal figure of nationalist right in the French political life, such as Phillipe de Villiers made himself a place by his political campaign with the maxim *non à la Turquie*) were gaining in popularity.

It is doubtful therefore to see these developments on the one hand in continuity with Republican tradition, on the other as uniquely French. Rather we can advance the idea that the claim of Universalism underpinning French Republicanism is in decline and politics of nationalism gain grounds, as in other European countries, in the face of encountering Islam.

The discourse of integration, whether it is immigrant integration to host countries or Turkish integration to Europe, does not help to frame the two-way relation in this process. The discourse of integration calls for politics that would facilitate assimilation of the newcomers to the host culture and conform to the national order. But there is no place for understanding the two-way change that is already underway shaping both Muslims and Europeans, and reducing the differences between these two categories. It is those social groups and generations that are in Europe, without hope for return, distanced from the national origins of their parents, shaped by new life-experiences, European languages, public schools and suburban districts of the European cities that claim for their public visibility. Those who are transformed by these experiences claim both for their difference and citizenship and signal the end of the problematic of *migra-*

tion. And the second and third generation young migrants do not identify themselves with their "migrant origins." The French formula *issue de l'immigration* is felt as a stigma to the extent that they are determined by their parent's condition. In that respect, Islamic identity, that some of them appropriates voluntarily, marks the distance from their national origins and expresses the wish to escape from the stigmatizations that their parents were expressing but also transmitting; such as the Algerian colonial past or Turkish first generation illiterate "guest worker."

The headscarf of young muslims exemplify the ways in which religious difference is carried into the European publics, and ceases thereby to be confined to muslim-majority nation-states, or to the "Middle Eastern" region. But in the European contexts the veiling signals a change in the sociological profiles of the migrant. The first generation of the "immigrant worker" represented the single male figure defined by the factory work and a temporary immigration. The second generation was perceived through the figure of the *beurre*, and named according to age and in relation to Arabic culture, "young male Arab." Rather than in the factory, it was in the streets that one could have visualized the second generation migrant youth with street manifestations against racism (*ne touche pas a mon pote*, "don't touch my friend" campaigns visualized with the emblem of Fatima's hand), but also being in the streets meaning without education and job opportunities. Whereas the *veil*, meant to efface the "feminity," bring migrant girls under public attention. The veil

symbolizes both the feminization and the islamization of the migrant population. The school becomes the battleground for the religious contestation, but thereby reveals the presence of migrant girls and their greater level of integration to education, compared to the previous generations. The headscarf of the young girls differs from that of the traditional woman image of the first generation, of their mothers, mostly illiterate, home and husband dependant and not educated. The daughters speak the language, whether it is French or German, they had access to public education but also to the grammar of self display and communication in public. If the traditional headscarf of the first generation muslims does not create a controversy, because it is out of public sight, and does not claim to take a seat in the schools, circulate in the urban life and participate to public sphere. Veiled girls are therefore much more integrated, and familiar with the culture and grammar of communication of the European societies. The Islam they appropriate is not a national one, but a de-nationalized one. Islam becomes a way for them of escaping the original nationalities that have little in common with their actual existences. They are re-territorialized and europeanized, but they come into public existence by turning their differences (small differences) into a public visibility, performed in everyday life by religious signs, and rituals.

The discourse on migration was based on the idea of "de-territorialization" of muslim migrants, their uprootedness, and therefore their greater exposure to alienation, cri-

me, drugs or all sorts of radicalisms, including terrorism. But it is rather the process of "re-territorialization" of the second generation that engenders conflict and confrontation. Following these lines of thought, one can ask whether French suburban youth riots can spread to other European contexts of migration, to Germany for instance. If we are inclined to answer in negative, it is not because Turks in Germany are more integrated to German society than Arabs to the French one. The ties between Germans and Turks are less forceful; there is no colonial heritage that binds them through memory but also through the language and the education system prior to waves of immigration. In other words Algerians are French in ways that Turks are not German. And furthermore Turks are not expected, neither desired to become German. The German notion of citizenship, based on the notion of blood, does not claim for the assimilation of the other, but coupled with politics of "indifference" or "cultural avoidance."

What I am arguing here is that if we can speak of French "exceptionalism," it stems paradoxically not from the distance between French and Muslims, but on the contrary because that the distance is much more abridged in France than in other European countries. The French Republicanism addresses a very high promise of integration, even that of assimilation that turns today into its contrary. Migrants and Muslims challenge the very places and vectors of integration and social mixing; the public schools, urban habitation and public life. The public school is the pillar of the

formation of a citizenship in the Republican French sense; it is in the school that individuals are taught to get distanced from their local attachments, class origins, regional accents, ethnic differences and religious convictions in order to embrace a universal knowledge and become French citizens. Apart from the schools, the urban life also contributes to the making and learning of the bonds of civility, necessary for the politics of cite. And the "laic" conception of the public sphere is thought to provide "neutrality," where in entrance particularistic identities, whether religious or ethnic should be left behind, so that a conversation among equals (but one is not equally naked or stripped of ones differences) can take place. The presence of muslims in public schools, in urban life and in the public debate carry the undesired difference into those spaces that are not only blind to difference, but also put them out of sight (as in the case of suburbans), prohibit them under law (as in the case of the headscarf) or label them as the "other," the "foreigner" (as in the case of the riots). It is not the universalist claim, but rather the equation between "Universal" and "French" that creates a problem today. It is the ways that Western self-presentation still holds to the hegemony over definitions of the "universal." As Norbert Elias pointed the French culture, among other European cultures was the one that contributed most to a Universal (French and Western) understanding of Civilization as opposed to the German notion of *Kultur*. It is also in France that this equation is most noticeably challenged in the present time, where the encounter between Islam and

Europe are displayed in the most dramatic way. The debates triggered by the Turkish candidacy to European Union exemplifies the ongoing and unresolved encounter between the two, revealing the importance of the stakes that surpass the Turkish question and touches the European future.

2. "Identifying" Europe is "Othering" Turkey?

It was a widely shared feeling for Turks that Turkey in joining European Union was to accomplish, somewhat naturally, the long historical course of Westernization process that has started in the late 19th century. The European ideals have already shaped Ottoman reformist intellectuals, "young ottomans" and *jeunes turcs*, formed by the influence of the French positivist thought and Jacobin tradition prior to the Republican era. The foundation of the Turkish nation State under the leadership of Atatürk in 1923 can be read as a culmination of this process, but a radical step, almost as a civilisational shift, as a way of turning away from the heritage of the Ottoman Empire to embrace a "new life" and a new nationhood that will make part of "civilized nations."

However from the point of view of European nations, the Turkish integration with the European Union, although a process that was welcomed by European politicians in the past, and started with the economic "Ankara agreement" in 1963, did not seem to be that natural from the prism of the present-day politics. Turkish candidacy became the most controversial issue, since the meeting of the European Council in Copenhagen (12 December 2002) to decide the

calendar for opening negotiations with Turkey. The debate started in France where unlike Germany, the Turkish immigrant population is not a major issue. It is the words of Giscard d'Estaing, the ancient president of the French Republic and the president of the Convention on the Future of Europe, that have initiated the debate on the entry of Turkey in bringing the argument of "difference" on the public agenda and saying that "Turkey is not a European country, its capital is not in Europe" and it makes part of those countries that make part of "another culture, another way of life" and its integration will mark "the end of Europe." His arguments made their way in the public opinion, found echo among politicians, intellectuals and journalists, independent of their prior political views and differing convictions on other subjects. Turkish issue ended up reshuffling political alliances and creating a new consensus among those who were until then in opposing camps and blurred the very deep divide among the left and the right in France. The number of articles published in the newspapers, the panels on television, the public spokespersons, and the books on turkey witnessed the intensity and the longevity (still on the agenda) of the debate that was carried into different spheres of public life, opening up a new market for publication and communication, but also for making politics. The boundaries of the public incessantly expanded from the mass media discussions, newspaper articles, and social scientific conferences to every day life conversations taking place in market places, at dinner tables, and among neighbours or strangers.

The arguments against the Turkish membership in the European Union did not remain the same. The Turkish agenda of the 1970's were mainly determined by the violation of human rights, the repression of the Kurdish nationalism, the influence of the military power in Turkish political life, the Cyprus discord with the Greece and the official denial of Armenian genocide. But the controversy, although including some of those questions into the debate, was not triggered in relation to those questions that can be considered making part of the "Turkish problem file." On the contrary, the debate started when the Turkish file was getting thinner, that is when Turkey has started, as observers would put it, "to do her homework," that is to resolve some of the problems in her file and hence become eligible for European membership. When Turkey started to get closer to European criteria of democracy that the arguments against Turkish membership were to become articulated, and expressed in offensive not to say aggressive tones, to the surprise of the Turkish pro-European democrat publics.

One of the new arguments concerned the question of European territory. Turkey did not make part of European geography, let alone history, and threatened in the eyes of many, the unity of Europe in geographical terms, representing an unlimited enlargement of frontiers. "Why not Morocco, and why not Russia" were among the widely used arguments to denote the "absurdity" of Turkish membership. Including Turkey would have meant expanding the European borders towards the East, and becoming neighbours with those unwanted, risk-countries. Another line of

argument concerned more economic factors, and basically the impoverishment of Europe by the already recent new comers to Europe. Turkey appeared as a burden that Europe would not be capable of including into its system (both economic but also political wise, Turkish members in the European parliament were scared to outweigh in numbers) without a high cost. Above all, Turkey was not a small country, and bringing more than 50 million "Muslims" into Europe would make a difference.

The debate on Turkish membership became a concern for all, when it started to become a concern for definitions of European frontiers, values and future. Turkey became a catalyst, but also the "other" for self-definition of what was to be defined as a European. In that sense "othering" Turkey became a way of "identifying" Europe. The need for an *altérité* to define European identity was integrated into political discourse of those sceptical of the Turkish membership in Europe. Turkey entering to Europe would mean, as a Dutch commissioner for the European Union (Frits Bolkestein) argued prior to entry talks with Turkey, forgetting the date of 1683, when the siege of Vienna was lifted and the Ottoman army was defeated. (One legend is that the *croissant* was invented in Vienna to celebrate the defeat of the Turkish siege of the city, as a reference to the crescent on the Turkish flags.) Hence the memory of the past entered into the present-day cleavages and controversies. The objection of Austria, until the very last minute, to the opening of negotiations with Turkey (October 3, 2005) had something to do with the past mem-

ories. (Austria agreed to remove her objections under the
condition that Croatia also began membership talks.)

The opening of talks with Turkey is an important date,
but does bring to an end neither the public debate nor the
process of integration that will take decades. One should no-
tice an important shift that has occurred in European politics
and transferred the power of decision makers to that of opin-
ion makers. The issues related with the European Union
were mainly in the hands of Eurocrates and resolved in
Brussels moved to national publics and became part of a
societal debate. The idea of popular sovereignty that is ex-
tended and juxtaposed from nation-State politics to Euro-
pean Union illustrates this shift. The idea of a democratic
Europe came to mean building Europe from below and fore-
most the necessity of consulting people, and therefore a con-
sensus on the need for referendums, whether to vote for
European constitution or for Turkish membership. The idea
of referendum on Turkey, as one could expect, is mostly de-
fended by opponents to Turkish candidacy, counting on the
popular vote for its rejection in ten years time.

3. The Working of the European Perspective
   in Turkey

Ten years time seems sufficiently long to Turks to trans-
form in the meantime their societies accordingly. In ten
years time, according to some Turkish democrat intellectu-
als, Turkey will achieve the level of democratic stability and
the rejection of Turkey by referendums in the European

countries will not matter that much and have a drastic effect. In a way, the optimists would think that the presence of European perspective would have fulfilled its role. Such an argument might sound as a wishful thinking or as a way of de-dramatizing the European anti-Turkish attitudes, but it illustrates also the confidence of Turkish intellectuals on the dynamics of the European perspective in Turkey, already at work.

The European perspective forced Turkey to introduce a reformation of the republican definitions of citizenship in order to be in harmony with democratic and pluralistic definitions of ethnical, political, religious and individual rights. Turkish republicanism as the nation-state ideology has been founded on two pillars: secularism and nationalism, referred as Kemalism (the name of the founding father of the Republic, M. Kemal Ataturk). But these principles also were coupled with monoculture definitions of society, giving rise to anti-democratic interpretations of these principles, namely authoritative secularism and assimilative nationalism. The working of the European project in Turkey meant the dismantling of the authoritarian and assimilative nature of Republicanism.

I'll select four concrete examples to illustrate the ways in which the Turkish society is overcoming, the authoritarian tendencies, breaking down taboo subjects and getting into a similar wavelength, not without inner tension and confrontation, with European democracies.

1. The first tension inbred into Turkish political system is between authoritarian secularism and democracy. We can

speak of a vicious circle, that can be seen in many other
muslim countries that were engaged with values of secula-
rism and modernity, but at the expense of democratic plura-
listic politics. Secular reforms were implemented in the
1920s mainly by means of single-party authoritarian rules.
An opening of a democratic space usually profits to those
who were excluded and namely to muslim groups searching
for public recognition and political representation. To pro-
tect the secular State and the principles of the Republic, the
military power does not mind putting democracy into brac-
kets. (Algerian parliamentary elections in 1992 is a dramatic
example of such a dilemma; The Islamic Salvation Front
[FIS] had the electoral victory, but the army dissolved the
parliament and cancelled the elections in order to prevent
Muslim fundamentalists having access to power.) The Tur-
kish army stands to be the guardian of the secular Republic
and therefore the military power occupies a central position
in the political life. For democratization, there is a need to
create a consensual "secularism," and not an exclusionary,
authoritarian one. This is possible only if there is a democra-
tic space, shared both by religious and secular; the first giv-
ing up the absolutism of the religious truth-regime, and the
latter giving up its claims of hegemony over the society. The
party of Justice and Development, the Ak party, who had is-
lamic roots gained November 2002 general elections by de-
mocratic means and came to power in Turkey. We can speak
of a building-up of a democratic consensus between secular
and religious publics, through an interactive process that

transformed both parties. In that respect, what Jurgen Habermas (in his talk on "Religion in the Public Sphere" in New School, November 2005) described as a cognitive precondition for a religious-secular dialogue, is engaged in Turkey. And furthermore, rather than a mere discursive debate and a dialogue between two supposedly fix identities between the religious and the secular, the interaction transforms and opens up a new intermediate spaces for self-definition and democracy.

In spite of the ongoing cleavages and conflicts, between hard-line islamists and secularist establishment, one has to witness that Turkish society experienced, especially during the last two decades, a "fall of the wall" that have separated and divided two Turkey's; one composed of educated urban and west-looking secularist upper and middle classes (labeled in the conversations as "white turks") and the other faith-driven lower middle classes ("black turks" Ismet Ozel, a well known poet, has considered muslims in Turkey as "Turkey's blacks") originating from Anatolian towns. The course of upward social mobility changed the life-trajectories of many of those belonging to the latter group (turned them into "grey" meaning partially whitened) who have had access to high education in the 1960s with emigration to urban cities, profited from new market opportunities that expanded in the 1980s and invested in the avenues of political power since the electoral victory of the Party of Justice and Development. The thinning of the wall between two faces of Turkey brought different publics and cultural codes in close

contact and interaction, albeit with intense conflict, yet transforming the mutual conceptions of muslim and secular publics and limiting the claims of hegemony of the latter. During the last two decades, the frontiers between the two publics became more porous and lead spokespersons of muslim, leftist, liberal movements to engage in public debates, to participate in round-tables, but also to cross the borders and address themselves to each others public. Well known public intellectuals from the leftist movement started to write in conservative religious or radical islamic newspapers (in "Zaman" or in "Yeni Safak"), while those from islamic movement turn their attention to secular publics and media (as in the case of Ahmet Hakan, the popular anchorman of the Islamic local television, who became a columnist in the secular mainstream daily *Hürriyet*). Such success-driven trans-public crossings were unthinkable in the 1980s; it helped to establish bridges of dialogue between divided publics, and created a new mental space for thinking and linking two faces of Turkey, secular and muslim in a more interactive way, that generates transformation and not mere hybridism.

The democratic sphere gained a momentum to the extent that the polarization between the secularist and islamist publics was played down, leading to an intermediary space of debate and representation. The European perspective reinforced the democratic momentum and created a new political agenda of reform. The mobilization of human rights movements in civil society, the formation of a public opi-

nion in favor of these reforms and the determination of the government and the political classes, all culminated in a series of reforms that were passed by the parliamentary vote during the course of 2002-2003 in order to harmonize the Turkish legal system with what is called to be the Copenhagen criteria.

2. One major example is the abolition of death penalty; a widely shared societal value in Europe, in counter-distinction with the American society. The Turkish Parliament voted in favor of the abolishment of death penalty (August 2, 2002), a first in a Muslim country. The repercussions it had for Turkey was far more than expressing the desire to embrace European values or just to please Europeans, as cynical observers would think. The project of abolishment of capital penalty deepened the political divide and confrontation with extreme-right nationalists because it came to be related with a more fundamental problem that is the Kurdish question. At the time the death penalty was discussed the leader of the Kurdish movement was in prison under death sentence. The death penalty would not have gained the prominence that it has had, it not been for the fact that it was related with the Kurdish issue and concerned the fate of jailed Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) leader Abdullah Ocalan, responsible for terrorist acts. But it had. In spite of the nationalist's objections, the law passed in the parliament with the help of increasing public voices of those who argued in favor of the abolishment of the capital punishment, including the sentence passed on Ocalan and for the recog-

nition of Kurdish rights in Turkey. It meant to be a victory of reformists against nationalists. The Turkish skeptics dismissed these reforms that they have considered on "paper" and as "cosmetic," that is superficial.

3. The third crucial moment I want to highlight is when the Turkish parliamentary voted (on March 1, 2003) denied the United States its request to attack Iraq from Turkish soil. Such a rupture of alliance with the American politics in the Iraq war was unexpected and meant to be a turning-point in the Turkish-American relations. There was no majority vote, and the outcome of the parliamentary vote represented the divide that many Turkish citizens felt inside themselves; they have thought this war to be an unjust one, but they feared to harm the alliance with the United-States. Besides the anti-war manifestations were in the same wave length with European peace movements. They were movements mobilized in favor of peace rather than around arguments of religious fraternity. Turkey long term ally of the United States and candidate for membership in European Union found herself in the divide between the two, at the fracture between the two West, appeared during the Iraq war. The European powers did not read the Turkish refusal of alliance with the American politics as a sign of sharing "European peace sensibility" or maturation of democracy. The Arab intellectuals did; Turkey gained respectability in their eyes to the extent that it articulated a decision autonomous from the American politics and foremost it relied on its public opinion and parliamentary power to say no to American poli-

tics; difficult they have thought would it be for many Arab countries and their rulers to counter the American requests by a parliamentary vote. Europeans however missed the democratic aspect of the decision. They have suspected Turkey to have a hidden agenda to invade the North of Iraq, and control the establishment of an autonomous Kurdish State and power. My point here is not to judge the plausibility of such arguments, although retrospectively speaking appears to be untrue, but to point out to the deficiency of European politics to hear and support the emerging democratic voices and thereby dismiss the very impact of European values of democracy.

4. The fourth and last topic that I select to highlight the stakes of democracy in Turkey concerns the Armenian question that represents still a major taboo for Turkish nationalism. The official view of the past is based on the suppression and the denial of the 1915 genocide that created a sort of forced short-memory and diffused amnesia of the past for the generations of the Republic. Therefore there are two aspects of the problem. One question is remembering the past and the second is developing and expressing points of view that are independent of the official one. The choice of words to label the events, whether it is deportation, ethnic cleansing, massacres or genocide is becoming a battle ground for the public debate that begins to start, albeit under the nationalist pressure and juridical intimidation. The debate is initiated by few Turkish intellectuals, historians, including that of the Armenian community who challenged the ideological version of

the events, defying the taboos of Turkish nationalism and exploring new ways of relating to emotional trauma of Armenians and developing a new narrative on the historical past. In that respect, the Istanbul conference signaled a new period. The conference brought together Turkish historians who wanted to pursue a free discussion on the Armenian past of Turkey, in spite of pressures and postponement, were at last held at Bilgi University in September 2005. It marked a collective effort to break away from the official discourse and to confront the Turkish nationalism with its own past.

Alongside these historically constructed points of view that challenge the established ideology, there are also voices and images that bring forth the past memory, and engage a process of remembering. I think of the postal-cards exhibition in Istanbul illustrating the lives of Armenians all over Turkey prior to events. The autobiographical book written by a woman human rights lawyer, Fethiye Çetin, "My Grandmother" (*anneannem*) and published in Istanbul in 2004, is another breakthrough in the public consciousness. She tells the story of her discovery of her grandmother as Armenian. The writer following her grandmother's life, gives an account of the past events, breaks the silence on the subject, but also brings for many other people, the possibility of remembering and discovering their Armenian ascendance.

The presence of European perspective in Turkey works against the identity knots as it dismantles national myths. It is not a linear, peaceful and once for all settled process, it is an ongoing process and battle. In the eyes of many hard-

liner nationalists and secularists (*laïcards*), European project in forcing Turkey in the direction of democratization and demilitarization, endangers the stability of the country, opening up a gate for escalating demands of Kurdish nationalists, religious fundamentalists and the claims of Armenian Diasporas.

I am trying not to argue therefore for a problem-free society but on the contrary illustrate, by means of concrete but significant cases, the ways in which Turkish society names the problems it faces, tries to bring into public awareness those subjects that were kept out of sight, repressed or forgotten and frames them politically. The crimes of honor follow the same political pattern; that is it is by the help of feminist organizations that the issue is brought into public attention, calling for new legislation. It is rather the "way" of politicizing the issues, carrying them from silenced arenas (silenced whether by shame, or repression) and giving them plurality of voice and visibility in the public sphere that I describe the existence of a democratic pattern.

In France, a debate on the legitimacy of the Turkish membership, as I have argued, started the moment Turkey accomplished to a great extent the requirements, getting closer to standards set by European Union. Once again one should note that it is the proximity, the encounter between the two which is the source of conflict, and controversy. Turkish membership triggered an anxiety of loss and a desire for boundary maintenance. The question of geographic frontiers, civilisational belongings, religious differences,

past memories all themes entered into the debate as a constellation of insurmountable differences and set a new agenda. Europe, until then an affair left in the hands of Eurocrates, made its way to a public societal debate, re-composing the political and intellectual arena independent of left-right, secular-religious, liberal-republican, feminist-conservative divisions. Identifying Europe meant "other-ing" Turkey. Throughout these debates, Europe is cons-tructed as an identity defined by shared history, common cultural values rather than as a project for the future. It is in contexts outside the core countries of Europe (for instance in Spain, Portugal and Greece) that Europe appears as a pro-ject and has the power of induction of democratization. In Turkey where Europeanness is not part of a "natural" histor-ical legacy, it is appropriated voluntarily as a political pro-ject, as a perspective, promising a democratic frame for rethinking commonness and difference.

To sum, Turkish candidacy reveals the difference be-tween Europe perceived as a project in distinction with Eu-rope as an identity. For the European countries there is no difference but continuity between the two: European Union is the European identity written large. Secondly Islamic presence in Europe reveals the tensions between Universal-ism of Europe and Judaeo-Christian legacy. The European claims for universalism and its limits are tested and defied by Turkish membership as well as by muslim migrants within Europe.

4. Europe as a Novel Experience?

Islam becomes an agenda-setting issue both for different national politics and countries of Europe, and for the European Union itself. Obviously, the intersections between Europe and islam is not a new phenomena; there is a deep rooted, long and connected history of exchanges, wars, colonization and waves of immigration that have profoundly shaped in different periods, the relations between muslims and Europeans; including their traumas. But yet, there is something novel in the contemporary mode of encounter between the two, including the ways the old memories, come out in the present day discourses.

In the present day, there is a two-way interactive relation between Islam and Europe and it is the proximity between the two that engenders conflict. Neither Islam nor Europe presents itself as a homogeneous entity. But rather on stressing the inner differences, I emphasized the processes of interaction through which both are transformed. It is the problematic zones of contact between the two that I wanted to bring to attention. The frontiers are considered to be both zones of contact and separation between different neighbor populations. But precisely because the European experience means the weakening or effacement of these frontiers that the process can be understood as "interpenetrations" (the title of my book in French) between Muslims and Europeans. However this does not imply a peaceful and non-violent process. The asymmetry of desires underpins the encounter between the two and fuels the emotions; pas-

sion, fear, irrationality, anger, and hate become the ingredients of the debate and the conflict.

Although the Islamic headscarf, Turkish membership or more recently suburban riots in France are radically different in scale, encompassing national, European and local scales, originating from different historical trajectories, colonization and westernization and present different political problems, yet each carry the issues that were until then considered to be external and foreign to the Western site, into the center of their public agendas. Muslims make their entry into European public agenda in different ways; whether they claim for their religiosity (as in the case of the headscarf movement), for European membership (as in the case of Turkish candidacy) or for their citizenship (as in the case of suburban youth). By means of religious signs or secular riots, muslim migrants make their way into the center of public attention. It is by performing their differences that they become "visible" and disturbing to the public eye. They "force" their entry into spaces that were reserved to European "white" citizens. Muslims in Europe imply the breakdown of boundaries that used to maintain the civilizational, national or urban divide.

The novelty of the experience originates from the very location of this encounter:

a) Europe is the place where the conversation and the confrontation take place in proximity of each other, and in the present time. The comfort of geographical distance is lost. In that respect, the "old" Europe is

becoming a site of novel experience where we can no longer speak of two distinct and separate civilizations in time and in space.

b) Neither can it be traced solely at the political level of decision-makers, governments and nation-states. It becomes a public affair, meaning a concern for all. But the publicity refers also to an emerging problem, a process that carries ideas, opinions from the private, interior, personal to an outspoken, shared, circulated public idea. In that sense, we can speak of a growing public awareness of Islamic presence in Europe.

c) The encounter between Europe and Islam is a two way relation that transforms both sides, both European and muslim self-presentations.

d) The project of European Union brings and reinforces a transnational aspect of connectivity.

e) And last but not least, the naming of self and the other becomes a crucial and decisive matter that will define the outcome of this process. The ways in which Europe and Islam will connect to each other, create hyphenated identities or on the contrary dress boundaries of separation, will be decisive for the future of "European Islam," "French-Muslims" or "Euro-Turks."

Note

1. The European Court of Human Rights was set up in Strasbourg in 1959 to deal with alleged violations of the 1950 European Conven-

tion on Human Rights. Recognition of the right of individual application was, however, optional and it could therefore be exercised only against those States which had accepted it. Turkey ratified the right for individual applications from Turkish citizens to the European Commission of Human Rights in 1987; the compulsory judicial power of the European Court of Human Rights was recognized in 1989. Turkey ranks first amongst countries with the highest numbers of applications to the Court.

Between Islam and Secularism: Religious Policies of Turkey in the Turkish Republics of Central Asia and the Caucasus

Bayram Balci

Since their independence, Turkish republics in Central Asia and the Caucasus have an entire place apart in the foreign cultural and religious policy of Turkey. Based on years of land surveys made during these past five years, this article is aimed at making a point on religious implications of Turkish policy in Turkish-speaking Central Asia and the Caucasus. Turkey's religious policy in the republics stemming from ex-USSR must be thought in triple dynamics: official Turkish State politics, Turkish brotherhood movements and "local," official or private components.

1) Islam and Politics in these Republics on the Eve of Independences

It is suitable to recall, first of all, that all States in question are of Islamic culture: the major part of the population is Sunnite and the Hanafi school is dominant, in the same way as in Turkey. Nonetheless, in Azerbaijan, more than 60% of the population is Shiite. Historically, Islamic civili-

zation has been present in most of these states since at least
the 10th century, except the Kazakh and Kirghiz steppes that
were Islamized later.

All these States were created in the frame of soviet pol-
icy nationalities in the 1920s and 1930s.[1] Islam's manage-
ment in all these countries during the entire soviet period
was the same, even though certain regions were touched
more than others by the regime's anti-religious policy.[2] In
all these States, during the soviet period a paradoxical situa-
tion was noted: officially, the State was basically against all
Islam public expression. The Communist Party and press
agencies, by perfectly submissive nature to the regime, ac-
tively fought against religiosity and against their influence
practiced by Islam on consciences.[3] However, in fact, the
situation was quite different. Certain local authorities, often
active in certain religious practices, witnessed a lot of toler-
ance vis-à-vis religious practices in the community. There
was numerous official administrators who, while denounc-
ing religion and its hold on populations, respected them-
selves certain Islamic rites such as circumcision, funeral
according to the mores or pilgrimages to the tombs of cer-
tain holy personalities. On the same way, in full soviet pe-
riod, certain religious leaders succeeded, in spite of and
under surveillance by official authorities, in continuing to
form Islamic groups. Therefore, in Central Asia, Domla
Hindustani formed several religious groups that since inde-
pendences have retaken the torch of political Islam by creat-
ing associations and political Islamic-prone parties.[4] In

Azerbaijan, in Guba region, in the mid-70s, when religious repression was particularly fierce, a local mullah, Mehemmed Hesen Shirkevi (1907-1976) was able to publish a *tefsir* (comment*)* of the Koran and train young disciples.[5] In the same manner, in southern Azerbaijan, especially in the village of Erkivan and in the vicinity of Massalli and Lenkeran, neighborhood mullahs kept dispensing Koranic courses and so trained young disciples who, in their turn, transmitted religious learning to their descendants. For example in Lenkeran city center, in southern Azerbaijan, a commemorative plate placed in 1994 by the local people pays tribute to a known religious personality in the region, Mirza Mehemmed Huseyin Molla Hemidoglu (1878-1960). Indeed, there are a lot of several local religious cases that, in parallel to their official activities, contributed to the maintenance of Islamic knowledge and practice among citizen.

One of the first consequences of independences was to allow Islam to become visible in public space. Already started thanks to perestroika and its contributions to freedom of association in the political and cultural domain, the rehabilitation of Islam was going on. Upon declaring independences, the "new" powers, often constituted of old apparatchiks reconverted to nationalism, took a series of measures that favored renewal of Islam and its acceptance as a national culture component. Thus, most presidents of Central Asia and Azerbaijan made pilgrimage to Mecca, took the oath on the Koran and encouraged and participated in the reopening of several religious establishments that had been closed dur-

ing the soviet period. For example, in Azerbaijan, president Aliev, although had being serving the State during decades and mostly the KGB, made his hajj in Mecca in 1993 and was the main artisan of the restoration of several local pilgrimage sites such as Bibi Heybet or Mir Movsum Ata mausoleum in the suburbs of Baku. In Uzbekistan, the former communist party secretary, today president, Islam Karimov went to Bahauddin Nakchibend's tomb in Boukhara and brought an effective political and financial support to the restoration of the sanctuary. These measures taken by the new political authorities were not the only encouragements to Islamic revival in these countries.

Since opening of the borders, external influences strongly affected local Islam[6] and can be ranked according to three origins. First of all, it is convenient to remember that the first foreign influence was the result of soviet cooperation policy with the Muslim world. Indeed, in the mid 1970s, amid of the development of relations between the Soviet Union and the Muslim world, Moscow sent to certain Arab countries (mostly socialist regimes) young soviets to study Islam. For some of them, these stays were a crucial moment of making contact with Wahhabite ideas and Muslim Brothers' philosophy.[7] It is supposed that Wahhabism and other radical Islamist philosophies entered the Soviet Union by this means. However, main Islamist influences were clearer after independences, due to several phenomena. Firstly, it is necessary to underline the role of pilgrimage, the hajj to Mecca and Medina. During the soviet period,

every year, central authorities only authorized some fifteen
or twenty pilgrims to travel to Saudi Arabia. Obviously, this
figures have had a spectacular increase upon opening of the
borders in the early 1990s. Some pilgrims, facing for the
first time rigid Saudi Islam, were seduced by the Wahhabite
discourse. In this aspect, the role of migrants originating
from Central Asia, installed in holy cities after several de-
cades, must be emphasized. There are in fact at least fifty
thousand ethnic Uzbeks and as many Uighours in Saudi
Arabia kingdom, which granted them political asylum,
when they had to flee their countries because of soviet con-
trol strengthening over the entire Central Asia in the early
1930s. On the occasion of two missions realized pursuant to
a study on Uzbeks in Saudi Arabia, it was possible to appre-
ciate to what extent Uzbek community had taken part as of
1990 in the re-islamization of Central Asia.[8] Always under
the renewing effort of the ties with the Muslim world, it ap-
pears that numerous students hade chosen to go studying
in Arab States, in Iran or Turkey. The contribution of these
students to the re-islamization of all these republics was
considerable. In some cases, they played the role of true
missionaries sent by the States where they concluded their
studies and were in charge of preaching the "true Islam."
Most Muslim countries close to Central Asia—Saudi Ara-
bia, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey—encouraged their respective
missionaries to come to propagate their national view of Is-
lam in these republics. Paradoxically, it is incontestably the
secular of these States, Turkey, which had the biggest influ-

ence on the new Islam in each State of Central Asia. This paradoxical Turkish influence deserves a few clarifications.

2) Turkey and its Model in Political-Religious Matter

The "Turkish model" concept is often, wrongly, seen as a political transition model, economic, political and religious, conceived by Turkey and designed to be exported to Turkish republics.[9] As a matter of fact, the situation was quite more complex in the early 1990s and it is incorrect to believe that Turkish diplomacy forged only one model for these States. It is undoubtedly necessary to remember what the context was at that time. With the Soviet Union dislocation, a new fear was installed in western chancelleries: The preoccupation was that Muslim populations from the former USSR, by reaction to anti-religious policy practiced by the soviet regime, drop into the trap of Islamist propaganda led by Iran and Saudi Arabia. Western experts (headed by Americans and Europeans) were persuaded that the communities in question would radicalize very quickly or at least, it was feared to see them seduced by the charms of Saudi or Iranian Islamism. It is in this context that western diplomats whispered to their colleagues and Turkish allies the idea of a "Turkish model"—where Islam, moderate and laic, is tightly controlled by military power—to be developed for these States and to be promoted as fast as possible. The reason by which Westerners where interested and reassured by the Turkish model was its choice for Kemalist secularism,

its great experience in market economy experience and the good integration of the countries to western liberal value system.

By the way, the developments of this "Turkish model" have evolved differently. Whereas Turkey has been chosen by its peers to export secularism in Central Asia, Ankara's policy participated in the dissemination of a quite different kind of private Islam in these republics. The question is to find out why secular Turkey deployed so many means to provide Islamic services in these countries. In order to answer this question, it is appropriate to develop two points that seem fundamental to me: missionary activities of Turkish Islamist movements and the reaction of the Turkish State in view of this competition.

3) Turkish Missionaries in the Conquest of Central Asia and the Caucasus

I use the term missionary to designate all Turkish Islamist movements that have been active in the Turkish-speaking world since the end of the Soviet Union. The use of this word seems to me to be in accordance with the reality that I observe in the field after ten years. Indeed, conversations with members of different movements, which will be approached here, have allowed me to reach the conclusion that every militant that is expatriated feels to be granted with a mission, i.e. disseminating Islam, or more precisely the Islamic conception of its origin community or of his brother-

hood in these virgin countries.[10] These movements are comparable, all proportions kept, to Christian missionary movements that set of at their time to conquest Africa or America. In our case, Central Asia and the Caucasus represent these new preaching countries, virgin of every influence, which must be conquered before it is too late, before other movements, Muslim or Christian, come and convert these "survivors of communism." Of course, we cannot go into details of all missionary activities of Turkish Islamists. We will only mention their most visible expressions, deployed by the most influent movements, and especially the *nurcu*.

It is perhaps appropriate to recall what the *nurcu* movement represents in Turkey, in order to better locate the action of these heirs in the educational domain in the Turkish world since 1991. As everyone knows, Sait Nursi is the founder and thinking master of a vast religious community in Turkey, the *nurcu*. Born in 1873 in Eastern Turkey where he received classical madrasa education marked by *naqchibandi*[11] philosophy, he travels all over the country to lead a combat that is dear to him: save the faith in strong erosion in a world in full mutation. Strictly watched by the young Kemalist republic, he recovers certain freedom of action with the arrival of the conservative right to power in 1946. He is the author of exegetics of the Koran of more than 6,000 pages, *Risale i Nur*. The *Risale i Nur* were drafted largely in prison and their original diffusion was at first made in clandestinity. His first and closest disciples

scattered "his" good word and formed a very large party of *nurcu* movement militants.

Upon Nursi's death in 1960, the movement split into several branches,[12] one of which is run by the not less famous Fethullah Gülen. These various groups and *nurcu* inheriting currents took different directions. Some privileged education (as is the case with Gülen), others publishing (such has *Yeni Asya* house specialized in publishing prestigious books on the movement founding master). In all cases, teaching of *nurcu* ideas is done within small circles created by the movement members, in school or even in university environment. The movement is very hierarchical and each bears a specific name: the first degree is to be *Talebe* (pupil*)*, then to be *Abi* (eldest brother), to finally reach the status of *Varis* (heir). However, one of the *nurcu* groups is clearly distinguished from the others in both his organization and his expansion tactics and methods outwards. It is Fethullah Gülen move, and his disciples, the *fethullahçi*.

Born in 1938 in Erzurum, in Eastern Turkey, Fethullah Gülen too, like Sait Nursi, received classical, informal religious education, in the sense that at this time there were no official religious educational establishments. The young Gülen however begins his career in full legality, in capacity as preacher, or *vaiz*, at the service of the State. After having officiated for a certain time in Edirne, he was transferred to a small mosque of the suburbs of Izmir, in Kestanepazari in the early 1960s.

Like Nursi, he developed his own thought of his Islam vision, trained disciples, created a real religious movement, neo-*nurcu*, distinct from the one founded by the master. Fethullah Gülen's movement is born out of questionings on new educational methods and his power grows thanks to the accomplishment and success of educational projects. Indeed, the birth of the movement is confounded with the creation of an educational foundation gathering students' and teachers' relatives, in order to allow children to reach better results at school. It is materialized by the organization by Fethullah and his disciples of courses and activities for scholars, under auspice of this foundation and his activities at Kestanepazari mosque. These activities were consisting first of vacation camps, which Gülen organizes during several successive summers between 1968 and 1972, for taking care of children and youths during summer months. Generally, the students are devoted to intellectual activities, such as reading of the Koran and Sait Nursi's works, but also learning a series of knowledge allowing them later to integrate and progress in the midst of the organization implemented by Gülen. The first "vacationers" trained by Gülen later became personalities among the most influential of the movement and hold important positions in the structures composing the community (*cemaat*), using its term to introduce herself. Among the main bodies of *fethullahci* movement, we quote newspapers and magazines *Zaman, Sizinti*, *Fountain*, *Bizim Aile*, and *Aksiyon*, *Samanyolu* television network and more recently the foundation of writers

and journalists of Turkey, *Turkiye Gazeteciler ve Yazarlar Vakfi*.[13]

Since its beginnings, the movement has been hierarchically organized. Similar branches to Kestanepazari community are created in other cities in the country. Influenced by Gülen's sermons or preaching, pronounced every Friday at the time of the weekly prayer, numerous and simple faithful, seduced by the character's charisma, go about disseminating his ideas and thus take part in the beginning of a truly distinct religious movement, with an original strong educational system. The "educational" foundations, *fethullahci*, initiated throughout the country by personalities marked by Gülen's *vaaz*, his books or further by the magazine *Sizinti* of which he is the inspirer or editor were increased. The role of the latter, founded by those close to Gülen and the movement, were crucial ion the diffusion of his ideas.[14]

On the other hand, the great strength of movement is to have chosen to recruit among pupils and young students, by providing them with effective support in their studies. This support goes through an assistance structure, gathering associations and small merchants close to the movement. It may make available to most impoverished students a collective apartment, called houses of light or *ýþýk evleri,* where often a responsible person is appointed *Abi*, initiated in the ideas of the movement and in charge of transmitting them to all those who share the apartment with him. Materially, the role of the Abi consists of teaching the students how to pray, read the Koran and the works of Sait Nursi and Fethullah

Gülen, but also each student is conduced to recruiting of new faithful in their original environment.

The 1980s constitute unquestionably a turnaround in Turkish economic, social and political history. January 1980 marks the end of the economic dirigisme inherited from the Kemalist period and a certain passage to market economy. Economic opening allows the beginning or at least the reinforcement of the private sector and with it of the associative environment close to brotherhoods and religious movements. Gülen's movement, and also other movements, at the same way as the *Naqchibandi* took advantage of this context to develop their associations all over the country. In the late 80s, enterprises, institutions and also private schools, university complexes are inspired by Gülen's and his friends' movement and are already counted by tens in the country. The 1980s can be considered as those of movement influence throughout the country, and the next decade was characterized by its expansion, far beyond Turkish borders, mainly in countries of the former socialist block.

The first *fethullahci* missionaries in Central Asia and the Caucasus arrive even before the declarations of independence, thanks to the establishment of intensive cultural ties between Turkey and Gorbatchev's Soviet Union. At this point, since 1989, the Perestroika enabled closer contacts between the two countries—these contact opportunities being seized without hesitation by Gülen's movement businessmen. In fact, initially ties are built by entrepreneurs in the economic sphere before expanding in other domains, mostly educa-

tional. A *fethullahci* businessmen association, such as *Aksaray*, *Nigde* or *Izmir* decided to develop its activities in a precise region, such as for example, Ferghana Valley in Uzbekistan. Once economic ties are solidly established and the confidence of local political authorities is ensured, the businessmen help teachers so that high schools may be implemented. This informal collaboration between cities and associations worked well and allowed springing up tens of schools in Eurasia. Teacher recruitment for these schools follows co-option logic. A teacher willing to be expatriated asks for a recommendation from the management of an educational enterprise that manages schools abroad.[15]

Unlike it is commonly considered, the private schools controlled by the group are not madrasas where the Koran and Nursi and Gülen religious philosophies are taught. They are "ordinary" high schools, but that are distinguished from local establishments by substantial human and material investment to ensure university and professional achievement of graduates. Initially without charge, schooling has gradually become payable. Mathematics, physics, biology, computing, English and economics are the most taught disciplines in these establishments, often of scientific character. However, although being without any religious expression, education contains some ethics and a certain philosophy, being the reflect, for example, of the nature at the same time conservative and modernist of the *fethullahci* movement. At first, the daily attitude of the teachers—characterized by hygiene, a good presentation, respect for hierarchy, politeness, cour-

tesy, sobriety—has unfailingly had real influence on their local Kazakh, Azeri, Turkmen etc. colleagues. Furthermore, outside school, when it is possible, in the dormitories and university complexes, the most permeable students are often identified, selected and their close tutors give them a religious instruction totally absent in school. Finally, we also must mention that in certain cities in Central Asia and the Caucasus, *cay sohbetleri* (collation-debate) were also organized, and have made the fortune and identity of the movement. They are private meetings, realized at initiative of every one, were a movement member read passages from the *Risale i Nur* by explaining them to the guests. However, two mitigations must be brought to this phenomenon: in Central Asia, still today, these theological debates only gather expatriated Turks. Very few "locals" are active in the movement, open proselytizing being dangerous to educational activities of the *cemaat*, and responsible persons behave in a very prudent manner. On the other hand, the situation is different in Azerbaijan. In this country, though the majority is Shiite, which therefore makes logically the task of *fethullahci* more difficult, who are very Sunnite, Fethullah Gülen's missionaries have been successful where they failed in Central Asia, namely on-site training of local movement representatives. Thus, there are numerous Azeris *fethullahci* who attend these theological debate soirées; indeed some are organized by Azeris without any Turkish attendance, which is no longer necessary, as the first missionaries have accomplished their mission of local staff

training. Several raisons explain this better result in Azerbaijan than in Central Asia republics. Although remaining till now the most influential, Fethullah Gülen's disciples have not the monopole of Turkish missionary activities in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Different brotherhood groups or belonging to brotherhoods have deployed their activities in these countries and constitute competition to *fethullahci*.

Under a more or less organized form, Turkish *Naqchibandi* tried to settle in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Central Asia is more particularly interesting to them because it is there, near Boukhara, where the tomb of the order founder is located, Bahauddin Nakchibend. However, it is in Azerbaijan where we find the most powerful Turkish *naqchibandi* order. They are the disciples of Aziz Mahmut Hudayi, mystical 16th century *naqchibandi,* whose tomb is located at Uskudar in Istanbul.[16] Around this tomb a large socio-educational complex is erected, whose activities range from assistance to the most impoverished ones and a religious course for everybody. One of the leaders most marked by Aziz Mahmut Huday's teaching, Osman Nuri Topbaº interests us more specially.

By his initiative, a charitable foundation *Azerbaycan Gençlerine Yardim Fondu* (Assistance Fund to Azerbaijan Youth) was born in 1994. Under the moral and spiritual authority of Osman Nuri Topbaº, the Bakou-based foundation developed charitable and educational activities for Karabakh war refugees. However, in parallel, on its sites in Bakou and in province, it organizes in full legality English,

computing and Koranic reading courses,[17] given by teachers graduated in Turkey and increasingly by Azeris graduated in Turkey. Koranic reading, Muslim history courses and other teaching are accessible to all young people who attend this center. Courses are free because the association is granted by important financial assistance from Turkish or Turkish-European sponsors. The library allows, on the other hand, young and less young people to have access to religious literature coming from Turkey. The movement magazine published in Turkey, *Altinoluk*, is commonly available, Osman Nuri Topbaº's books as well as works by other religious movements, such as for example the works of Sait Nursi or even by certain Arab islamist thinkers like Seyyid Qutb.

Recently, the association launched a magazine in Russian aimed at readers from the former USSR, considering that most of them many speak Russian much better than the national Turkish language. *Zolotorodnik* (the golden source) retakes in fact articles published in Turkish in *Altinoluk* and translates them into Russian. At last, another magazine, for children, *Sebnem*, hold an important place on the library shelves. The association's activities are also as important in the province as in the capital, especially in the north of the country reputed to be more marked by Sunnism than Shiism. In the cities of Sheki, Zaqatala, Agdash and Goytchay the foundation owns and manages madrasa or Koranic reading centers. Regularly, the movement leader, Osman Nuri Topbaº, comes to the country and encourages his disci-

ples to pursue their educational activities. The knowledge transmission means are therefore open, classical, under the form of a course in classrooms, registered at the Ministry of Justice and State Committee for religious affairs. We note that this is not the case of the groups *nurcu* or *fethullahci,* which under cover of secular education in high schools spread their respective leaders' thinking without being "controlled" by political and religious authorities. Likewise, in certain cases and according to their method and tactics, the association makes an agreement with Azeris public establishments to manage certain university branches in province. This is especially the case of the very Shiite Islamic university in Bakou whose branch in Zaqatala is managed by this foundation.

A small minority, but nevertheless active, the last and *naqchibandi* group of Mahmut Ustaosmanoglu must be mentioned. His community regularly meets around Ismail Aga mosque in Fatih-Carsamba on the suburbs of Istanbul. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, the movement has sent emissaries upon the collapse of the Soviet Union to develop contacts with local *naqchibandi* groups. Limited in Central Asia due to the distrust of Uzbek authorities, specially, the activity of the movement is remarkable in Azerbaijan and in Georgia (mainly in Adzharia), essentially in Sunnite regions. Until 1997, a date on which the army in Turkey brought a new restriction on religious activities of brotherhoods, the movement regularly received students from the Caucasus and Central Asia and trained them at its madrasa,

located on the premises of Ismail Aga mosque. Since the warning of the army in 1997, the madrasa in question works slowly, but Caucasians and Central Asians trained in its ranks continue to spread master Mahmut's message in certain regions of the former USRR.[18]

Suleyman Hilim Tunahan, born in 1888 en Bulgaria and deceased in 1959 in Turkey, is another great Turkish religious leader whose heirs have settled in Central Asia and the Caucasus as of the early 1990s. His main concern regards Koranic reading or more precisely training children so that they will be able to read the Koran.[19] By all means, the slogan for this movement was "everything for the Koran, everything by the Koran." It is estimated that disciples of this movement tried to settle in Azerbaijan in the early 1990s. After a few months of activities, seeing that the country was not a favorable place for their mission, *suleymanci* disciples stopped their youth supporting work or returned to Turkey. However, at the present time, a small *suleymanci* presence persists, especially in the midst of Turkish students coming to study in Bakou. This presence is however limited, personal and informal, at least compared to other Turkish movements. However, in Spring 2004, an educational center linked to this movement started again its activities in Bakou, in a center where Tunahan's disciples taught young Azeri Koranic reading.[20]

Several factors contribute to the quick, solid implementation of Turkish Islamist movements in the former USSR. We must first mention the relative linguistic relationship be-

tween Turkish and the main languages of Muslim former USSR (Uzbek, Kirghiz, Turkmene, Kazakh and Azeri) which makes Turkish expatriation in these countries easier. We might also suggest, as an explanatory criterion, cultural closeness between Turks and these above mentioned Turkish-speaking peoples, but it seems to me that the settlement of Turkish islamists is made easier mostly by the strong resemblance linking Anatolian Turks' Islam to the one of Turkish-speaking people in Central Asia. In fact, in this huge region extending from the Chinese border to the Balkans, there is the same type of Islam, very marked by brotherhoods and mysticism. The *naqchibandiyya*, this brotherhood born in Boukhara region counts devotees all over Eurasia and Turkish Islam, to a great extent marked by this brotherhood. We must further recall that in its expansion in Central Asia and the Caucasus, Turkish Islam (the movements as a whole) was supported by the State, and for at least two reasons. The first one refers to a sort of implicit encouragement to the settlement of certain movements, because their presence indirectly favors the implementation of some movements, for the reason why their presence is helping indirectly the implantation of the Turkish language and culture in these countries. For example, in the case of Fethullah Gülen's disciples, State support was tacit: openly distrustful and skeptical *vis-à-vis* the movement leader and his ideology in Turkey, the State indirectly strained Gülen's disciples to extend their school network to Central Asia where henceforth, thanks to Gülen's schools, Turkish cul-

ture is exported to all the steppes. But mostly, the Turkish State itself conceived an Islamic policy and exported a religious ideology that it now appropriate to explain.

4) Official Policy in the Turkish-Speaking World: between Islam and Secularism

It is not quite exaggerated to say that Turkey's foreign policy in religious matter is inspired by reaction. I mean that Ankara, pushed in this direction by Westerners, conceived an Islamic and Kemalist policy for the States by reaction to the strong dynamism of private Turkish religious movements and by fear that other countries or other Islamist movements of the Arab world or Iran will impose their conception of Islam. Chronologically, after the beginnings of intensive missionary activity by private movements, the Turkish State implemented spreading a moderate Islam and the promotion of Kemalism principles in the new republics.

One of the consequences of independences in all these countries was the keen interest in building new mosques or the restoration of the ones that had been closed or transformed into warehouses during the soviet period. The main mosques funded by the Turkish Directorate of Religious Affairs or *Diyanet Vakfi* are the ones of Achkhabad in Turkmenistan, of Kochkor Ata in Kirghizstan. We will equally mention those of Nakhitchevan bearing the name of Kazim Karabekir or further the one of the Karabakh war martyr monument in Bakou. All these mosques imitate an ottoman

style and are run by an imam coming from Turkey. The mosques built in Azerbaijan take into account the Shiite character of Azeri Islam. So, for Shiites to feel at home, The Turkish management of the mosque made available to the faithful the famous *muhurs*, clay stones from holy Shiite cities such as Mashad, Kerbala or Qom and on which the faithful place their forehead during the prayer. Above all Shiite, this practice is usually totally absent in Sunnite mosques.

Spreading an abundant religious literature constitutes the other face of official Islamic presence of the *Diyanet*. In all the republics, this literature is displayed at mosque exit or in the main bookstores. Free, it intends mostly instill to the faithful prayer rules, Islamic morals. Thus, part of the literature insists on the misdeeds of alcoholism or drug usage, which put forth increasingly problems in these countries.

The creation of several Islamic educational establishments (theology colleges and high schools) undoubtedly constitutes the most important religious action, which has more consequence on Islamic revival in these countries. We give some examples of religious establishments opened by the *Diyanet*. In Turkmenistan, Kirghizstan and Azerbaijan theology colleges were created, where teaching is conceived on University of Marmara theology college model. Regularly, these students are sent to Turkey for long-term courses or training. Likewise, certain students are making all their studies in Turkey. These establishments try to guide themselves today towards general and orientalist teaching, and no longer solely theological, by proposing language and

eastern civilization courses, in order to allow graduates to
find jobs more easily once their studies are completed.[21] Be-
cause the fundamental problem of these colleges is to train
religious staffs in the countries where there really no new
openings in "religious" professions. By training specialists
of Arab-Muslim countries and reinforcing the ranks of Arab
and Persian ranks, some students are enabled to find a job in
enterprises, NGO or even diplomatic services of these coun-
tries.

Another initiative taken by the Turkish State via *Diya-
net* is to be mentioned. It is setting up a Eurasian Religious
Council (*Avrasya Dini Surasi*) that gathers on average every
two years the major official religious personalities of Tur-
key, Caucasus States, Central Asia, the Russian Federation
and certain Balkan States.[22] Meeting for the first time in An-
kara in 1995, the council next met in Istanbul, Sarajevo then
in the Turkish part of Cyprus. This council seeks to develop
Islamic cooperation among all these States and go towards
certain harmonization in religious practice and in the cele-
bration of great Islamic holidays. Actually, organized under
the auspices of Turkey, this council aims at establishing
Turkish hegemony on the entire Caucasus, Central Asia in-
deed even the Balkans. More than religious, this *Diyanet*
policy meets national political considerations originating
from Turkish official authorities.

The second phase of the Turkish State reaction in view
of the missionary movement offensive was Kemalist and
secularist. In fact, noting the strong settlement of Turkish

Islamist movements in these countries and their strong polarity, the Turkish State implemented a Kemalism principle promotion policy. This policy had two positions.

By way of educational cooperation policy, Turkish school establishments were implemented in several Turkish-speaking republics. High schools, universities and colleges were created in several cities. Thus, there is a Turkish university in Kazakhstan, another one in Kirghizstan. Turkish high schools attached to the national Ministry of Education were implemented in Bakou, Bichkek, Almaty and Achkhabad. Educational programs of these establishments give great importance to Kemalism teaching and its secularism principles.[23]

More specifically conceived to spread Kemalism principles and ideas, Atatürk centers that Turkey implemented in Kirghizstan and Azerbaijan have had more mitigated results. Indeed, these centers produce in local languages a important literature on Atatürk and Kemalism, but they are often centers disconnected from reality, cut off from society and occasionally serving to organize meetings and conferences on modern Turkey's founder.

5) Conclusion

By way of conclusion, three fundamental remarks can be made. First of all, Kemalist republican Turkey, compared to Turkish-speaking republics stemming from the former USSR seems to us to be quite more Islamic. In fact, the secu-

larization policy implemented among USSR Muslims was much more radical than the one of Mustapha Kemal in Turkey. After independences, the most Muslim character of the population and even of Turkey's institutions is undeniable in relation in relation to what prevails in Central Asia. For this reason, Turkey in principle had no need to export secularism, already strongly present in the countries that it wanted to secularize.

Actually, the enthusiasm of Turkey to propose an Islamic cooperation to these countries was based in 1991 on a myth, the danger of Iranian and Saudi Islamist movements. From the early 1990s, Ankara implemented a multi-factorial policy, in order to, among others, prevent the new republics, originated from the former USSR from becoming the Shiite or Wahhabite militant activism theater. Actually, these States demonstrated few penchants to being tempted by Islamisms originating from these two countries. This Turkish fear comprises also the Turkish Islamist movements which went to the conquest of Central Asia and the Caucasus. Fearing a harmful influence on its foreign policy, Turkish diplomacy was eager to send religious employees to all these republics to counteract the competition of Islamists, which is a constant of Turkish diplomacy: not to let its citizens acting alone abroad. At the same way as in Europe, where Turkey's Islamic policy enters into open competition with private Turkish private movements among Turkish immigrants, we in Central Asia watch at an equivalent competition, though less vehement than in Europe.

Thus, to Turkish diplomacy, religion and Islamic cooperation are perceived as tools serving an implementation method of Turkish policy in these countries. In other words, we assist to a religious cooperation instrumentation, on the same way as there is a Turkish Islamist movement instrumentation by Ankara, so that the force and dynamism of *nurcu*, *fethullahci* organizations and others will be useful to Turkey's official policy in these States. The ultimate target for the Turkish State is not so much to contribute to Islamic awakening in these countries, but to accompany it in order to prevent it from becoming radical and hostile to Turkey, and mostly to ensure that these spaces and societies in reformulation enter fully into a true Turkish zone of influence intended by Turkish policy and that would extend from the Balkans to Central Asian steppes.

Notes

1. Olivier Roy, *La nouvelle Asie centrale ou la fabrication des nations*, Paris, Éditions du Seuil, 1997, 326 p.
2. On the situation of Islam during the soviet period see the classical study by Alexandre Bennigsen, *Les Musulmans oubliés, l'Islam en Union soviétique*, Paris, 1981. For a more recent and pertinent analysis of soviet policy *vis-à-vis* Islam see Daniel Brower, *Turkistan and the Fate of the Russian Empire*, London-New York: Routledge Curzon, 2000. More specifically devoted to the fights led by the Soviet State against Islam, see the work by Soshanna Keller, *To Moscow, Not Mecca. The Soviet Campaign against Islam in Central Asia, 1917-1941*, Westport, CN-London: Praeger, 2001.
3. Soshana Keller, *op. cit.*

4. See the works by Bakhtiyar Babadjanov and Muzaffar Kamilov, "Muhammadjan Hindustani (1892-1989) and the Beginning of the 'Great Schism' Among the Muslims of Uzbekistan," Stéphane Dudoignon, Hisao Komatsu, *Islam and Politics in Russia and Central Asia (Early Eighteenth to late Twentieth Centuries)*, London-New York, Bahrain, Kegan Paul, 2001.

5. Interview with Naile Suleymanova, theologist and instructor of Khazar University, Bakou, June 2004.

6. Habiba Fathi, "La naissance de la coopération islamique en Asie centrale," *Recherches internationales*, n. 46, 1996, p. 65-80.

7. Bakhtiyar Babadjanov, Muzaffar Kamilov, *op. cit.*

8. Bayram Balci, "The Role of the Pilgrimage in the Establishment of Relations Between Uzbekistan and the Uzbek Community of Saudi Arabia," *Central Eurasian Studies Review*, v. 2, n. 3, 2003.

9. Gareth Winrow, *Turkey in Post-Soviet Central Asia*, London, The Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1994, 53 p.

10. On the missionary spirit of Turkish islamists in Central Asia see Bayram Balci, *Missionnaires de l'islam en Asie centrale, les écoles turques de Fethullah Gülen*, Paris, Maisonneuve et Larose, 2002.

11. On Sait Nursi movement, see: Safa Mürsel, *Siyasi Düþünce Tarihi Iþýðýnda Bediüzzaman Saïd Nursi* (Said Nursi in the shadow of political ideal history), Istanbul, Yeni Asya Yayýnlarý, 237 p. One can also refer to the very instructive and most critical contribution by ªerif Mardin, *Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey, The Case of Bediüzzaman Said Nursi*, New York, State University of New York Press, 1989, 267 p.

12. On the different religious groups stemming from the movement founded by Sait Nursi, see Hasan Hüseyin Ongun, "Baþlangýçtan Günümüze Said Nursi ve Nurculuk Hareketi" (The nurcu movement and Said Nursi: from his its beginning until today), *Yeni Türkiye*, n. 45, Nisan 1997, p. 57-71.

13. See the foundation's website, www.yazarlarvakfi.org.tr

14. Hakan Yavuz, "Towards an Islamic Liberalism? The Nurcu Movement and Fethullah Gülen," *Middle East Journal*, v. 53, n. 4, Autumn 1999, p. 584-605.

15. On the implementation, operation of the ideology conveyed by the schools, see the studies of Bayram Balci, "Fethullah Gülen's Missionary Schools in Central Asia and their Role in the Spreading of Islam and Turkism," *Religion, State and Society*, v. 31, n. 2, p. 151-78.

16. On the movement religious philosophy, see: Kâmil Yilmaz, *Azîz Mahmûd Hüdâyî, Hayatý, Eserleri,Tarikatý* (Azîz Mahmûd Hüdâyî, his life, his works, his brotherhood), Ankara, Erkam Yayinlari, 1999, 325 p.

17. Conversation with Nedim Kaya, director of the foundation that represents in Azerbaijan nakchibendi*naqchibandi* movement of Topbaº, Bakou, January 2004.

18. Conversation with Medet Bala, secretary-general of Hüdâyî Vakfý, Istanbul, September 2003.

19. On Süleyman Tunahan movement, see Birol Caymaz, *Les mouvements islamiques turcs à Paris*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2002, 282 p.

20. Conversation with Abdullah Þanlý, responsible for the association, Bakou, April 2004.

21. Conversation with Ahmet Polad, dean of the college of theology at the State University of Bakou, January 2004.

22. On current operation of the Diyanet, see its official website, www.diyanet.gov.tr

23. Saðlam Mehmet, "Türk Cumhuriyetleri ile Eðitim Iliþkilerimiz" (Our educational exchanges with Turkish republics), *Yeni Türkiye*, n. 14, 1997, p. 683-84.

Azerbaijan at the Crossroads of Three Powers: Russia, Iran and Turkey

Leila Alieva

Significance of the Country

Two major characteristics of Azerbaijan are usually brought in to justify an outside interest to the country—its geographical location and abundant oil and gas resources. Located on the shores of the Caspian Sea—with old city Baku as important port—for many centuries it used to connect trade routes between North and South, and had been part of the Great Silk Road from the East to the West. It is the only country in the South Caucasus, who borders all three powers. Strategic location on the crossroads and rich oil deposits made it attractive for conquerors who were competing for the influence over the Caucasus, inhabited by numerous ethnic and confessional groups. Thus in different periods of history this mountainous and diverse region was part, besides others, of the Persian, Ottoman and Russian empires, with all its controversial legacies and influences. It became a divided nation since the two Russian-Persian wars in the beginning of the 19th century and at present has even greater representation in Iran (around 30 mln.) than in independent republic of Azerbaijan (8 mln).

Before industrial development of oil, the strategic location of Azerbaijan played an important role in the great powers competition. The fortress Baku served Russia as the outpost in its South Eastern and naval borders. For Azerbaijan the influence of its oil resources in this significance grew exponentially since the middle of the 19th century with the development of industrial capitalism and technologies. This turned the country in the "Klondike" of Russian Empire, attracting major capitalists of the West, such as Nobel, Rothschild, and causing mass inflow of the labor force from Russia and Iran. The lands of the villages around Baku appear to be rich with shallowly located and pure, almost refined, which was called since old times—"white" oil and gas. These as a result of extensive exploitation were exhausted by the 40s, and left behind it contaminated lands of the formerly agricultural areas, so that the Soviet development of the oil transferred to the sea. For that a unique extended platform of dozen of kilometers was built on the sea—almost a whole town with infrastructure and even cultural objects—called the "Oil Rocks."

The long history of raids, conquests and occupation from the side of empires created a pattern of resistance, which often leaves a wrong impression of natural bellicosity of the region—permanent warlike culture, which is impossible to change. The historical roots of instability in the Caucasus and the role of the great powers and empires in the conflicts was perfectly described by Bruce Grant[1] in his research of rebellion against Bolsheviks in the Azerbaijani

Sheki villages in 1930. In fact, the long term and fierce resistance of Azerbaijanis even after 10 years of bloody occupation by the Red Army, was the best proof of imposition of the last Russian political project brought in to the other republics and nations. It also explains its failure and the immediate victory after collapse of the Soviet Union of the pre-Soviet political project—the first democratic parliamentary republic in the Muslim East—Azerbaijan Democratic Republic founded in 1918.

In all major events of the 20th century oil of Baku continued to be source of significant attraction for the big powers. Similar to the beginning of the 20th century when Bolsheviks viewed occupation of Baku as vitally important, in the middle of the century during the second world war the oil rich Baku was an important strategic objective for the German troops, which however were stopped before they advanced in the Caucasus.

Modernization and Role of Azerbaijan

Most of the foreign actors and analysts define Azerbaijan's importance in terms of real interests, namely hydrocarbon resources and geographical strategic location. Historically, however, Azerbaijan used to play even more important role as a source and conductor of modernizing influences far beyond the Caucasus. Few factors make Azerbaijan's role special in this regards.

One is an open and dynamic culture, which was formed not in the last turn because of its location on the crossroads.

This culture served a fertile ground for development of reformist and innovational trends within Islam as early as 12th century. The magnificent view from the bay of the medieval town on the hill, surrounded by double walls, minarets, baths and European style 19th century "oil boom" era buildings, has significantly changed since post-Soviet independence. Previously the pride of all Baku citizens, the shape of the town is now dominated by the multi-storey buildings, chaotically and hastily built by the nouveau riche, conveying not its ancient history, but rather having the look of a recent settlement, built from scratch.

This view of Baku reflects and symbolizes the transformation of Azerbaijan over the centuries, including the different paths of its modernization during two waves of the "oil boom"—first, the industrialization of the 19th—early 20th centuries, and the second following the post-Soviet independence at the end of the 20th century.

Modernization processes in industrial Europe penetrated Caucasus mainly through Russia, whose colonies were particularly affected by the political and economic czarist-reforms in the second half of the 19th century. Arrival of foreign entrepreneurs to Baku—industrial capital of the Caucasus—accelerated development of technologies, infrastructure, trade, construction, culture and service sector. Most importantly privatization and industrial capitalism led to the development of "the classes similar to those in Europe"[2]—working class and bourgeoisie, multiparty system and free media.

The Westernization of Azerbaijan is deeply enrooted in its history. In the middle of the 19th century the educated elite—philosophers, writers, scholars-lead a reformist movement, which had an influence reaching far beyond the Caucasus. Suggestion by a writer and philosopher Mirza Fatali Axundov, who appealed to the rulers of Russian, Ottoman and Persian empires to transfer from the Arabic alphabet to Latin to promote progress of the Muslim peoples was supposed to accelerate modernization of the large parts of population. The reformist and anticlerical satirical journal *Molla Nasreddin* published by outstanding Azerbaijani intellectuals, painters, poets was read from "Greece to China." Moreover, ideas of the Azerbaijani reformers, (along with other intellectuals of the region) had a significant impact on the Constitutional revolution in Iran. Azerbaijan Musavat Party emissaries, spreading their ideas beyond Azerbaijan, played a crucial role in formation of Turkish national identity.[3] Establishment of the secular democratic parliamentary republic in Azerbaijan was met with inspiration in Central Asia.

The important potential of Azerbaijan's political influence was understood by Bolsheviks, who after occupation of the country held their first Congress of the Peoples of the East in 1920 in Baku, which had near 2,000 delegates from 38 countries, including Central Asia, China, Korea, Syria, India, Japan, Iran and other.

Indeed, before arrival of Bolsheviks, there was a lot to "export" from Azerbaijan to the other Muslim states—its

liberal constitution and representative parliament, women's rights and freedoms, its secularism and modernizing high culture, political pluralism and tolerance.

In spite of the Soviet purges and attempts to eradicate historical memory through change of the alphabet, the true nature and identity of Azerbaijanis, such as individualism, ties to the land, philosophy, history and language survived the worst years of the Stalin's repressions. Private entrepreneurship—both legal and illegal—was mushrooming in the times of the "thaw," proving alien nature of the collective forms of property and production imposed by Russians in the Caucasus.

Post-Soviet Caucasus Conundrum

Three civilizations, Zoroastrian, Christian[4] and Muslim, which were spread for centuries on the territory of Azerbaijan, and influences of at least three empires—Persian, Ottoman and Russian—added to the complex and multilayered character of Azerbaijani identity. In spite of this complexity, after collapse of the Soviet Union, similar to the other states in the Caucasus, the generation of intellectuals and dissidents, who elevated to power in their struggle with communists based their policy on the ideas of liberal democracy, thus reviving pre-Soviet political projects.

This ideology of a secular democratic liberal state, along with the issue of the conflict with neighboring Armenia, determined post-Soviet foreign policies of the country and direction of integration of Azerbaijan.

Geopolitically the country faced an intense competition of all three regional powers after collapse of the Soviet Union, seeing it as a unique window of opportunity. For the "newly" independent states, however, it represented a significant security challenge—in the face of Iran with its sentiments about former "provinces," Russia—with her unwillingness to reconcile with loss of "the underbelly" or the Southern flanks, or for Armenia—in the face of possible increasing role of Turkey in the region.

Collapse of the Soviet Union changed power balance in the region and brought to agenda not only pre-Soviet political projects, but unresolved territorial issues and historical grievances, inflamed by the intensified competition of the three regional powers for influence over strategic region with rich resources.

The Upper Karabagh conflict emerged while Soviet Union still existed and by opinions of many significantly contributed to its ultimate disintegration. Not only it started a series of flows of refugees and IDPs, ethnic cleansing, humanitarian emergencies which added to already worsening economic situation and insecurity of population, but it also prevented unification of the South Caucasus states, similar to that in Baltic region. It substantially slowed down economic growth and pace of reforms, affected state and democracy building, and their integration in the European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Similarly, secessionist conflicts in Georgia—Abkhazia, Southern Ossetia—were increasing internal instability through undermining political leadership

and preventing the country from serious breakthrough in economic and political development.

De-colonization put young states *vis-à-vis* three ambitious powers in the region and in the situation of necessity to maneuver in order to avoid turning into arena of clashes of their interests. All three of them applied coercive methods in their foreign policies. For instance Iran used its gas supplies to Nakhichevan (part of Azerbaijan with no borders with the mainland), or trade with Armenia and Upper Karabagh as means of pressure on Azerbaijan, Turkey joined embargo of Azerbaijan towards Armenia. But of all three only Russia interfered in the region through the direct military or political support to autonomies in Georgia and to Armenia and Upper Karabagh. For Russia, resolution of the conflicts would mean loss of the Caucasus, as normalization of relations of Armenia with Azerbaijan and Turkey would make Russian basis in Armenia meaningless.

The paradox in the eyes of many observers is a consistency of the leadership of the Caucasus states, first of all Georgia and Azerbaijan, in foreign policy priority of integration in the West.

Two major factors determine direction of integration or foreign policy priority of the Caucasus states: security and identity, as expressed by the nature of political projects. For Azerbaijan the issue of violated territorial integrity as a result of Armenian occupation was the main security threat determining its post-Soviet foreign policy and alliances. Similarly, Russia has been perceived as a primary threat to

Georgia because of her support for the secessionist move-
ment in Abkhazia and South Ossetia.

Russia

Russia's permanent pressure on the insurgent repub-
lics—Azerbaijan and Georgia—by means of direct military
support to Armenia during the war for Upper Karabagh au-
tonomous region of Azerbaijan, or support for secessionist
movements in Georgia did not leave many options for these
two republics. Some concessions to Russia in sovereignty
by the consequent leadership in Shevardnadze in Georgia
and Aliyev in Azerbaijan (entrance to the CIS for instance)
just decreased some intensity of pressure on the leaders, but
were not sufficient to make Russia to abandon its traditional
policy divide and rule. There were obvious limits to what
could Russia sacrifice to normalize relations with her for-
mer colonies. High dependence of all three states, particular
Georgia and Armenia on Russia's energy, makes them vul-
nerable to the usage of the energy supplies as mean sof polit-
ical pressure from the Russian side. On the other hand,
Russia is hosting near 3 mln labor migrants from the Cauca-
sus, the status of whom is also being used as means of
pressure. Growing Russian ambitions in economy opens op-
portunities first of all in the non-oil sector, which is not at-
tracting Western investors because of many risks. Russia is
also watching with anxiety the strong intention of Georgia
and Azerbaijan (and recently—trends in Armenia) to inte-

grate in European and Euro-Atlantic structures. Thus Russia is not ready yet to accept an independent policies of the Caucasus republics and slows down further integration of Azerbaijan in the Western structures.

Iran

As it was mentioned above, Iranian-Azerbaijani relations are full of controversy. On the one hand, for centuries Azeri Turks and Persians co-existed in the common state, the Azeri Turks rule in Iran, such as Sefevi or Gadjar dynasty, alternating with Persian. United by Zoroastrian past, Shia branch of Islam, cultural and kinship links, they celebrate the same holidays and Azeris dominate some areas of economy and politics. On the other hand, normalization of Azerbaijani Iranian relations face structural obstacles. These obstacles were observed in the pre-Soviet period, when Iranian religious influence was perceived as contradicting and hostile to the very essence of the democratic secular republic of Azerbaijan—the statehood of which was formed not on the basis of religion but nation. Similar to the beginning of the 20th century Iran invested in extension of its influence after collapse of the Soviet Union to independent Azerbaijan, building mosques, medreses, offering thousands of students from poor families free education in Iran. On the other hand, Azerbaijan was perceived as a threat to Iran with its potential influence on the nationalism in the Northern provinces of Iran populated by more than 30 mln.

Azerbaijanis, who, unlike other minorities in Iran were deprived of some basic cultural rights. The notion of "one" nation, thus denying distinguished national identity of Azeri Turks by Persians, were not shared in independent Azerbaijan. Unlike some expectations by the scholars of the region, Iranian-Armenian relations appeared to be much warmer than those of Iran with Azerbaijan. The crucial factor in relations was Iranian cooperation with Armenia, who were in war with Azerbaijan and secessionist Upper Karabagh, what undermined its non-partisanship and hindered its ability to mediate the conflict.

Iran in turn was irritated by the pro-Western, in particular pro American and pro-Israeli policy of Azerbaijan. Not only leader Heydar Aliyev were crucial in bringing in the region numerous extra-regional actors, such as US and major transnational oil corporations, but refused Iran a share in the contract of the century in 1994 under the influence of the US. Thus Iranian—Azerbaijani relations were characterized by normalization alternating with periods of tension. The strategic partnership with the US, in particular, participation in coalition in fight with terrorism clarified a division line between the security orientation of two neighboring states. The most recent aggravation of the situation related to the possibility of application of the strict measures by the US on Iran because of the issue of nuclear weapons, put Azerbaijan in the spot of debating its role in this policy. Against the background of growing anxiety, the statement of one of the delegates at the congress of Azerbaijani Diaspora regarding

the issue of the Iranian Azerbaijan caused immediate reaction of the official Iran as unfriendly gesture from the side of its neighbor.

Turkey

There is a misperception that this is mainly language and culture which makes Turkey and Azerbaijan natural allies. In fact, closeness of language is similar to that between Croats and Serbs, or Russian and Ukrainians, while two people belong to different branches of Islam—majority of Azeris to Shia, while Turks—to Sunni. In reality, the secular democratic independent and westernized state with Turkic speaking population has been a model for Azerbaijanis all through the years of Soviet suppression. While social and emotional sentiments of Azeris in the Soviet Union were connected with the members of their families in Iran, whom many lost ties with since creation of the USSR, while politically their aspirations were connected with relations with Turkey. Besides, in population memories these were Turkish troops which protected for some time Azerbaijani Democratic Republic, attacked by the Bolsheviks and Armenian Dashnaks in 1918-1920. For Azerbaijan the closest ally was Turkey, who was the first to react to the advancing Armenian troops in the Azerbaijani territories. True, tied by its membership in NATO and objective of integration in Europe, Turkey did not interfere militarily in the conflict, unlike Russia, limiting her reaction by economic measures and

military exercises during the war close to the borders with Armenia. However, should Turkey got involved directly in the conflict, as the counterbalance to the Russian military participation, the international community would be quicker to react to the threat of internationalization of conflict and probably the conflict would be resolved by now.

Respect for territorial integrity of post-Soviet Azerbaijan and identity formed a foundation for the good relations between two states, which on many occasions cooperated on the foreign policy issues in the international scale. The leadership of Azerbaijan in turn created all the conditions for the Turkish business, besides cooperation in oil and gas sector and strategic pipeline projects. However, position of Turkish business, outside the main oil contracts, is vulnerable to the domestic political shocks and changes, particular in areas which are the subject of other regional actor's ambitions. In a move to consolidate power from the side of the authorities, cracking on the rivals oligarchs consequently led to the loss of position for the related foreign business, as it happened recently with the Turkish and other companies, who were seen under the patronage of the imprisoned former Economic Development Minister.

Thus, post-Soviet geopolitical situation did not favor smooth state, nation and democracy building of the newly independent states in. Similar to the pre-Soviet brief period of independence the region has become a victim of the high interest of different powerful actors to its oil and strategic location. Politically it first of all affected domestic instabil-

ity in these states, creating either power gaps or frequent changes of leadership, which in turn led to other internal, and regional security challenges.

Extra-Regional Actors

Of all regional powers none, except for Turkey, looked attractive for Post-Soviet Azerbaijan and not only because of the cultural and linguistic similarities and shared security concerns. Turkey was a secular democratic state, closely connected with the West—member of NATO and integrating in EU. However, relations of the Caucasus states with the West were characterized by the contradiction between the "identity and geography." While trends of modernization and Europeanization, as it was mentioned before, had its roots back in the history, the perception of the Caucasus in the West, in particular of Muslim Azerbaijan, did not coincide with its self-image in the region. Despite that most of the South Caucasus elite and population is considering themselves "European" with strong desire to integrate in Europe, the image of the Caucasus in Europe for a long time did not extend beyond that of mountainous and exotic people.

The Western aid in particular to the civil movements and democracy building was driven by the historical and subjective factors, rather than by thorough calculations of sort term and long-term interests and anticipation of the policy consequences. The US and European foundations would come to Georgia early because of the factor of Edward

Shevardnadze and his role for the West (German funds
would, for instance, give support to Georgian Greens, while
Azerbaijani Greens were hopelessly trying to find support
from the West in the end of '80s early '90s), while well es-
tablished Armenian Diaspora abroad would attract grants
and investments in Armenia. Thus in the most intense pe-
riod (end of '80s middle of '90s) of social activism and pop-
ular mobilization Azerbaijan was not receiving enough
support for its civil society and building of democratic insti-
tutions.

Azerbaijan's relations with the West were characterized
thus by asymmetry—strong incentive from the side of Azer-
baijan to get Western attention to its security and identity is-
sues and little interest from the side of the West to anything
there, but oil. The investments in the oil sector, which re-
mains in the state ownership, started since the contract of the
century signed by the late president Heydar Aliyev and 11
foreign oil companies, majority of which are Western and
counted in billion of dollars. By 2012-2015 extraction of oil
will reach its peak, but then it will experience sharp decline.
Because of the high dependence of Azerbaijani econ-
omy—GDP, exports etc.—on oil and its products, national
economy is vulnerable to the external shocks, such as de-
cline of the world price of oil and to the so called Dutch de-
cease.

Most important, however, is the influence of oil factor
on the state and democracy building. The Human Develop-
ment Report of Azerbaijan in 1997[5] warned about long-term

consequences of the development of hydrocarbon resources of Azerbaijan in the absence of mature democratic institutions. It anticipated process of strengthening of ruling elite through multibillion investments and weakening under funded civil society and creation of the conditions well described by the scholars of the oil dependent economies.[6]

The abundant oil and gas resources affect the bilateral relations and the influence of their agenda on the nature of transition in the newly independent states. The case study of Azerbaijan proves that democracy agenda in bilateral relations is usually sacrificed for the sake of energy or security interests. In this regards satisfaction of the economic interests, first of all in the energy sphere, of the leading economic powers—the US, UK and other states of the West did not lead automatically to the promotion of the economic reforms or institutional liberalization. As it was dependent on the political will of the authorities, which bore legacies of the old communist leadership style, the reforms got frozen at the point when it started to be perceived as a threat to the monopoly on power and resources of the ruling elite.

Neither bringing in energy interests of the Western states to the Caspian, or cooperation in the war with terrorism helped the Azerbaijani government so far to resolve the most important security issue of the occupied territories.

The US is the most powerful extra-regional actor. It has enormous resources at its disposal as the foreign aid to the states in transition. Yet, first democratically elected Azerbaijani government was deprived of the US aid in 1992 as a

result of the pressure of the Armenian lobby in the US Congress, which adopted amendment 907 to the Freedom Support Act.

Neither US—Azerbaijan cooperation in security sector has been sufficient to restore territorial integrity, counteract threats from Russia, or possible threats from Iran. Deepening cooperation with NATO and intensified cooperation with the US after 9/11 contributed to the improvement of the security situation in the region. Yet, cooperation in security sector is now facing another dilemma—how to improve professionalism of the force structures and at the same time avoid its abuse from the side of the government in dealing with political dissent and popular protests.

European Institutions, first of all Council of Europe, which Azerbaijan is a member, has been most consistent regarding reform process in the country. Unlike representations of individual European states, except for Norwegian ambassador, the co-chairmen of the monitoring committee of the Council of Europe were perceived in the region as the most devoted and principled representatives of the European Institutions. EU, in particular its assessments of Azerbaijani elections, in this regards looks less principled. Much will be dependent on the nature of cooperation between the EU and the country within European New Neighborhood Policy framework.

This leads me to the most crucial issue regarding Azerbaijan's legacies and the future.

Taking into account mixed legacies of all the epochs and influences, one should assume, that the democratization

and realization of the reform potential of Azerbaijan under such complicated geopolitical environment, when none of the regional actors is really interested in the development of strong, independent democratic secular state rich with oil resources and Muslim population—is not possible without *genuine* support of the Western democracies. When I say *genuine*, I mean caring not only about real interests, oil and security, but also about the *effects* , which such policy may have on this state in transition.

Azerbaijan is the most dramatic example of the above mentioned contradiction "between geography and identity:" to the peripheral location and exotic image of Georgia and Armenia in case of Azerbaijan the issue of oil and Islam is added. This makes its objective to get integrated in the West even more complicated, because of the perceptions and real interests in the West. In spite of the fact, that political Islam traditionally has been very weak in the country, and that the country showed a unique example of building the first democratic republic in the Islamic world based on liberal principles with its influences going far beyond the region, there is little trust and interest from the West in reform potential and power of the civil society of Azerbaijan to lead the process.

The availability of hydrocarbon resources makes not only regional powers, but also the western states to prioritize stability or security agenda in bilateral relations with Azerbaijan, leaving reforms and democratization as a secondary issue in perception of leaders, while undermining the image of the Western democracies in the eyes of public.

Even the new security priorities and objectives as expressed in the New National Security Strategy of the US, which stresses democracy as the main factor of security, were "adjusted" to the assessment of elections in the oil rich Azerbaijan. To the great disappointment of the civil society and opposition the US recognized the fraudulent 2003 presidential and 2005 parliamentary elections.

Squeezed between three regional ambitious powers, Azerbaijan managed both to maintain its independence, and to maneuver between regional powers' interests in order not to turn into the stage of their clashes.

The direction of further integration will be dependent on the Western attitude to the country—strengthening trust in its reform potential of the society and principled approach in the relations at the state level. The greater authoritarian trends in governance is already reflecting itself in drifting towards Russia. Before it is too late, the world community should try not to lose a unique chance to promote reforms in the Muslim country with the broad basis for liberal democracy.

Notes

1. Bruce Grant, "An Average Azeri Village (1930): Remembering Rebellion in the Caucasus Mountains," *Slavic Review*, v. 63, n. 4 (2004): 705-31. According to Bruce Grant near 10,000 local villagers in and around Sheki took place in the rebellion against Bolsheviks in 1930.
2. This process of modernization in Azerbaijan was described by Audrey Alstadt in her book *The Azeri Turks*, Stanford University Press, 2000.

3. This circumstance was particularly stressed by historian Kamal Karpat reflecting influence of Azerbaijan on Ottoman Empire, during the discussion at the conference on Central Asia and Caucasus foreign policies (Russian Littoral Project) at SAIS Johns Hopkins University in March 1994 in Washington DC.

4. The spread and influence of Christianity in Azerbaijan is well described in the most recent publication by Sara Kasumova *Khristianstvo v Azerbaijane v rannem srednevekoviye*, Baku, 2005.

5. *Human Development Report*, UNDP, Azerbaijan, 1997.

6. See for instance Terry Lynn Karl, *Paradox of Plenty: Oil Booms and Petro-States*, University of California Press, Berkeley-Los Angeles-London, 1997.

3

Post-Modernity
and Critical Thought

Reason and Faith in an Intercultural Context

Sergio Paulo Rouanet

On January 19, 2004, a historic meeting took place, in Baviera, between one of the foremost philosophers of our times, Jürgen Habermas, and the then Prefect of the *Sacra Congregatio pro Doctrina Fidei,* Joseph Ratzinger, later to be elected Pope under the name of Benedict XVI. The subject of the debate was the issue of whether a democratic political order required a pre-political foundation, that is, whether a link had to be postulated between the political community and a pre-existing national or religious culture. Not surprisingly, the two dialogue-partners disagreed on this issue. What was surprising was their near-coincidence on a related matter: the role of religion in the modern world.

Habermas answered negatively to the question posed by the organizers: no, no conceptual link was necessary, because political liberalism, in the version advocated by Habermas—that of Kantian republicanism—was fully capable of legitimizing a democratic State, without any need for a pre-political legitimation. This State is legimate, not because it corresponds to religious values or embodies cultural characteristics deriving from the history of a particular

community, but because it is based on procedures that take into account all points of view and in this sense lead to decisions which in principle are acceptable to all. The Constitution that citizens give themselves includes not only political rights, through which citizens are enabled to participate in the political process, but also liberal rights, which are enshrined in the Charter at the same time as the political rights and cannot therefore be viewed as extra-political, transcending the body politic, as assumed by theoreticians of natural law.

Ratzinger agreed that there were good grounds to consider democracy as the most adequate manner of organizing society politically, since the participation of all citizens in the formulation of law was a *prima face* guarantee that power would not be usurped by the few to the detriment of the many. But majority decisions can be unjust, and lead to the oppression of religious or racial minorities. Hence the need for ethical foundations going back to values shared by all human beings, and which must be considered valid even if rejected, at a given time, by contingent majorities.

This theoretical disagreement would seem to doom the very idea of a dialogue on religion. After all, in stressing the self-sufficiency of political liberalism, the former Marxist and agnostic thinker was in fact denying the necessity and validity of religious legitimations; by the same token, in stressing the need for an extra-political foundation, Ratzinger might be suspected of opening a space for the reentry of religion into the public sphere. Both would be acting in

character, according to their respective intellectual biographies: Ratzinger's "transcendentalist" position, in which the City of Man is always open to the divine, would never coincide with the secular "immanentism" of Habermas, apparently convinced that there is no place for the sacred in the world of human affairs.

Yet religion was precisely the area where the professor and the cardinal came closest to each other.

The fact that religion is not necessary to legitimize the political order does not mean, for Habermas, that it has no role to play in a democratic society. On the contrary, he recognizes it as a very active social force, with a positive role to play in a modernity that has become a victim to what he calls *Entgleisung,* de-railing, a condition induced by globalization, and that has among its characteristics anomy, political skepticism, privatism, narcissism, which transforms the democratic process into a routine and a parody. Religion could contribute to re-introduce civic solidarity and commitment into the political arena. It goes without saying that even then religious pluralism would be the rule and the State would be continue to be neutral among the various worldviews. But the State would not be secularist in the traditional meaning of relegating religion to the limbo of obscurantism. It would be post-secular, in the sense of paying greater attention to the semantic and motivational potential of religious tradition. There would still be a difference between a secular discourse open to rational arguments and a religious discourse dependent on Revelation, but religion would be

taken seriously. Conversely, members of religious communities would be receptive to secular rationality.

Instead of drawing from the pathologies of modernity the conclusion that a return to the religious tradition is needed, Habermas thinks of a twofold process of reciprocal learning, in which believers would learn from non-believers, and vice-versa. Post-secularization, in this sense, would take the relay of classical secularization, in early modernity. On the one hand, the secular consciousness would be expected to conduct a self-critical reflection of its relationship to the Enlightenment. In addition, the State would be expected to do more than just organize the peaceful coexistence of all religions: it should abstain even from spreading a secularistic world-view, because this would jeopardize its ideological neutrality. On the other hand, religious communities would be expected to re-think its negative attitude towards modernity. Post-secularization would push both traditions, that of religion and that of the Enlightenment, to a reflection on their respective limits. In a way, this has happened in the past, when Christianity absorbed some concepts of Greek philosophy, and philosophy assimilated and translated into its own language a large number of Christian categories, such as responsibility, autonomy, justification, new beginning, alienation, and above all the idea that all men are created in God's image, a doctrine that secular thought translated into the assertion hat all men have equal dignity. At that time, biblical concepts migrated from religious groups to the whole of society. Can't this happen

again? Religions have preserved the memory of historical injustice, of crippled lives, of betrayed hopes, and philosophy could well listen to their voices. The concept of post-secular society reflects the conviction that religion continues to exist, that it is still relevant, that religion can contribute to give meaning and direction to lives that are being eroded by market values, and that in this sense is indispensable to a vibrant political process and therefore to democracy itself.

So much openness to religion on the part of a philosopher who defines himself as religion-deaf, *religiös unmusikalisch,* may have contributed to Ratzingers's reciprocal gesture of agreeing with the substance of Habermas' practical recommendations. "Regarding the practical consequences, I find myself in broad agreement with what Habermas says about post-secular society, and about the readiness to learn and the self-limitation on both sides." He goes even further than Habermas, who had been too polite to denounce the evils of religion: the fact that some time ago the department he led had been called the Holy Inquisition did not prevent Ratzinger from attacking the "pathologies of religion" and from suggesting that reason should play the role of "control organ" in order to "purify" and "order" religion. Of course he is thinking mainly of Islamic terrorism, but the generality of his attack on religious pathologies makes it clear that he is also thinking of past Catholic sins. He goes on to say that there are "pathologies of reason" as well (atom bomb, genetic engineering) and suggests that it should be

controlled by religion, in the same way as religion should be controlled by reason. His idea is that there should be a correlation between reason and religion, so that they should "purify" and "heal" each other.

So far neither Habermas nor Ratzinger have broken really new ground. Habermas moves in the well-known conciliatory tradition according to which there is no intrinsic hostility between religion and science, and that there should be a mutually productive dialogue between the two areas. (Maritain, Jean Guitton, Teilhard de Chardin, Barbour) although his concept of dialogue is of course more of a moral than of a cognitive nature. The views by Ratzinger that we have examined up to now follow the traditional position of the Catholic Church on the complementary relationship between faith and reason, recently exemplified in the Encyclical "*Fides et ratio.*"

What is new and potentially relevant to the international debate being carried out by Academy of Latinity is Ratzinger's view that this hoary and venerable theme should be inserted into the new context of interculturality. When we speak about the relationship between faith and culture we delude ourselves into thinking that we are speaking about universals, when we are in fact speaking only about Christianity and about secular rationality, that is, about two products of Western culture, that are by no means universal. Ratzinger has no such illusions. He believes, as we have seen, in the need for an ethical foundation of the political order, but he knows perfectly well that there is no global con-

sensus in this respect. The controversy on human rights illustrates this point. What conception of rights should we adopt as a pre-political basis? The Islamic? The Chinese? The Malaysian? The Latin American? All main cultural areas are going through tensions between faith and reason, and a meaningful debate on this issue has to take into account the fact that secularization can take different forms, depending on the religion to which it applies. It is one thing in Islamic countries, and another in Buddhist societies. In non-Western societies the tensions are aggravated by the fact that even if they are not universal, the two components of Western culture—Christianity and secular rationality—struggle for hegemony, and this circumstance adds nationalistic overtones to the problem, since all cultures want to preserve their identity.

All these complications make it extremely difficult to apply Ratzinger's rule about a mutually "purifying" correlation between faith and reason. But the attempt should be made. This presupposes that the two blocks of Western culture—Christianity and secular rationality—increase their listening potential, so that they can learn from other cultures, thus contributing to identify a common stock of values held in common by all men. In other words, Habermas' view about reciprocal learning as an essential component of the new concept of post-secularization should apply not only within societies but among them. In the intercultural perspective, post-secularization means a world in which reason will listen to the different world religions.

Shall we then say, with Ratzinger, that it will be a world in which reason and faith will correct each other? Personally, I would prefer to speak, not of the pathologies of reason, but of the pathologies induced by instrumental reason. The atom bomb and certain types of genetic engineering are not the products of reason as such, but of instrumental reason, a reason dissociated from the communicative context in which human beings come to an understanding about goals, in the medium of language. The "pathologies" occur when instrumental reason is set loose and runs amok. It occurs when the logic of the system (market and bureaucratic rationality) prevails over the logic of communication. It follows that instrumental reason should be reconnected to communicative reason. If this is true, the "purifying" and "healing" correlation would be between instrumental and communicative reason, and not necessarily between reason and faith. Reason would correct reason.

But as communicative reason needs religion in order to give meaning to the world and thus increase the political capacity to win back the territory annexed by system rationality, the correlation established by Ratzinger stands, and may be the basis for an intercultural utopia from which all kinds of fundamentalism—both the fundamentalism of religion and that of instrumental reason—will be banned forever.

Political Theology in the Post-Modern Age

Susan Buck-Morss

The term "political theology" describes the appeal of the political sovereign to transcendent power for legitimation. It was developed by Carl Schmitt, a conservative German professor of jurisprudence, who achieved international fame in the 1920s for his theories of sovereignty and his critique of parliamentary legality, and who later collaborated for several years with the Nazi Party. There has been a strong resurgence of interest globally in Schmitt's texts of political theory, which might seem surprising, given the post-modern intellectual climate. Very much like Marxism that preceded it, post-modernist theories have tended to view the state as an epiphenomenon, focusing instead on imperial culture (orientalism), power and the body (biopower), or social ontology and the text (deconstruction), ignoring the more traditional political issues of national sovereignty, legitimacy, the enemy, and war that were Carl Schmitt's main concerns. Social scientists, too, have tended to neglect these concepts in recent years, in order consider, as the central question, the degree to which the nation-state has been superceded by the global economy, and whether

international institutions like the World Bank, IMF, and European Union have made the issues of nation-state sovereignty obsolete.

Symptomatic of the bypassing of state sovereignty is the worldwide academic bestseller by Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, *Empire*. It is a call for a revolutionary, global transformation accomplished by the "multitude" through direct action, whereby the state, rather than slowly withering away as Marx imagined, is perceived as already superceded, the salutary effect of the global economy that makes old-style revolutions no longer necessary. Their book was published in 2001, just before the spectacular attack on the United States by a non-state, non-military, small cell of Al-Qaeda activists whose action challenged the hegemonic conception of geopolitics. That conception was itself under attack, and the old issues of political sovereignty were again center-stage.

If militant Islam does not operate within established political categories, it does appeal for its legitimation to transcendent power, God, as the *only* sovereign demanding human obedience. Islam—like Christianity and like Judaism—is inherently antinomial and revolutionary, insofar as it rejects any claim to supreme command by an earthy sovereign that contradicts the will of God. But Islam—like Christianity and like Judaism—by claiming that its own actions are legitimated in God's name and with God's blessing, is capable of the most indefensible forms of political violence. The rediscovery of theological legitimacy by po-

litical factions within all three of these monotheistic religions is fundamental to the present international crisis. Sharing the same God, they face each other as mortal enemies. This is the context for the renaissance of Carl Schmitt's term. Here is his claim from the 1922 text:

> All significant concepts of the modern theory of the state are secularized theological concepts not only because of their historical development—in which [in the west] they were transferred from theology to the theory of the state, whereby, for example, the omnipotent God became the omnipotent lawgiver—but also because of their systematic structure… The exception in jurisprudence is analogous to the miracle in theology.[1]

The theologically inflected issue of sovereignty, which, Schmitt claims, survives in so-called secular modernity, is central to both the existing hegemonic world order and the non-state violence that opposes it. However, for the vast majority of the world's Christians, Muslims and Jews, this theological-sovereign standoff is highly unstable and insecure. The temptation is to retreat to protective boundaries. Given the realities of globalization, however, defending such boundaries has equally distressing implications. If nationalism is the alternative, the likely victims are ethnic minorities, including the immigrant laborers on which every country within the global economy depends. If state rulers feel compelled to choose sides, becoming the protected clients of regional or hegemonic powers, their own sovereignty and the possibilities for democratic participation by their citizens are compromised.

There is a further complication. As political actors, we citizens now perform on a global stage. The justness of our performance cannot be determined by domestic effects alone. If we commit ourselves to act on moral rather than purely self-interested ground, we are faced with the dilemma that political theology poses: how can we remain obedient to existing sovereigns if they do not represent the global good, and how can we refuse obedience without falling into a warring state of nature, where we defend the good by defining a new enemy in its name?

It would be a simple affair if we could easily reason with each other in a Habermasian, global, public sphere. But we do not have a common political language. Nor, when we speak the same language, do we agree within it as to the reasons that matter. How are we to keep political imagination free to refuse the present scenarios? How can we rip our own, locally shared values out of past traditions of sovereign legitimation that thrive on the construction of enemy outsiders? How can we truly reinvent political life, and do this together on a global scale? For those of us already accustomed to the groundlessness of the post-modern world, the unanswerability of these questions is not paralyzing. But if post-modern theory is to be useful today (this is equally true of Islamic political theory), it must show the world by its actions and perform rather than preach its politics, outside of its own comfort zone of cultural familiarity, without the safety net of pre-approval.

Living and working in the United States during this political crisis, I am troubled by the inadequacy of American

intellectual response. As a consequence of a misguided notion of expertise that exonerates intellectuals from taking scholarly risks in unfamiliar territory, the university culture remains incredibly provincial. The kind of courage that has inspired the founding and flourishing of the Académie de la Latinité is rare anywhere today. I am grateful to be a part of it, and for the exploration and dialogue that it affords. As a non-Latin, my credential for membership in the Académie has been my writing. The work most relevant to this conference is a short book published in 2003 by Verso Press, London, entitled: *Thinking Past Terror: Critical Theory and Islamism on the Left*. It was conceived in New York City in September 2001. I began to read everything I could find in translation on and by contemporary Islamic political theorists. What made it impossible to continue work as usual, unaffected by political events, was the fact that as a US citizen, I was now engaged in an unlimited war that placed civilian populations at unlimited risk in a part of the world and from a political culture about which I had only a vague, stereotypical understanding. That situation suddenly seemed inexcusable.

While my book has been largely ignored in the US market, it has been translated by left-wing presses in Israel, Greece and Japan. For the publication of a paperback edition next fall, I was asked to write a new preface, not an easy task. When a book is written in response to a historical event, precisely the history in it quickly recedes. The September 11 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, that were

the impetus for its writing, have led to a measure of global violence that could not then have been imagined. The attacks themselves are several wars away. A preface to the paperback edition needs to ask: When history recedes, what is left standing? What is the value of the book for readers today?

A central proposal of the book is that Islamism as a political discourse can be considered together with Critical Theory as critiques of modernity in its western-developed form. It asks readers to suspend existing political identities and reconfigure the parameters of their discourse to recognize overlapping concerns. It does this performatively, analyzing the present through the work of contemporary Islamic rather than western theorists. Its touchstones are not Agamben, Zizek, Derrida, or Habermas but, rather, Taha, Gannouchi, Shariati, and Qutb. Three years later, these names of Muslim political theorists are scarcely more familiar to western theorists than before. Despite post-colonial sensibilities to the errors of orientalist discourse, despite all the sensitivity to constructions of the Other, with few exceptions (already existing and acknowledged in the book), western critical theorists act as if all that is necessary is to draw on their own, existing models and traditions to define any new state of the world.

If religion has been allowed back on the theoretical agenda, it is St. Paul who monopolizes the discussion. For a number of important western theorists, Pauline Christianity has suddenly become fashionable. But it is an idealized and

sanitized Paul, stripped of the anti-Semitism that was a consequence of Christianity's separation from its Jewish origins, with the first Jewish anti-imperialist revolt of 66-70 CE, and forgetful of Christianity's own imperial legacy inherited from the Emperor Constantine, that culminated with the papal-led, medieval crusades against the Muslim world.

Western philosophical traditions of the European enlightenment, American democracy, and post-Nietzschean skepticism become conservative in a global context *malgré lui-même* insofar as they bolster and protect the presumption that Euro-American thinking is in advance of the rest of the world, hence historically and intellectually superior. It is one thing to champion multiculturalism in the spirit of Christian love, or Enlightenment cosmopolitanism, or democratic inclusion, or post-modern anti-essentialism; it is quite another to accept, when judged in global terms, the minority position of one's own intellectual culture, the present dominance of which cannot be explained solely on the basis of its intrinsic worth. My book is not a call for western theorists to convert or be still. Rather, it implies the need to argue for our beliefs on truly foreign, and in many ways unpalatable, discursive terrains—just as colonized people are routinely required to do *vis-à-vis* the invading culture, just as Muslim intellectuals have done since the Napoleonic invasions several centuries ago.

The sub-title of my book, *Islamism and Critical Theory on the Left*, was meant as a challenge, and a question: to rediscover one's own political commitments in a foreign political

language, and to ask not only what is lost in translation but also what might be gained. How does Islam, that defines progress in terms of social cohesion rather than individual competition, and evaluates society in civil rather than personal terms, provide a corrective for the morally indifferent world of global markets, where social responsibility is an optional appendage to political life? How does the transnational strength of Islam as a highly contemporary phenomenon expose the fact that Western norms are not natural, not inevitable, but contingent and subject to change? In the reception of the book, it is not the descriptive term Left that has proved problematic. Muslim critical theorists have been grateful for the acknowledgement that the progressive policies they espouse are fully compatible with this positioning on the political spectrum, whereas the sort of Islamic politics that appeals to transnational Muslim elites is fully compatible with the self-enriching goals of economic globalization, not to speak of the right-wing agendas of extremists on issues of military violence and sexual control (which they share with right-wing supporters of G.W. Bush). Being on the Left is an orientation, not a dogma. The word makes sense wherever progressive politics requires independent judgment (*itjihad*) rather than unquestioned obedience in thought and deed. Muslim feminists are a critical part of this Left, refusing on theological, social and legal grounds to equate Islam with the patriarchal society in which it has too long been embedded. Far more controversial has been my use of the word Islamism. It was at a meeting of l'Académie de la Latinité in Alexandria

that Dr. Ahmad Jalali rightly questioned this choice, as it implies ideological conformity rather than a discursive terrain that encourages dissent and is open for creativity and change.

Not all of the essays in my book deal directly with political Islam, but all reflect the challenge of this engagement. Acknowledging the unavoidably global resonances of any theoretical claim today, they call generally for an epistemological rather than ontological approach to theory, because existentially we are *not* in the same position, whereas critical judgments can be shared. Implied is a questioning of the presumption that ethnic culture is the determining factor in the construction of political subjectivities. Physical torture, bodily mutilation, civilian casualties, public humiliation, arbitrary imprisonment, and the construction of dividing walls —these are the physical realities of war as a human initiative, the terrors of which do not depend on cultural mediation for their meaning. The task of an artistic avant-garde in this context is defined less by achieving global recognition within the proliferating artworlds, than by its self-positioning below the global radar as a subaltern, globally-connected underground, that speaks not for the warring factions but for those civilian multitudes who are caught in the crossfire. It is a mark of our time that the most radical, most difficult political position to sustain is independence from both violent sides.

A certain strand of Muslim thought has indeed become more accessible to western readers. Liberal Islam is promoted as the responsible core of contemporary Islamic

thought. Muslim reasonableness, tolerance and fairness are reassuringly presented to European and US audiences as the non-dangerous, de-politicized center. But the alternative to both terrorisms, non-state and state, is not some safe, middle position of political quietism. Progressive does not mean: "like the west." In a too-eager attempt at reconciliation we lose the space for radical, critical distance from both sides in this war. For the past several years, I have taught the political theory of contemporary Islam. What happens in my seminar is not quite what the title advertises. A sustained engagement with Islamic political thinkers inevitably ends up destabilizing the students' own political identity. In discussing whether politicized Islam is compatible with democracy, their presumption of democracy in America begins to unravel. Confronting the prejudice of western discourses of orientalism is only the beginning of this process. It is by reading the debates *among* Muslims that the students' world-orientation is most unsettled. Muslim political debates today engage divergent Islamic approaches to issues of sovereignty, national identity, legal traditions, and social justice that leave the tired category of the West out of the discussion altogether. That is far harder for US university students to bear.

What three years ago seemed implausible is now commonplace: the US population has demonstrated its support in free elections for preemptive war, government lies, media control, dictatorial executive powers, suspension of human rights, and violation of international and domestic laws. In

the US government's identification of its own national inter-est with maintaining global hegemony, democracy is not the uncontroversial bedrock of political life, but merely one, ex-pendable option in the policy toolbox. We are witnessing a test case of how far the US democracy will go in agreeing to its own destruction—not the first time this has happened in the history of democratic states. The situation calls for a very different theoretical discussion than the one that has domi-nated in western critical circles until now. As Muslims strug-gle with the issue of the legitimacy of sovereign power and its relation to religion, ethnicity and the nation-state, western publics are doing the same. Debates about *vilayat-i-faqi* par-allel those over the "state of exception" in western democra-cies—if not in the substance of the arguments or the specific populations targeted by state repression, then surely in the dangers of unchecked executive power over governing and justice alike. Interpretation of *shari'a*, like constitutional ju-dicial review, negotiates change through continuity. Both are challenged by the moral claims of global majorities who, while outside of their proper jurisdiction, are no less worthy of moral recognition. Revolutionary violence may be ex-pressed in terms of the Mahdi, or the Messiah, or Marx, but all such legitimations of force are limited by human fallibility and historical unpredictability, and all are subject to moral scrutiny by non-adherents within the newly globalized public sphere.

It seems light-years since the euphoria experienced by millions who participated in the spontaneously organized, global manifestation of February 15, 2003 against the

planned invasion of Iraq. That was the dream-form of a global Left. Against it, the historical realities of public responses are stubbornly intrusive: the second-term election of George W. Bush; riots in the Muslim suburbs of France; the London metro bombing; anti-immigrant xenophobia in many countries, violent demonstrations from Pakistan to Nigeria against the Danish cartoons. These incidents, encoded within local political rhetoric, easily reinforce existing power while diverting it to the right, and that is precisely the problem. When the standoff between competing political powers becomes increasingly hostile and yet still claims to represent the mainstream, then the *global* center appears in these partial and polarized contexts as a radical, leftist fringe.

Nonetheless, one by one, but cumulatively in massive numbers, people are refusing to accept the traditional ways of framing global politics. Ideologies come later, if at all. Discursive articulations are secondary, as people are motivated above all by material realities. Global media have been progressive in transmitting these realities. Jean Baudrillard, in criticizing the society of the spectacle, opposes to the virtual world of media "the event," implying that only the latter can motivate a progressive, political response. For Alain Badiou, prototypical of an event are the street demonstrations of 1968. But it needs to be remembered that these were *image*-events, effective because of their entry into media-flows which, although far from unobstructed, repeatedly escape control. Surely the images of US torture at Abu

Ghraib produced such an event, as have citizen demonstrations for democracy in many countries. Global publics continue to be engaged in the production, circulation and reception of image-events as significant political actions. Can it be that we are at last growing up to our global responsibilities? There is a developing conviction that the proper judge for the legitimacy of sovereign foreign policy cannot be sovereign power itself, but rather, an impartial jury that also hears the case of those affected by it. To speak of a global public sphere today means to acknowledge the fact that domestic and global politics bleed into each other. Governments can no longer make a convincing moral case for limiting justice or humane treatment to the minority of humanity whom they happen to recognizes as their own. Democracies are obliged to act democratically on the global stage. Islamic states cannot limit their understanding of *itjihid* in a way that criminalizes dissent or condemns non-believers.

To cite Abdul-Karim Soroush, "Religion is divine, but its interpretation is thoroughly human and this-worldly."[2] To mimic or perpetuate western-modern political forms is indeed backward if these forms are revolutionary violence, state terror, or constructions of sovereign power that rely on naming an enemy for their legitimation. The revolutionary goal is a new moral template for earthly rule. Ahmet Davutoglu, speaking specifically to Habermas' claim that modernity is an "unfinished project," asks: "who shall complete it? (…) [W]hat will be the role of non-western civilizations,

which have been the object of this project, in the next phase?"[3] The question is precisely to the point, but the answer is not yet within our grasp. A theoretical frame of clashing civilizations, proposed by Samuel Huntington, cannot perform the critical, counter-hegemonic task at hand, which is not to replace one dominating civilization by another, but rather, to put an end to the structures of cultural domination.

The recognition of cultural domination as just as important as, and perhaps even the condition of possibility of, political and economic domination is a true advance in our thinking. Moreover, if the Western model does *not* have a monopoly on the future's meaning, then we are obliged to look to the cultural pasts in imagining a future that is not-yet. But—this is crucial—it is to the cultural imaginaries of past civilizations that we must look for inspiration, not the power realities. In other words, cultures must be understood as always radical, in the sense that they are always negotiations between the real and the ideal, hence at least potentially in protest against the societies and power structures in which they emerge. The cultures that defenders of tradition look back to with such nostalgia are the dream-form of the societies that gave them birth. Precisely for that reason, in their time they functioned ideologically, covering up the inequities and iniquities of minority rule, patriarchal domination, and class domination—all forms of the violence of power that deserve to be called barbaric.

Culture *and* barbarism—the barbarism of power that at the same time provides the control, the legal order that al-

lows culture to flourish—these are the two sides of the golden age of every civilization, whether it is called the *Pax Romana*, or the *Pax Britannica*, or *Pax Americana*, or the Classical Age of Islam, or the heights of civilization of the Chinese Middle Kingdom. No great civilization has been free of this contradiction. This was the tremendous insight of Walter Benjamin when he insisted:

> Whoever has emerged victorious participates to this day in the triumphal procession in which the present rulers step over those who are lying prostrate (…). There is no document of civilization which is not at the same time a document of barbarism.[4]

In revering and desiring within changed current conditions to salvage our different cultural traditions (and Marxism is one of them, as is Islam's Golden Age *and* the European Enlightenment) we would be well advised not to confuse the dream of the past with its reality, valuing the former, but continuing to criticize the latter. Such redemption of the past would rip culture out of its ideological role of justifying not only past violence, but new violence committed in its name.

Notes

1. Carl Schmitt, *Political Theology: Four Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty* [1922], trans. George Schwab, forward Tracy B. Strong, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2005, p. 36.
2. Abdul-karim Soroush, "The Evolution and Devolution of Religious Knowledge," lecture at the Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University, April 13, 1995.

3. Ahmet Davutoglu, "Philosophical and Institutional Dimensions of Secularisation: A Comparative Analysis," John L. Esposito and Azzam Tamimi, eds., *Islam and Secularism in the Middle East*, New York: New York University Press, 2000, p. 174.
4. Walter Benjamin, "Theses on the Philosophy of History," in *Illuminations*, ed. Hannah Arendt, trans. Harry Zohn, New York: Schocken Books, 1968, p. 256.

The Three Global Curtains
From Dependence Civilization to Contempt Civilization: Education Beyond Severance

Cristovam Buarque

There is no power vacuum, nor of ideas. When they are necessary, they are born at the moment other die. In late 20th century, ideas that criticized social reality and formulated alternatives to build a civilization died. There was the feeling that these ideas had become unnecessary, and did not need to be replaced. Utopian ideas were buried under the wreckage of the "iron curtain."

Twenty years after the so-called "end of history," humankind has nothing to celebrate, except the end of the risk of nuclear conflicts between the superpowers, even so replaced by the risk of nuclear terror. The early 21st century shows an irresponsible economic and social model in the use of science and technology, immoral in income distribution, indecent in cares with the planet. A humankind split by a more brutal separation than social inequality, and which quickly marches toward biological dissimilarity, which warms the Earth and destroys life on the planet; which suffers from an existential emptiness filled with drug consumption or consumption drug, which creates a culture without esthetics oriented to-

ward market immediateness, with chaotic international migration that creates displaced, displeased and cultureless people, a world submitted to a superpower that tries to appropriate natural resources and impose its culture, religion and a thought that assumes to be the only one.

Instead of the "iron curtain," the global world has built as or more oppressive curtains, which hinder progress. Never have alternative ideas and projects been so necessary to global civilization. For doing it, we must understand why alternative socialism has died.

We can list at least thirteen reasons:

Moral—Implementation of the utopian leftist project has failed, especially in Eastern Europe countries. The more we try to concentrate on Stalin' figure, the inhumanity of the soviet *Gulag* was a product of the left. And this was an extreme example, but not the only one. To the extent that we reached the late 20th century with the idea that socialism was equal to political repression, instead of seeing socialism as the symbol of freedom.

Political—With the exception of the USSR and national liberation movements and Cuba, there have no substantial political victories conducted by forces of the left. Victories of the left were limited to conquering national independence and the defeat of dictatorships, but these are also objectives of the forces of the right, and their consequences were not close to desired.

Social—Notwithstanding the greatest victories of socialism having been meeting essential social needs to everyone, such needs have not been abolished, as has already

happened in capitalist countries; conquests were limited by restrictions to technical or economic advance, in the case of health and housing, and individual freedom restriction, in the case of education.

Consumption—Socially failed in part, the left has totally failed in meeting consumption demands, killing them by technical incompetence through prohibition, or focusing its care on chosen people.

Equality—Even breaking class privileges, the left has not been able to eliminate inequality, it has only eliminated hereditary transfer of inequality, because those who jointed the party or carried out special tasks defined by the State had the right to reach privileged tiers.

Ecological—In addition to not being foreseen by 20th century theoreticians, and having been an initially refused flag by the left and despised by regimes, the ecological problem is one the fundamental causes of the failure of the left, which did not know yet how to formulate a development model free of the sad arrogance of anthropocentrism.

Historical—The manner in which the soviet empire was undone, starting from the whisper of the fragile labor union movement in Poland and the religious ideas of a Pope in Roma, the nationalist soul of the USSR federation peoples, much more that the West threats, will leave a mark of failure on the left that will remain recorded in humankind history for centuries.

Circumstantial—The fall of the Berlin wall and spreading of neo-liberalism and a single thought have had a great impact on the left in the West, causing radical ideological

changes in socialist parties in each European country, Latin America, and also in the few countries that resist with leftist governments in mutation, such as in China, Vietnam and Cuba.

Spiritual—The mistake of linking social utopia to a rational utopia that would deny spirituality has failed everywhere, to the extent in which materialist thought has not been able to kill, or even diminish, the yearning for spirituality that exists in the human being.

Existential—The left has also failed in the existential plan, when it failed to created the new man that it had promised in the early 20th century. Except for times of national clash, as in the USSR during the Second World War, in Vietnam during the independence war, soviet socialist man continued being selfish. Even in Cuba, where apparently national spirit seems to prevail, it is hard to be convinced that this national spirit would prevail without the foreign threat from the North American empire. A few capitalist countries, such as Japan, for cultural reasons, are able to have a more social man than leftist regimes have.

Intellectual—The left has lost the technical debate that tries to explain the evolution of civilization and be convinced of the direction toward which this process should evolve.

Emotional—The left has failed to mobilize crowds and awaken young people who today would rather enjoy the *status quo* and focus on looking for individual pleasure offered by consumption, the right, instead of the pleasure of fighting for the revolution offered by the left.

Epistemological—The loss of the debate has mostly resulted from the epistemological prison that tied leftist thinking to 19th Marxism without realizing that the technical bases on which Marx supported his thinking have changed.

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But this intrinsic failure to socialism did not mean a victory of capitalism as a civilizing ideal. While it buried socialism under the Berlin wall wreckage, of the "iron curtain," global capitalism built three new curtains.

Golden Curtain—Iron was used by Churchill, in his famous speech where he created the "iron curtain," because it meant the power of the authoritarian regime; gold reminds us of Midas, when it socially separates people, according to income and access to goods and services essential to modernity and in this process destroy civilization.

Petroleum Curtain—Petroleum symbolizes at the same time consumerist affluence civilization and non-sustainability of the capitalist model.

Firewood Curtain—Firewood was the element used by medieval catholic inquisitors to burn heretics, Arabs, Jews, gypsies, sorcerers and even Catholics who got out of orthodoxy, judged unfaithful because they did not accept official thinking. The current firewood curtain separates, in the modern world, those who think according to the global-neo-liberal credo fundamentalism from those who dare challenge it, by thinking differently.

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In the first moment, in the 20th century, the division occurred among countries—metropolitan and peripheral, depending. Dependence has become a sociological theory, overcoming it has become the purpose of poor countries' social struggles.

One of the flags of the world left used to be national independence, identified with the end of colonialism. And the independence of each country would be the first step for developing it and, consequently, for its wealth to contribute to distributing it among its population.

The world would consist of independent, developed and fair countries, all part of a *capitalist and developed First World*, or a *socialist and developed Second World*, separated by an *Iron Country*. The 21st century arrived with all politically independent countries, but never has colonialism been so strong, or development so excluding, even in no longer among countries, but among social blocs. The world has made a huge *World-Third-World*, full of poverty and wealth in all countries, although in different proportions, *Countries-with-High-Income-Majority-Population (PMP-AR)*, and *Countries-with-Low-Income-Majority-Population (PMP-BR)*. Wealthy people of all countries form today an *International Wealthy People First World (PMIR), integrated* in consumption and main cultural preference aspects. Poor people of each country forming a *Poor People Social Archipelago (ASP)*, separated and without identity among them, which can also be called *Neo-liberalism Social Gulag*. Separating the *PMIR* from *ASP*, a *Golden* Curtain hovers over the

Earth, cutting off each country between rich and poor, included or excluded from modernity. included or excluded from modernity.

Countries with High Income Majority Population

Countries with Low Income Majority Population

▣ International Wealthy People First World

At the first moment of industrial civilization, under the protection of national borders, workers from developed countries allied to the capitalists of their countries in order to enjoy capitalism benefits, by using several manners of colonialism and imperialism. At a second moment, in a similar manner to South African *apartheid*, included white workers untied against excluded black masses. White workers started defending their economic privileges against the black population, under protection of the *racial border*, but still inside the national border.

Currently, instead of racial or national borders, capitalist economy absorbs part of the modern sector workers, no matter from which country, thanks to global modernity pockets everywhere in the world, and inside each country a new *social border*, which separates workers from excluded

ones. The next step would be the implementation of a *biological border* that, more than separating, will make human beings dissimilar, by private and expense excess to technology products and medical techniques.

Dependence ideology among countries does not know how to behave in this new unforeseen reality, which came up suddenly, less split by national borders and more by a social border; and economic and social distance among nations is replaced with the distance among the inhabitants of the same country. PMIR people feel at home anywhere in the world, when among included people, and they feel displaced when in the midst of poor people in their own city. It has become easier to cross-oceans than turning a corner. Because the homeland has become international, even if restricted. It has become even harder to understand the new class reality, where modern workers ally themselves to capital owners, negotiating modern product distribution, while the masses continue excluded.

What is seen, as crowning of the industrial society civilizing project, is humankind walking toward escalation of inequality, which comes close to feeling of dissimilarity among human beings, in the molds of slavery times. This phenomenon is worsened before the predictable biological break among human beings, which may be induced by technical progress, taken over by the modern part of society, and that may differentiate human beings by their physical features, their intelligence, health, life expectancy.

In this new reality, in which technical advance that has built equality and independence now builds international in-

tegration with dissimilarity and separation within each country, utopian ideas seem ruins of "isms." Utopian ideologies are unable to orient themselves, like someone who walks on the debris of a city wanting to orient himself holding in his hand a map prior to the bombing.

The 20th century left is the daughter of industrial revolution, and watches the world, in criticism and proposal, on the opposite side to proletariat. What it cannot imagine is that, instead of evolving to socialism, national and imperialist capitalism would evolve to global and national separation encompassing rich people in the same world, separating rich and poor within each country, and transforming modern sector workers into superfluous consumption beneficiaries, allied to capitalists, who watch exclusion of the masses.

The optimism of the past two centuries had a concrete base to state that, thanks to technical advance and national independence, the world walked toward equality among human beings.

Four vectors have led industrial civilization of the 19th and 20th centuries, which expanded and universalized consumption, to an exclusion civilization:

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1. Technological—It was with Marx that socialism consolidated the utopian dream and decidedly opted for rationality. Marx not only introduced the idea of communism as a target, but also explained why this utopia was an inevitable trend of human project. Nothing would be able to pre-

vent the end of capitalism. The workers' and communist movement had the simple task of hastening this end. And socialist utopia would be ahead.

In order to reach this conclusion, Marx observed the technological evolution dynamics in industry and its consequences. He could not or did not know how to foresee a radical change in the directions of this technical evolution. At the time in which he lived, technical evolution happened inside the factory, it was a productivity increase instrument, it would force profit drop and would naturally reduce needs, building a world of abundance for everyone by production growth and competition among producing companies. It was the time of technical advance paper optimism.

Neither he nor any 19th century utopists could imagine that human creativity would exchange the preference for concern with productivity increase, reducing needs for already known products, with concern with inventing new products, creating new needs. Technical advance changed its paradigm in the late 19th century, and started inducing needs, instead of reducing them. Therewith, it took political breath away from socialist ideas that sought equality, but had to meet superfluous demands, and gave capitalism breath, providing capitalist economy with a permanent dynamics. However, with this process, it split the world.

2. Product—Starting in mid-20th century, the growing cost of their products required demands formed by high-income consumers, which is impossible to be universalized. The 19th century industrial economy and up to mid-20th century sought to expand the market by producing increasingly

more for more consumers for a lower and lower price. In order to grow, demand had to be expanded, by increasing the number of buyers. In the last decades of the past century, the economy is stimulated by producing more expensive products for the same set of buyers, who periodically change products. Circulation does not require new buyers, only more sales to the same buyers. Instead of producing for the masses at reduced prices, high prices are produced for a smaller number of buyers.

Even if technical advance made each product cheaper from year to year, new products were invented with growingly increased costs, either in the purchase value, or its maintenance value.

In each country, an income concentration process started, in the opposite direction to distributive trend that came from industrial revolution. At the first moment, "developed countries" were able to increase their population average income, raising the standard of everyone. In "developing countries," income was concentrated further more, taking into account the low average per capita income and the need for expanding demand among a small portion of their population, in order to enable their late industrialization. Income of "developing countries" inhabitants comes near and often exceeds average income of "developed countries." Creating an upward integration, among the rich, with a downward disintegration, on the poor.

3. Educational—A third excluding vector comes up due to technical education requirement, in order to partici-

pate in the modernization process and inclusion in modernity. Even if there were availability of financial resources to make investments and natural resources were inexhaustible, income distribution would be impossible due to educational exclusion of the majority of the population.

In the same manner that previously concentration was made thanks to financial capital ownership against workforce ownership, today concentration is made among capital or knowledge owners, and the "dispossessed" of capital and knowledge. The skilled worker has jumped over the line that separates him from excluded masses, and has acquired strength to participate in product distribution, beside capitalists

4. Ecological—Ecological limits have imposed an increase in predictable cost and even a physical limitation to consumption, preventing a generalization for all the world inhabitants. This made concentration to become a need not only to stimulate demand, but also to keep it in the limits of resource availability. If all the inhabitants of the world had the consumption of rich people of the world, resources would be exhausted in a few hours. Perhaps more that the other aspects, the discovery and awareness of ecological limits to industrial progress are fundamental causes for industrial utopia death, either in capitalism or socialism. When the short period of Malthusian scare was gone, over the 19th and 20th centuries, all industrial civilization "isms" were optimistic, no matter what the civilizing process point of observation was: on the capitalist side or on the proletarian side.

Utopia—capitalist or socialist—stumbled against ecological limits and did not know how to recycle itself, incorporating these limits as part of their civilizing project.

Accordingly, when ecological awareness came up in the 70s and its critical turn to technical advance, traditional ideologies, of the right or left, stood on the side of polluters, not on the side of the "green." A non-governmental or party entity, was needed, the "Club of Rome," funded by businessmen and hiring intellectuals, to produce the first consistent document of a new Malthusianism. The document "The Limits to Growth" was received with mistrust by the entire intellectual establishment, of right or left. The ecological movement was seen with distrust, as a conservative movement, unbelieving of human power. Articles on the ecological issue were refused, because the idea of ecological limits was seen as an invention of imperialism to prevent liberation and development of Third World countries. The end of dependence was to walk toward growing plundering of the environment, which approximates these countries to rich ones standards. Having forests was seen as delay, breathing clean air was lack of industrialization. Science and technology as synonyms of unlimited progress hindered perception of the risk resulting from environmental one. Added to this ideological hindrance, prisoner orthodoxy of reality-built thinking of the 19th century—of optimism and class struggle—failed when it did not adopt the new reality of class struggle among generations, due to humankind's natural asset plundering. The product was no longer appropriated by

capitalists against the proletariat, but appropriated by the current generation of modernity participants, financial capital or knowledge owners against excluded masses and against future generations.

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Instead of one, two additional divisions emerged: between social blocs and between generational blocs. With the political disadvantage that in these new divisions, losers are excluded, unnecessary. Instead of dependence, disdain. In the class struggle between labor and capital, the proletariat had a determining role that granted it power in the productive process dynamics. Today, those who have not been born and marginal ones cannot exert any political power. They are not organizable, or owners of any pressure instrument. They do not make war or strike. They are nonexistent or disdained.

If we follow industrial civilization proposals, whether from the right or left side, the 20th century technical progress and its consumerism will lead to a disastrous social division from the moral point of view, and to an ecological unbalance of catastrophic consequences to life on the planet.

Evolution has shown that the class struggle between workers and capitalists, which Marx and the left always placed as the engine of history, has become a triangular struggle, between workers and capitalists, on one side, and excluded masses on the other. Added value between capital and labor has acquired a triangular feature, in which capital

and labor appropriate the shared product between them, at the same time in which they marginalize excluded masses, destroying the planet and sacrificing future generations.

And, to the surprise of utopian ideologies, modern sector workers support this excluding progress on a global scale, in terms of interests and proposals, between workers and excluded masses.

However, not only social and generational exclusions divide human beings. In a world dominated by the arrogance of global civilization builders—the West—, the attempt to impose a single thought emerges and, consequently, identified credos with this part of the world. But this imposition meets immediate resistances, because marginalized ones from the single thought are not "dispossessed," they already exist in the current generation, and are not part of excluded masses from knowledge, because in addition to intellectual education, to the point of building atomic bombs, have a religious credo to defend.

The cartoon in a small newspaper, of a small country, in a language that few read, has caused a planetary fire. Few facts would better indicate the greatness of fragility of the global world. Technical greatness of an integrated world, where the drawing made by a simple cartoonist, published without any pretence, in a short time spreads an international revolt wave, a social and political tsunami. And the social frailty of a globalization that did not integrate human beings in the same ethical, religious, political milestone.

World information has been integrated, but not men's soul feelings. This is one of the risks of globalization.

Because of this, the fact kindled so many doubts. Even to Islamic country inhabitants, the reaction against a cartoon seems exaggerated, it surprises that demonstrators do not understand the press freedom in some country, and further they confused the newspaper with the journalist and with the country where they work. At the same time, to some inhabitants in western countries, joking with sacred things is disturbing, touching the beliefs of billions of people. Islamic peoples do not understand how the West's moral frailty the fact of sacredness of the freedom of the press as been placed over religious sacredness. And westerners did not perceive as an Islamic right the respect for their values; over the freedom of world press itself. Not only because press freedom is fundamental to defend ideas, not to degrade religious creeds.

This is a fact where all are right: those who publish their cartoons and those who kindle afar. And all are wrong: those who publish and revolt against publication, and those who are scared and try to prevent publication or those who defend with courage the right to publish, by republishing it. All are right and wrong at the same time, become we live in a time of doubts, with personal, local, national values, and reality being global, without unanimous rules for social behavior, but with a crushing force that divides the world:

   a) between current and future generations, those who were born and those who were not;
   b) between socially and economically included and excluded, knowledge owners and those who have no knowledge;

c) between those who take on the single thought of global neo-liberalism and those keeping firm in old creeds or those who keep open to new ideas, between those who believe that history has ended and the world walks toward being a great North American-Europe, ignoring the poor and those who respect the world's cultural and religious diversity, and still dream of a post-capitalist utopia.

Global society, which considered itself unitary in a single kind of world, and considered class struggle a phenomenon of the past and utopia dreams dead, because they would already be built nowadays, refuses to see that the world has never been so brutally divided, that freedom is an illusion, except freedom to adopt prevailing models in the single thought, and that instead of a class struggle there are today three divergent interest struggles.

But those who do not accept the end of history and do not see utopia in the unfair, inefficient and plundering civilization of the global world, often do not realize the lack of ethical values and utopian models. Many of them have not seen or refuse to see the changes of the last decades. They keep believing in utopias, but in old, overcome utopias.

Until the end of the 20$^{\text{th}}$ century, there were available utopias. Capitalists believed that economic development would build a new rich, egalitarian, individually free utopia. They were mistaken. The result of wealth was not well-being, or much less equality, and freedom is false. Socialists had clear models, they believed that it would be possible to

implement them on a short term, and fought for it. Today their models have crumbled, displeased with capitalism, but they do not know how it will be later, and they have no flags to fight for.

The crisis is not of ideological trends only, but of the civilizing project itself, which when ethics crumbled and utopically, thanks to technical success, it compromised positions emerging from the industrial civilization spirit itself. Instead of capitalists and socialists, both sides of the same coin, an emptiness emerged. Nevertheless, everything indicates that history has not ended. That in the future, perhaps not near, there will be the possibility of a civilizing model capable of using human intelligence to make a more humane society work, in full balance with nature, without any form of exploitation or unequal exchanges among human beings, with the same compensation of the work of each person, without capitalism inefficiency losses, with compatible planning with individual freedom, where diversity—of race, culture, creed, gender—is a peace asset, and not a reason for war. But in the early 21st century, this picture is so technical to utopia as Jules Verne's stories were to science, in the 19th century.

Even so, we must continue the march toward this utopia that seems evanescent.

The path is in understanding that current contradictions are less between capital and labor, between workers and employers, and much more between those excluded and included of modernity, between current and next generation

consumers, between those who think according to western hegemony and those who believe differently. The struggle is for overcoming barbarism of the three manners of exclusion—social, environmental, ideological—as much as was the struggle of abolitionists in the time of slavery.

Some of these abolitionists were socialists, many utopian, others already Marx sympathizers, but at that time the struggle was against slavery. They were utopian in sociology and economy, but in political practice they were abolitionist only. And they were the vanguard, not because they were socialists dreaming of a post-capitalist utopia, but they wanted immediate slavery abolition.

Being of the left or vanguard is not measured by the size of the dream, or its distance to its fulfillment time, but by the size of the immediate potential transformer. It is mostly military by and immediate social transformation cause in favor of humanist values.

Abolitionists were more of the left than theoreticians who dreamed about socialism without seeing with indignity, without suffering as a humanist, without urgency of changing immediate slavery reality. Before fighting from utopia, abolitionists fought against barbarism, because of this they were more humanist than utopists.

To that end, the 21st century, has brought a throwback in the size of utopists' struggle.

In a world where barbarism of inequality is on the march becoming separation and dissimilarity, the utopists' immediate flag cannot be in socialism, not even in a post-

capitalism, but only in preventing this barbarism, knocking down the "golden curtain" that separates social blocs in today's world, the "firewood curtain" that separates single thought from alternative thought, and the "petroleum curtain" that separates today's generations from future ones.

The gravity of utopia loss is not the fact that it is impossible at the immediate time, because the present and power require pragmatism; the gravity is pragmatism making itself to be somewhat temporary, a requirement of political and financial limits of the immediate, but rather a definitive posture, ignoring the three divisions of civilization, assuming the end of history.

For this reason, the first objective of a utopian thought flag is the defense of those exclude from the world. A global flag on the side of those who did not believe that history is dead. It is possible that objectives will change, but their bases will continue: the increase in the degree of freedom, the end of essential needs, peace, and tolerance.

Because of this it is so difficult to be of the left in Europe, because excluded masses are outside their borders or are emigrants without any right to citizenship to demand changes in the government line, which leads to the left, by force of electoral circumstances, to take measures against immigrants, in defense of their workers' interests. Because consumption vices have already been spread and it is impossible to imagine any change in the model, and because they are the source of single thought, and arrogance is hard to be improved. The First-World-International-of-the-Rich inhabitants who live in Countries-with-Majority-Low-Income-Population think as

their "social countrymen" of "developed countries," and with the same arrogance reject the poor in their own countries. With less easiness, because they are around, because they vote in election, even liable to manipulation and submitted to the blackmail of charitable benefit programs.

Industrial civilization utopia was born with western arrogance, and Marx was part of this world, thinking that the Europe project should be followed in all quadrants of the planet, provided that under the highest from of industrial civilization, the socialist one, and not under the form of capitalist imperialism. The theory of dependence defended that the independence of each nation was the objective of utopian civilization.

The imposition of a single civilizing standard, capitalist or socialist is a form of imperialism, if not economic, cultural. But when the power of techniques allows any nation in the world to make decisions that will resound in the entire world and over centuries, or even millennia, utopia demands respect to the set of nations and to necessary diversity of peoples. This evolution requires a new posture where respect to diversity is a fundamental objective.

An even greater challenge of utopists will be to formulate a civilizing development thought and model that it will take into account the value of nature. At its origin, civilization was a predatory instrument. Its origin in Greek rational thought and in Judeo-Christian relations led the left to relegate in arrogant manner any value to crude nature.

This thought is shown in the value theory, where only human work creates value, and nature is seen as a raw mate-

rial and industrial garbage repository. If it is certain that this theory represented one of the greatest intellectual and moral advances in humankind history, it is also certain that, in face of today's world reality, it is reactionary, because it does not realize the risk that humankind runs in light of the ecological crisis.

Utopia to be born requires tearing down the three global curtains. This must be the flag of the 21st century abolitionists:

a) give up the arrogant anthropocentrism of western history and build a modest anthropocentrism, which will build the civilizing project in communion, between man and nature;

b) abolish social separation that divides human beings, breaking the cradle of inequality that in the cradle inequality—the school;

c) build a tolerant society, which respects cultural diversity, with no imposition, open to new ideas.

The path to it is education.

Global left needs to be global in its objectives: formulate and defend a worldwide program for education of all children and adults of the entire world. A program such as this is possible; the world has financial and material resources. There is lack of political will. This is the reason for the struggle.

The way to mobilize necessary resources without threatening consolidated interests, creating an ecological aware-

ness and cultural and religious tolerance, is through and intensive, radical Global Program for Education.

The flag of those who consider themselves of the left, in today's world, is to defend universalization and education qualification, within each country and the whole world. This is more possible today than the fight for slavery abolition was two hundred, one hundred years ago. We miss that many of those who fight for utopia farther in possible and more delayed, in the conception of 19th century socialism, understand both limitations that they suffer: fight with overcome instruments and objectives, and fight against impossible to vanquish forces, before the end of separation is done and the three global curtains and torn down.

The Anonymous Community

Helen Petrovsky

Why anonymous community? I would first of all like to clarify the meaning of these terms since they have been extensively used (and perhaps abused) in way too many contexts. They have been assigned a value-judgment, have indeed become domesticated. For community, in its ordinary usage, stands for a group, an identity and a belonging. No matter how fuzzy or indeterminate its actual contours may be. Anonymity, for its part, is something that we, individuals, as members of highly developed societies, are taught to scorn and avoid—the very ethics of social existence demands achievement and success, therefore a radical breakaway from hopeless anonymity. Indeed, what could be worse than remaining just "anyone?"

But let us try to reverse the perspective. Let us try to develop a non-substantive view of community and to speak up for anonymity. Let us come up with an apology of both. In my task I am greatly aided by the already existing thinking on community. I am referring to a constellation of thinkers, itself a community, who have been the first to raise these issues. Bataille, Nancy and Blanchot—a helpful point of reference, the beginning of a thinking of community. (However,

as I hope to show later, there are other beginnings, and that is what makes the task so challenging for us today—finding insights related to a different time and place but already imbued with the same passion, already mapping out a future commonality of thinking, if I am permitted to say so.) These three thinkers have posed a type of adhesion that precedes all socially definable or established forms. A belonging without any guarantee of belonging. Community, according to this reading, always already exists and yet remains unattainable. It exists as the ultimate possibility of cohesion, which no single existing society can ever implement. Or, to be more exact, it harbors this possibility which reminds of itself in various forms. (According to Nancy, it can be traced in the very myth of community that societies so painstakingly produce and maintain; then in what he calls "literary communism," or the continuity of writing cutting across the variety of literary institutions; also, in the non-dialectical nature of love which poses a challenge to thinking as such; and, finally, in the decline, the disappearance of divine names, which opens onto the advent of nothing other than community.)

To sum it up, or to give a new take on the subject, community is that which is devoid of any communitarian "essence." Indeed, no such thing exists. If we think of a "place" for community, it remains "in between"—shapeless, it is rather about the "between," as in the phrase "between us" or "between you and me." An interval which never ceases to create a bond without actually bonding; a touch, provided

that it happens at the very limit where singularities (unlike subjects) communicate. However, community is also about questioning communication and communion. And, therefore, about resuscitating the once lost unity—that of non-alienated, "intimate" life. (Here is where Bataille's problematic predictably comes in: in the blue of noon—a powerful recurring metaphor—the individual remembers: it is some sort of awakening, a *déjà-vu*, opening onto the lost immanence of being. In this immanence, one might say in this impossible community, men are unaware of the limiting laws of production—they are both "sacred" and "bare.")

In any case, we are invited to think community as having no substance, therefore never reduced to any one of its possible representations, and as resolutely avoiding closure. I would like to pick on these challenging insights in order to suggest a reading of community that will hopefully link it to some of our own basic concerns. Given that "we" are historical beings undergoing a certain moment in our no less historical lives. A moment for which definitions, no matter how tentative, already abound: the post-modern and even the post-post-modern, the post-industrial, the post-historical (another variant of history?), and, on a more modest scale, the post-Soviet itself. I would like to analyze this moment by discussing "anonymous communities," incomplete and indefinable collectives attested to primarily by their fantasy lives.

Needless to say that art has the greatest capacity for revealing the truth of the moment. In my own research I have

been particularly indebted to some of the current practices of photography where it reaches the very edge of visibility. No longer simply showing what is to be seen, photography triggers off collective fantasizing—but it does so in a necessary way. For our access to history, indeed our experience of history, is mediated through these fantasies which seem to condense and materialize, in an almost impossible way, the very conditions of seeing. Photography, therefore, simultaneously renders the visible *and* the conditions of visibility, and in this it is undoubtedly historical.

What are these imagining collectives? And whence the necessity of such imagination? Here, finally, we must return to anonymity. Instances of anonymity are many. The most striking one, perhaps, is what has been pejoratively called *the banal* by being implicitly set against the individual and the uncommon. However, the banal seems to map out a new space of commonality which does not reduce to the *artifacts* of the banal and to their use in common. What banality points to is a new form of subjectivity emerging in "post-societies," call them whatever you will. Or, to be more accurate, to a new form of partaking—that of the stereotypes. In terms of photography and its theorizing it would most certainly mean this: "*my*" photograph as the epitome of individual affect, the site of a non-written personal story (to remember Barthes' astonishing project), gives way to "*whatever*" photograph pointing to an affectivity which is *a priori* shared. And the "bleak," interchangeable surface of "whatever" photograph is precisely the space of anonymous freedom.

There is no use showing pictures. Or at least almost none. What I am talking about has little to do with the material certitude of an image. It has to do with the image coming into visibility when it is recognized by a fantasizing collective. And such recognition is twofold. On the one hand, the image crystallizes into a meaningful whole, i.e., emerges precisely as *image*, whereas on the other, it gives rise to a fleeting collective which recognizes *itself* in the image. Neither viewer as such nor the fantasizing collective exist prior to these dreams. We may say that fantasies return or, better still, are *restored* to the dreaming collective, for what is recognized is exactly this mode of being-in-common. There is no other "content" to dreams except for affective partaking.

But let us not be entirely hostile to material surfaces. Surfaces, objects, artworks are the sites where fantasies, however temporarily, reside. The latter are just so many displacements of representation, of the represented. But, as I have tried to indicate, fantasizing is connected to a certain moment when the very understanding of the passing time undergoes dramatic changes. Discontinuous and out of joint, time today is either reified by being sliced into decades, which, as a way of grasping one's own immediate past and present, is itself a form of historical consciousness (here I am referring to Fredric Jameson's seminal interpretation). Or, time is, so to say, enhanced, rendered whole in one's imagination. Reified time is the presentation of a space or unit, whereas time whose wholeness is achieved through the workings of imagination is an attempt to come to terms with

nothing other than experience. Fantasies are the simple indication that experience took place. However, by the same token, they are never arbitrary.

What is at stake is indeed experience. Anonymity as shared experience. Examples of negative anonymity are too painful and too shocking to be cited in passing. Yet, everyone is well aware of this anonymity-to-death which still has to be tackled theoretically. Anonymity-to-death, I will remind, is a polemical figure that Giorgio Agamben addresses to Heidegger who, with his philosophy of being-to-death, implicitly asserts the value, as well as the dignity of the individual faced with this "decision." The reality of concentration camps, however, points to a different mode of existence, in actual fact of survival—one in which the symbolic value of death itself is brutally denied. Negative anonymity, therefore, has to do with the utter loss of "humanity" or what undeniably appears as such. However, in these wholly indistinguishable faces, in these violently wasted lives something remains—indeed a "remnant," to use Agamben's term. It is a blank—in life and in death, in memory, as well as in language. Yet, being constitutive of post-war subjectivity, the remnant is precisely what guarantees *our* humanity. Agamben refers to the structure of shame. But I will stick to experience.

Experience is something which remains essentially un-(re)presentable. Given we are not talking about the experience that is accumulated and stored. Experiential knowledge; positive knowledge; the continuous flow of human memory

enriched by experience—we are referring to no such thing. Obviously, there are less traumatic examples of experience and likewise of anonymity than the one I cited a moment ago. But what appears indisputable for all the cases in question is that experience *calls for* translation. Otherwise it runs the risk of perpetrating a nightmare coupled and eventually replaced with just another *ressentiment*. Or, this experience will simply fall into oblivion together with the collectivity to which it occurred. Collective experience or the experience of a collective demands articulation. To link this to my preceding argument—it has to be recognized.

So let us once again return to anonymity. Anonymity has always been treated as that homogeneous backdrop against which individuation takes place. Forms, subjects and values would, moreover, come into being by virtue of surpassing this inertness, by way of leaving it behind. Therefore, it would be something like a springboard for future social incarnations and, on a different level, would serve as metaphor for the unpleasantly amorphous. (Think of the "anonymous reader"—there is nothing more disconcerting, even now, than the so-called anonymous reader, someone no true writer or academic, for that matter, would really want to address. Art in general, to be sure, has been a form of individuation *par excellence*, a way of positing values; and this has been done *against* (both in contradistinction and in opposition to) something which remains stubbornly indifferent or inert—shall we say "anonymous?") But let us think of anonymity as standing outside the binary division: if we still

choose to call it background, then there will be no figure to set it in contrast against. Or, rather, every figuration would appear as a fold of the anonymous, while anonymity would be reminiscent of a primary element engendering the world itself.

Synonymous with experience, anonymity belongs neither to presence nor to re-presentation. As such, it cannot be represented. But what *is* represented, especially today, can point to anonymity as an essentially shared experience. What is the Soviet? (The exploration is facilitated by our addressing the topic retrospectively.) What is the world which has crossed the threshold of globalization? What is the world for which this definition remains empty, providing not even the slightest hint at a descriptive discourse? What is private life in the obvious absence of privacy? These and other related questions spring from an unresolvedness—there in no answer to them, at least no answer coming from "us" who are undergoing this kind of experience. But while being "in" (or "inside") experience, we do form transient communities irrespective of our actual social identifications. Experience, to be sure, cuts across accepted identifications by suspending and dramatically reworking them all. It opens onto a space of commonality (likewise of communality), a space interspersed and laden with affect.

Anonymity, therefore, has nothing indistinct or obscure about it. It is, on the contrary, the moment of greatest clarity that one could possibly expect: on the one hand, it indicates a primary bond *apropos* experience, a bond already in place;

while on the other, it shows that there is no ready-made collective which would neutralize and thus forget this experience by way of assimilating it. Anonymity is a flash of the false and living memory of a community that is being reborn.

Spectators of Cindy Sherman's famous *Film Stills* dating from the late seventies insisted on having seen "those movies." Of course, it was impossible to attribute them exactly—and a viewer is not an art historian, after all. The tremendous success of these photos lies in the fact that they were recognized—by the so-called ordinary people. What Sherman managed to produce was a dreaming collective—a collective dreaming history itself whose experience is strongly mediated by the movies. "A democracy of glamour"—this is how Laura Mulvey has defined this imaginary construct of the 50s. Something close and even stored in memories and at same time endlessly remote, for the experience of time is itself from now on imagistic, cinematic. But again, this is not a pictured image. Rather, it is a crudely constructed representation which *gives way* to collective fantasizing. The image is forgotten inasmuch as *something else* attaches itself to its surface—this something, this invisible supplementation is precisely the way in which Sherman's pictures form a space of commonality. Such commonality, to be sure, is profoundly affective. For the image of *that time* is itself a shared experience of history.

The cruder the image, the better for our common dreams. The material surface is just the site of so many ruins.

However, they are brought to bear on a greater, indeed a seamless whole because each one of these details, in its turn, has been touched and magnified by so many aspiring glances. What the viewer "sees," therefore, is nothing other than this aura—a detail which is already sublated, transfigured, suffused by the dreamworlds of others. (I am here referring to a term coined by Susan Buck-Morss, as well as to a phenomenon she has so originally analyzed precisely by putting it into a historical perspective.) In other words, instead of categorizing his or her historical experience, the viewer allows it to "float" in its pre-semantic openness and overabundance.

This same kind of exploration seems to have been carried out by my compatriot Boris Mikhailov. Mikhailov, however, not so much plays on the cinematic-historical as he traces lines of continuity for Soviet experience, or the experience of the Soviet, to be more accurate. I would take the liberty of summing up his work as follows. Experience never allows for a plenitude of meaning. While it is taking place, it lacks in meaning, it is meaningless, in fact. At best, we can hope to focus on what Raymond Williams has so aptly called "structures of feeling"—a form of sensibility still in the making. Needless to say that structures of feeling are short-lived. They may roughly indicate a decade or a generation. Also, they are quite diffuse. But what they do point to is a collectivity having its *emotional*, i.e., fantastic, phantasmatic stakes in the passing moment. And this exactly is what is lost in the master narratives of history. Barthes, as we re-

member, was scandalized by the irretrievable loss of the
"unknown" individual, as well as his or her emotion. His
great book on photography is an affirmation of filial love.
But no less can one be scandalized and saddened by the loss
of whole collectives whose only "objective" quality would
consist in a shared affective being.

To return to Boris Mikhailov and his lifelong endeavor.
What he has been trying to do is to translate this blank or
omission—the emotional lives of the generations which are
closest to us. Of our fathers and grandfathers. What do we
know about them? What will we store in our memories, es-
pecially if historical memory in my country was as such at
one point denied? How can we hope to preserve the truth of
"their" moment if we know very little about it, almost noth-
ing at all? Again, I am not referring to a knowledge of facts
and of dates. I am talking of the experience of the Soviet
with a special emphasis on both of these words. And if I
have already briefly spoken on experience, let me now con-
centrate on the Soviet. The Soviet that Mikhailov is showing
us—and here lies the greatest paradox of his photogra-
phy—is in fact *the doubling* of representation and its visible
signs (which are also signs of the Soviet: ethnographic deta-
ils, culturally coded landscapes, etc.) with the invisible
which allows for this very reading to take place. Only the
punctum, to use Barthes' term, or the implied photographic
reference has to do with an *a priori* collective. What is posi-
ted here, in other words, is a spectator who does not exist in
some sort of contemplative isolation (the paradigm of clas-

sical art). On the contrary, in order to "see," you must already be part of a dreaming collective. For these pictures, very much like Sherman's, become truly visible through a shared affectivity which resurfaces in them.

I am not talking of empathy. Contemporary works of art are not empathetic. Their stakes are much higher. They allow you to enter a space of commonality which is the very condition of seeing and likewise recognition. And they do so in various ways. To return one last time to Boris Mikhailov. If the continuity of experience ever takes place (something I mentioned above), it is by setting against each other, i.e., juxtaposing or putting into play two types of experience. The Soviet reaches plenitude in the post-Soviet and, presumably, vice versa. And it is by making both form a constellation, in the Benjaminian sense, that we can hope to uncover the meaning of this historical eventuality. At a moment when our "own" past seems to be completely disowned—for what are we, bearers of a post-Soviet identity?—we can hope to come closer to that other "omission" which is the life of our fathers.

The anonymity of the Soviet. For it to be discovered as such, in its non-alienating aspect, it has to be both hidden and shown. What is this "other" of the Soviet which transforms all visible signs crowded in a photograph into a historically meaningful image? I would tentatively call this "other" forces of the private. It is not just private life rendered visible in the captured moment—be it swimming, celebrating, picking mushrooms and the like. It is that which

never enters visibility but which seems to blast wide open, to strangely decode all public (but also private) spaces. The thrust of life itself, if you will, or that primary distinction—forces of the private *versus* substance and representation—which accounts for visibility. Such forces work their way through and even across existing social forms and definitions. They contextualize our vision of the Soviet in a very special way. It is by imagining or rather *fantasizing* their existence, something prompted by the changing nature of the Photo, that we, today, succeed in recognizing and acknowledging "that" moment.

And we do so by switching on to "them," by creating some sort of a circuit. "We" and "they" are interchangeable. Or rather "we" and "they" form the only possible continuity of history, a history yet to be written. Which is not to say that this history *will* be written. It is unwritten precisely inasmuch as it avoids closure by speaking for and in the name of an indeterminate collective—the anonymous community. Yet, this possibility is itself historical. It opens up in a time of so many devastating ends and endings and is thus a promise. Something is still promised to us.

In the remaining time let me very briefly and, therefore, irresponsibly sketch out other instances of a thinking of anonymity, at least of a thinking that seems to contain this potential. In a book which by the standards of our time is old (but not outdated)—I am referring to the *Différend* published in 1984 and to a subsequent study *L'enthousiasme* (1986)—Jean-Francois Lyotard examines Kant's "critique"

of history. He is specifically interested in the strange status of what Kant calls *Begebenheit* and what is translated as "sign of history." Kant's task, it should be explained, is to answer the question (against the Faculty of Law, and there is indeed an ongoing conflict) whether it can be affirmed that the human race is constantly progressing toward the better. The requested demonstration is complicated by the fact that neither progress, nor the human race, being objects of Ideas, can be presented directly. Which is only aggravated by the phrase itself having an explicit bearing on the future. Moving away from any intuitive given (*Gegebene*), Kant comes up with his most intriguing concept of *Begebenheit*, an event or "act of delivering itself which would also be an act of deliverance, a *deal* [*une donne*]" (the Crakow manuscript calls it *Ereignis*). This event would merely indicate and not prove that humanity is capable of being both cause and author of its progress. Moreover, the *Begebenheit* must point to a cause such that the occurrence of its effects remains undetermined with respect to time. Being on the side of freedom, it may therefore intervene at any time in the succession of events.

I will hasten at this point just to show where and how exactly Kant comes up with his answer to the problem. He does find an index, a *Begebenheit* of his time, which for him, predictably enough, is the French Revolution. However, he makes a necessary and exciting detour. For the *Begebenheit*, strictly speaking, is neither momentous deed nor occurrence, but "the mode of thinking (*Denksungsart*) of the specta-

tors which betrays itself publicly in [the] game of great upheavals…" This "mode of thinking" is simultaneously universal (albeit not lacking in partiality) and moral (at least in its predisposition), in a word, progress itself. As for the French Revolution, whose outcome remains unknown, it "nonetheless finds in the hearts of all spectators (…) a wishful *participation* that borders closely on enthusiasm, the very expression of which is fraught with danger;" this sympathy, however, springs from nothing other than the moral predisposition of the human race.

Lyotard, a profound scholar of Kant and the sublime, immediately stops to analyze this enthusiasm which is expressed by so many "disinterested" national spectators. For him it is a "modality of the feeling of the sublime," in fact extreme and paradoxical: an abstract presentation which presents what is beyond the presentable ("presentation of the Infinite"). Bordering on dementia, itself an *Affekt* (an extremely painful joy), enthusiasm is condemnable as pathological from the point of view of ethics, yet aesthetically it is sublime, because, says Kant, "it is a tension of forces produced by Ideas, which give an impulse to the mind that operates far more powerfully and lastingly than the impulse arising from sensible representations." Now, the *Begebenheit*, or sign of history, continues Lyotard, can be understandably found on the side of audiences watching great historical upheavals—firstly, revolutions themselves are like spectacles of nature, they are formless and thus account for an experience of the sublime; secondly, the spectators,

as opposed to direct participants, are not empirically impli-
cated and therefore, so to say, corrupt. However, being in
the "theater hall" is an unprecedented privilege. For the fee-
ling of the sublime experienced by the spectators spreads
out toward "all the national stages"—in other words, is po-
tentially universal. This universality, as Lyotard goes on to
show, is of a very special nature, for, quite unlike cognitive
phrases, the feeling of the sublime "*judges without a rule*"
(italics added). Its *a priori* is not a rule universally recogni-
zed, but one that *awaits* its own universality. Universality in
abeyance, in suspense (*universalite en souffrance*), a *promi-
se* of universality. Which necessarily brings us to *sensus
communis*. Characteristic of the aesthetic judgment, this
common or communal sense is an "indeterminate norm" in
that it does not guarantee that "everyone *will* agree to my
judgment…" But, as a faculty of judgment, it does take ac-
count of the "mode of representation of all other men." To
finish the argument, enthusiasm as a probative *Begebenheit*
(and also a pure aesthetic feeling) calls upon a consensus
which ends up being nothing other than "a sentimental anti-
cipation of the republic" (in the form of a *de jure* undetermi-
ned *sensus*).

Here I will stop. I will only point to the one important
consequence that follows. The universality invoked by the
sublime (as well as by the beautiful), concludes Lyotard, is
merely an Idea of community, for which no proof, that is, no
direct presentation exists or will ever be found. What there
does exist, however, is a bond, a bond of "communicability"

between two parties to a conflicting phrase, and this bond retains "the status of a feeling." Communicability, one might say, is a way of "logging onto" the phrase of taste and thus of informing it with varying degrees of heterogeneity. For Lyotard *sensus communis* (in aesthetics) signifies an "*appeal to community*" (italics added) which is carried out *a priori* and judged without any rule of direct presentation. What is *a priori* shared is "feeling."

Of course, it is no discovery that Kant opens space for a thinking of community. But thinking Kant according to this exigency is quite another matter. I would claim that this very "retrospection" is a sign of change—if not a *Begebenheit* in the proper sense, then at least something that emerges from within contemporaneity and that tends to be associated with the present-day "condition." There is much to discuss inside, as well as beyond the Kantian framework. Let us simply bear in mind the following. Community is never there, that is, it is not objectifiable. Not only does it remain unpresentable but it cannot be, properly speaking, achieved—even the French Revolution is meaningful to the extent to which it is *anticipatory* of the republic. (Community, let me note in passing, is on the side of that very eventuality which is dispersed in time: Kant's *Begebenheit* is what he explicitly calls "*signum rememorativum, demonstrativum, prognosticon*," a sign recalling, showing, and anticipating all at once.) Yet, there must be something that allows for a discourse of the community even though community itself cannot but fail. (And, one must add, it is always failed—always on the

edge of language, always indicating an "other" space, always, in a word, anonymous.) We *must* be able to deliver its message and its promise. For Kant, as Lyotard convincingly shows, the problem is resolved by the affective paradox of the sublime. A feeling is shared about a formless something that alludes to the beyond of experience, yet, the feeling itself constitutes an "as-if presentation" (be it the Idea of civil society or that of morality), and it emerges right there where the Idea cannot be presented, i.e., in experience. (Of course, the Kantian understanding of experience is significantly different from what was said about it earlier above. Rather, the *Begebenheit* itself would be synonymous to that experience.)

So, let me emphatically repeat that community calls for translation. And it keeps producing its "as-if presentations" in so many various ways. I have chosen to speak of photography and the virtual affective collectives that it brings into being. Which, of course, is just another name for anonymity. But anonymity is not timeless, to be sure. Rather, it is a way of approaching the post-Soviet, being an image of that experience (its "as-if presentation") and perhaps a sign. But in the same fashion anonymity indicates the emergence of a new subjectivity in our not so divided world—and it is the task of the scholar to formulate its definition.

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Transculturalism and Borderlands

Trans-Cultural Tricksters in between Empires: Eurasian Islamic Borderlands in Modernity

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I would like to point out from the start that I am not either an Islamic intellectual or a Western style area specialist in Islamic thought. I do not share the view point typical of most Western Sovietologists, who after the collapse of the Soviet Union hastily reoriented themselves to the typical area studies discourse, based almost entirely on their efforts to subsume the logic of post-soviet development of newly independent states under the existing postcolonial models. Mostly it comes to finding similarities with the de-colonized new nations gaining independence after the collapse of the Western colonial system—be it Africa, South-East Asia, Middle East, or the Caribbean (a good example here would be Davis Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies at Harvard with its clear goal of establishing an epistemic control over the newly independent states in Caucasus and Central Asia, or the works of a well known area specialist in this region Martha Brill Olcott (Olcott, 1993). The same logic is typical of the post-Soviet pale copies of area studies specialists, such as Alexei Malashenko (Malashenko, 1993), the main Russian expert on Islam, whose extremely Eurocente-

red and politically biased works unfortunately are virtually the only available for the Western and non-western audience alike. On the other extreme there stand the voices of Islamic radicals—again, mostly either from the Arabic countries or the West, who if writing about the Eurasian Islamic borderlands at all, are mainly preoccupied with just using the local cultural and epistemic traditions and people as a polygon to manipulate in arguing for the realization and justification of their own theories, models, and designs, that can easily turn out to be dangerous.

Finally, there is the position of the Western left, which all too often applies automatically the cultural essentialist model within which the inhabitants of the other locales are interpreted as given once and for all, stuck in some particular point of development which is proclaimed for them as the only possible and organic and which the Western left want to defend from the infringement of modernity, capitalism or other such entities. This attitude does not promise any prospects for the future dialogue either. In "Globalization Muslim Resistances" a Moroccan by origin scholar, living in Western Europe, Tariq Ramadan observes that many representatives of the Western left, seeking an alternative to neo-liberal globalization,

> think of cultural and religious diversity as a principle of goodwill to be affirmed, but rarely see it as a reality with which it is necessary to engage, venture into and to build (…) From forum to forum, one grows accustomed to meeting this new species of activist—a living contradiction of the contemporary left—economically progressive

but culturally so imperialist; ready to fight for social justice but at the same time so confident and sometimes arrogant as to assume the right to dictate a universal set of values for everyone. (Ramadan, 2003: 27.)

The cultural opaqueness of the East for the West is connected not only with the objectively existing differences, which nobody can deny. Rather it is connected with the lack of real interest and curiosity on the part of the West towards anything that is not the West, and with the lazy inertia of primitive stereotyping. Today invariably the Islamic cultures and countries are negatively stereotyped according to the well known scenario—from the exclusionary stage to the idea of threat to the civilized society and order and, further on, to confrontation, presenting the people from these locales as not quite people, but the champions of unmotivated cruelty, irrationality and underdevelopment. This is how the images of bearded Muslim terrorists, the wondrous riches and poverty, and no less astounding cruelties are being circulated. They can acquire various forms in the Western mind, but their essence has remained the same in the last several centuries.

My positioning rather can be defined as that of the internal other of the Russian empire, not a practicing, but rather a cultural Muslim with a rather circular and cosmopolitan identity, because both my parents were born into such ethnically Muslim families and my great grandfather was even a Mullah, but of course, the Soviet atheist years and modernization made it impossible to remain practicing Muslims for any of us. People like me are multiply colonized by many

imperial traditions and by the ubiquitous "coloniality of power,"[1] acting on the global scale in the world. I would also argue that this positioning characterizes not only my personal view but can be found in more general terms in such bordering locales, positioned in-between Europe and Asia, Western modernity and Islam, the Ottoman Empire, the Russian empire, China, India and Persia as Caucasus and Central Asia. These locales fall out of the general logic, imposed upon the world by the several centuries of Western European supremacy and also—out of the prevailing Arabic Islamic tradition. Moreover, being doubly or multiply colonized in epistemic as well as economic and political sense, these regions have developed throughout the centuries their specific techniques and strategies of survival, resistance and, in some cases, the positive models of thinking and subjectivity formation, that even if virtually unknown in the West and in the Islamic world at large, can constitute a way out of the contemporary dilemma—the Christian West versus Islam.

The territories of Eurasian Muslim frontiers for centuries have objectively given birth to various models of transcultural, border, hybrid, mediating thinking and subjectivity, that even if suppressed by various imperial regimes, turned out to be impossible to completely destroy. On the contrary, the trickster sensibility of a particular kind, incorporating various cultural, ethnic, religious, epistemic traditions, and demonstrating particular empathic models of treating the other, managed to survive and was only

strengthened by the imperial influence and control. I would like to link this sensibility to the subjectivity of a new trans-cultural[2] migrant of globalization époque, an individual who lives in the world and not in a particular (xenophobic) national culture, who is rootless by definition, who is a wonderer with no links to any particular locality. Today it is necessary to stop seeing Central Asia and the Islamic part of Southern Caucasus as only the source of exotic culture or dangerous terrorism and instability, as a new risk factor in the world after the collapse of Soviet Union, as the sinister "dust of empire" (Meyer, 2004) that the West has to be aware of. Instead, it is necessary to give voice directly to these people, to let them express themselves within the wider global logic of "other thinking" and "border episte-mology," unfolding in the world.

Central Asia and more so Southern Caucasus are para-digmatically border spaces. It is a geographic, a geo-political and ontological phenomenon, as they are positioned on the cracks of not just mountain ranges or deserts, caravan cross-roads and between the seas, but also on the borders of empires and civilizations. A noted journalist and political scientist Karl Meyer in his *The Dust of Empire* points out that

> culturally and physically, Caucasia is the prototypal borderland. Its mountains, stretching six hundred miles from sea to sea, not only form the divide between Europe and Asia but also separate the two earliest Christian kingdoms (Armenia and Georgia) from Islam's two major branches, the dissenting Shias, mostly inhabiting what is now Azerbaijan, and the majority Sunnis who predominate in the North Caucasus. (Meyer, 2004: 145.)

But this geopolitical point can and should be complimented by epistemic and existential rendering of the border, that we can borrow e.g. from a Chicana poet and philosopher Gloria Anzaldúa. Her border sensibility seems to me very much in tune with trans-cultural multiply colonized discourses and subjectivities of the Islamic Eurasian borderlands. Anzaldúa states that

> a borderland is a vague and undetermined place created by the emotional residue of an unnatural boundary. It is in a constant state of transition. The prohibited and forbidden are its inhabitants [Anzaldúa, 1999: 25] (…) The new *mestiza* copes by developing a tolerance for ambiguity. (…) She has a plural personality, she operates in a pluralistic mode—nothing is thrust out, the good, the bad and the ugly, nothing rejected, nothing abandoned. Not only does she sustain contradictions, she turns the ambivalence into something else. (Anzaldúa, 1999: 101.)

A very similar sensibility is to be found in Caucasia and in Central Asia alike. Both regions happen to be simultaneously inside and outside the Muslim tradition, in any case they are marginal for the Islamic world, always playing a secondary part in it, at the same time constantly finding themselves in the zone of clashing interests of various empires. This positioning gives them, among other things, an epistemic potential of the border that a Russian semiotician Y. Lotman called the space of intensive semiotization and metaphoric translation-transformation, where new texts and new meaning are being frequently generated (Lotman, 2000).

Both Caucasus and Central Asia remain for the West a paradigmatic anti-space, a non-space. It is quite logical because the universal Hegelian history never unfolded there. Even a Ferghanian Babur left his motherland in quest of fame and only after he conquered Kabul, he was able to found the Great Mogul Empire. But in today's global geopolitics these remote, from Europe and America, spaces suddenly come to play an important role in the new world order. Hence comes a new round of struggle between various forces for the dominance in these regions. An important role here is played by the economic and social factors—from the high density of population to the low level of economic development, from the limited land and water resources to mass unemployment. Besides, an important factor has been also the political clan struggle which leads to destabilizing of the general situation and potentially can also lead to the growth of the influence of Islamic extremist movements (such as Khizb-ut-Takhrir or Wahhabism). It would be nearsighted to blame only the Soviet empire for this, because it happened to be just the latest and not the most important colonizing agent in these locales. In fact, it seems that they were doomed much earlier, in the marvelous époque of Renaissance, which unfortunately resulted among other things, in the decline and fall of both Central Asia and Caucasus. It was precisely starting from the Western modernity in all its forms (including the Marxist model), that these locales fell into the permanent decline cycle, and even today, when they finally became politically inde-

pendent, they still cannot leave this vicious circle of multiple colonization. So instead of continuing to demonize and exoticize Central Asia or Caucasus, it is better to try to understand, under the influence of which global factors their history took this particular turn. And it would be much more fruitful if this task is performed by the thinkers from these regions themselves, and not by the Western experts.

Up to the second modernity and the establishment of Western European absolute dominance on the global scale, the power asymmetry based on the Hegelian understanding of world history was not yet absolute and hence, e.g. the other, exotic Tamerlane's empire could not possibly be interpreted by the Europeans as something low, primitive, underdeveloped and in need of civilizing, as fallen out of history and modernity. An interesting example illustrating the lack of xenophobia and religious intolerance in the relations of European and Asian oikumene to the modern extent is a 1403 document—a diary of the Spanish envoy Ruy Gonzales de Clavijo, the chamberlain of Henry (Enrique) III's—the king of Castile and Leon, who was sent to the court of Tamerlane. The latter, after his victory over the Turks, maintained the widest political, trade and military contacts with Europe and mainly with France and Spain, which were thankful to Tamerlane for saving Europe from the Turkish invasion, as they put it. Tamerlane himself is an interesting semiotic sign of trans-cultural exchanges between Europe and Asia, Christianity and Islam. In the late 19th century the French would even put a gilded statue of Tamer-

lane in one of Parisian streets commemorating him as the liberator of Europe from the Ottoman conquest. The irony is that it is the acknowledgment of the person who contributed indirectly to the fact that later Europe managed to throw Asia out of history and make a non-space out of it, a passive exotic material for the study of Western anthropologists.

However, the beginning of the end of Tamerlane dynasty's prosperity and, consequently, Central Asia's falling out of the future world history was linked with nothing but capitalism and the shaping of the new capitalist world economy, with the European absolute dominance—in the 16th century. It was then, that Vasko da Gama's ships blazed the sea route from Europe to India and further, to China, and the Great Silk route suddenly lost its significance. While Central Asia also lost its strategic economic importance on which it had rested for two millennia and became a periphery, a border—for several centuries.

Even a very brief glance at the history of Caucasus and Central Asia clearly demonstrates the complex and multiply colonized nature of these locales throughout history. Both territories have been always cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic cross-roads. Various religions and ethnic and linguistic groups came one after another into these locales, some of them stayed and hybridized their cultures with those of the people who lived there before, creating a unique and complex history. E.g. in the territory of Modern Azerbaijan antique Zoroastrianism gave way to Christianity which later was replaced by Islam, when Azerbaijan became a part

of Arabic Caliphate. Central Asia with its heart in Ferghana valley (Transoxiana or in Arabic "*maa-waraa-nahr*"—a place between two rivers Amu-Darya–Oxus and Syr-Darya–Jaxartes) has been also a site of multiple religious, ethnic and linguistic mixing, starting from the same Zoroastrianism, which many scholars believe to be born there, in Khorezm, and to Buddhism and Hellenism, the nomadic pagan cultures of the steppe and the metropolitan master-craftsmen traditions, the scientific and cultural achievements, borrowed from India, China, Persia, Greece, Middle East and Turkey—all of them synthesizing in the flourishing medieval Central Asian culture, which also came under the Arabic control in the 7-9th centuries, to become finally Muslim under the Samanid dynasty, and in the 13th century, once again, being conquered by Genghis-Khan's army. Thus, both territories from the start had been the sites of intense cultural, linguistic, religious hybridizing and transcultural tendencies due to their specific geographic positioning in the world, and their taking active part in what was then the pre-capitalist world economy. Consequently they elaborated their own unique and tolerant ways of dealing with this cultural multiplicity as well as strategies of survival under various regimes, which, I would argue, are still alive even today in the subjectivity of the majority of people who live in these locales, even after the distorting influence of Western modernization brought with it such initially foreign to these territories concepts as ethnic and linguistic nationalism and the strong sense of ethnic belonging, religious

and linguistic purism and intolerance, racialization and eth-
nization, artificial divisions into the major ethnicities and
minorities, into "Arians" and "Mongolians," etc.

Both Central Asia and Southern Caucasus featured a va-
riety of independent and semi-independent states in medie-
val époque—the so called khanates (with the exception of a
rather large and powerful Tamerlane's empire with its capi-
tal in Samarkand—the ancient Marakanda) virtually up to
European Enlightenment, when the main colonial spaces
were already divided between the large Western capitalist
empires and there started a process of appropriation of the
less attractive but still geo-strategically or economically im-
portant territories, such as Central Asia and Caucasus. A
crucial feature here was that they were colonized not di-
rectly by the Western capitalist empires, but by the so called
subaltern empires, or empires-colonies, like Russia and the
Ottoman Empire, which were themselves colonized episte-
mically and culturally by the West and thus, acted as media-
tors, as champions of Western modernity in these locales,
albeit in the distorted form. The Shia Persia, the Ottoman
Empire and Russia were all competing for Azerbaijan in the
second modernity. And Russia got it after its victory over
Persia in the early 19th century. As a result, one of the many
Eurasian artificial borders was drawn on the river Arax
(echoing Gloria Anzaldua's border semiotic interpretation
of Rio Grande, that continues to bring people death, suffe-
ring and humiliation), that even today divides the Azeri peo-
ple of Northern Persia and those of Azerbaijan.

A similar history is to be found in Central Asia which after the collapse of Timurids dynasty and several centuries of decay, was also conquered by the Russian empire in the 1860s. Russia imposed upon this space its own colonial model of modernization, copied from the West and mainly from the British empire, up to minute details, such as the famous concept of the "tools of empire" (e.g. railways). It is worth noting that immediately Russia began making a cotton colony out of Central Asia, intending to shake the cotton monopoly of the US South. This project of Central Asia modernization was only continued by the Soviets with larger and more violent excesses, ultimately resulting in ecological and humanitarian catastrophes of the second half of the 20th century.

It is only natural then that both Azerbaijan and Central Asia were torn between the influences of the modernization via Russian empire (that after all controlled Azeris for almost 170 years and Central Asia for almost 130 years), via the Ottoman empire (especially in Azeris case) and more traditionalist Muslim Persia and the countries of the South-East Asia (in case of Central Asia). Their modernization model came directly from Russia and later from Soviet Union, up to the 1990s, when the circular Turkish model (very attractive and compatible for both Central Asia and Islamic Caucasus and also more politically pragmatic for them today) with its pan-Turkic vision, as well as the more local Muslim influences of Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan—in case of Central Asia, and the renewed attempts at directly Western control—came back and flourished.

It is necessary to stress here that even if the West never succeeded in directly colonizing these locales, there were several Western attempts in modernity at establishing its direct or indirect rule over both Caucasus and Central Asia—all of them within the logic of redistribution of colonial spaces when the collapsing empires give a chance to their more successful rivals to gain control over their previous territories. This is what happened roughly in the 1917-1920 when the collapsing Russian empire slackened its grip and both Azerbaijan and Turkestan became independent states, if only for several years. Immediately the Western European countries attempted (unsuccessfully) to take over both Central Asia and Caucasus, but the strengthened Bolshevik empire quickly restored its dominance. In Azerbaijan there was an earlier attempt at Western economic colonization connected with the sudden though short skyrocketing of Baku in the late 19th century to the status of the world oil capital, which opened this traditionally multicultural city to the direct influences of Western modernization, not via Russia. It became the city of oil barons from all over Europe and even America. Another most recent example of the same imperial tactic we witness today, after the collapse of the Soviet empire, when once again the West and particularly the US are trying to establish control over these regions—economically, politically, culturally. However, today, in 2006, it is obvious that the Western tactic is skidding once again. As these regions are not so ready to chose the neo-liberal model of modernization for themselves. True, the influence of Rus-

sia diminished, the influence of Turkey somewhat grew, there were sporadic attempts at growing a new generation of pro-Western elites in these locales, in the last two decades, but Islamic Caucasus and Central Asia both refuse to make a final choice—instead they resort to the age-old tactic of balancing, of mediation, of trans-cultural sensibility of a trickster type, that I believe gives them a lot of potential for the future.

The tactic of Russian and later Soviet variant of modernization in both regions were strikingly similar. They can be summarized in the motto "divide and rule." Artificial borders were drawn and ethnic and religious conflicts induced, alphabets changed to cut off the vital link with the past, history and tradition, new ethnicities invented, mosques closed and atheist campaigns launched, the so called "Oriental women" forcefully liberated—all that done to ensure the imperial dominance, but at the same time causing, particularly in Soviet period, a very cynical reflexive resistance to and distrust of official authority that is still there. Examples of this devastating imperial tactic are abundant. Russians used the Shia and Sunnis opposition in Azerbaijan to make sure that they cut off the Sunni Azeris from the possible alliance with Shamil Sunnis in Northern Caucasus. Later Soviets mapped Turkestan in such a way as to prevent any attempts at Turkic and Islamic reunification, when they once again put artificial borders between artificially created republics and ethnicities. Before the Russian modernization of the second half of the 19th century there was no idea of ethnicity in Central

Asia and people who were much more socially mobile and flexible, who leaving one region for another could easily change their status, name and enter into different hierarchies, due to the specific local mechanism of mutual adaptation, which allowed for this complex cultural multiplicity to coexist peacefully, categorized themselves in cultural, regional, social, economic and religious and not ethnic or linguistic sense, and only the Russian and later Soviet colonization forcefully and nearsightedly introduced the idea of ethnicity into this region and the model of modernization, based on ethnic-national identity.[3]

The Soviets divided the ethnic-religious-linguistic unity of Turkestan into artificial entities—creating the potential for ethnic explosions and today's territorial conflicts between virtually all Central Asian newly independent states. The tactic of Stalin's deportations of whole peoples into Central Asia (Meskhetian Turks, Crimean Tatars, Chechens, Balkars, etc.) and artificial borders, contributed to the future ethnic and economic tensions in these regions (Karabakh conflict between Azeris and Armenians, as a result of which over 30 thousand people were reported, according to several sources, to perish and around one million became refugees, the Osh conflict and other ethnic clashes in Ferghana valley). This is a direct result of Russian and later Soviet imperial tactic of ethnicity-building. Although the modern nations in Central Asia and Caucasus were formed artificially and even in some cases by chance, the result is there nonetheless. The scholarly constructs turned into political instruments which in their turn

were implanted into the texture of economic, social and cultural life and began to be seen by the people as ancient and given once and for all. Therefore, for the majority of modern inhabitants of Central Asia or Azerbaijan nations are not "imagined communities."

The most hard to understand and cope with for the Russian imperial ideologues remained the problem of Islam, although we must admit that the Russian tradition of interactions with Islam, starting from 1552, when Ivan the Terrible conquered Kazan and Astrakhan, was not always based on absolute rejection. This is a relatively new phenomenon, connected with modernization of Russia itself and the gradual naturalization in its mass consciousness of racism and Eurocentrism, interiorized by Russians, who consequently grounded their relations with Islamic colonies in the firm belief in their own superiority as the champions of Western modernity.[4] It was precisely the wave of Western modernization in its Russian and Soviet forms that lead to the fact that the more complex, nuanced and empathic models of interaction with Islam as an internal other were forgotten. In the last 200 years Islam itself in the territory of Russia and its colonies transformed into ethnicity and started to be regarded not as a religion, but rather as a color of skin, eyes, hair, etc., i.e. religious opposition turned into an ethnic-racial one. In the last 20-30 years a radical ethnization, racialization and politization of Islam took place. In many postcolonial spaces with traditionally weak idea of ethnicity, this risk is especially noticeable, as there, ethnic

nationalism often takes Islamist forms, they claim Islam for their own new nations and interpret it as first of all a manifestation of their own local culture. Both Central Asia and Azerbaijan unfortunately demonstrate some aspects of this dangerous tendency, although not to such a large extent as Northern Caucasus today. But even though there are unquestionably many crosses between the ethnic culture and larger civilizational specificity and Islam, still it would be incorrect to regard them as one. The former is much wider than the latter. And it is in the former that we find most promising prospects for the future.

The Russian empire was a lazy empire in the sense that it always performed its Christianizing mission half heatedly, particularly when it referred to Muslim people. A famous Russian poet Alexander Pushkin in his *Journey to Erzerum* urged the lazy Russian empire that limited its cultural mission to sending books to illiterate people, to apply along with economic and cultural tools the curiously archaic for the 19th century forms of imperial control over Caucasus that would make it turn its back to Turkey—"the force of the gospel brought by Christian missionaries—as a means more powerful, more ethical and more in accordance with our educated century" (Pushkin, 1934: 745). As for the Soviet period, in spite of its general tendency towards atheism, at the moment of stability this regime tended to smuggle into the collective unconscious the idea of superiority of the Russian Orthodox church over all other religions, even if in the masked form of Russian national traditions, and rejected Is-

lamic thought and organizations—again, masking this tactic as a fight with "bourgeois nationalism." In Central Asia or Caucasus in the 1970s one could easily find an Orthodox church and even a Jewish synagogue in any relatively small town, but there was often not even one mosque left. As for post-soviet period, I would say that it has been marked with pragmatism and cynicism in the relations between the state and Islam. On the one hand, the authority allows for the existence of Islamic centers, the building of new mosques, the Islamic festivals, etc. On the other hand, the same authority pretends not to notice the extremist organizations, parties and politicians, who openly demonize Islam as a part of today's wider Russian xenophobia and migrant-phobia. On top of that there are clearly more calculated efforts to control the cultural-political unconsciousness and preserve the dominance by flirting with Islam in fear of possible non-systemic organizations and leaders, that the authorities in Russia see as a potential danger. E.g. the director of the Institute of Ethnology and Anthropology, Russian Academy of Sciences, an ex minister of nationalities of Russia and a member of many international commissions Valery Tishkov, finds the roots of global terrorism and the ways of fighting it in the following:

> The global strategy of counteraction against terrorism is the strengthening of the state as a source of order and legitimate violence, keeping strictly the interests of the majority, imposing the will of the majority and restricting the non-systemic activists and

the politics of minorities, rejection of radical projects and appeals. (Tishkov, 2004: 278.)

Although this position is understandable as a manifestation of the state ethnic-cultural politics, suggested by someone who takes an active part in shaping of this politics, but what worries me here is the ethical dimension. What we can read in between the lines here and in many other instances of geo-political theorizing today is the pragmatic politics of brain-washing, that proclaims that it is better not to let the poor and the disenfranchised know that they are poor and discriminated against, because within this logic it is precisely the eyes, opened to this injustice, that become the eyes of the terrorist. This pragmatic logic is mirrored in the number of the so called Muslim intellectuals in the post-soviet space most of whom are successful or not very successful political projects and constructed identities even if they may be quite interesting and well-educated people themselves. The problem is how they are used by the state. And here history repeats and reminds us of the infamous Orthodox priest Gapon who in 1905 instigated the mass workers march which resulted in the mass massacre that goes in Russian history under the name of the "Bloody Sunday." Today such "Gapons" acquire sometimes a more exotic guise (e.g. of Russian Orthodox priests converting to Islam) and are used by the official power to ensure that Islam does not develop in any non-systemic uncontrollable forms.

What has happened in the political life of the Muslim Eurasian frontiers, after they gained independence, unfortu-

nately does not leave many hopes for the future, at least if
the same logic continues to be reproduced again and again.
E.g. in Uzbekistan, the largest of the Central Asian states,
the authorities are trying to use the ideas of Uzbek tradition
and "Uzbekness" (*uzbekchilik*), and the comparison of the
state with the family or community (*makhalla*), as a justifi-
cation and a source of legitimacy for the existing politics
and power relations. Then the authority is deliberately
presented as a manifestation of authoritarian, but fair and
just patriarchal element in the family (Karimov, 1993). In
Rasanayagam's words, the ethnic divisions that were im-
posed on this region in Soviet times were not questioned by
the leaders of the post-soviet Central Asian states. Instead
they stressed the validity of ethnic-territorial idea of the na-
tion, but replaced the Marxist ideology as its glue, with eth-
nic nationalism (Rasanayagam, 2004). As a result, nothing
changed in the life of common people who remained as
powerless and vulnerable as before. Here as well as in Rus-
sia proper we find the peculiar transmuted forms of ethnic
etatism, which do not promise anything good either. As a
Northern Caucasus social philosopher K. Tkhagapsoyev
points out, in the post-Soviet space there emerged

> The ethnic states with the ethnic-clan system of power. Thus para-
> doxically the "space of freedom of ethnicities," that was proclaimed
> with the collapse of Soviet system and was a complex and contradic-
> tory multiplicity of cultural meanings and ideas—post-colonialism,
> traditionalism, neo-liberalism—rushed in the end into generating a
> certain "transmuted form" of social-political being: ethnic etatism.

Such a result was influenced by certain features of Russian reforms and first and foremost by being an integral part of the reformers' "total othering." Othering of unitary and international forms of Soviet power quite logically turned into the locus of sovereignty, regionalization and ethnization of power. As a result, in ethnic republics the political instrument for the implementation of reforms—which were manifested as liberal and democratic in their aims and content—turned out in fact to be the authoritarian regimes of ethnic etatism—which has nothing to do with democratic principles (Tkhagapsoyev, 2006.)

In these conditions a citizen of such ethnic etatist states (and almost all of the post-Soviet states including Russia itself are ethnic etatist) today often simply has to become a new nomad against his will. The inhabitants of Central Asia who are so much hated by xenophobic Russians and constitute a larger part of the labor migration today, still go mainly to Russia and not e.g. to the West (that is possible only for the chosen few), looking for jobs and better life, because in the modern global configuration of power their entering the world economic system as labor force is still impossible. They do not have any other choice of entering the world of globalization, but go to Russia, as the North will never let in either Uzbeks, or Tadzhiks, or Russians for that matter. Another minor alternative for migrations from these regions would be South East Asia (e.g. Malaysia) and Turkey. As for Russia proper, which is beyond our interest in this conference but is worth mentioning, it also shapes today an ethnic etatist model, but of a more dangerous kind. The director of the Center for the study of xenophobia and prevention of ex-

tremism, Emil Pain calls it a model of the Third Reich or ethnocratic empire, based on the idea of superiority of Russians over everyone else (Pain, 2004: 309).

And yet today, after almost two decades of post-soviet existence and in spite of the above mentioned problems, we can still find that such trans-cultural spaces as Southern Caucasus or Central Asia retain their particular sensibility. The specific multicultural sensibility that we find in cities like Baku or Tashkent was not the result of just Soviet fake theory of proletarian internationalism. The roots of this linguistic, religious, ethnic and cultural tolerance are much deeper and after the initial ethnic nationalist explosion of the early 1990s today there is generally a nostalgia in these places for the times of tolerance and trans-culturation and what is more important—there are conscious if sporadic efforts to revive it. In spite of all Russian chauvinistic and imperial attempts at casting slurs upon these locales, these places are still very tolerant of both the ex-Russian colonizers and other ethnicities that traditionally lived here or found themselves here as a result of major historical cataclysms of the 20th century (e.g. Tashkent accepted several large migration waves, from the Russian settlers in the 19th century to the mostly Jewish families from the West of Soviet Union, who were evacuated here during WW2. Many of them after the end of war preferred to stay and not go back, and still stay there even today). The topos of such colonial multicultural cities as Baku or Tashkent, carries the traces of the influence of various traditions and imperial models—we can study is as a cultural palimpsest of differ-

ent, often conflicting or merging meanings—one can find here a Governor's palace or park of the Russian colonial times, traces of the circular colonial architecture in the form of gymnasiums or theaters, almost always they are copies of a copy, meaning that the Russian imperial imagery was in itself borrowed from the West and hence its colonial copies were double simulacra, which easily coincide with the later Soviet layers and the so called "old town" with its typically narrow streets and fortresses (like Bakinian Icheri-Shekher). But what is crucial in all these multicultural colonial capitals is certainly the people. As an Azeri-Jewish writer Afanasy Mamedov wrote in his nostalgic novel about Baku, describing the old city's atmosphere, it is the people that create this trans-cultural mood—"the old men with their Muslim beards under the palms and the tolling of the bells at the Armenian church that sounds so close from the Jewish quarter Juude-Meilesi—a real present for Shagal (Mamedov, 2000: 110).

Both Baku and Tashkent which were before a part of the great silk route, then went into decline for several centuries of European modernity march, only to reemerge in the second modernity as typically colonial subaltern spaces at the outskirts of empire—each with its specific task—in case of Baku it was the oil, in case of Tashkent it was being the center of colonial administration and cotton industry and trade. In other words, their role of the tolerant multilingual crossroads was revived to some extent even under the loss of independence.

From what I have tried to summarize above, it is clear that it was the second modernity that ultimately made an anti-space out of Central Asia and Caucasus, a non-space that can exist in the Western mind only in the form of a conventional topos of some exotic parables, where stereotyped Orientals reside. But who were these people the West never really wondered. They were interpreted as Deleuze and Guattari's "nomads" at best—the abstract agents of some conventional speculative history, who just illustrated the concept of deterritorialization and the nomadic culture. However, in the East this trickster, wondering, mediating, rootless sensibility is no news—it is just that in globalization it acquires an unexpected confirmation and reification on a global scale. The abstract nomad turns out to be a real new Ahasuerus or rather, al-Hadir of the newest époque of the great migration of peoples, or in the more pedestrian variant—a wondering Hodja Nasreddin. I intentionally chose for my attempt at defining of this contemporary trans-cultural empathic border subjectivity a metaphor from the Asian tradition which in my view, clearly expresses the positioning of the individuals from the Eurasian Islamic borderlands.

You can raise an objection and say that people living in Central Asia or Caucasus do not travel much, that they are inescapably tied to their locale and their destiny. But this is not so. Rather, they would probably prefer to stay home and make out of it once again a previously existing multicultural universe. But today's logic of globalization makes them be-

come migrants—there is no work in their countries or it is so low paid that it is not enough to survive. That is why among the younger generation of people from these locales we find so many migrants against their own will.

Saint Hadir, so popular among the Sufi mystical tradition, with its specific culture of respect for the other, standing in the center of the ethics of interpersonal relations—is initially a trans-cultural personage, in a way, a quintessence of the mentality of people who for centuries have lived between empires, between religions, between languages, in a complex imperial-colonial configuration, not always understandable in the West, and have managed to preserve their own system of reference and world vision under all regimes, a system, marked with specific tolerance, for lack of better word in English, though as we know tolerance comes from the medieval concept of tolerating the poison and hardly matches the trans-cultural philosophy of treating the other. This trans-cultural personage is to be found in many traditions from India to Palestine, from Ferghana Valley to China. Saint al-Hadir or al-Hidr, having a parallel in Christian Ilea, in modern terms, is the immortal protector of all migrants and travelers who is himself constantly traveling around the world, fulfilling his mystical mission. This character has a pre-Islamic origin and among its sources there are the Acadian Gilgamesh epic, the novel of Alexander, the Judaic parable about Joshua b. Levi. Hence the Central Asian popular belief: "Hospitality cannot be selective, for Hadir can come to your house in any disguise, any person

can meet him, but what would he gain depends on how pure his intentions are." In this belief one finds a specific philosophy of treating other persons, other cultures. What kind of philosophy is that, I would like to illustrate by one example, but first let me quote the worlds of a progressive Muslim intellectual Omid Safi that refer directly to this issue:

> Adab (…) that most essential, basic and glorious of Muslim inter-personal codes. Adab is the compassionate, human, selfless, gene-rous, and kind etiquette that has been a hallmark of refined manners in Muslim cultures. Almost anyone who has ever traveled to areas that have been profoundly influenced by Muslim ethics has no doubt seen great examples of this wonderful way of being welco-med and put at ease. (Safi, 2004: 13.)

But the scholar sadly continues that "it is precisely this compassionate humanness that is missing from so much of contemporary Islam (Safi, 2004: 13).

It is missing from contemporary Islam, but it is certainly not missing from such border spaces as Azerbaijan and Central Asia and from the sensibility of the people who live here, which cannot possibly come to just Islam, even if unorthodox and mutated by various processes of hybridizing and syncretism with pre-Islamic traditions. It is this inherent trans-cultural border element—forever open to the dialogue with the world, even if often artificially restrained and deprived of this possibility, that can be a way out of fundamentalism vs neo-liberalism opposition. The latter, as we all had a chance to see lately, is a dead-end, leading only to global catastrophe of the clash of civilizations, the idea, that

being a carefully constructed myth far from reality, nevertheless has become very powerful today in the minds of both Western and non-Western thinkers and groups.

And now the promised legend that recently has found a scientific proof in the studies of both Polish and Central Asian scholars. In 1241 when Khan Batu had conquered many cities of Eastern Europe and finally came very close to the Polish Krakow, on the roof of the famous Maryat Cathedral a trumpeter was holding his post. He was the first to notice the enemy. He managed to warn his compatriots by playing his trumpet, before he was killed by the arrow of one of khan's warriors. Later Poland lost independence and the Poles believed that their country would become free again if a Polish trumpeter would climb one of the minarets in Samarkand which at that point was governed by Genghizids's successor Tamerlane, and finish the interrupted melody. In 1918 when the Polish army was leaving Samarkand after the failed Entente attempts at gaining control over this territory, one of the Polish soldiers did climb a minaret of the famous Registan square and played his trumpet. Soon Poland became independent again, if for a short time. Several decades had passed and during WW2 the members of the future Polish Army regiment happened to be in Samarkand. They were stopped at the market and asked by the local elders to bring their trumpeter to Registan and urge him to play his instrument because it was necessary to expiate the old sin of the Khan Batu warrior—the murder of the

"muezzin" of Maryat Cathedral. To wash off the sin it was needed that the trumpeter from that country would stand in the center of Samarkand market and finish his interrupted azan (http://www.e-samarkand.narod.ru/ poland.htm). This logic of Samarkand elders and their sincere willingness to correct the past and make the world more just and fair, is very far from any intolerance that Islamic cultures are often associated with today. Rather it is a logic of respect for any other culture, religion, history, a logic of dialogue and fairness, whose legacy is preserved in spite of any historical cataclysms, wars and colonization. It is in the revival and cultivation of this element of Central Asian culture that lies a possibility of intercultural dialogue in the future. The West with its exotization and fear of non-West, the East with its opaqueness and passive resistance—can they still hope to hear each other today, not in the fake clanking of neo-liberal multicultural discourse, which proclaims difference verbally, but in fact leads only to the commercialization of the predicted and attractively packed exoticism and whose fiasco demonstrated itself with devastating clarity in the last decade, but in real global and alter-globalist thinking? Are they still able to realize that the world is one in all its diversity, and interconnected within itself by thousand of threads. The Samarkand elders seemed to understand that, but can the modern world follow their route?

One of the most promising sensibilities that is being shaped today in the world on the global scale is the trans-

cultural border sensibility and epistemology that comes with it. This is what can give us at least a chance of a dialogue and a dialogue based on a symmetry and the birth of a specific critical thinking, which is born at the border, between two or more various traditions, questioning equally each of them and not regarding one of them as an absolute point of reference anymore. This powerful deconstructive impulse we find not just in western postmodernism, which performs this task from within the Western tradition itself, but more and more we also find it in various alternative traditions, including the ones between Islam and the West. The most fruitful for the future are those that are marked with hybridity and trans-culturality, lacking religious and ethnic-national fundamentalism, based on cultural polilogue and syncretism. These traditions of thinking and seeing the world are clearly better realized in Latin America, in the Caribbean, in some parts of South-East Asia and Africa, most of which were also doubly or multiply colonized spaces. This new subjectivity and epistemology can be expressed in many ways—from theology of liberation to progressive Muslims project, from other thinking to border thinking, but is always based on questioning the neo-liberal modernity from in-between position. The Muslim frontiers of Eurasia such as Caucasus and Central Asia, with their hotchpotch of various traditions and unorthodox Islam are objectively close to them in the prevailing sensibility.[5] They are undoubtedly a part of this global non-unified and lose move-

ment of trans-culturation and border thinking as a new episteme.

Trans-culturation presupposes the inclusion of many and not just one cultural reference point, the criss-crossing and negotiation of cultures, a specific state of cultural in-between-ness. In case of Central Asia such subjectivity has been always a norm in ethnic-cultural, social and linguistic sense (e.g. the specialization of languages: Arabic was used for the official sphere and law, Farsi referred to culture and poetry, the local vernacular languages like New Uzbek were connected with the sphere of the quotidian). Here the imperial assimilation tactic was needed not as a way of coping with metisation (as in Latin America), but as a realization of the imperial principle "divide and rule." But behind the surface, the age old processes of mutual cultural interaction, that do not recognize the difference between the dominant culture and the suppressed one, and refuse to accept the imperial cultural hierarchy, flourished, giving birth to new meanings and complex cultural codes and textures. Following Eduard Glissant's metaphor, we can say that both Central Asia and Southern Caucasus are the spaces marked by opacity,

> that is not enclosure within an impenetrable autarchy but subsistence within an irreducible singularity. Opacities can coexist and converge, weaving fabrics. To understand this truly one must focus on the texture of the weave and not on the nature of its component. (Glissant, 1997: 190.)

If for the West these locales remain the exotic or threatening others, then what happens in contemporary Central

Asian or Azeri cultural and political imaginary itself ? How do they see the world and themselves in the world ? It turns out that in these marginalized non-spaces there are some attempts at critical rethinking of the caricature or exoticist image of the East, created by the West. Alas, this rethinking cannot happen any more or yet in the form of the serious global canonical counter-discourse, offered several decades ago by Kazakh writer and philosopher Olzhas Suleymenov in his *Az i Ia* (Suleymenov, 1975), where he retold the Russian foundational epic *Lay of Igor's Campaign* from a Turkic viewpoint, and stressed a utopian possibility of creating a great secular Eurasian Slavic-Turkic confederation or state based on their common history and culture. In post-soviet period, when the ethnic political pendulum, in Emil Pain's words, goes from Yeltsin's period of minority ethnic nationalism to Putin's predominance of fundamentalist Russian chauvinism, Suleymenov's utopian, but global and positive model is equally unattractive to both parties. Instead we find only sporadic and local efforts at questioning both the Western modernity and the ethnic nationalist or religious fundamentalist discourses. It happens mainly in the sphere of aesthetics, art, literature, music, rather than on the political or purely philosophic level, where still the dead-end models of ethnic nationalism and fundamentalism or a blind repetition of Western discourses prevail. Maybe and even most probably there are interesting and original thinkers in this part of the world, but the problem is that their works and views are not accessible not only to the West,

but today even to people in Russia. And yet, let me give you one positive example of trans-cultural aesthetic and border thinking coming directly from the heart of Central Asia. It is the Tashkent theater *Ilkhom,* whose creators seem to have asked a question: what would happen if we blow the breath of real history and real culture and people into the western Orientalist metaphors and elegant parables, where Asia, e.g. Samarkand, acts as a paradigmatic anti-space where it is suitable to have a rendezvous with Death, to quote Jean Baudrillard's famous essay (Baudrillard, 1979)? *Ilkhom* in its Jewish director M. Vile's words, mixes on its stage the languages, the faces of Tashkent people, their tempers and ways of life. This theater is as trans-cultural and hybrid in the true sense of the word, as the city where it exists. Their famous 1993 production that still successfully runs today, was a Samarkand fantasy based on Karlo Gozzi's comedy *Happy Beggars* (*I Pitocchi Fortunati,* 1764). The show was built on the mutual penetration and hybridizing of totally unexpected sources and traditions—comedia dell'arte and traditional Uzbek comedy "maskharabozami." In fact this theater negates Gozzi's orientalism, that presented Samarkand as a fantastic distopia, a place nowhere, fallen out of time and progress, as well as Baudrillard's beautiful and sad parable of the rendezvous with death in Samarkand. This production, in contrast with Baudrillard's essay from *De la Seduction* can be called "Life in Samarkand."

If we apply this example to a wider context, we can say that the lingering interpretation of Central Asia or Caucasus

as an exotic or threatening anti-space is just a continuing European and American practice of power asymmetry, of pushing the other out of the sphere of valuable, out of the myths of progress, linear world history, science, etc. While what is needed is so little—just to make this asymmetry vanish and accept that Samarkand is not just a fairy tale space, successfully exploited by the Western culture as a source of exotic imagery, but is also a real Tamerlan's empire capital, an important late medieval cultural center of the East, a city where one could find the famous observatory and library built by Mirzo Ulukbek's (Tamerlan's grandson), who yielded to no Western colleagues in his knowledge and who was reigning under the slogan "Striving for knowledge is a duty of every Muslim." It was the center of many Sufi orders and the city of three Islamic universities, where people could get an excellent education, combining the study of various circular disciplines and theology. And what is more important, it is a place where life never stopped, even if Western modernity went around it, leaving it behind and beyond. And to learn what kind of life it is we need to listen to the people who live, feel and think in Samarkand, Baku, Tashkent or Dushanbe.

The problem remains however that at this point the alternative thinking models are still not properly consolidated in spite of such exemplary events as the World Social Forum. What is needed is the development of coalitions of such border thinkers and trans-cultural multiply colonized locales on a global scale which in spite of such technical means of globalization as internet, still remains a problem to

be solved. Moreover, they lack not just financial support, but also a sufficient global knowledge and global drive in themselves to be able to include into their sphere such paradigmatic others as Azeris or Uzbeks to name just two. This void, this lack of dialogue, of communication among the groups of people in the world that although coming form different locales suffer from the same logic of coloniality of power, is immediately filled by completely different ideologies, that normally do not suffer from lack of resources to promote themselves on the global scale—such as ethnic and religious fundamentalism and extremism of all shades and, of course, the Western neo-liberal modernization in all its traditional forms from military bases and economic pressure to opening English speaking universities in the vast spaces of Eurasian steppe and then punishing these countries if they refuse to accept the Western dominance, like the US did recently with Uzbekistan. Our conference is one of the very few and fortunate exceptions from this rule. And I hope that in the future there will be more such exceptions that will eventually change the rule itself, as one important step in making this world a better place for us all.

Notes

1. The concept of coloniality of power was formulated by a Peruvian philosopher A. Quijano as a set of various strategies of colonization in modernity on the global scale. For Quijano, coloniality of power has been a constant reproduction of colonial difference, penetrating all spheres of human life and defining all cultural models of modernity (Quijano 2000).

2. I view trans-culturation as a new episteme, corresponding to globalization, a new type of specific linguistic thinking and discursiveness, as a cultural and political unconscious of our time. It is expressed not only on the level of social reality, e.g. in ethnic convergence, but also on the conceptual level, in bringing forward the principle of hybridity instead of previous purity, the changing attitude to national languages and cultural traditions whose immutability gives way to trans-nationalism and poliglossia. It changes the relations between language, thinking, knowledge and "things." Trans-culturation is an episteme of problematizing the difference and diversity, and shaping of new ways of communication between various others in the world.

3. In general, the Islamic world was as united as the medieval Orbis Christianus, while the ethnic and state belonging of its representatives did not matter that much. A large number of Azeri or Central Asian thinkers, scientists, philosophers, poets were regarded within the parallel non-European (Asian) history not as the sons of their ethnic cultures, but as representatives of the Islamic oikumene that were also recognized as such by the West (Abu Ali Ibn Sino (Avicenna), Beruni (Albiron), Ulugbek, Navoi and many others.

4. Even in the prime time of Russian absolutism under Katherine the Great the attitude to Islamic people was not as demonizing as today. Katherine's minion prince Potyemkin when he administered the loyalty oaths of Tatar princes, interpreted it in a symbolic sense comparing the conquering of Crimea with the actions of European powers in Asia, Africa and America and predicting the birth of a new Russian Paradise, which he peopled with the refugees from other empires—the German Mennonites, the Swedish protestants, the Orthodox Romanians, fleeing the Ottoman empire, the Jews escaping the Polish pogroms. But the same Potyemkin stood for the rights of the Tatars and defended them from the intolerance and cruelty of the Russian army. He granted the Tatar aristocracy (murzas) the rights, equal to the Russian gentry and started the long process of co-opting the Muslim elites into the Russian society which with some violent excesses remained intact until the Soviet time.

5. There are many parallels between the Islamic borderlands of Eurasia and other locales marked with trans-cultural impulses. One of them is the idea of hybrid, impure ethnicity, mixed blood. Thus, it was the Russian imperial scholars that built the convenient—pure in blood—classification of people living in Central Asia. In reality they never existed. And even the imperial ideologues themselves realized that. The first Turkestan general-governor von Kaufman lamented that the local population is mixed and often impossible to define in ethnographic terms (Abashin, 2004: 49). Moreover, there was a specific variant of Central Asian Creoles—the "Sarts"—half Uzbek and half Tadzhic, in ethnic sense and in some elements of the way of life resembling the Tadzhic, but speaking a Turkic language (new Uzbek), and not Farsi. And again, as in the Caribbean or in Latin America here as well there was a supra-identity which made these internal names unimportant for the people themselves, because they knew that there is a certain pan-Turkic identity working for the unity of all Central Asian tribes. The latter was dangerous for the Russians, because it did not correspond to the "divide and rule principle" and Russia fought this threat in many ways—from the forceful change of linguistic hierarchy to census of the population, based on binary principle.

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The Caspian Sea and the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Pipeline

Cesario Melantonio Neto

Introduction

The role of the United States in the Caspian region has passed through several phases since 1991. Initially, Washington was not keen on asserting its influence in the region. This policy mainly stemmed from a lack of knowledge and initiative as concerning the Caspian region, as well as a lack of realisation of American interests there. The success of the Armenian lobby in convincing the American Congress to impose an embargo on Azerbaijan in the wake of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict illustrates lack of proactive American policy in the region. However, by 1994-1995, American policy was in a stage of transition. Azerbaijani oil resources and the war in Chechnya—a groundbreaking event that demonstrated Russia's military capabilities to U.S. officials—were the two factors, which prompted Washington to initiate assertive policies from the second half of 1996 onward. The United States has announced that it considers the Caucasus and the Caspian a region vital to U.S. interests.

This text will focus mainly on two questions. Firstly, are U.S. policies in the region serving to divide instead of acting as an integrating or unifying force? Secondly, do U.S. policies in the region prioritize economic-energy security or political-military security? When one tries to respond to the first question, the second question automatically comes to the fore because the changing economic and political security understanding of Washington after September11 made it evident that the United States today, unlike in the 1970s, is not concerned about its hegemonic decline anymore; on the contrary, it is affecting the global order. Most importantly, it no longer feels threatened by its dependence on important oil. Then, under these circumstances, one can argue that it is to the advantage of the United States to focus primarily on economic security which, for liberals, means creating factor-mobility among national economies or a joint gains view of economic relations.

In order to respond to the above-mentioned questions this article aims mainly to focus on changing U.S. energy policies in the region after the September 11 disaster in terms of its relations with the Russian Federation and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The positive attitude of the United States toward the construction of the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline will be taken as a case study to assess whether Washington's policies are serving to divide or acting to unify the countries in the region. In addition, Turkey's increasing geo-political importance in terms of the construction of the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline is also relevant.

American Oil Diplomacy in Terms of Increasing U.S. Interest in the Caspian Basin

The United States, who had become accustomed to expanding energy consumption with minimal concerns about the constancy of supply or sharp price escalation by 1972 never articulated or implemented a long-term and comprehensive energy strategy. Major energy initiatives were taken largely to address specific crises and they did not last. In other words, the Americans have done no way to deal with their ever-growing thirst for energy. The critics of the U.S government claim that Washington has made energy goals, secondary to other foreign policy objectives, particularly during the 1990s, but is correcting the situation now.

American sanctions policy, for example, has slowed the development of plentiful resources in Iran (and Libya), while Iraqi production has been held back by the United Nations and the Iraq war. The sanction policy, thus, meant less diversification of sources. The answer to the question "why then does the Bush administration still continue the sanction policy on Iran?" Is that the Bush administration views diversification of sources as a means of assuring the United States of political-military security rather than energy security, while it is generally thought that it places energy security before other foreign policy goals.

In the report prepared by the National Energy Policy Development Group (NEPDG), which was established after the energy turmoil of 2000-2001, an explicit emphasis was put on securing more oil from foreign sources in order to

support the U.S. and global economic growth. The reason for this is twofold. Firstly, the United States is unlikely ever again to be self-sufficient in oil with two percent of the world's proven oil reserves, although it is a leading energy producer. The second reason was the heavy interdependence between the American economy and those of Europe, Japan and other Asian nations, which means the U.S. national energy security depends on sufficient supplies not only for the American market but also for those of the U.S.' major trading partners. In other words, high levels of imports by the U.S.' friends and allies, as well as by the United States, means that energy security cannot be defined as self-sufficiency.

In order to guarantee the continued flow of energy, Washington not only aims to remove political, economic, legal and logistical obstacles in areas that are petroleum sources like Azerbaijan, but also is determined to take steps to ensure that wars, revolutions or civil disorder do not impede foreign deliveries to the United States. Thus, Washington appeared to have abandoned its traditional policy of taking energy initiatives as specific crises came out; on the contrary, the American unipolar system necessitated the existence of an American presence no only with its liberal economic policies but also with its military presence in regions such as the Persian Gulf area, the Caspian Sea Basin, and Latin America. In sum, Bush undeniably prioritizes the enhancement of the U.S. power projection. He, at the same time, endorsed increased dependence on oil from unstable areas.

In this context, although Persian Gulf oil producers will remain central to world oil security, and the region will continue to be the primary focus of U.S. energy policy, the Caspian Basin has been supposed to be a panacea as a new way of managing dependence with its potential, offering the possibility of production increases from 1.6 million b/d (barrels per day) in 2001 to 5.0 million b/d in 2010.

Moreover, the transportation of the Caspian Basin oil resources to the United States, Israel and Western European markets aimed to reduce dependence on OPEC oil producers in the Middle East, to create a secure supply of oil to Israel, and to put an end to the dependence on Russian and Iranian oil transportation networks from the Caspian region. The fact that the region is sandwiched between two of the world's energy superpowers—OPEC Iran and non-OPEC Russia—and the fact that the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline passes through regions of enormous political instability and social unrest—have been the two reasons for broader U.S. military presence in the region which increased the sense of vulnerability in both Iran and Russia *vis-à-vis* the United States and confirmed their partnership in the nuclear field.

Are the American Policies Serving to Divide Instead of Acting as an Integrating or Unifying Force in the Region?

For many years, but especially since the mid-1990s, there developed what one may call two approaches or two

schools of thought regarding the proper way to address U.S. policies in the region: the first preached conciliation and alignment, the other, containment and isolation. while conciliation meant bringing Turkey, Israel, and Europe under the same umbrella of interest and general aims despite the differing goals and priorities especially regarding commercial rivalry and favoring the partnership of Azerbaijan and Georgia with Turkey and the United States in what might be called the "Baku–Ceyhan bloc," Washington's policies of containment and isolation were meant to hegemony over the region particularly over Georgia.

The above-mentioned policies of Washington have been strongly criticized on the ground that they led to a growing polarization of regional politics. Indeed, conventional wisdom has it that alliances bring about the formation of counter-alliances. The growing U.S. engagement in the Caspian region and the high profile and geo-political importance attributed to the Baku–Ceyhan project fuelled, in a way, the rapprochement between Russia, Iran and Armenia while it solidified a strategic alliance among Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey and the United States. However, the direction of the U.S relations with Russia is very different from that with Iran. While Russia's Caspian policy under Putin moved away from trying to contain U.S expansion in the region in favor of "constructive engagement" with the American government and oil companies, Iran was included in president Bush's "axis of evil."

Russia and Iran

The immediate reaction of Russia to the American penetration of Central Asia, which was, from the Russian perspective, an effort to displace Russia and marginalize its influence, was to restructure the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) to tighten cooperation, to improve economic and political links with China and to improve relations with Middle Eastern states, especially Iran and Iraq.

Russia has many economic and strategic levers in the region including security measures and the ability to obstruct pipelines; however, Moscow's Caspian policy under Putin moved away from trying to contain U.S expansion in the region in favor of a "constructive engagement" with American government and oil companies. Even in April 2001, in his speech to the Federal Assembly, Putin gave more prominence to Russia's integration into the global economy than to hard line security issues. Putin's permission for the deployment of U.S. troops and military bases in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan, bypassing the reactions of the Russian Defense ministry in the name of supporting the U.S was against terrorism in Afghanistan, illustrates the changing policies of Moscow in the region. In addition, the Russian Federation's latest expression of intent by LUKOIL to secure a 7.5 percent stake in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan Consortium is a sign that Russia does not want to be cut off from the Caspian oil riches.

A joint declaration on strategic relations signed at the May summit of U.S. president George W. Bush and Russian leader Vladimir

Putin emphasized the potential for energy cooperation. The two sides expressed a desire for the "intensification" of joint development of resources, especially oil and gas—making a specific reference to the Caspian Basin. The document also recognized a "common interest" in promoting stability, sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states in Central Asia and the Caucasus. Thus, for the first time, policy coordination as well as energy cooperation has become an integral part of the mutual security agenda.

There was a multitude of reasons for the change in Russia's policy. But the foremost reason is the fact that Russia today is isolated and seems on the verge of being left out of the "great game" that is taking place in its southern borderlands. The Russian Federation still could not secure a position of trusted partnership with the West and Russia's inefficient energy network also prevents it from becoming a significant supplier to the U.S market.

Washington, worried by the unpredictability of Russia's foreign policy at the outset, has played an active role in the Caspian region and has given its full support to the American oil companies whose activities in the region were in line with some of the trans-Caucasian and Central Asian states such as Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Among the United States' priorities in the region, safe access to the underwater hydrocarbon reserves and the creation of a neutral zone bordering Russia, Iran; Afghanistan and China come to the fore because the landlocked nature of the Caspian magnifies not only its infrastructure problems but also its security problems.

It is of vital importance for Washington to prevent the region from becoming a breeding ground for terrorism and a

hotbed of religious and political extremism and a battle-
ground for outright war. For example, in the wake of armed
incursions by elements of the Islamic Movement of Uzbe-
kistan (IMU) into Kyrgyzstan in the Summer of 1999, the
United States formulated an extensive New Central Asian
Border Security Initiative (CASI) in April 2000, with $3
million in additional security assistance to each of the five
Central Asian states. The NATO Partnership for Peace Pro-
gram (PfP) also served as a key channel for U.S (and West-
ern) military engagement in Central Asia. Through "NATO
Partnership for Peace Program," the newly independent, yet
still vulnerable, Central Asian nations were able to gain
significant experience and contacts with the U.S. military
establishment. by 1999, the U.S. Congress expanded a com-
mitment to military engagement with a special stress on mil-
itary cooperation, both to westernize and to professionalize
the regional militaries but also to entrench the U.S. presence
in this increasingly important region.

The economic and political reforms in the countries of
the Caucasus and Central Asia and the solutions to internal
and cross-border conflicts are concerns of Washington.
Therefore, the United States, for example, came to the con-
clusion that Section 907 of the "Freedom Support Act" hin-
dered the U.S. energy diplomacy in the Caspian region; it
changed its policy to one of providing aliev's regime with
financial aid, which would help consolidate Azerbaijan's
prosperous secular government and thus project U.S. invest-
ments in this country. The arrival of 18 American military

advisers to train Georgian soldiers in antiterrorist operations is noteworthy with respect to understanding U.S. anxieties concerning the safety of future energy supply routes in the area.

The American military presence in the region has affected not only the safety of future energy supply routes but also the power projection from Central Asia into Afghanistan and from Caucasus into the Northern Middle East (most notably into Iran). The Islamic Republic of Iran stands as the sole country in the region reinforcing Washington's sense of vulnerability concerning the spread of radical Islam and nuclear armaments. Therefore, despite the growing pressure from U.S. oil companies to lift the embargo upon Tehran, which wants to be the main export corridor for Central Asian oil and gas, the U.S. administration is reluctant to soften its stance towards any Iranian role in the region.

The U.S. policy, which has overly focused on pipelines, and specifically on efforts to ensure the construction of the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline for oil exports from Azerbaijan and Central Asia, aimed mainly at excluding Iran and at making Turkey a major actor in the region. The fact that Iran's losses in the region happened to be Turkey's gains confirms the belief that Washington's policies do not have a unifying and integrating effect in the region.

Iran, whose sense of vulnerability has been reinforced by the American presence not only in Afghanistan and Iraq but also in the Caspian Sea Basin, did not want to be

marginalized strategically, and it has proposed the development of a pipeline from Baku to the Persian Gulf coast via Iranian territory to serve as an export route for Azerbaijan's oil. (The construction of a 100-km oil pipeline to Tabriz in Northern Iran would connect Azerbaijan to the Iranian pipeline network.) However, U.S. sanctions have acted as a barrier towards the construction of the above-mentioned pipeline and other alternative pipelines proposed by Iran on the ground that a pipeline through Iran would give it dangerous leverage over the economies of the Caucasus and Central Asia. The real reason behind the U.S policy towards Tehran is perhaps that the White House is reluctant to see Iran turn into a regional power which could pose a potential military threat to Israel and compete with Turkey in the Middle Eastern oil market.

The general belief in Washington, that "only through a *Pax Americana* the anarchic world can be saved" is best illustrated by the current situation in Central Asia. The United States, whose main objective was the strategic encirclement of Iran and Russia focused on precluding the emergence of any future competitor in Central Asia.

The military-security-focused relations which are still dominated by regional security dynamics as well as by domestic dynamics in weak states create holes in the fabric of international society because most political and military threats travel more easily over short distances than over long ones. The rationale behind the classical security complex theory explains the above-mentioned relations because

it claims that for most of the actors at the unit level, the relevant factor in determining relations is region. in other words, a set of states whose major security perceptions and concerns are so interlinked that their national security problems cannot be reasonably analyzed or resolved independent of one another. Classical security complexes formed by local groupings of states not only play a central role in relations among their members, they also crucially condition how and whether stronger outside powers penetrate the region. This situation is best illustrated by the controversies between Azerbaijan and Iran.

The policies of Azerbaijan, whose priority is to do business with Western companies have completely clashed with that of Iran, which is currently characterized by a marked hostility to the Western investment in the region. In addition, the Baku administration invited Israel to invest in oil extraction schemes mainly in order to counter attempts at developing a Russian-Armenian-Iranian axis and to find means to free their Armenian-occupied land. Tehran's perception that a prosperous, independent Azerbaijan would be an unwelcome role model to the enormous Azeri minority in Iran, the conflict over the legal status of the Caspian, and the fact that Iran joined Russia in support of Armenia in its conflict with Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh are also among the reasons for the breakdown in relations. The above-mentioned controversies led to Iran's failure to secure a share of Azerbaijan's competitive oil and helped in Turkey's campaign to build a 1,081-kilometer connective

line from Baku to the Turkish Mediterranean terminal at Ceyhan.

Turkey: the Evident Beneficiary in the Caspian Pipeline Diplomacy

The reasons for Turkey's emergence as a country supportive of Washington's pipeline-focused policies should be assessed on several levels: geo-strategic, economic and cultural. Turkey not only enjoys tremendous geographic significance, straddling Europe, Asia and the Middle East, but it also the region's commercial locomotive, with Istanbul serving as the financial and commercial hub of the entire Caspian Basin.

Turkey shared with the new states a historic and cultural heritage and an ethnic bond. Azerbaijan was exceptionally important within this pattern. Since the 1980s, Turkey has swapped goods and services for natural gas from Azerbaijan. Additionally becoming aware of Turkey's importance as a transit point for Azeri oil to the West and of the fast-growing Turkish economy, which depends on energy imports for 85 percent of its needs, Azerbaijan tried to promote further relations with Turkey rather that with Iran.

Moreover, Turkey which is expected to consume 40 million tons of oil and 5 million cubic meters of natural gas by 2010, views the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline as an outlet to the West protecting the fragile environment of the Black Sea and Aegean Sea because the shipping bottleneck of the

"Turkish Straits" will be avoided. Turkey's concerns over the environmental and safety consequences of a major tanker accident in the Bosphorus make Baku–Ceyhan the most viable route for a main export pipeline for Caspian oil. Ankara objects to the view that the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline is more costly with respect to Baku–Supsa, which traverses the Bosphorus, when it comes to the security issue.

The question is not whether the route is commercially viable. The idea is to make it an East-West transport corridor, which in the future might expand to include rail lines, communication networks and highways, so as to unobtrusively connect the economies of the Southern former Soviet Republics with the markets of the world. This is because the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline is not simply an economic project but also an issue of political convenience for the trans–Caucasian and Central Asian states, which view their reliance on foreign aid and investment as crucial for their economic survival.

Because the Baku–Ceyhan Project is essentially, from Washington's perspective, a matter of paramount geo-strategic and political significance rather than an economic one, Turkey despite the fact that Iran offers the shortest and cheapest route to global markets for oil from the Caspian Republics, succeeded in drawing the United States to its way of strategic thinking. Ankara benefited enormously from Washington's determination to push ahead with this project although it struggled with many obstacles to the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline.

Obstacles to the Baku–Ceyhan–Tbilisi Pipeline

Originally, all the oil companies operating in the Caspian region opposed Baku-Ceyhan. There have been two kinds of opposition which Turkey has had to cope in the construction of the "BTC" pipeline: the big oil companies' concerns about the feasibility of the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline and the emerging alternative pipe routes proposed by competing neighbours such as Iran and countries such as Kazakhstan.

The fact that at 1,800 km in length, Baku–Ceyhan had a cost of $3 billion was the foremost problem for the construction of the "BTC" pipeline. Because of the high cost, legislation was introduced in Congress to prohibit U.S. financing unless the pipeline followed the shorter, more direct route through Armenia. After September 11, Colin Powell openly announced that the integration of Armenia to the world is one of the priorities of the United States and John Knollenberg stated that the United States should not support any pipeline project excluding Armenia despite the continuing Armenian-Nagorno Karabakh dispute.

As well as the financial issues, "BTC" faces environmental concerns. The pipeline has drawn lots of fire from environmentalists and local groups because it passes through the Borjomi region of Georgia, home to mineral water and tourism industries that are among the few promising sectors of the nation's economy. But an International Finance Corporation (IFC) employee said the preventative measures being taken by the project proponents, oil companies BP, Italy's ENI,

STATOIL of Norway, California-based UNOCAL and France's TOTAL are quite extraordinary and area's water would not be at risk. In addition, the governments of Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Georgia signed a declaration stating that the construction and operation of the pipeline will comply with international environmental and human rights standards. Nevertheless, activists are concerned that many of the decisions governing the pipeline have been made without proper consultation with the local population in the South-East of Turkey.

Another important obstacle is the critical question of whether there are sufficient oil volumes in the area to justify the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline; some experts have argued that there are not. The design of the pipeline calls for an initial capacity of 1 billion barrels per day (bpd), since only a large volume of exports could justify the project's price tag. But finding the oil to fill such a tubby tube has provided troublesome. To keep the pipeline viable, some oil would have to come from Kazakh fields like Kashagan, Kazakhstan's very large offshore oil find in the Caspian Sea. But despite a strategic oil and gas treaty between Kazakhstan and the United States, which meant a great breakthrough in answering the question of available oil for exports through the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline, the volume of oil is still a problem because Kashagan's production will not come on line for six to ten years.

Many analysts said that the BTC pipeline, as well as other ways of developing the region's oil wealth, were ham-

pered by instability in the region. This included not only Georgia's internal strife in the Ossetia region, which threatened to destabilize the Caucasus, but also fighting in Afghanistan, which threatened Central Asia's stability.

The Latest Developments

Whatever the reservations may be, the news is positive for the pipeline project, the $3 billion, 1,800-kilometer Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline, which was started in a ceremony hosted by the Azerbaijan president on September 18, 2002, and completed in 2005.

Most important of all, the fact that 27 Western oil companies have considered membership of the Main Export Pipeline Company (MEPCO), which is expected to develop Baku–Ceyhan, has made it evident that Baku–Ceyhan is a success. In addition, the announcement of the U.S.-based Chevron oil company that it was seeking to take part in the project indicated that the Baku–Ceyhan pipeline appeared to have moved one step closer to viability. Italy's ENI oil company became the last of a nine-member consortium to approve construction of the project. The move cleared the way for creation of the two companies to finance and build the 1,800-kilometer link. The biggest interest belongs to Britain's BP oil company with 34.7 percent, followed by the 25-percent share of the Azerbaijani state-owned oil firm SOCAR.

The crux of the matter is that the deal of the century, a $7 billion contract signed by Azerbaijan in 1994 with a

Western consortium that marked the kick-off of the "great game" pitting U.S., Russian, European, and many more national interests against one another, seems to have been concluded after 10 years. Many analysts agree that Washington has achieved its main objective; reducing the Caspian region's reliance on Russia in terms of export capabilities and sustaining the U.S policy of containment toward Iran. However, it would be misleading to claim that the Caspian is no longer important to the United States. The truth is that "the noise and perception have come back to normal."

The fact that Russia has announced that it will build a connection to the Baku–Ceyhan oil route and that the Russian government has found a way to take part in a U.S.-backed oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea have made it evident that the changing security and political parameters will encourage cooperative relations in the twenty-first century, rather than the confrontational attitude of the 1970s. Oppositions from Russia and Iran has not ended, but it has eased in tone, partly because both countries see an interest in broader ties with Azerbaijan and partly because they are aware that U.S withdrawal from the region at this stage would be far too late and too costly. In addition, for the Russian Federation, economical engagement is seen as a prerequisite for expanding its strategic presence in the region.

It is a matter of curiosity to what extent Iran, the sole country in the region to be under the U.S. embargo, will continue to incur Washington's wrath at a time when the economic considerations as well as U.S.'s fear strategy of

global leadership urge countries even such as Libya to take significant steps to dismantle all weapons os mass destruction programs and to integrate the world economy. Since the September 11 attacks, which proved a major boost to bilateral ties, as Russia was quick to offer its support, the White House has seen Russia as key partner in the global fight against terrorism. Many analysts viewed the U.S focus on energy partnership with Russia as a shift in U.S. foreign policy, which no longer considers the Caspian Basin a top priority, partly because of September 11 and partly because of internal issues within the Caspian. However, whatever, Washington's energy interests in the Caspian area, analysts agree that the United States is going to remain a long-term presence in the Caspian-Caucasus region, if only for security reasons. Since the launch of the U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan, the Pentagon has set up military bases in Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, placing at least 2,000 soldiers in the two Central Asian countries. In Autumn 2002, the United States sent ten helicopters and two hundred "special forces" to Georgia.

Most governments in Central Asia have been much more forthcoming in supporting American military operations in Afghanistan while, given their domestic constituencies; gulf leaders (particularly Saudis) have been reluctant to provide strong, unconditional public support to the war on terror. Therefore as the Middle East has been increasingly perceived by the West as an unreliable source of oil and gas to the global market, in the aftermath of September

11, Central Asia as well as the Caspian Sea states have proven themselves a strategic and reliable partner for the United States. In other words, Washington's economic-energy considerations, as well as political and strategic ones, are gaining ground in the region.

Conclusion

The fact that the "Bush energy plan" envisions increased rather than diminished reliance on imported petroleum signalled a dramatic change upon the previous energy policies of Washington. In other words, it marked a transition from a professed concern with conservation and energy efficiency to an explicit emphasis on securing more oil from foreign sources. Washington, thus, made energy security a priority of its trade and foreign policy. In parallel with this policy, and as an immediate consequence of September 11, the United States expanded its military presence in Central Asia, Caucasus, and the Caspian Sea Basin, areas traditionally viewed by Russia and Iran as its special sphere of influence.

The United States's military presence and its liberal policies in the Caspian Sea Basin and Central Asia has a dual function for U.S. policy. The first is related to Washington's fear of being over-dependent on any one source of energy, especially a foreign source which would leave the United States vulnerable to price shocks and supply interruptions, because the Caspian Basin serves to diversify the United States's sources of imported energy since it is one of the non-OPEC

areas like the West coast of Africa and Latin America. The other function is that the American bases in the region serve Washington's policy of power projection from Central Asia into Afghanistan and from the Caucasus into the Northern Middle East so as to enhance its capability for intervention. In sum, while the first objective arises from energy preoccupations, the other arises from security concerns.

The Soviet Union's disintegration, but even more important, the rapid economic and military meltdown of Russia, led to the emergence of the United States as the pre-eminent global power. Washington's determination to shape the world according to its values and interests explains why the United States prioritized a commitment to military engagement with Central Asia as well as to the democratization and marketization of the region. American policies were driven by overarching geopolitical considerations in order to contain the influence of China, Iran and Russia.

In addition, by focusing on pipelines that will transport the Caspian Basin's oil resources to the United States, Israel and Western European markets, Washington also aims to exclude Iran and Russia. For example although the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline was not commercially viable, and it is a strategic transportation route Washington pushed ahead with the project and did not accept the construction of the cheaper alternative pipelines proposed by Iran. Here the fear was that Iran would turn into a regional power, which could pose a potential military thread to Israel and compete with Turkey. The U.S.' interpretation of Iran's role in global

terrorism not only creates problems in U.S.-Russian relations but also acts as a barrier to the long, slow process of Iran's emergence from isolation: one step forward and two steps back. American fears of Tehran's ambitions played an important role in encouraging a counter-alliance between Iran, Russia, India and China as a reaction to Baku–Ceyhan bloc.

In short, the fact that the Baku–Ceyhan Project is essentially, from Washington's perspective, a matter of paramount geo-strategic and political significance rather than an economic one, illustrates and even epitomizes that Washington's policies in the region prioritize political-military security in order to ensure the stability of the region. However, the current regional engagement of the United States, which can be defined as drifting into an unplanned but protracted military presence, might be more threatening for Washington because if the U.S. presence and operations in the region do not bring stability and security while fuelling extremism and terrorist attacks, it might be difficult for Moscow to manage and silence domestic discontent created by America's presence in Central Asia.

Currently, the U.S. faces a choice of two vastly different policy directions regarding Central Asia and the Caucasus. One would involve a unilateral strategy, based on self-defense and pre-emptive attack against terrorist groups and regimes, while the second would support continued multilateral collaboration against trans-national threats. American policies focused on political and military security, as reflected in a unilateral strategy, do not put a high short-term priority on the democratization of the region's countries.

However, the weakness and volatilities of the regimes, in other words the domestic fragility of the region's countries, poses the greatest potential threat to U.S. objectives and invites a rapid multiplication of challenges to U.S engagements in the region. The region's countries share a landlocked dependency both in terms of relying on an external guarantee of security as well as in terms of economics and energy export routes. Therefore, The United States views its presence as inevitable for the development and stabilization of the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus, although it is a long-term endeavour. At the same time, however, it is apparent that America's enhanced military position did not prevent Washington from being vulnerable to transnational threats. Merely to fight terrorism in the region is insufficient; the United States must also encourage the region's countries (including Iran) to diversify their economies and integrate into the world economy.

One of the key lessons of September 11 is that despite its preponderant power, the United States remains vulnerable to terrorist attacks and requires the collaboration of other states to combat them. In Central Asia and the Caucasus, Washington needs to redefine its national interests and address the interrelated nature of political, economic and security problems in the region. Washington's long-term interests in the region necessitate provision for the economic security of the region as a means to integration, development and globalization, which means it must promote joint policies to profit from energy development rather than geopolitical competition in the region.

Dwelling in the Borders: Nations and Subaltern Cultures

Walter D. Mignolo

■ Is "Capitalist diversity" thinkable and desirable? Are there "subaltern capitalist economies?" Or shall we think in terms of "economic (instead of capitalist) diversity", since capitalism is one way of economic organization but not the only way (although so it seems)? How does Central Asia fit in the global scene? How its economic and cultural diversity are entangled with global economy (natural resources); with international politics (in between China, Russia, the European Union and the U.S.)? And how its cultural configuration, with a significant population from Islamic enters in between Jihad and US war against terrorism? What follows are the personal meditations of a concerned scholar and intellectual rather than the opinion of an expert on these issues.

I – Nations, Subaltern Cultures and Globalization

The very idea of subalternity (the subalterns, subaltern cultures) is an invention of the national imaginary (Antonio Gramsci). Gramsci was himself a subject in the borders of the modern/colonial world. Gramsci was born in Ales, Italy,

on the island of Sardinia, a relatively remote region of Italy
that was mostly ignored by the Italian government in favor
of the industrialized North. In the modern/colonial world
one side of the border is hegemonic and capitalist and the
other is "subaltern" in various and different ways. That was
later translated into the nation-colonial imaginary of post-
partition India. Gramsci is better known as a communist and
anti-fascist. Less attention he has received from dwelling on
the borders of the nation and, as Sardinian, "feeling" the
marginal and lesser conditions of certain people who were
not only the proletarians. Thus, we can say that "subaltern
cultures" are cultures at the margins or not quite integrated
to the "nation," that is, "the people." You have noticed, for
example, that Presidents and First Minister never refer to the
nation as say the "American, Argentinean or French subal-
tern." They always refer to the "American, Argentinean or
French people." But again, Gramsci described the mod-
ern-European subalterns as an extension of the class com-
posed by proletarians, the working class engendered by the
Industrial Revolution. "Subalterns" shall not be understood
in ontological terms but rather in terms of power relations of
the modern State. Subaltern cultures are defined in relation
to the "hegemonic culture," the culture of the homogeneous
nation-state. When Ranajit Guha translated the concept to
post-partition India, he (and his group) ended up identifying
a different social sector: the colonial subalterns. That is, the
subalterns that, on the one hand, where marginal to central
power (British empire or independent Indian national state)

and, on the other, the subalterns that endured the colonial wound, that when through the history of the colonial difference; that is, of the racialization of human beings in the modern colonial world, from purity of blood in the sixteenth century to the color of your skin in the nineteenth; to the accent or your language and how far is from Greek and Latin and the nature of your religious belief in the twentieth century.

The very idea of subaltern cultures, either within a nation or at a global scale, had a better fortune in the ex-Third World than in Europe or the U.S. You may guess why. It became common, for example, to use the concept of "subaltern modernities" to describe peripheral countries and culture catching up with European modernity which of course was "hegemonic." The very idea of subaltern modernities is either colonial or imperial following the lead of Euro-American modernity (today called also "globalization"). Subaltern modernities, therefore, are always already racialized in the hegemony of modern imperial (and Western) discourses. They have been racialized since the sixteenth century through the construction of the colonial difference. That is to say, Indians and Blacks were not just culturally different from Christian Spaniards. They were inferior. And this ranking was not invented by the Indians and the Blacks, but by Christian men of letters. You see how the colonial difference is constantly being hidden by the talk on cultural differences and cultural diversity? Subaltern modernities could be also conceived through the Imperial, and not just colonial, differences. Think of Russia and the Soviet

Empire, for example, or of Japan or of China today. Modernity is assumed to be, as British sociologist Anthony Guiddens will have it (1991), an invention of Europe toward the end of the seventeenth century that, since then, spread and continue to spread (and 15 years after Guiddens pronounced that dictum, we know how is spreading). Imperial nations like Russia/Soviet Union, China or Japan beyond the Atlantic empires of the past five centuries (again, Spain and Portugal; France, Holland and England; the U.S.) were cast as either yellow or Slavic Orthodox/Communist empires. That is, empires beyond the Western imperial frontiers which are assumed to be, again, Christian religion, white stock and capitalism in the economic sphere.

   "Cultural diversity" at a global scale becomes entrenched with "economic uniformity" which it begins to be re-articulated as "economic diversity." Cultural diversity is a mild form of maintaining racism under the carpet. And the illusion of economic uniformity made racism invisible in the sphere of international trade and international merging. Take for example the recent debates over the terminal ports in the US and whether it should be owned by a company based in Dubai, in United Arab Emirates. It was obvious, when President Bush announced the possible deal, that he was shooting his own foot. One was wondering whether he was totally unaware of all his previous actions and discourses; whether he did not care and thought that "the American people" will not care or pay attention to it; or whether his rootless determination toward the military and economic control of the world allows him to ignore every-

thing that matters but that it gets on its way. The Dubai deal acquired an enormous visibility because economic deals all of the sudden got entrenched with the "clash of civilization" that Samuel Huntington either forecasted or contributed to unfold at the cultural level, only. However, Dubai was not the only case in the recent past where cultural diversity gets in the way of economic uniformity. Last year CNOOC, a Chinese oil company, was stopped from its desire to acquiring U.S. based UNOCAL (a Chevron Company).[1] And there is also the story of an Indian metallurgic company attempting to buy a European based-one. Coming back to the deal with US terminal ports, the debate came to an end when it was announced that the deal will be transferred to the British owned Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation, generally known as P&O. It is useful to remember that P&O is a shipping and logistic company that dates back from the early nineteenth century, when the British Empire was at its very inception.

The *New York Times* (Sunday, March 12) published an article by Daniel Gross on the Dubai-P&O deal, and conceptualized it using a restaurant metaphor: "Globalization offered two ways: A la Carte and Prix Fixe." The highlight sentence was the following: "The Dubai debate shows the new desire to pick and choose trading partners." What is the logic of the pick and choose? My contention is that the underlying logic is the logic of coloniality, which is based on racial discrimination. Up to this point, that is, the past 10 years, racism was looked at within the nation (or nations) and casts as a problem of the civil and political society. That

is, something of which both the State and the Corporations were out of it. Although the articulation of economy and racism where brought together particular by Marxists interpreters of society, such articulation was always pointed out in the sphere of civil and political society but never at the level of the cooperation and conflicts between the State and the Corporations. Now it became visible, in full bloom, a point of non-return.

"Cultural diversity in Central Asia" is indeed an intriguing proposition for some one, like me, existentially coming from the Western Hemisphere and whose professional training in the history of the modern/colonial world, and the emergence of the Atlantic economy, in the sixteenth century. Notice: not the European Renaissance, but the Atlantic economy and the imperial colonial/culture that emerged from it and flourished ever after—that is to say, the darker side of the Renaissance.

That displacement, from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, went hand in hand with the writing of history and above all the world. It was the moment in which Christian history of the world since its creation, which was one among many, started its route toward becoming the model of Universal History. World histories were subsumed under a hegemonic uni-versal model. The imprints of Christian narrative did not go away with the Enlightenment. They were only secularized and Hegel re-told uni-versal history not from Paradise but from some place in the East and its triumphal march toward the West. Today, that tradition (from Christianity to Hegel) was subsumed and incorporated into

a uni-versal history that changed its direction, from West the East. If for Christians the uni-versal narrative of the past justified the conversion to Christianity, of the entire world; and Hegel wrote at the time when the civilizing mission was the self-assigned responsibilities of Western European countries already under a well established capitalist economy. In the past half a century, history changed its direction and its mission: it was development of Southern and Western countries what animated its soul, the soul of History. More recently the mission has been redefined: the spread of democracy to the South (America and Africa) and to the East (Middle and Far) is what moves history now. Central Asia, which was marginal to the Western map tracing the march of history, came into focus after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Central Asia, South America and Sub-Saharan Africa are three regions in the global distribution of wealth whose destiny may be that of providing services for the concentration of global economy in South and East Asia, the Middle East, European Union and the U.S.

II – The Rise of Western Imperial Hegemony and Dominance: Central Asia in/and the Modern/Colonial World

I would like therefore to engage in a speculation that will bring cultural diversity, racism and capitalism together at a global, not just national level. Thus, we would have to consider, on the one hand, nations and subaltern cultures within the nation (as the title indicates) but, also, subaltern

nations in the concert of the global inter-state and inter-economic relations. I would ask, with the intention of engaging a conversation with colleagues from this part of the world, where is Central Asia in the global distribution of cultures and in the global distribution of wealth? So, let's take one thing at the time since there are many issues packed together here.

First let's spell out the rhetoric of cultural diversity hiding under it the latent racism entrenched in the logic of coloniality or the colonial matrix of power that govern the modern/colonial world. I have addressed related issues in previous conferences of the Academy de la Latinité (chiefly the meetings in Alexandria and Istanbul).

I am not sure when the concept of Central Asia originated, but I am sure that it was not before the 13th century. The only civilization of the globe, at that time, to conceive the world divided in Asia, Africa and Europe was Christianity. Chinese did not conceive themselves as Asian at that point. People living in the African portion of the world did not conceive themselves as Africans either. If then the division of the globe in Europe, Asia and Africa is a Christian creation, it carried also the seed of racism, at the global scale, in the configuration and foundation of the modern/colonial world. Why I am making this assumption? Because the Christian distribution of the known world, at the time, was based on the attribution of each part of the globe to Noah's son: Shem, Ham and Japheth. If then Asia could not have been conceived before the 312 century AD, when Constantine converted to Christianity and Christians be-

came entrenched with the Empire, then Central Asia is a division of a later vintage. It has to be part of the re-distribution of the globe in the hand of Western empires and the building of international law, drawn by Spanish legal-theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, in the sixteenth century, and by Dutch jurist and humanist Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). Not before then for sure, but probably not before either 1848 when the British empire forced China deal with Western economy and military power and perhaps not before 1865 and the Meiji restoration in Japan. Thus, all the names that identify the region are part of the growing imperial dominance and influence of Western imperialism from (Spain, England, France, US).

> **Central Asia** (Russian: Средняя Азия/"Srednyaya Azia" for "Middle Asia" or Центральная/"Tsentral'naya Azia" for "Central Asia"; in Persian آسیای مرکزی; Standard Mandarin Chinese:中亚/pinyin: "Zhōngyà"; Arabic آسیا الوسطی/"Asya al Wusta") is a vast landlocked region of Asia. Though various definitions of its exact composition exist, no one definition is universally accepted. Despite this uncertainty in defining borders, it does have some important overall characteristics. For one, Central Asia has historically been closely tied to its nomadic peoples and the Silk Road. As a result, it has acted as a crossroads for the movement of people, goods, and ideas between Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and East Asia. It is also sometimes known as *Middle Asia* or *Inner Asia*, and is within the scope of the wider Eurasian continent. It is also sometimes known as Turkestan (*Wikipedia*).

But where is Asia coming from? It is assumed that in early Classical times, the term "Asia" referred only to the

small region known today as Anatolia (a part of Turkey). Eventually however, the name came to denote the much larger land area with which we associate it today.

> The etymology of Asia can only be guessed at. The strongest possibility is that it derives from a borrowed Semitic root "Asu," which means varyingly 'rising' or 'light,' of course a directional referring to the sunrise, Asia thus meaning 'Eastern Land.'

And what about Africa?

The ancient Romans used the name *Africa terra*—"land of the Afri" (plural, or "Afer" singular)—for the northern part of the continent, corresponding to modern-day Tunisia. The origin of *Afer* may be the Phoenician *afar*, dust; the Afridi tribe, who dwelt in Northern Africa around the area of Carthage; Greek *aphrike*, without cold; or Latin *aprica*, sunny.

And what about Europe?

The name *Europe* derives from *Europe*, probably a compound meaning "broad-faced" (referring to the Earth), *eurus* (PIE **wer-*, "broad") meaning "broad" and *ôps* (PIE **okw-*, "eye") meaning "face." A less likely possibility is that it derives from the ancient Sumerian and Semitic root "Ereb," which carries the meaning of "darkness" or "descent," a reference to the region's western location in relation to Mesopotamia, the Levantine Coast, Anatolia, and the Bosporus. Thus the term would have meant the 'land of the setting of the Sun' or, more generically, 'Western land.'

In Greek mythology *Europa* was the beautiful daughter of a Phoenician king named Agenor, or Phoenix. As Zeus saw her, he transformed himself into a gentle white bull and approached her and her playing friends. She climbed onto the bull's back and it began so swim off to Crete, where she fell in love with the then-changed-

back Zeus and had three sons with him (Minos, Rhadamanthus and Sarpedon, the first two of which constitute, together with Aeacus, the three judges of the underworld). (http://www.answers.com/ topic/placename-etymology.)

If we look at the latest geo-historical locations in this definition (Europe, Middle East, South Asia and East Asia), we begin to understand the making of Central Asia. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the author of the *The Influence of Sea Power over History*, invented the *Middle East in 1902*. In 1902, Mahan published an influential article in *National Review*, an important British imperialist journal. There he came to an appreciation of the Middle East's strategic importance in the coming world conflict that would pit Britain (and, by implication, the United States) against the increasingly aggressive naval power of imperial Germany and the threat by land posed by imperial Russia. What is so astonishing is that someone so ignorant of what was happening in a geographical area to which he helped to give a name—the Middle East—could in his time so influence European and American understanding of that area. Mahan was among the few who understood the importance of the Middle East in a new global strategy, a strategy that would also include the U.S. with its newfound world role. The Persian Gulf—as it was known to Anglophiles—was the main area in a strategic line linking Europe with India—and this before the age of oil. Thus, if China and Japan were located in East Asia, and India in South Asia, Central Asia became configured as a region of Asia that was under the control of the Russian empire and of which Western capitalist empires were not

yet economically invested. The invention of the Middle East, because of its oil resources needed as the consequence of the Industrial Revolution, had priority in the global designs of a well-established British imperialism and French colonial dominions and an emerging U.S. empire (remember that Mahan wrote during the presidency of Theodor Roosevelt).

Why am I telling this story? For two reasons: the first is to underscore the fact that Central Asia, like South America, South Asia, Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, East Asia, etc. are not regions naturally emanating from nature, but all of them have been defined according to global designs of Western empires and by theological and egological epistemology. Let me put it another way: *cultural diversity*, in any region of the world and within one single nation, is subservient to *epistemological uniformity*; and epistemological uniformity is imperial, theological and ego-logical (e.g., the secular frame set up by René Descartes by putting thinking before existence and in that move des-embodying and un-placing epistemology. One of the effects of the faith of an epistemology that is not located in any-body and in any-body's place is the assumptions that geo-historical regions, like Asia, South or Central and the Middle East, America or Europe are indeed natural configurations of the planet. And the second is that whatever histories and cultures unfolded in the region today called Central Asia before Central Asia became a region mapped by Western Empires in their constant distributions of land since the sixteenth century (see

Carl Schmitt, *The Nomos of the Earth*, 1952), those histories and cultures had to re-define and re-do themselves in relation to the insertion of Western categories of thoughts from religion to science, from political economy to political theory, from philosophy to aesthetics, from diversity of subject formation to the model of the modern subject (self-sufficient, competitive, defender of meritocracy, imperial). Dwelling in the borders became little by little around the world, since the sixteenth century, the historical conditions of non-Western people both in the history of geography and in the history of epistemology and the philosophy of belief (e.g. religion). But this I mean that non-Western subjects and subjectivities are all of those whom, whatever place of the planet they grew up and were educated (in Central Asia or Central Europe; in the Middle West or Western Europe), Greek and Latin (languages, histories and cultures) and the six imperial languages of the modern/colonial world (Italian, Spanish, Portuguese, French, German and English) where not the house they inhabited in their, yours or our lives. Dwelling in the borders means to belong to a subaltern "culture"; that is, to a subaltern language and epistemology. I am using epistemology in the sense of principles and assumptions upon which knowledge and understanding is construed, either among Native Americans or Native Europeans and assuming, also, the power differential that placed Native Europeans in a privileged epistemic position. Epistemology was indeed and continues to be the empires companion. In the last analysis, the conflict between the U.S.

and Iran is above all a conflict for the control of knowledge which, at this point, is crucial to the continuing control of the economy and of authority (e.g., the State and the army) which means that nuclear knowledge in the hands and in the heads of Iranians, who speaks Farsi or Persian and are Muslims. Dwelling in the borders means exactly that: inhabiting a language and an epistemology that is not Greek-Latin based (even if in many cases is Greek-Arabic) and that did not unfold in the six imperial European languages of the modern/world.

If we take a glance at Azerbaijan, we see that its history shows the mark of substantial religious and cultural influence from Iran (Shiite Muslim) although linguistically and ethnically the country is predominantly Turkic. Furthermore, the republic was part of the Soviet Union for seventy years, but Russian culture had only incidental impact. In other words, Russian language and Orthodox Christianity were the imperial languages and religions that may have been in the head but not in the heart of Azerbaijanian. In the Americas we have similar phenomenon. Five hundred years of Christianity, Liberalism and Neo-Liberalism had as one of the consequences, the election of the first Indian President in Bolivia, and a government that is projecting the transformation of the State following the principles of Aymara and Quechua languages and epistemology. Of course, the history of the liberal state (imposed from outside with the consent of the "White" elite in connivances with European and/or US interests—similar to the case of Russia in Azerbaijan.

III – Dwelling in the Borders: Colonial Wounds and Subaltern Imperial Prides

The schematic road map I just traced is the blue print from where and in which the very idea of "cultural diversity" came into being at a world scale. Today, cultural diversity of a given region cannot be understood properly without reference to the larger picture in which regional/cultural diversity have been formed: that is, of the modern/colonial world. It can be objected that it is really an imperial interpretation to believe that cultural diversity in Central Asia and Azerbaijan. But I would argue that, first of all, the very concept of "Central Asia" is the invention of modern Westerns empires, taking for granted the Christian three partition of the world. From where Central Asia would come from if not from a cosmology that has conceived Asia as one of the three continental parts of the planet? Secondly, Central Asia whatever its previous local histories and "cultural diversity" had to be re-articulated once the local history of the Russian empire infringed upon them its global designs. And third, Central Asia cultural diversity had been again re-articulated with translation of the Russian Empire into the Soviet Union and, finally, with the end of the Soviet Union and the global dominance of Western (US yes, but Europe no) neo-liberal doctrines and designs. To simplify the story, let's say that:

- Central Asia cultural diversity was articulated with the modern/colonial world when the Russian Empire—particularly after Peter and Catherine The Greats, controlled the colonies

economically and militarily and its imperial culture enters in conflict with regional ones. [*The Russian Empire and the World, 1700-1917: The Geopolitics of Expansion and Containment* by John P. Ledonne.]

- Central Asia cultural diversity when the modern/colonial world re-entered Russia through Marxism and from there forced a cultural re-articulation of Central Asian colonies. [*The Transformation of Central Asia: States and Societies from Soviet Rule to Independence* by Pauline Jones Luong (editor).]

- Central Asia after the fall of the Soviet Union, the growing incursion of US neo-liberal international and economic politics in the region disguised under the rhetoric of "democracy". ["Central Eurasia In Global Politics: Conflict, Security, And Development," *International Studies in Sociology and Social Anthropology*, v. 92, by Mehdi Parvizi Amineh and Henk Houweling (editores).]

In these three coordinates, the imperial and colonial differences (Tlostanova 2003) are at stake. Cultural diversity today in Central Asia cannot be properly understood without taking into account imperial designs and colonial subjugation, which is "cultural" as well as economic and political. What is that story of the "imperial difference?" Let me make a long story short and linked with "nations and subaltern cultures" which is the topic I was suggested to address in this conference. In other words, "cultural diversity" means the *accumulation* of memories, of languages, of religious practices and beliefs in relation to land and, on the other, the *accommodation* of memories, languages and religious practices in relation to the land to imperial infiltration. Now, imperial infiltrations in Central Asia were of two kinds. First, through the Russian/Soviet Empires, which means, from the Russian incorporation of liberal political,

economic and cultural designs and through the incorpora-
tion of Marxist political, economic and cultural designs.
However, it has been said several times in several forms,
that the Russian Empire (as it emerged and unfolded since
the sixteenth century) it was different from the Western
ones that also emerged and unfolded in the same century).
Interestingly enough, both Western empires (first under the
lead of Spain and Portugal and after the eighteenth century
of England and France) and the Russian had the Roman Em-
pire as their ancestor. However, there are two stories of the
fall of the Roman Empire. The fall of the Western Roman
Empire (from were Western modern and capitalist empires
emerged) is generally dated in 476 AD. However, the end of
the Eastern Roman—that is the Byzantine Empire (from
were Russia Empire emerged), is generally in 1461. The
collapse of the Byzantine Empire opened the doors for the
emergence of the Russian and Ottoman ones, as well as the
fall of the Western Roman Empire paved the ways for
Spain, England and France to take its destiny as their inheri-
tors—and, of course, today to the US.

The point in remembering this story (often forgotten be-
cause by the fall of the Roman Empire is assumed to be its
Western incarnation) is to also revisit a piece of history fa-
miliar to most: the Russian Empire was coetaneous to the
formation of Western Empires, but was different. And one
of the differences is that it expanded through land and not
crossing and traversing the seas. More important than the
facts, are the racialization that went on in the interpretation

of the facts. The Russian Empire (as well as the Ottoman) was not just perceived as different by Western Christians, but as in some way wrong headed and, in the model of the perfect human beings that Christians established for themselves, in some way also inferior. However, since neither Russian nor Turks were colonized by Western empires, at stake it was not the colonial but the imperial difference. It is in this sense that Madina Tlostanova described Russia/Soviet Union as a Janus-Faced empire (2004) and Taiwaness scholar, Leo Ching (2001), described Japan as a Yellow Empire with two eyes, one toward the colonies and the other toward the West. The point Janus-Faced empires are always aware of Western Empires, while the reverse is not true. Europe or the US never had problems with Easternization, but Chinese and Japanese had a history of pre-occupation with Westernization. This concern is not manifested at the level of the authority (State, military power) and economy (labor, land appropriation, financial circuits, trades and banking systems), but it acts in the formation of the subject and, of course, of knowledge. Subjectivity and identity become entrenched with epistemology. It was imperative for many Japan philosophers between the wars to study in Germany. There were not many Germans of Western Europeans who wished to "study in" Japan, although they were many Europeans and US scholars (from Orientalists to Area Study specialists) interested in "studying Japan." This logic is indeed global. It is the logic of the coloniality of knowledge and of

beings, the formation of subjects dwelling on the borders of the imperial and colonial differences.

This is the global logic in which I am looking at "cultural diversity of people and colonial subalterns" in Central Asia as well as Central Asia "natural diversity of resources" for the global economy. Both spheres, the cultural-political and the natural-economic, are related to the war on terror.[2] Central Asia has raised to visibility, in the West, due to the war on terror, the economic challenge of China and the US needs of its natural resources. Briefly, this means the US imperial need to control authority and economy under the rhetoric of national security and the war on terror. It also means control of the imperial differences with China and Russia. U.S. military bases have been established in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan, causing both Russia and the People's Republic of China to voice their concern over a permanent U.S. military presence in the region. It should be consider to what extent the Popular Republic of China and Russia, as well as several of the former SSRs, have taken advantage of the war on terror to increase oppression of separatist ethnic minorities. China has taken a harder line against the Uighur separatists of Xinjiang, while Russia has pursued the second war in Chechnya with greater intensity. Washington, which considers Russia and China as strategic partners in the War on Terror, has largely turned a blind eye to these actions. The ethnically diverse former SSRs, especially Uzbekistan have reclassified ethnic separatist attacks as terrorist attacks and pursued more oppressive policies.

In the sphere of economy, the most obvious countries conforming Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan), offer a well of natural resources and a large Muslim population. That is, five countries positioned halfway between the Atlantic and the Pacific and bordering Russia, China, the Tien-Shan mountains and the Caspian Sea.

> Far from bringing an "end of history," the collapse of the Soviet Union has restored the Middle East to a condition that is much more historically normal than what prevailed for the better part of the past century and a half. History has come alive again. The whole northern third of the region—the Caucasus and Central Asia—which was locked in the Russian and Soviet Empires have again become part of a world that is primarily Islamic. But there is little evidence of a "clash of civilizations" within it. Christian Georgia already does most of its trade with Muslim Turkey and has a good relationship with Muslim Iran. Christian Armenia trades with Iran. Israel has constructive relations with all the new states of the Caucasus and Central Asia, both Christian and Muslim. They all look to the United States for support and leadership that will give them the strength to develop a normal relationship with their former colonial Russian masters.[3]

Thus, thousands of years in the history of these five countries were re-articulated when the Russian Empire colonized them and then colonial power was transferred to the Soviet Union. Today, "cultural diversity" enters the major global conflict of our time for the control of authority and economy (natural resources more than labor in the region). In the last analysis, Central Asia and the Caucasus, may

have an important role to play now that capitalism is being detached from its original *secular ideological beliefs* (liberalism) and attached to *sacred religious beliefs* alien to the formation of capitalism, both in its Catholic mercantile moment as well as in its Protestant Ethics moment. Once again, cultural diversity is confronted today with economic homogeneity. That is, as China and India are added to Japan economic power, and so Middle Eastern oil-based countries, would a global capitalism with a diversity of cultural faces will be better for the humanity at large than a capitalism with only one face? Could we imagine a politics of liberation based on economic wealth, as it may be the case of Hugo Chavez, in Venezuela, reach in oil and Evo Morales, in Bolivia, reach in natural gas and coca-leaves economy?

IV – The World Is not Just Flat; it Is also very Thick

I am not thinking of a Chinese or Singapore or East Asian capitalism. In 1994 *Foreign Affairs* published an interview with Lee Kuan Yew, Primer Minister of Singapore between 1959-1995 that became a signpost for debates on capitalism and Asian values. One of the many avenues that the concept of capitalism with Asian values opened up was to detach capitalism from liberalism and Christianity; that is, to detach capitalism from Western or Euro-American values. To link Christianity to capitalism may sound odd because Christian spiritual accents clashes with the material accent of capital-

ism. This is not the place to engage in such exploration; it should suffice to underline that capitalism and Asian values open up the naturalized and unquestioned relationships between capitalism and Euro-American values.

Detaching local values from global capitalism really opens up a can of worms; but it helps in understanding what the problem really is and what are really the issues in the US debate about whether or not to sell the terminal ports to a company based in the United Arab Emirates or a Chevron oil company to a Chinese one based in Hong Kong. We (and by that I mean all the 6 billions plus people living on planet earth) may be facing a future in which, part of it, will be the struggle of "capitalist diversity." I would like to say "economic diversity" with the awareness that capitalist economy will be around still for a while yet, from US and the European Union to China; from India Brazil and Mexico; from Russia to the Middle East. The rest of the world will be reduced, really, to "cultural diversity" and "service countries." That is the portion of the world that is flat, according to Thomas L. Friedman.[4]

The portion of the world regulated by capitalist corporations and supporting States it is just part of it. It is the most visible, *and flat*. But there several other short histories of the twenty first century. One of them, and relevant to our topic of "Cultural Diversity in Central Asia" has been the *re-articulation of the Jihad as a de-colonial project.*[5] And I said Jihad and not Al-Qaeda, although Al-Qaeda has been the main force in the re-articulation of the Jihad *from the Cold*

War to the world between Imperial States and Colonial Political Societies. The role of Al-Qaeda, with different means of course, was equivalent to the role played by the Zapatistas uprising in 1994: the Zapatistas globalized Indigenous struggles and brought back to the present the five hundred years of the formation and global expansion of the colonial matrix of power. They used the internet, instead of other means provided by capitalist globalization that used by Al-Qaeda. After the Zapatistas, the Indigenous movement cannot longer be reduced to individual countries and to national struggles. It is at once continental (the Americas) and global in two complementary senses: the identification of aboriginal people in New Zealand and Australia but also of entire populations that recognized in the Zapatistas *their own colonial wound*. In this regard it is remarkable the reception that the Zapatistas discourse (not just the uprising, but the discourse; that is, knowledge and subjectivity) had among Kurds in the Middle East and Turkey—and of course among aboriginals in New Zealand and Australia.

Just in case you have been distracted or the phone rang when you were reading the last two paragraph, let me clarify that I am pairing (and not com-pairing) the Zapatistas and Al-Qaeda for three simple reasons.

- They are both responses to the end of the Cold War and to the "end of history" announced by neo-liberal triumphal rhetoric. The Zapatistas uprising, which was not spontaneous!, happened the very day in which the NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)

went into effect. Al-Qaeda responded to a more tenu-
ous menace that was announced in 1993 by Samuel
Huntington "clash of civilization" and by Condoleeza
Rice, in 2000, writing in *Foreign Affairs* that the end
of the Cold War posed a problem for U.S. National
Security: they did not have a clear enemy against
whom to fight and justify the need for national secu-
rity. You see, social security is not a natural need but
an invented need.[6]

● Both, the Zapatistas and Al-Qaeda placed the struggle
at another level, the global and trans-national, and
moved it away from the fundamentalist ideals in Mus-
lim and Indigenous thoughts, both among Indians and
Muslims as well as about the common sense imagi-
nary of the Western world (Europe and the US) *about*
Indians and Muslims. And both the Zapatistas and
Al-Qaeda articulated a powerful discourse that is no
longer *anti-colonial* (or anti-Western) but *de-colo-
nial*: that is, revealing that the rhetoric of modernity
hided since the 1500 the logic of coloniality.[7]

● Muslim and Indigenous share one heterogenous histo-
rico-structural moment in World History: the same
forces that ended Muslim domination in Europe, in
the fifteenth century and since then the "victors" con-
tinue to humiliate them were the same forces that
ended with the Inca and Aztec empires and, since the
early sixteenth century, continues to humiliate them.

Al-Qaeda doesn't equal Jihad, but it contributed to detach the history of the Jihad from the institutional holy war and to place at the level of the public sphere. It contributed also to detach the Jihad, by the same token, from Muslim Fundamentalism. Muslim Fundamentalism (like Hindu Fundamentalism), are not just religious but entangled with Hindu Nationalism and Arab nationalism, respectively. That is, it is the European and imperial concept of nationalism that forced the merging of religious belief with nationalist feelings. Now you see where I am heading to close this article: to the very question of "nation and subaltern cultures" and subaltern cultures at the global scale.

Let me risk a triple parallel:

● When Karl Marx disclosed the transformation of living labor into waged labor and, therefore, the exploitation of labor re-structured by the Industrial Revolution, he thought that he found a model for global history since the exploitation of labor provoked a conflict between the exploited sector of society (workers, proletarians, working class) and the exploiter sector (bourgeoisie, capitalists, owner of the means of production). As a European, he was able to perceive the logic of exploitation of labor and as a Jews (and since one of his first writing was on the Jewish question), he obviously felt the "internal colonial difference:" that is, that within Europe the Jews were inferior and suspect human beings. He was not expected to necessarily to "see" things from the perspective of a non-European person (whether

Chinese; a person in British India or in Hispanic America; Indonesia or in what will become after Marx death of the Middle East; or from the perspective of Black slaves on the Caribbean plantations); or from the perspective of a non-Jewish person (Muslim in Indonesia or the Middle East; Hindu in India; Indigenous people in Bolivia or Canada; Blacks in the Caribbean or in Sub-Saharan Africa) who were "feeling" the consequences of capitalism and racism. Thus, Marx was perceptive of the miserable conditions of *subaltern cultures within European Modernity* and capitalist European nations. He was not aware of *subaltern cultures* in both the colonized world and the world not colonized but degraded through the imperial difference. Arab nationalism, as Hindu nationalism, as other non-European nationalism, were responsive to the impositions of the model of the European Nation-State. And in the case of Arab and Hindu nationalism, things got entangled with religious practices and beliefs. Al-Qaeda, Jihads and the plurality of manifestations, organizations and movements known as "The Islamic Revival" since the 1970 testifies of a larger phenomenon: the thickness of the globe since the 1970s when, emerged simultaneously, the theory and practice of neo-liberalism (the end of the welfare State in the US and the collapse of "development projects for the Third World") and the emergence, at the global scale, of de-colonial thinking and actions (e.g., Indigenous movements through the

Americas, Civil Right Movement, 1968 in Beijing, Paris, Checoeslovaquia and Mexico).

● Al-Qaeda and the Zapatistas contributed to uncoupled struggles de-colonial struggles from the idea of the nation and of the nation-state (which was the limitations of political decolonization from 1947 to 1965 approximately). "Subaltern cultures" at the global scale (Indigenous and Muslims) overcome the limitations of Ecuadorian and South American Indians or Arabs, Tajiks or Indonesians Muslims. James Phillips wrote recently in *The Heritage Foundation* (*Heritage Lecture* # 928) the following:

> Jemaah Islamiah, captured in Thailand; and Hamzah al-Rabbiyah al-Masri, a key operational leader killed in Pakistan. More than 4,000 suspected Al-Qaeda members have been arrested worldwide since September 11, 2001. Al-Qaeda cells have been uncovered, dismantled, and disrupted in Europe, the Middle East, Asia, and Africa. More than $140 million of its assets have been blocked in over 1,400 bank accounts worldwide.

I am not interested in the figures, but on the places: you realize the scope of geo-political reach of Al-Qaeda and also of Jihad and of Islamic Revival at a global scale.

● "Cultural Diversity in Central Asia" shall be viewed and understood today, in the double and almost simultaneous scenarios of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the globalization of Islam. Both are tied up through US imperial designs: when the Soviet Union collapsed

a new justification for national security was needed, as
Condoleezza Rice candidly stated. Curiously enough,
Central Asia began to emerge in the global imaginary
at that junction. Afghanistan brought together US sup-
port of the Taliban against the Soviets and the first tar-
get of a global war on Terrorism that replaced the war
against Communism. But "Cultural Diversity in Cen-
tral Asia" (and in Caucasus) began to be re-articulated
(from outside and from inside; that is, from global de-
signs of imperial *local* histories and *local* histories
responding to global designs) also in relation to "eco-
nomic diversity." China knocking the doors of Central
Asia eastern frontiers and Muslims everywhere be-
came a serious concern of US imperial designs to con-
trol of the economy and of authority. And imperial
control of authority (the State, like in Georgia; or the
conflicts in ex-Soviet colonies, in Central Asia and
Caucasus, in their looking toward Moscow or to Wash-
ington, through London or Berlin).

If you look at technological and industrial capitalization
of China and India, as well as East and South Asia at large,
the world may look flat. But if you look at the growing global
articulation from global and colonial subaltern cultures, you
realize that the "the culture of capitalism" is no longer the
only game in town. And at this point it is necessary link, on
the one hand, "cultural diversity" with "capitalist diversity"
and on the other, to de-link "capitalist diversity" from "eco-
nomic diversity." That is, there are many ways of organizing

the economy beyond the capitalist model; and there are many examples already around the world, thinking and acting on non-capitalist economies. The bottom line is that "cultural diversity" within "epistemic and economic homogeneity" is just a prescribed game of imperial reason in its Euro-American foundation. The struggle of the twentieth first century will be that of "epistemic diversity" necessary for de-colonizing the state, the economy and all dimensions of subject formation (e.g., gender, sexuality, racism). In the de-colonial turn we are witnessing, the struggle will be between uni-versal and imperial knowledge (that is, disembodied and un-placed knowledge, that is, di-racialized knowledge sustaining "capitalist diversity" in US, India or China) and embodied and emplaced knowledges that rather than buying into the mythology of progress and development for the good of the people at large,[8] they began to build alternatives to the imperial bubble and the sacred belief that the only way to go is to improve what you have.

Notes

1. CNOOC is a Hong Kong-incorporated public company that engages primarily in the exploration, development and production of crude oil and natural gas offshore China. We are the dominant producer of crude oil and natural gas. The Company is also one of the largest offshore producer of crude in Indonesia.
2. "Cultural Diversity" in Central Asia evolves around religion, politics and economics. "Islam is the religion most common in the former Soviet Central Asian Republics, Afghanistan, Xinjiang and the peripheral western regions. Most Central Asian Muslims are Sunni,

although Shia comprise the great majority in Azerbaijan, and in Afghanistan and Pakistan there are sizable Shia minorities. Tibetan Buddhism is most common in Tibet, Mongolia, and the southern Russian regions of Siberia, where Shamanism is also popular. Increasing Han Chinese migration westward since the establishment of the PRC has brought Confucianism and other beliefs into the region. Nestorianism was the form of Christianity most practiced in the region in previous centuries, but now the largest denomination is the Russian Orthodox Church, with many members in Kazakhstan. The Bukharan Jews were once a sizable community in Uzbekistan, but nearly all have emigrated in recent years."

3. "American Middle East Policy. The Need for New Thinking," Paul B. Henze and Enders Winbush, in *Central Asia* 2/8, 1997; http://www.ca-c.org/dataeng/stã05ãhenze.shtml.

4. *The World is Flat. A brief History of the Twenty First Century*, New York: Farrar and Strauss, 2005.

5. I owe the frame and history of this idea to Faisal Devji, *Landscape of the Jihad*, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2005.

6. "Campaign 2000: Promoting the National Interests," http://www.foreignaffairs.org/20000101faessay5/condoleezza-rice/campaign-2000-promoting-the-national-interest.html).

7. Zapatistas discourses are well known and available, but see Walter Mignolo in a previous publication of the Academy de la Latinité. For Osama Bin Laden see the edition of his speeches in *Messages to the World. The Statements of Osama Bin Laden*, edited and introduced by Bruce Lawerence, London: Verso, 2005.

8. UNOLOCAL/Chevron motu in the web page is: "We improve people's life, wherever we go."

APPENDIX

Walter D. Mignolo

Spanish Empire in 1770

The Uncertain Oikoumene.
Contested Borders and Imagined Civilizations

Enrique Rodríguez Larreta

Interpreting Clashes and the Rise of Culturalism

The end of the Soviet Union inaugurated a period of border redefinition, universalization of particularism and the sole presence of the United States as a world economic and military hyper-power. Ethnic violence in the Balkans and civil wars presented in culture and religion language have held the place of 20th Century conflicts formulated in political ideology language. Historical formations such as Islam have become the center of a civilization conflict tale.

In a comment on the book *The Decadence of the West* by Oswald Spengler, a European best-seller in the '20s of the past century, Marcel Mauss, comments that the morphology Spengler's civilization, is "literary." Moral classifications of civilizations and nations in tough and soft, in organics and their philosophy of history only have high value to the great public It is a return without any precision to overcome formulae of "cultural fates," of historical missions, "there was all the jargon of sociology and pseudo-social science of the parties. "Indeed the sociologist finds more ideas and more facts in Guizot" (Mauss II: 278).

If Mauss in the name of sociology and ethnography treats with so much severity Spengler's suggestive and obscure work, the reaction by specialists in view of *The Clash of Civilizations* by Huntington, a book full of errors but that has been successful in all communication media, were predictable. However, paradoxically just like Spengler's cultural relativism, has stimulated historical investigation in the non-European world—in Latin America, for example, in the work of Gilberto Freyre, Fernando Ortiz and the Arab world (Rodinson: 80) an aggressively pro-West conservative study such as Huntington has opened the debate on civilizations in Iran, China, Japan and several international forums. The same Harvard professor openly acknowledges that his book

> is not intended to be a work of social science: it is instead meant to be an interpretation of the evolution of global politics after the cold war, it aspires to present a framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics that will be meaningful to scholars and useful to policy makers. (Huntington: 14.)

In many senses it is worrisome since the social science tradition to read Huntington because it is possible to see in the shape of a stereotype, some of the major problems of categories such as identity and culture that have become commonplace in social sciences and cultural studies.

In the first part of his book Huntington discusses several civilization theories in analytical terms tending toward a plural vision of civilizations and equating culture with civi-

lization, thus keeping a distance from the German interpretation

> (…) a civilization is a cultural entity, outside Germany. Nineteenth century German thinkers drew a sharp distinction between civilization, which involved mechanics, technology and material factors, and culture, which involved values, ideals and the higher intellectual artistic moral qualities of a society. This distinction has persisted in German thought but has not been accepted elsewhere. (Huntington: 41.)

When simplifying the stresses and shades of the relation between civilization and culture, Huntington facilitates its political use and opens the way to the journalistic success of his book. Civilizations are transformed into what anthropologists (Fredrik Barth, Abner Cohen) call corporate groups, tribal segments operating in worldwide scale. In addition to religious ties that he considered central, the language of blood and parentage finds wide space in his analysis.

"Civilizations are the ultimate human tribes and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global scale" (Huntington: 207). This tribal idea, essentialist of civilizing units, leads him to a crude cultural pessimism. "Relations between groups from different civilizations however will be almost never close, usually cool, and often hostile" (Huntington: 207).

Curiously, the American professor succeeds in gathering in a single study the worst traditions of the civilization concept, the cultural particularism of German tradition deprived of their esthetical and spiritual connotations, the stat-

ism of French and Anglo-Saxon tradition as well as the feeling of superiority of national traditions themselves in the clash with the other barbarian or made barbarous. All at once, qualifying rationalism of modernity is present in an outline of contrasts, crude analogies and friend/enemy oppositions. Religion, Culture, and Civilization are categories that are employed without sufficient reflexive distance.

> The underlying problem for the West is not Islamic fundamentalism. It is Islam a different civilization whose people are convinced of the superiority of their culture and are obsessed with the inferiority of their power. (Huntington: 217.)

It is the *Muslim Rage* inspired in Bernard Lewis's well-known article, commented as follows by John Esposito (1992: 173-174).

> It reinforces stereotypes of Islamic revivalism and of Muslims and predisposes the reader to view the relationship of Islam to the West in terms of race, violence, hatred and irrationality.

Characteristically, on the other side of the mirror, are the Islamic neo-fundamentalists claiming to be the representatives of "Islam" in its clash with the West (Kepel, 2000; Roy, 2003).

On the other hand, Huntington assimilates the technical and scientific knowledge of Western civilization, particularly of the United States and considers that

> To preserve Western civilization in the face of declining Western power, it is in the interest of the United States and European coun-

tries (…) to maintain Western technological and military superiority over other civilizations. (Huntington, 1996: 310.)

But the quick acceptance of Huntington's ideas and main theses of the book can be considered as symptoms of a growing global uncertainty that has its main dimensions in a crisis of the national States and a growing border redefinition process produced by the impact of communications and technology impact. A feeling of an increase in risk thresholds and anarchy leading to the formation of new imaginary communities capable of providing a holistic meaning of integration and collective identity. Civilization is one of these communities and the civilization clash the imaginary risk rate that one runs when safe borders are trespassed.

But let us see a little more about the invention process of those collective in the troubled origins of modernity.

Inventing Civilizations

The notion of civilization formulated in the 18th Century in France and England in the Scottish Enlightenment (Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, David Hume, etc.) contained since its beginnings the tensions and ambiguities that allowed singling it out, its pluralization and also its self-criticism.

Adam Ferguson, a member of Scottish illuminists, employed the notion of a sociological sense for the first time in 1762 *An Essay on the History of Civil Society* (Edinburgh, 1767) and afterwards in his lectures published in 1792. In this text, one can perceive already in the origins of the notion, the

distinction between the material dimension of civilization as a time in the history of a people and civilization as value.

> The success of commercial arts, divided into parts requires a certain order to be preserved by those who practice them, and implies a certain security of the person and property to which we give the name of civilization. Although this distinction both in the nature of the thing and deviation of the word belongs rather to the effects of law and political establishment on the forms of society than to any state merely of lucrative possession of wealth. (*Retrospect of Lectures*, cit. en Benveniste: 218.)

Adam Smith writing a few years later employs the notion without the need for clarifications "The invention of fire arms, an invention which at first sight appears to be so pernicious is certainly favorable to the permanency and to the extensions of civilization" (215).

In the case of Ferguson and Adam Smith, the idea of civilization is associated with a certain view of history in terms of progressive stages. It is a type of approach that we will find again in Condorcet and Engels, a sense of social evolution that is identified with a modernization project.

In the French invention that is ascribed to the Marquis of Mirabeau, a very important physiocrat thinker and polygraph of his time and almost forgotten today, the state of civilization is a time of a rise and fall process of societies that they all go through, according to the precedents of the old world. In his 1757 text *L'Ami des Hommes*, Mirabeau keeps considering religion as the first factor of civilization.

These writers, it is worthwhile remembering, are writing in context that the crisis of European conscience in the

classical expression of Paul Hazard. In the 18th Century, there is already a clear idea of Europe as a family of nations that does not preclude international clashes. It refers back to a cultural space and even a political power balance system resulting from European wars. The European conscience crisis restores the idea of a cultural unit. The production of the press has created a European literary and journalistic space with its extensions to the colonial world.

In the 18th century authors one records, a tension between civilizations as made by the state and as an ideal value, from which according to the point of view one can always dialectically distinguish the barbarian aspects of civilization.

The thought of the Lights as employed in Condorcet's *Esquisse* (1794) condemns colonial conquest and chiefly the proselytism of overseas Christian missions. Traditionally reserved epithets to barbarians ("bloodthirsty," "tyrannical," etc.) are applied to missionaries, "superstition" etc. But a new task appears educating, emancipating, civilizing. The sacredness of civilization takes the relief of the sacredness of religion" (Starobinski: 22). We have here the replacement of religious values with enlightenment values within a salvation project.

The difference of other authors such as Edward Gibbon who considers that the introduction of European civilizing arts would the condition of other peoples to enter civilization without necessarily modifying their traditions. Condorcet reasons in the expansion direction of civilized values.

Making a leap to the present and towards imperial policy: In its National Security Strategy published in September 2002, it is reasoned that the purpose of American foreign policy is "to extend the benefits of freedom across de globe." "We will actively work" the document declares

> to bring the hope of democracy, development, free markets and free trade to every corner of the world (…). America must stand firmly for the nonnegotiable demands of human dignity, the rule of law; limits on the absolute power of the State; free speech; freedom of worship; equal justice; respect for women; religious and ethnic tolerance; and respect for private property.

Similar speeches are previously found in Winston Churchill. As senator J. William Fullbright observed in 1968.

> The British called in the white man's burden; the French called it their 'civilizing missions' Nineteenth Century Americans called it 'manifest destiny.' It is now being called the responsibilities of power. (Ferguson: 23.)

This civilizing discourse present in contemporary American political discourse, which is summarized in advertising American values, a set of values having the right to impose itself on other populations by violence in last instance, may be considered in the extreme a political theology (Derrida, 2003). Somewhat secular religion it is a reification of civilizing ideology already denounced by the same Spengler:

> Expansionism is a conviction, something demoniac and intense that dominates, puts at its service and exhausts whatever remains of

humankind in the world city. (…) Imperialism (…) is civilization in pure state. (Spengler: 534.)

From Ferguson to Spengler, passing through Condorcet and Guizot what we have in relation to the idea of culture and civilization is the process of intellection reinvention of modernity in formation. The intellectual reconstruction process results from the collapse of the religious universe that occurred in the 17th Century and that can be summarized in the dialectic between Faith and Doubt inaugurated by Pascal. Indeed, as a result of the collapse of European intellectual conscience Christian cosmology will be found between an uncertain, insecure universe, with progressive absence of meaning. A rational classification and reification effort of the order, production or invention of abstract categories that allow redefining man's position in the cosmos. Reinhard Koselleck has shown that

> older, Christian attitudes toward historical time (salvational expectation) were combined with newer, secular practices rational prediction to give us our modern idea of progress. The new conceptions of progress and simultaneity did not replace the older conceptions but were transformations of them. (…) It is fascinating to see how, in the nineteenth century, protestant conceptions of guilt and atonement, of the "few elect," of God's grace were transformed in conceptions of progress, of grace extended to all inhabitants of the world, of the "white man's burden." (Van der Veer, 2001: 25.)

The people concept is employed for the first time by Rousseau in his *Confessions* written between 1765 and 1770. The civilization notion is employed in French for the

first time in 1760 by the Marquis of Mirabeau and by Adam Ferguson in English more or less at the same time. In the 19th Century, it is going to be a prevailing notion of usage in Europe from where it will be exported by the intellectual elites in the colonial and semi- colonial world until entering the 19th Century until merging with the idea of modernization and progress.

But the kind of expressing the idea of civilization considerably varies from one European Nation to the other and among several authors.

Ferguson as we have already seen emphasizes the virtue of the personal and property safety. From original barbarity to man's current condition in society a gradual universal change was discovered, a slow education and finishing process in one word, constant progress in the order in which civility, static conclusion, was not enough to express and that it was not more than calling civilization to define together the meaning of continuity (213).

Edward Tylor, the English anthropologist indistinctly employs both notions:

> culture or civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom and other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society.

In this manner, keeping the dual purpose of notions as synonymous, allows accommodating distinct degrees of expansion in a progressive scale starting with primitive societ-

ies and projecting itself over Italians, Chine, until climaxing with Victorian imperial England.

In England, particularly in the 19th Century the place of religion in the definition of civilization varied in relation to France. The moral state such as defined by Gladstone, has a strong evangelical character. Missionarism is part of the duties and propagation means of the Empire and Anglican religion in this case is confused with the national and imperial project Culture becomes the central category of the distinction.

> Religion says: The Kingdom of God is within you and culture is like manner, places human projection in its internal condition, in the growth and predominance of our humanity proper, as a distinguished from our rivalry (…). Not a having and a resting, but a growing and a becoming; is the character of perfection as culture conceives it, and here too it coincides with religion. (Mathew Arnold, cit. by Van der Veer, 2001: 40.)

The French in turn enter modern times with a powerfully constituted National State capable of overcoming religious wars and unifying the country. France incorporates the Roman imaginary. In the 18th Century, a national awareness is consolidated in France and to express its objectives, a universal formula appears, civilization. Napoleon disseminates the ideal of French civilization during the Egypt campaign. In his case, this expression possesses the considerable advantage of expressing the spirit of the French Revolution without directly alluding to his political objectives.

A few decades later the formulation of a philosophy of history that will have as leitmotif the idea of civilization,

will correspond to Guizot the theorist of bourgeois liberalism in his *Histoire de la Civilisation en Europe* (1828) and his *Histoire de la Civilisation en France (*1830). The philosophy of history underlying these books is that humanity's history is the history of civilization; this coincides with the development of freedom. Ernst Robert Curtius (1930) comments that the vocabulary ("pontificat de la civilisation," Michelet and other authors) reveals the influence of religious passions, which nourish the enthusiasm aroused by the idea of civilization (Curtius: 42). Summing up, to French intellectual tradition is a religious truth that links the national to the universal.

Analyzing sociological bases and state power structures behind these processes Norbert Elias writes that the French concept of civilization reflects the specific social fortunes of the French bourgeoisie to exactly the same degree that the concept of culture reflects the German. The concept of civilization is first like *Kultur*, an instrument of middle-class circles. "Above all the middle classes intelligentzia in the internal social conflict. With the rise of the bourgeoisie, it too comes to epitomize the nation, to express the national self-image" (Elias: 49).

In Germany, separated in the political and political plan, culture differentiates it from France does not seem provided with a political dimension if not mainly esthetic content. In Herder, we find a conception at the same time communal, the nearness of the people—particularly the peasantry—linguistic and artistic of culture whose core is found in the

Geist, a principle of merging with the world. It is a conception of culture, opposed to the State somewhat in principle outer, oriented towards the territory and the roots, hostile to the artificiality of urban world. It is the nostalgia and a wish for integration, overcoming the separation of the nature impregnated with religious components. Novalis in full German romanticism draws up the idea of a Christian Europe. A way of resuming the new ripped modern subjectivity with collective solidarities.

In his installation conference in the College de France, *De la Part des Peuples Semitiques dans l´Histoire de la Civilisation* (21 février 1862) which is sustained in the impetuous development of philosophic and historic science a, Ernest Renan presents a large picture of plurality based on a linguistic/cultural criterion.

With displaced religious passion of a former priest converted to scientific positivism Ernest Renan examines the contribution from Semitic peoples to human history. The East, chiefly the Semitic East writes Renan, has not known a midpoint between complete "anarchy of nomad Arabs and bloodthirsty despotism and its compensation." The idea of the public house, public welfare, is absent in these peoples. Complete freedom and such as "Anglo-Saxon" peoples have accomplished and large State organization such as the Roman Empire and France have created were equally foreign. Theocracy, anarchy and despotism are the summary of Semite policy.

In the second half of the 19th Century in the context of European colonial expansion toward the East and Africa,

Renan writes that "the essential condition for European civilization to expand is the destruction of the Semitic thing par excellence, the destruction of Islam's theocratic power, by consequence the destruction of Islam" that Renan admits may have had a beneficial civilizing action in Africa in Southern Sahara.

Renan's conclusion is that the future belongs to Europe. "Europe will conquer the world and will extend its religion that is the right, freedom, respect for men, the belief of possessing something divine as provided by humanity" (Renan, 1862).

The idea of different civilizations evolving in different regions is now theorized in a philosophical manner that influences the time of European nationalist claims. Each civilization possesses an essential, singular core. Orientalists tip over toward the origins to find purer manners. This orientation is found accentuated by human sciences that the 19th Century cultivates with predilection: the history of religions and compared linguistics (Rodinson, 1980; Said, 1978). This is what we have seen in Renan 's case and is also present in Huntington's theory of civilization. The history of religions originated from the struggle of pluralist and relativist bourgeois liberalism against the Christian ideological monopoly dedicates its efforts to the study of eastern religions as past and present alternatives to Christianity. It is understood that the fundamental knot of each civilization is found in the dominion of religion. Civilization units conceived in this manner pass by in parallel lines or crossing each other

from different origins. This approach reaches the 20th Century with Max Weber's comparative studies. The values of each civilization are thought about in Weber en in parallel lines, not in terms of historical interactions.

Clearly European colonial and imperial experience and soon American is present in the definition of identities that we call culture or civilization as well as the competition among several national state formations for splitting the world. Indeed an essential phase of the civilizing process was concluded at exactly the time when the consciousness of civilization, the consciousness of the superiority of their own behavior and its embodiments, its science, technology or art began to spread over whole nations of the West (Elias: 50).

But, the notions of civilization and culture are at the same time symbolic orientation processes in replacement or transfiguration of progressive collapse of the religious universe among European leading classes that soon extended to the world. A secularization process that means the search for new fundaments and in which modernity laboriously redefines its system of beliefs. Nation, People, Culture, civilization are new key symbols of this new semantic universe that will be transformed into central metaphors of new secular religions.

Global Modernity and the Uncertain Oikoumene

Modernity has been defined as a movement, a creating destruction in which Schumpeter defines capitalism (Touraine, 1992). This vertiginous movement has experienced an accelerated situation in the last decades not only in terms

of speed, but also of scale. Contrasted with incessant flows of images, people and capitals that circulate through the most varied networks, the world cultural mosaic presented by Huntington consisting of large cultural sets but the least coinciding with territories, curiously appears static and sedentary. Twenty million Hindus live outside India today, of which more than 1 million in the United Sates, 90% of the inhabitants living in the Arab Emirates are foreign, there are 11 and a half million Muslims in Europe, 7.5% of French population and 4.5% of the German. The West is in the "East" and Islam is on the other side of mobile borders if not in the hear of western capitals. After having writing in *The Clash of Civilizations* that the cultural difference between Americans and Mexicans is smaller than between Turks and Europeans, considering these populations in relation to foreignness, he dedicated a book to the danger represented by Latin Diaspora to American national identity (Huntington, 2004). Rather what seems to be happening is that the world is being "resegmented, refounded and reformatted in the space of a few decades. It was clearly, some sort of revolution. But what sort what it was that was turned around, and in which directions was and still is imperfectly understood," as writes American anthropologist Clifford Geertz. We are found in the midst of a global modernity, which crosses national spaces and cultural areas, a worldwide technical-scientific civilization in the words of Alfred Weber and Robert Merton (Weber, 1922; Merton, 1932). An unequally distributed oikoumene, with power centers that implode on cultural areas and peripheral national spaces that in turn fall

on certain circumstances on metropolitan spaces. Local conflicts in progress, may be defined as struggles for appropriating this modernity, in which States, social movements and local cultures participate. At the same time, many of these movements resort to local cultural repertories to face challenges, sometimes felt as global ecumene characterized by complexity and uncertainty. The principle of nationality established in Europe in the second half of the 19th Century has given place to a world formed by 191 national States arising from several imperial dissolutions as of the second half of the past century. Precisely this conference is taking place in one of these new national States harassed by several conflicts of border definition and incorporation of populations into the polity. Networks of historical interactions more than fixed cultural identities is what we should pay attention to if we want to understand cultural reinventions and conflicts in progress. From the ethical point of view the great challenge of our time is the recognition of the contingency of our condition opening us to the recognition of the foreigner as another without merely purporting to eliminate him or assimilate him to our "culture" or "religion" considered as homogenous and everlasting sets, closed on themselves.

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5

Hegemony and Domination

At Odds with Difference
and Pluralism in Times of Hegemony

Candido Mendes

The Accelerated Regression of World Dialogue:
Towards a Fundamentalism of Reason?

The present perspective of the world reception to the Dialogue of Civilization shows the overwhelming impact to the Mahomet cartoons. The Middle-Eastern distress in response to the Danish drawings against the Prophet exceeded any controlled demonstration. In addition, the beginning of the European reaction to the mounting unrest in Islamic cities signals the rise of a new fundamentalism of the Western reason. Are we on the eve of a primary, surprising and defensive Enlightenment in the aftermath of an impending closure of an exchange between cultures? Upon the ravage of the Islamic world, the West may tend to support, without concessions, the rights of reason, reaffirmed in two of its direct corollaries, namely the freedom of expression and the freedom of the media of our times, at the full risk and responsibility of their stakes.

The initial reactions of the European media, recognizing the disproportion reached by the response to the car-

toons, straightforwardly refused to abide by the formal demands for apologies, upon the huge range of values put in conflict.

The Bush evangelism, nevertheless, hastened to express such regret in the name of religion and with respect to the platform of human rights. Does the reaction manifested by major French, Spanish and Italian dailies express only the immediate tensions *vis-à-vis* the Islamic world after the terrorist assault on the World Trade Center? Or is it the platform of freedom conquests that is in question? Secularity, as gained in history, claims its respect for religions, fully recognizing their equal places in the contemporary public space.

The controversy triggered by *The Jyllands-Posten* cartoons indeed involves not the simple contextual reciprocity of dialogue between cultures, but rather a confrontation, in its absolute, transcendent sense of mankind's rights and their support, at level with what intrinsically makes modernity driven by the Enlightenment, namely such true, intrinsic progress of the time of men.

Therefore, in itself, what the blasphemy questions, as far as neo-fundamentalisms are concerned, is the very exchange of the Islamic culture, with critical reason. What is at stake at the effective isochrony of a world's mind in reflection, where a contextual thinking does not preclude a working consciousness as a transcendental conquest, inseparable from a *Dasein*, a being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 2006).

Also alongside this direction, one is required, together with a preliminary, epistemological reading of the dialogue

of cultures, to see, within the deepest Islamic scholarship, how the dialectics of modernity advances and responds to such simultaneity of critical thought, regardless the contextualities of world representations, of their coding and of their Rosetta Stone (Bordes-Benayoun and Schnapper, 2006).

Modernity and Critical Thought

The extraordinarily rich contributions of several Islamic thinkers, including Abdul Karim Soroush, Mohammed Arkum, Fazlur Rahman, and Abdel Mahid Charfi, mark in their approaches this seminal breakthrough. They face themes such as the theory of contraction, in the expansion of religious knowledge, the thinkable and the unthinkable in contemporary Islam, a new vision of the Koran and the Revelation, and a reassumed comprehension of the prophecy's sealing. A theorist like Abu Zayd summarizes all this global, deconstructive thinking, as he reflects over the long duration and the reference polarities in their contents. In his veritable, comprehensive exegesis, he sets the distances between manipulation and hermeneutics (Benzine, 2004).

Western post-modernity might find in this reception and in its broad range the same isochronial opening, thoroughly working today in true epistemic efforts overcoming blocking methodologies or voids in the references to the sense of contemporariness.

A new demand points today to the raising of new collapses in these deconstructions and of an irrupting collective unconscious with all the vigor of its irrationality. There would be, along the axis of the great Western rationalism, an instinctive rescue of the *cogito*, in prey with the swell of difference carried out to its intransitive, assertion in a world threatened by globalization (Glazer, 1997).

One could not, however, be held only with this new concern, going up to the crack of this long push towards the platform of transcendence, in the context of men's history (Favre, 2006).

An Unshareable Fear

Moreover, after September 11, and the explosion of a culture of peace, we face a universally inappeasable fear, unable even to a shareable panic. Emergency exits are equivocal and carry us out furthest away from the practices of detente of the good old days of late 20th century. The new outlined confrontation between West and Islam presupposes confused, discontinued alarms and straightforwardly different mobilizations.

The fall of the W.T.C put the Oval Room perpetually on its guard against the violence of terrorism, at one time anonymous and unverifiable, creating this new contradiction for the international coexistence of a "super-*potestas*." Never before has a world power been the continued, conscious prey, at one time, of its imminent blow (Lewis, 2005) of a

specific aggression, whereby Al-Qaeda may target Los Angeles' Library Building, for example, as a catastrophic sequel to the Manhattan twin towers episode. Especially, this is only the beginning of times when young girls carrying dynamite corsets, in Iraq or Palestine, kiss their parents goodbye and leave to explode inside a bus. They are driven by a response to the collective unconscious's faintness after such long expropriations of the soul, experienced by the cultures object of the radical domination, to the extreme point of rapture by the West, and its infinite apparatuses and wonders. It is an obsolete de-victimization, which has the full power of a surge of awakenings sharpened by the revolution of Khomeiny in Iran and supported by the successive chain of distress where Al-Qaeda in Kenya, Tanzania, then Aden, carried the final blow against New York. This would be a true "Big-bang," a response of historical vindication carried out with an apocalyptic dimension. The movements in reaction to the cartoons of the Prophet showed how much the wave of rejection was reinforced, with the masses in Damas, Cairo, Tripoli or Beirut beyond any control by any system.

Hegemony, Contradiction and Preemption

At the same time, this era of regression accelerates, due to the fact that, beyond the corollaries of the civilization of fear, the order of hegemony tangles up with objective contradictions of its own *diktat* and the models of its *potestas* (Zizek, 2004). The Oval Room world can even allow itself

to face its own assumptions, according to which a truth imposes itself by its internal consonance as well as, especially, by compliance to the established rules of the game.

Exactly the opposite occurs nowadays, considering the growing elusive respect to democracy, emanating from effectively free elections, like fundaments of general recognition, for international stability, and the reference between Society and State. The emerging resistance of the United States against Hammas, who legitimately seized the power in Palestine through general elections, shows the limits of the ideological range of the *urbis et orbis* model of coexistence between Washington and the peripheries. Admittedly, the purposes of radical conflict with Israel imply all efforts of the United Nations in order to ensure international world order. But they do not include the rejection, in principle, of the new emerging actor, Hammas, in Ramalah, or of the principles of recognition whereby a reliability in itself of the model might still make progress on the *ad hoc* stakes of the Oval Room.

We have not quite realized every step where the complexity of hegemonic conditioning can face not only its own discourse but also the very sequence of the event (Baudrillard, 2004). A brand new power is manifest on those unilateral limiting margins, truly in detriment of the established givens of the conflict, which are projected onto a whole new range of initiatives, when the action and interactions cross quite disparate scales, as compared to their former assumptions.

There are, with the pre-emption and quartering of old event-driven serializations, not only the still unperceived impact of such an ousting on the collective unconsciousness, but also the subliminal construction of its representations and compensations, from the point of view of the old collective protagonistic level (Kastoryano, 2006). Or, especially, of what, *vis-à-vis* such subtractions, continues to comprise a symbolic compensation, a sense of sacrifice and a collective rescue. How does the ousting of the event reflect over the imagination—in all the violence of the shock grammar and its expected gamut? To which point has the stake of hegemony and its discourse not only drawn aside the event, but also installed an odd, subjective aim at the range of erratic substitution, by such evacuation and such resumption of its course completely removed from the antecedent? Can one escape from the sequences but not from the transcendence of their transformation into a spectacle? Also, what is the weight, in backlash terms, of the sequels for the traditional assumed roles of resource and risk in taxes by their options? Does the fall of the WTC provide a surplus of a ravaged awareness? Such a spectacle wake up on the collective unconsciousness a fitting prowess-martyrdom, and a vindictive connotation only found *ex post*, facing the awesome tide of the World Trade Center collapse (Stockhausen). Can history write off such late awakening of a collective perception? Social complexity moves in the open, with no *a priori* rule to cumulate mobilization with conscience and collective reification, with virtualization and its

fetish. Which was, in this causality inner, the link between the fall of the towers and the surge against blasphemy? Without such apocalyptic glare, would the shock level have reached such an identitary fusion? And to which point has this imagination, thus triggered, brought up the acting of a collective unconsciousness for good?

Pre-emption and Subliminal Retrieval

How do these emerging diffuse actors behave *vis-à-vis* such an expropriation scenario? Especially when this subtraction of the event takes place, following a historical dismissal in the long term, and suddenly becomes the prey of its seizure by an excessive spectacle and its subsequent mobilization? In the long term, history shows us that a collective awakening is not a, *per se*, condition for a decisive subjective play, in the causality of events dealing with "global social facts" (Bello, 2005). Colonial assimilation, for example, managed to be perpetrated in subtle caesuras, many times by delaying the national re-appropriation of political independences, when proselytism held to ransom, without remainders, identity assertions persisting at the heart of the dominated people.

One wonders which scenario is opened today on the assumption of cumulating these two conditions, when hegemony imposes pre-emption on the Islamic world at the moment of a full swarming of its delayed conscience and in the wake of the Western expropriation. This sudden es-

trangement will perhaps, still ravaged, avenged, and rein-
forced, reach the point of martyrdom and testimony, which
has been shown, in its anonymous tragedy, by the spontane-
ous awakening of terrorism, built-up since the invasion of
Iraq. Considering the new Iranian escalation, the Oval
Room says it is ready to provide "any responses" up to some
of the new innovations and sequels to the *Star Wars* saga
(Peters, 2005). To what point do radical horizon changes in-
scribe forever pre-emption as a fact marking today the orga-
nization mode of complexity, subjected to hegemony, in
these times inaugurated by the 9/11 aftermath?

The Stake of the Irrational

A doubly termed irrationality may also account, on the
antagonists' side, for a cumulative jump in the hegemony
scenarios as being precisely the natural logics of conflict, in
the early 21st century. How to appraise such a much orches-
trated escalation tragedy? Can the trajectory drawn by
Ahmademinejah, as a reprisal of the Khomeyni tradition,
elude the adversary, and in spite of the long Khatami dia-
logue, through a re-affronting at any risk, still stop preemp-
tion? The nuclear threat games reflect an outdated tone,
faithful to the cold war climate, talking of alert exchanges,
anticipated symbolic confrontations, and discharge of the
effective aggressive power, in an always-symmetrical re-
sumption of threats and responses. In the context of hege-
mony, risks only come from irrationality, and then from

confrontations passed on to testimonials, nevertheless their radical anonymity. In fact, in this context, the desire of the bomb from Iran has to be shown in the labyrinth of alleged peaceful uses of atomic energy. Ahmademinejah's threat plays in this universe whereby rhetoric becomes the event through to its own enunciation. Irrationality is the continus escape to preemptive surge, for good. The post-September 11 era buries any idea of resuming the world's order as thought by a culture of peace, disarmament and good willingness, according to the old world of nations, with their alliances and sovereignties now corroded by hegemony (Hersh, 2004). There is no return to the *status quo ante*, as if the occupation of Iraq could be reversed just like the U.S. did in the Vietnam War. At the same time, what it is the trigger for the outburst of a final solution against the second "axis of evil" in Teheran?

Hegemonic Logic in Distress

We are very close to a new stage of history where causation flirts with spectacle in order to disentangle itself of the old event's entire linearity. It is marked by sequels, exponential reprisals, irrational turnings, perverse accountancies of mobilization and open bluff games, amidst the full paradoxes of the hegemonic rationality. Doubly termed confrontation endeavors to recover the land of exponential power beyond deterrence, at the erratic cost of absolute power. It is crucial to inquire into the cumulative causality of these

states of representation of the Islamic world over the West, and the successive sides of this delayed, continual logics. It follows in successive stands the sacrificial attack, the vindicatory conscience, the permanent confrontation, and the irretrievable account settlement. The late game, kept out of night-light by the apocalyptic disproportion of September 11, has raised the accelerating recoveries in this mobility through anticipation testimonials where Islam prophecies have taken the form of anonymous and incontrollable martyrdom. It is with the threatening thus unchained that the Moslem world can still avoid the advent of the preemptive universe.

Only by this stage of unnegotiable irrationality can Rumsfeld's buttons still remain halted by the Islamic new public conscience of the rejection to any intervention in the Middle East. The swell against the cartoons may have provided such a proof in advance. Eventually, "Marines" were not received in Baghdad as liberators of Saddam's yoke. Likewise, Ahmademinejah succeeds in showing how eager the Oval Room is for "any-azimuths" confrontation as a requirement for setting a hegemonic order. In such a cumulative reverse of logics the "axes of evil" objectively become residues of resistance—at the old level of sovereignties—against radical intervention, ensured by the fight against universal terrorism.

Democratic insurance is no longer due to the bastion of difference but rather, *urbi et orbis*, to the earthmoving of a flat tening order, by either throwing the opponents to the

void, or offering them a return to the system as replicants. As long as a truce can be still supported by the marshes of irrationality, or as long as Iran faces the imminence of a new preemptive irruption, it is necessary to signal the hostage area, where difference can still be maintained between exile and survival, at the peripheric regimes already menaced by the escalation of simulacra (Baudrillard and Valiente Noailles, 2005).

Prospective Diasporas and Identities

The appeal to the concept of Diaspora (Safran, 1991) would still help us to retain the stake of these collective actors' sense, at the brim of the very stage of their history. They would not be driven out of their original territory, pushed by the first alignments of hegemony as an democratic diktat put forward early political forces split on a civil war stage, at the edge of new war of religion, at the risk of a return to ethnocide. In the deepest of their quest identities, peripheries would wanton out of the paradigm of a national soul. Virtualization becomes hegemony's final blow, with the seizure of the dominated cultures' subjectivities.

Even in the good old colonial times of domination and massive migrations, they secured their Diasporas' survival by safeguarding the bridgeheads of their first and fundamental identity matrixes, and every historical beginning returned to the Jewish paragon. In our times, throughout the 19th and 20th centuries, diasporas featured in the American

vastnesses, as an example of such primordial roots, with the Chinese or Japanese flow of immigrants. Or, in the mid twenties, the Armenians in their voluntary ghetto (Van Hear, 1998). In spite of distances, undeceived by the caesura, these identities at large always took shape according to a center and to a peripheral fold in the traditional references of a historical space. The pattern stood, regardless of the migrations' forced character, as a consequence of a civil war, or of the original countries' own demographic explosions. We can see now the increase of a different, prospective diaspora (Kodmani-Darwish, 1997). The identity gathering moves to the dimensions of a future seizure, at the same time, also emphasized by the de-axed times of a radical wandering, as a world fully threatened, after 9/11.

The construction of this prospective identity reflects the large migratory flows of these last 30 years continental displacements towards Europe. They respond to the successive sagas—Turkish-German, Maghrebo-French and generalized Arabs of in the UK. The November 2005 incidents in the Parisian suburbs show very well how any policy of assimilation disappears. Eventually, the attraction exerted by the megalopolis only reproduced the center/periphery opposition in resonance of a growing memory of failure before new horizons. This would plunge any Diaspora into a true loss through a discourse whose intransitive violence is the answer to the old civilizing, flowing movements, betting in early modernity of the last two centuries on the world's macro-balance games, dynamisms and their final success.

The concept of a prospective Diaspora, beyond simple return, has an identity reference frame, which also shows itself in the Caucasus exposed to the Empire de-mediation, propelled into the subjective collectivity of a world going global (Scheffer, 1995). The historical proportions of this clamor faces, at the same time, a national State, recasting, the multiple social times of its memory. This fundamental uprising is as out of date as again, rebirthed, for having covered, its Islamic and pre-Islamic basis, of its recognizable cultural roots, together with their different Empires, and, as a first Empire of modernity, the Soviet system (Chauprade, 2006).

To the benefit of the true strategic debate regarding differences, brought to the last stake of pluralisms in search of the new isochronal history, we can see, in this huge theatre of Empires, the assertion of meaning and event—in a praxis, as creative as wild, in which identity emerges according to a new perspective. Where are at work the diachronically buried marks and remains of historical recognition? Where, indeed, to carry out even further, start true hermeneutics in order to find the minimal reference frames of such "being in the world," exposed in its recasting with political differentials of memory?

From the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean

Any cultural dialogue depending on the last grounded historical mobility implies at the geopolitical level the eco-

nomic emerging leverages of globalization. Therefore, the impact of the huge Bakou–Tbilisi–Ceyhan pipeline linking the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean (Simonet, 2006). Therefore, it is from the tallies of supra-continental integration that the oil economy of the Caucasus has established itself in an emerging Western market, assuring new connections between that area and the Latin world. It did so in a new crucial scenario where hegemonies still pay their debt with the territories and to the objectively conditioned games of their apparatuses of influence and control. It brings, at in the same time, a new shift of the Caucasus from the Eurasian continental mass, where the Soviet world widened on the dominant Slavic empires of the early modern era.

One does then meet, through a true tectonic history, a contemporary stake of such kind, which rejoins the Mongolian or Turkish historical course, throughout the last millennia, of the Western Asian population flows (Termon, 2005). One returns, with respect to the Latinity empires and the Arab print, to the theatre par excellence of civilizations and historical games of exponential "excess." All this scenario is grounded on a literal emerging landscape for the impeding globalization. There are few dimensions in the world where international perspective also becomes a exemplary in such times, when the State assumes its Nation-like entity, still exposed to the turbulences of its regional rallying.

Turkey and Russia take shape as a counterpoint to such game where the geo-economy is dimensioned at the eleventh hour as the final body of the Azeri protagonism. The

Mediterranean escape from the Caucasus is of primary importance within this framework, which regains identity weights of a social memory and their mobilization in this specific "world-border" of Empires. At all events, and beyond the monumentality of the pipelines works, all the frame of this new Azerbaijan strategy profits from diachronic richness for that historical recovery of willful strength, at odds with the creative push of its diasporas.

The Caucasus Upstream of Difference

What is the Azerbaïdjan emergence, upon its collective recognition, working at the same time amidst new isochronal projects and the multiple architecture springs of its subjectivity?

The world of the Caucasus offers us an exemplary situation in its current search for, both, the Nation State and a stock for a "too much identity" of Empire, at an anthological crossroads of history's courses (Carrère d'Encausse, 2005). It lines up in a whole density of references *vis-à-vis* this collective unconsciousness of Islamic revivals under Western expropriation. The Azeri universe is unexpectedly reinforced by the continental role as well as by an identity willfulness played even against mega powers built as system of reason or democratic accomplishment.

In such frames of identity search, few areas in the world can claim the resosurce fullness of these "diasporas-in-the-making" as seen by Kodmani-Darwish. The last found-

ing decades show us, in this creative dialectics, the cumulative reference in their pantheons among true national dynasties and their founders, the appeal to the Nation at the time of the overflow of this historical matrix by the West, and an eventual ethnical revival brought by the addition of regionalisms, or, at distinct enclaves, the test of an unheard-of acceleration reinforced by its extremes in order to best resist against an hegemony without borders (Laruelle and Peyrouse, 2006). Their founding memory is agonistic because it is folded up over canonically generational times. It can succeed by moving forward from an empire and its ideology of reason, together with a cultural background assumed in plain secularization like a heritage. It is with the rise of a paradigm that the force of a difference, lively acquired at the globalization crossroads meets its ramparts before hegemony. Rather by an optional collective will than by an inertial drive towards the future.

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Europe for a Meta-Dialogue

Bernard Bosredon

For the title of this proposal, which I will describe as "lazy,"—surely, a Mendes-like adjective—I have relied on an almost readymade phrase that, so it seems to me, speaks for itself: a "meta-dialogue of cultures." Europe indeed commonly conceives herself as a space for dialogue between her States and the people. However, there often remains the feeling that, in Europe, any dialogue between States is a dialogue "beyond" the people, therefore, at least philologically speaking, a "meta-dialogue" between European nations, her human groups, and cultures. This meta-dialogue is only the first issue of a whole series and I would like, if you please, to further explore multiple "meta-dialogical" aspects, which the European entity now and then experiences. It is indeed possible that Europe does generate a dialogical complexity, which may be useful and transferable toward other areas of the world.

1. From Dialogue to Meta-Dialogue

Dialogue between people, North-South dialogue, dialogue between cultures, or cultures' dialogue, these are many

metaphors in which the word dialogue seems to amount to a stable pivot. In addition, it is clear that these expressions should be interpreted as a number of assertions, if not injunctions. "Dialogue between people," for example, is all about saying No! To reciprocal ignorance, and to war, at the same time affirming that people must be able to live together. The phrase "North-South dialogue" points out to the inequality between people distributed throughout vast zones. "Dialogue between cultures" or "multicultural dialogue" underlines the need for comprehension amongst those very people.

It is noted that the same actors often interpret the same roles in the same fields. Southwise, one observes countries that mainly claim their cultural, religious, institutional identities as well as equal treatment. For both South and North, these expressions resound with a categorical imperative: dialogue concerns people, i.e. different stories and memories. But sometimes they resound as expressions telling us that those dialogue-facilitating instruments are not available.

Let us initially recall that one only dialogues with one's equals. This is the first condition to be satisfied. Without it, nothing goes. But this difficulty is not insurmountable. People's difficulty in their search for dialogue is elsewhere. It is rather in the need for a research without a predetermined discovery goal. It is rather in the curiosity and desire to know our neighbours' habits, in the feeling that we do have much to learn from the others, and they can learn from us. However, the history of each people, in their own eyes, seems to have been solely made of determinations—under

every sense of this word—i.e. of collective wills and achievements. An authentic dialogue thus starts by setting such certainty between brackets. Consequently, how would you build such exchange when there is no roadmap and your interlocutors remain in the illusion, having to guess it by their rear mirror? The answer is not an easy one.

This difficulty is even greater because the larger the actors' proximity is, the stronger the stereotypes opposed to such coming together are. It is often the nearest difference that is most visible. This is what nourishes collective imaginations, which, for their turn, nourish division and hostility, by propagating fears and maintaining, in every sense of the word, the major media avid for reproduction in a space of global supply and demand. Europe is made of such closest differences, but she knew how to dissolve the old stereotypes that used to oppose Frenchmen to Germans, to Englishmen and so forth, as a number of stable categories. She can thus dissolve contemporary dichotomies such as Islam/Christianity, East/West etc, as the concomitant disappearance of the old, bipolar worlds has returned the so-called yellow and red perils to the folklore of long forgotten pulp fiction.

Europe is multiple. She is made up of various peoples. Europeans consider that their diversity, the multiplicity of their languages, very soon the lingual diversity of their children, their diversity of ways of life, all these are major assets in the European construction, which certainly predispose them to best know their immediate neighbours around the

Mediterranean and even beyond. But can she claim the counselling role of an expert, even of a judge, as regards dialogue? Can she pose herself as a meta-place for dialogue, at the service of people usually kept to themselves? Before trying an answer, one can note the existence of a form of agreement in Europe that may be thought of as the product of freely accepted constraints, and, based on such understanding, one can indeed see at work, in that part of the world, a specific form of dialogue, which I will readily describe as meta-dialogical.

Meta-Dialogue 1: the Dialogue of the Europe States

I will initially note that meta-dialogue seemingly does remain a form of dialogue. When European States engage in a "meta-dialogue" on behalf of the people, their dialogue takes place through their representatives. They find thereby a priori conditions for any possible dialogue: recognition of the other as one's equal, since one only dialogues with his equal in rights and duties. That implies passing the collective discipline of an effective multilingual system, maintained and defended in its unique richness.

However, contrary to the type of international relations practised by the ordinary diplomacy, these dialogical liaisons are based on a Charter, which constitutes such equality ratio before any dialogue. The option for the levelling relation is therefore not an expression of the will—i.e. the precise "entry into dialogue." It is pre-built. This dialogue is

therefore not a complete dialogue because such relation, established between two European States, is never simply binary; it is underlain by the whole equality relations stated by the Charter. Consequently, this is rather a live "multilogue" within what it is commonly called multi-laterality. Such "multilogue" constitutes today the modus operandi of the Union's democratic life. And whenever the pulsation of interactions is simplified into a simple relation between a State and the Union, incarnated by the Committee—or, even worse, limited to two States of the Union—, we are no longer far from complicity or illicit liaison and, in any case, we are touching the lowest level of the citizens' life in Europe.

This "multilogue dialogue" is thus built based on a European agreement that binds equal States in their rights and duties. But est modus in rebus: this equality, like others, is but formal, as it is the case with any formalism that ends up weighing up the reality of things and the product of effects. Essence is here: the "major members" of the Union well know that the union itself is indeed larger than they are. The "small countries" of the Union do know that they are minor parties of such vaster entity and that, beyond economic, political and, no matter what one may say, diplomatic inequalities, Member States are accepted like equal partners of a "multilogue," therefore devoted to a new form of meta-democracy by means of interposed States. Let us call "meta-dialogue 1" this meta-dialogue, which rests on a number of freely accepted constraints. It develops itself among European citizens throughout their States.

This first meta-dialogical form is a question of treaties. It is thus within the range of many, provided the will of States relaying their fellow-citizens is sufficiently continuing, provided the texts are sufficiently constrictive, provided every one seemingly takes daily advantage and—I may add, as a strictly personal comment—as long as any business is relatively kept, for some time, far from the political sensitivity of citizenships, if we may judge from the state of opinions in Europe, and provided the stakes of national politicking are never involved.

2. Meta-Dialogue-2: Dialogue for a "Meta"

I mentioned above that Europe could not set herself as a judge of good practices as regards dialogue. Nevertheless, I would keep her eyes bandaged like an allegory—that of Justice—which she cannot incarnate. Because Europe is at work, even if she cannot see what she is to become tomorrow. She is, therefore, blind. Also—to parody Galileo—, I will say: "but still it moves." With economic union and a single currency, Europe moved from lawful integration to gradual institutional integration. Currently, Europe is knowledge, development through knowledge, and brains. It is not an easy conclusion that contemporary European achievements and building sites did originate from the earlier integration of the coal and steel single market. It would be more reasonable to say that the current situation corresponds to a simply foreseeable result.

Europe, whose most tangible reality in the eyes of her fellow-citizens is certainly the history of her development, may be defined, in its beginnings as well as at each moment of her history, as a new form of an integrative process. No plan was designed because the term of the process was not preset. This is all about a project, not a plan. This curious object features something of a scientific laboratory, and something of a workspace driving at discoveries without an a priori plan. In this place, ahead of people's freedom, a new political reality is worked out based on the denial of Division and its corollary, Collective death.

Side by side with the preceding meta-dialogic construction, Europe thus presents a quite different experiment, that of an inbuilt meta-dialogue in progress. She dialogues with what she is not quite yet; she dialogues with her own desire for Europe. In this sense, she is definitely a meta-dialogue, thereby her true nature, a nature in permanent gestation, and a nature that, one wonders, contains perhaps its own end. This is an essential dimension of the European dialogical specificity that I would like to illustrate, at this stage of the reflection, with two European "meta-dialogic" experiments, namely the Bologna Process and Lisbon strategy, on one side, and the Euro-Mediterranean dialogue, on the other.

3. Meta-Dialogues

The Bologna Process of building a European space for higher education constitutes a perfect illustration of meta-

dialogue-1 and meta-dialogue-2, which we have defined. It is essentially a meta-dialogue-1 because it includes over forty countries. This is an area of the World that covers, eastbound, countries from Iceland to Turkey and, north-bound, from Portugal to Finland. Economic shifts, cultural and linguistic diversities are considerable. Yet, starting with some simple directives proposed at the Sorbonne in 1997, which were set up and defined in Bologna in the following year—i.e. two major graduation cycles, Licensing and MBA (then, afterwards, Doctorate), a system of credit transfers (ECTS), quality-assurance and student-centred dispositions—Europe has taken a considerable step in her meta-dialogue with the States to build a common space for higher educa-tion. This *is* a meta-dialogue-1, since it is a multilogue be-tween Europe and her States.

The next stage, a common space for research provided by the European Council of Research, completes the dispo-sition of a European space for higher education, research, and development, because we now know that such triple as-pect is a strategic axis of development. The Lisbon strategy, fitting in the European Council of Research, aims to trans-form the European economy, between now and 2010, into "the most competitively knowledgeable and most dynamic economy in the world, capable of durable economic growth, accompanied by qualitative and quantitative growth of em-ployment as well as greater social cohesion, respecting the environment." Let us emphasize, in such strategy, that it endeavours to build a European response to the new globa-

lisation data, and that such response is at the service of multi-polarity rather than alignment. Thereby, it builds a space of decisions and autonomy.

One finds herein something of the old clerk circulation space. However, this mobility is not reserved to an elite. It is rather directed to the greatest number, because we have already surpassed in Europe the difficult course of the higher education "massification." people want to be able to move, to go-get, anywhere where there are qualifications and jobs. For that, it is indeed necessary that higher education be largely recognized by different institutions belonging to different areas in Europe. All this implies strong engagement by the States. One can also expect effects on the States themselves. Students, professors and researchers who move from one country to another, according to certain training and/or research programmes, represent, beyond any anticipations of economic appreciation, the certainty of a European citizenship, tomorrow.

Accounting for such future results is a meta-dialogue of another level about which we have spoken above, a meta-dialogue-2. The Bologna Process actually equates and interacts with what was built along a sustained plural history like as a number of complex idiosyncrasies. And, if we may legitimately expect from a higher education "Common Market" effects similar to those produced by the organization of a single market of products, we are before a new space, that of the possible emergence of a new citizenship, fruit of the movement of the women and men who are being educated.

A Meta-dialogue indeed, because such grossly "upwards" construction leaves very little place to licensed, idiosyncratically structured institutional interlocutors. Universities thus trace new roads under no preset plan, however equipped with a few principles, forums, and networks.

Another meta-dialogue, where Europe should play a driving part, is the work to be achieved between two banks of the Mediterranean and, beyond such banks, in the depth of her closest territories. We do know that the situation is serious and insecurity threatens us. However, we must not make allow simply safeguarding actions to direct all actions, quite to the contrary. The Barcelona Process led to a certain progress, certainly still limited (MEDA, Agadir Trade Agreements, associations agreements etc.), and its continuation is too slow. Civil society actors *can* play a reinforced role. Regional cooperation, ditto. The last conference on regional co-operation between France and Morocco, which was held in Rabat in January 2006, showed the effectiveness of relations established between areas and cities. It underlined the powerful role that may be played by the universities in the follow-up or support to projects. Universities in networks, on both sides of the Mediterranean, bring expertise, carry out exchange programmes that allow their teachers and students to initiate researches and produce innovation, particularly on the difficult issue of water. The Barcelona Process eventually emphasized the often-determinant roles played by bi-national, even bicultural actors who sometimes actually carry the responsibility of elected

officials, in their host country. Europe can implement this type of regional action.

I would like, in conclusion, to return to the essential idea of a Europe initiator and engine of a meta-dialogue, which only concerns her. The European meta-dialogue is indeed a dialogue not limited by its nature to the relations between Europe and certain zones of the world, even if it must hold account of the diversity of interlocutors and the disparity of their means. For more than one century, Europe has shown that a peaceful coexistence of languages and cultures and multiple Weltanschauungen are indeed possible. She anticipates, not necessarily exhibiting its pre-built image, a society of unstable, precarious peace, however with a universal scope. And such ambition turns its back against both local identities and globalisation of products and services. In this sense, Europe is both dialogue and a space of idiosyncratic dialogue. She lives out her objectives, which privilege the formation of a rising generation of executives, the support toward researches, the demand for balanced partnerships and, on certain zones experiencing an appalling economic underdevelopment, an in-depth alert against pivot partnerships in order to prevent the breakout of graduates. Youth is a major actor of this meta-dialogue. Youths were not directly acquainted with the times of colonialism. In other countries, they are upright and mobilize themselves to build a righter and more democratic world. Everywhere in the world, they show an exacerbated sensitivity with regard to international balances and do not consider planetary scale at all beyond

their range. New technologies of communications, Internet etc bring them new ways of action. More than the preceding generations, they show an astonishing capacity to experience cultural and linguistic complexity.

The Goal of University through Globalization

Gianni Vattimo

It is mostly due to commercial exchanges and technological unifications that globalization, in which the whole world is involved, is developing with great speed. Although it is an economical and technological globalization, it's not very different from all the other forms of homologation between cultures of the past: not only the crusades were a huge economic and commercial issue, but also pilgrimage; devotion and fear of hell, in Medieval age (cfr. Duby) used to induce rich landowners to leave, in forms of testaments, their goods to the church, contributing in a significant way to the distribution of wealth in society at the time. But if today the economic-technological nature of globalization is felt more intensely by everyone, it's due to the speed in which it develops through computer science. It is from here that a very sensitive imbalance is created between globalization of goods and technologies on the one hand, and the much slower "globalization" of cultures, customs, and ethics on the other hand. According to my thesis, it is here that the so-called "clash-of-civilizations" has its roots. It seems to me that the two speeds through which both processes of

globalization happen produce a friction from which the racial, religious, and political conflicts arise.

Naturally, the task of the universities in this situation cannot only be that of simply accelerating globalization also on the cultural level as it occurs, for example, when people say that all the world should get used to speak English. If civilizations and cultures between each other become similar through a very slow process, it is not only due to a practical problem, because the "historical" nature of cultures and customs also consists in the fact that their maturation requires time. The same Latin term for "religion" indicates the direction of "binding," to adjust to something from the past, to its roots, that although it appears natural, it is remote for the individuals and its community in which they recognize themselves. Paradoxically, culture follows a rather natural rhythm or, we could also say, it tries to keep alive those "natural" roots that experimental sciences and technologies tend dissolve in its own abstract universality—such as the mathematical language. It is probably in this opposition that justifications can be found for those propositions of great rational project of a universal language—from Leibniz's "naturalistic" to the Esperanto—were never able of substituting the "natural" languages. All the formalized and purified languages need, to be instituted and function, the background of a natural language, as can be seen in Goedel's theory of incompleteness. It is verified here a phenomenon that seems to turn upside down the metaphysical tradition effective from Plato to Nietzsche and Heidegger: in Platonism, the

empirical knowledge had to be overcome by the scientific
and philosophical knowledge that was supposed to elevate
itself from the world of ideas where it would be freed from
any historical mutations. The truth model of Platonism we-
re mathematics and geometry, the essences of things had
the same eternal and immutable nature of figures and num-
bers. But today, according to a development that Heidegger
taught us to call the "end of metaphysics," philosophical
knowledge seems to have just that task to re-establish the
ideological essences in their historical context. It is not sur-
prising that this outcome comes about just in the epoch of
fundamentalism and terrorism, that is, in our age of "clash
of civilizations." It is exactly Heidegger, once again, that
tells us that metaphysics—hence, the identification of Being
with the stability of ideal un-mutable form, mathematical
entities or general laws of nature, on which science and
technologies are constructed, which are also applicable ev-
erywhere—comes to an end just when it becomes a general
law of the existing real world: just when the rational and
pure order of the world becomes, in general terms, "real," it
reveals its human indefensibility. Also, in Theodore Ador-
no's theory, the illuminist ideal of a universal rationality,
from the instant that technology makes it possible through
"total organization," appears unacceptable for our everyday
life. Let's imagine this through a recent example: generally
what has been called the "US Empire" is actually very real
indeed because they are the greatest world power and that
cosmopolitan order that the UN was not able to bring for-

ward, is actually produced today by the Pentagon and the, moral or un-moral, US laws. It is just in this moment—as the Iraq situation shows us—that fundamentalism and terrorist of all sorts are in full expansion and also seem much more violent than at the times of the Cold War when two superpowers were certainly in a dangerous balance, but at least much more stable comparing to what we have to deal with now. Even the "US Empire," with its order under menace from local revolts and from a general social disorder, is a consequence of a different speed of globalization, a manifestation of the "natural languages" revolts against the English speaking Universality which have become of the language of communication and commerce, and whose generality is the same as the mathematical language of science.

Could one think of the task of Universities in terms of safeguard of differences, of the confirmation of the roots of local cultures, without this contradicting the traditional "platonic," metaphysical, and illuminist understanding of Universities?

With such a question what has been traditionally considered the European and developed world regions university culture of Western modernity finally receives a real task for transforming, or at least revising itself not only in Europe, but in the whole developed world. This world itself was actually constructed on the basis of the discoveries of experimental sciences, which were massively applied on all spheres of life. University's culture has always been, during the centuries of modernity, a fusion between "sciences of

nature" and "human sciences," that is, in the structure of universities it has always been more separated and at the same time in un-stable equilibrium. When Kant, at the end of the seventeenth century, entitled one of his essays "The Contest of Faculties" (1798) he was not alluding at a clash between the faculties of Reasons, to which he dedicated his three Critiques, but to the sections in which it was already divided ("*gleichsam fabrikmäßige*") in the university. To-day, this equilibrium which already at the time of Kant, was an object of discussion, has became more and more precari-ous. People like us that teach in the so-called humanities feel increasingly, in the Western World, as dinosaurs condem-ned sooner or later to extinction unless someone comes up with a new social cause that could be drawn from professors of history, literature, theology and so on… In recent years, for example, the European Union launched as a directive for its own development, the so-called "Lisbon Program" [in March 2000]—called thus because of the town where this EU Members reunion took place—which was titled "Eu-rope of Knowledge." Not only the original content of the document, but also the interpretation it went through in the following years by the Governments and Institutions, dem-onstrated that the term "knowledge" was here understood in the strict and precise sense of scientific knowledge with a particular attention to the one susceptible to technological application in industrial scale. Of course, not only biologic sciences are part of this understanding of knowledge and therefore their application to medicine, agriculture, and fo-

od, but also those sciences that promise a development of the interplanetary explorations which, until now, do not seem to render any economic applications if we do not consider the possible discovery of useful minerals from other planets and the case of interplanetary interments, for which some enterprises have already risen in the United States. Obviously, I do not ignore that at the ground of the development of each knowledge the Lisbon Program places the learning of writing and reading, which is a personal richness useful to the culture of the spirit. But in general, most of the effort to promote knowledge in the West, is strictly oriented towards the scientific and technological development with the specific purpose, obvious in the Lisbon Program, to prepare the European nations to win the international economic competition: more scientific knowledge means more technological creativity, therefore, a more competitive force in the world-wide market… The devaluation, lost of prestige, and social recognition human sciences texts and teachers in recent years have undergone, is a proof of the direction towards which we are all heading. Also, the enormous rise of new "specializations"—in the world of computer science, of show-business, of communication (from the rapid transportation of merchandise to the "confectioning" of the same merchandise, to the "logistic," which few of us could define)—happen most of the time out-side schools and universities, not only because most public schools are frequently much more slow in adjusting their program of studies to the latest industrial discoveries, but also because the same

structure of traditional schools and universities (books, lecture classes, divided exams) is not adapted to the new kind of "instruction" that it actually needs. Many of the new works, also the most technological ones, that today are demanded—not only in show-business, communication, but also in the distribution of merchandise—may only be learned in structures that are similar to the *bottega,* craftsman or artistic "work-shops" of the past and not in formal institutions such as schools and universities. I'm recalling all this because it seems to me that also independently from the problem of the humanistic education; today's school and university must conceive knowledge and culture through new terminologies from their own tradition. In order to concentrate on humanistic education—which is the one that needs the greater amount of protection, since the techno-scientific one is "naturally" pushed forward by economy—I would like to invite you all to remember that it has survived in modernity because it was able to fulfill also social tasks in part clearly economic or at least socially useful (for example in the realm of legal sciences [Kelsen]) or because it help to prepare other human sciences "distributors" (masters and teachers or even preachers from various religions…). But already today the request of human sciences teachers tends to reduce itself more and more to primary education, in other words, who will study philosophy or literature at a university level if these disciplines progressively vanish from secondary school and therefore do not offer any employment perspectives?

Obviously, it is not a question of being aware of this tendency, hence that with globalization it has become more and more important to adjust the university structure to this new situation, but rather what we are supposed to remember is that in the contest of faculties that Kant talked about, the humanities are destined to succumb, at least if the dominant criteria is that of the scientific value that they are "supposed" to have. Already today an academic thesis on Hegel, Heidegger, or Kant is a scientifically "impossible" work: the author would have to know an interminable bibliography, which he will not be able to read completely. But even so, in this terrain, apart from discoveries of new material (such as an un-known manuscript of Kant; a pre-historic town that came out from some archeological site), the scientific value is brought forward primarily from the discussion of other texts from the same theme… Human sciences, have until now, in order not to succumb in the contest of faculties, only tried to imitate scientific sciences adjusting themselves to rigorous and "objective" criteria. But also for practical reasons (there are far too many specialist on Hegel as on Kant in the world) such a criteria (the work done on the theme, hence the other books on the theme) becomes the more absurd. We rather call valid and original a study on Kant or Hegel that achieves reading these authors in such a new perspective that would be useful for today in order to understand our life. And often this occurs without any "objective" thoroughness. But, as one can easily see, a similar criterion of value has much to do with the taste, sensibility

(of the student and his judgments). The problem lies in the fact that of such a criteria human sciences are often ashamed because it always seemed to them too subjective and little susceptible of a rigorous application—as it often happens for public academic competitions.

The crisis of the humanities in today's western education, that we may recognize in examples such as the ones I just mentioned (the Lisbon Program, the clash of faculties, the reduction to absurdity of the scientific character of the "search" in philosophy, literature, history, to not mention theology contexts) shows, as far as I'm concern, that the modern conception of knowledge, basically inspired from the Enlightenment ideal, by now is not practicable. On the one hand, the efficiency of research and of its technical applications demands by now levels of specializations that are so elevated that impose to the experts of the various sectors a form of isolation and separation from common culture that can no more find any solution in the economic gratifications and social prestige that they are attributed to. On the other hand, human sciences, when they do not structure themselves (cognitive, biological sciences) on experimental knowledge cannot ground themselves anymore on values of criteria's that are revealed always more and more absurd.

If this is the problem—and this can be disputed—a solution (of which I do not dispose, of course) should be to start searching from a distinctive point of view authoritatively brought forward from Kant, and resumed by Heidegger in terms that seem scandalous, but actually aren't. Heidegger,

in "What is Called Thinking" published in 1954 (a course delivered at the University of Freiburg in 1951-1952) declared that "science does not think" because when it knows, it only knows the "phenomena," the totality of the objects that allow themselves to be placed in space and time and deal according to some categories. For Kant, on the other hand, thought deals with the "thought" (in Greek: the "noumenon"), hence with all that is not the phenomenon. More than God, the soul, human freedom, the nuomeno is for us, as for Heidegger, the totality of conditions that render possible the knowledge of phenomenon: we would say of our cultural heredity and life wisdom that is handed through the language we talk amounts to the "knowledge" (but not objective since it is not thematic and explicitly argued) that we dispose as members of a community (as what we have assimilated in the arts, literature, moral and religious education). We could identify all this also within the sphere of values based on which we judge life and that guide us in our relation with others. The progressive liquidation of humanities from our scholastic institutions threatens just this sphere of "contents" that are objects neither of experimental science nor of demonstration. We could also say (and I have made such a proposition in a debate at the UNESCO) that to the society of knowledge, of the techno-scientific wisdom, we intend to place side by side (certainly not oppose) a society of *loisir*, of games (for Kant the experience of beauty, in nature and in art, is the "free game of faculties" in the sense of the of the soul faculty). A society of knowledge—of sci-

ence and of technique—risks to being also a violent society, at least when it excludes from education that terrain of vital knowledge, knowledges of the *Lebenswelt* that help to configure the social relations, from being together of communities till political democracy. It is clear that to capture these wisdoms from the scholastic and university education cannot mean to teach them as scientific knowledges. It is possible only to do it by recuperating ancient models of "*universitas*"—the community of academics and disciples, the spirits of the craftsman or artistic "work-shops" or also by creating models of educative relations different from those too rigid inspired by the "hard" sciences. These of course, cannot be at the same time liquidated even though one may hope that the proximity with the contemporary human sciences instructions effect a less rigid and formal way the learning of hard sciences and technologies in order to try to make them acquire a more human nature as an old book by Hubert Dreyfus (1972) is entitled *What Computers Still Can't Do: A Critique of Artificial Reason.* Many of the activities in which the results of scientific research may be applied to technology can be brought forward by robots—even though this is still a dream for the time being, but it is a legitimate dream: for example, just like until today man has progressively freed himself from the manual work through the invention of machines, it is not that absurd that machines (the thinking machines of cyberneticists) may freed themselves one day from the fatigue of calculations, of learning the laws of matter, of tables and theorems, in order to only

leave them the task of "creation." Also scientist, have progressively become conscious of the aesthetics aspect of their work, that might imply that they recognize that neither is their work that far from the loisir, the game for which, at the end, real human existence ought to exist. We are certainly talking about prospective that are quite far away, but it is just the university that has today the task to study and prepare its realization.

Islam: Waiting for Post-Islamism

Alain Roussillon

The transformations of Islam's practices and discourse in the late 1990s have led some observers to invent the post-Islamism category. Supposed to designate a new ideological age on Islam land, this category sends back to a series of logics and players that disavow the initial Islamism project (and in particular the construction of an Islamic State). The rise of new Muslim intellectuals, favored by the development of communication tools, and the appearance of discourses praising the individual success or values of market economy, would thus mark the decline of Islamism in favor of new, and more subtle forms of societies' Islamization.

That these phenomena—unexpected hybridizations brought about, among others, by globalization—exist is not doubtful. But that the post-Islamism category may account for the entire current religious and political configurations in the Muslim world has on the other hand nothing certain. Its generality risks particularly masking the complexity and mostly the ambivalence of the number of procedures at work in Muslim societies.

From Islamism to Post-Islamism

Since its emergence in the 1930s, or its reemergence in the 1970s—those who took Nasser, Bourguiba or Boumediene for "secularists" did not perceive anymore—, that political Islam has gone by, in the vision of observers in Europe or the United States by three "phases" in the midst of whom one can identify both *pseudo* and *quasi* paradigms, structuring the analysis grid, independently of positions (sympathetic or hostile) adopted by said observers in relation to the phenomenon itself.

One would have at first attended the "return" or the "reawakening" *(sahwa)* of Islam: actors manifested, since the mid-1970s, reviving the observation (drawn up by Hasan al-Banna in the 1920s, afterwards radicalized by Sayyid Qutb in the 1960s) according to which it would be no longer possible to live as a good Muslim in society. From this observation, they draw political and/or social programs where they enter into conflict with the State/the political power. Some will see in this process the effect of a "return of the frustrated" in contexts marked by the defeat of developmental projects, of nationalist inspiration and by a generalized legitimacy[1] crisis. Others (sometimes themselves) underscore the rise of economic and political exclusions striking sectors more and more numerous and educated in society, effect of deregulation policies in which regimes in power are engaged.

In both cases, these processes would command phenomena of *conversion* in the contexts where Islamic religious

reference appears as the last source of legitimacy and, simultaneously, of contestation—the only language in which the elites in place or protesters might further hope to make themselves understood by the masses. Gilles Kepel has undertaken to deliver *ex post* what seems to him to be the "formula" for this moment: the Islamic contestation of regimes in power would only result in their overthrow and the establishment of an "Islamic" power where an alliance would be successful in tying and maintaining itself between "pious bourgeoisies," "poor urban youth" and "Muslim intellectuals," this could only occur in Khomeynist Iran, in lesser degree in Sudan where Islamism serve as a smokescreen to a northern military dictatorship, and, in caricature, in the Afghanistan of Talibans.[2]

In the early 1990s, a second phase begins: "the defeat of political Islam," or even "decline of Islamism" would be the order of the day. A double defeat, in fact: the one of Muslims reproducing somewhere else the Iranian "model," as in Egypt or Algeria where armed conflict with the regimes in power turns into advantage of those supported by Westerners, scared by the threat of contagion in vital regions to their interests, particularly concerning energy. And mainly a defeat to give rise to an "Islamic" political formula linking religion and politics and liable to present an alternative to nationalism and theocratic feudalities in power in the Arabian Peninsula, Saudi Arabia at the top. Olivier Roy was one of the first ones to record, in 1992, what seemed to him to be the symptoms of disillusion in the very bosom of Iranian

bastion, where men of religion and intellectuals, previously won over by the cause of Islamic revolution, came to "denounce this association between Islam and politics that illegitimates, in the long run, the first, all in making serene exercise of the second impossible."[3] It is G. Kepel who, once again, stated here the most optimistic hypothesis, or the most consensual, anticipating the beginning of a new age,

> with the twenty first century [which] will see undoubtedly the Muslim world going into straight forward modernity, according to unheard fusion modes with the western universe—particularly by the expedient of emigration and their effect, the telecommunications and information revolution.[4]

Soluble Islamism in the markets, the Internet and democracy…

It is remarkable that, in a third phase, the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks did not fundamentally return in question the hypothesis of "post-Islamism"[5] which has seemed to be the French contribution to this debate since the late 1990s, in the field that I refer to as the one of "neo-orientalism,"[6] based on this observation of defeat. On the one hand, in the logic of its globalization and dislocation of its operations, jihadism seems to be, a little paradoxically, an extreme post-Islamism manifestation, breaking off from what had constituted the very objective of Islamism *stricto sensu*, namely, the overthrow and construction of the Islamic State. The political offshoots of' Al-Qaida and its emulators would have in return for effect, a little everywhere, to

stimulate Islamic groups to try to obtain from the States in Power their political normalization, by solemnly disowning violence, accepting pluralism and presenting themselves as the warmest partisans of the democratic game. On the other hand, often in the laudable intention of preventing the merger between "Islam" and its most "repulsive" manifestations in the eyes of western opinions, certain observers are from now on mindful of the emergence of new manifestations of "how can one be a Muslim?"[7] The findings here are unanimous: The rise of a "post-Islamism" does not mean in any way that concerned societies or players would give up wanting to be Muslims. Better: it does not translate a reflux of imaginary social-politics built on referent Islamic religious. As O. Roy remarks, "the political Islamism reflux is accompanied by the advance of Islam as a social phenomenon."[8]

The Faces of Post-Islamism

By schematizing, three records are most often invoked and documented to account for the ways and issues of the emergence of players and logics identified as "post-Islamic."

We refer at first to the appearance of "new Muslim intellectuals."[9] After Christianity and Judaism, Islam's turn would finally come to be submitted to *interiorly* albeit still in a marginal manner, to human and social sciences investigation methods: implementation of new hermeneutics based

on critical approaches of sacred texts, particularly the Koran itself; revival of the personal interpretation effort (*ijtihâd*); placement of the "models" in historical perspective, particularly political models (caliphate, imamat, jihad…), inherited from Pious Ancestors… With for effect a relativization of the religious law centrality (*sharî'a*) to the benefit of cultural dimensions of belonging to Islam, the rehabilitation of religious pluralism, an opening to the problematic of Human's rights and establishing necessary conditions for the revival of a true inter-religions dialog.

We underscore next the emergence of new action records and systems, particularly in the economic and social spheres: globalization of markets and exchanges, including university exchanges, would have favored consolidation of new social economies, mobilizing the virtues of "good management," restoring also personal success and individual enrichment, maybe even the consumerism, when these would be "purified" by the respect of rules of an economic moral reputed to me Muslim, rejecting monopolization and enrichment without cause (*riba,* incorrectly translated as "usury")—but no capitalist exploitation of labor.[10] Social economies that would equally render possible consolidation of new modes of mobilization and action of "Islamic civilian societies," more and more independent in relation to the States and linked to transnational information and communication networks.

Finally, one rests on the emergence of new legal and ethical standards: reaffirmation of categorical imperative of

respect to religious commands, more than ever, socially expected from one end to the other of the Muslim sense universe, on one hand would tend to be accompanied by a narrowing of their field of application, and on the other hand, would be offset by giving rise to individual assertion and right to separation from the public sphere and private sphere in religious matter. The vigorous self-assertion of an "Islamic feminism," both in Muslim societies themselves and in the midst of Muslim communities in Europe or the United States, is what gives rise, in the most visible manner, to this regulatory and ethical renewal, noticed by several western feminist movements during the French debate concerning the veil.

The Limits of a Category

The abuse of foregoing conditional and quotation marks in the text didn't seek to question the very existence of original manifestations, often deeply innovative, of "how can one be a Muslim?": the "new Muslim intellectuals" exist, one can meet them, as well as the "Islamic feminists;" in Turkey or somewhere else—even in Iran, including by electing a "radical" president to succeed reformist Mr. Khatami[11]—, political forces exploit the paths of a "Muslim democracy," like one speaks about "Christian democracy," and companies like *Mekka Cola* have undertaken to apply the most sophisticated marketing techniques to the promotion of explicitly communal consumerism.

It would rather be about pointing out what would seem to me like the fundamental ambiguity and the limits of the "post-Islamism" category, ambiguities and limits that it shares anyway with other, likewise articulated—post-modernism, post-communism, post-Nation-State… Egyptian political scientist Diaa Rashwan, among others, emphasizes the fact that those who mobilize this kind of categories

> suggest, implicitly or explicitly, that certain phenomena [characteristics of a world they believe began to disappear a decade ago] perpetuate themselves however with the end of the "old" world, without bringing to light accurate outlines of the new world that has supplanted this.[12]

Without going, like him, even into seeing a characterized illustration of *wishful thinking*, one can identify, in the records and even the lands where the post-Islamic hypothesis partisans see the most evidential manifestations of the Islamism reflux, a certain number of liable indications to put the scope into context.

First of all, the "new Muslim intellectuals" exist. They are characterized even all the same time by the great diversity of their origins[13] and remarkable convergence of their measure. Their daring leads some observers to see in the period that is opining "a period of as deep changes to the Muslim world as the ones determined by the protestant Reformation were to Christianity."[14] This new age would be marked by a "reintellectualization" of Islam made possible by the new means of communication, Internet and satellite, which gave rise to a class of "micro-intellectuals" having

the widest access to global Muslim community. No doubt. But, however, a good number among them have been compelled to exile—such as Iranian Abdulkarim Soroush, South African Farid Esack, Egyptian Nasr Abou Zayd or Sudanese Abdulahi Al-Na'im, who work henceforth at European or U.S. institutions and essentially express themselves in English, main debate language, which they host. In most cases, what drives them into exile, is the rise to power and body of oulemans, in favor of confrontation between Islamite and the powers in place, of which they have taken advantage to gain an growing independence and to exercise an ever growing supercilious censorship over the entire intellectual and artistic production. We can then ask ourselves, undoubtedly forcing somewhat the quality, if the main interlocutors of these new Muslim intellectuals are not the (western) observers who recognize them as such.

Next, favoring the emergence of what O. Roy or D. Eickelman name as a de-territorialized "virtual *Umma*," no one doubts that the Internet would have contributed to a perception globalization of problems put forth by the interactions between "Islam" and "modernity." One only has to visit the countless sites dedicated to the promotion of a "XXI century Islam" to note what is presented as a meaning flow reversal: whereas standards in force in Muslim societies (in their "origin societies") were supposed, if not impose, at least to serve as models to "emigrated" Muslim communities, which are henceforth, the Internet helping, more and more often specific problems faced by these populations—those related to their interactions with "moder-

nity"—who tend to guide regulatory production, *including in societies with Muslim majority.* Production of behavioral models at the same time "Muslim" and "modern" is thereby explicitly the objective of a militant Tariq Ramadan for the cause of an "European Islam" conceived as the laboratory of an *aggiornamento* of the Prophet's religion. The problem here is of vicissitudes to which Muslim communities are opposed in the different contexts where they are installed, about which there would not be a question of stopping here, but that do not fail to influence in return over the pending reformulations of Islamic movements in Muslim countries, as well shown by the Islamic veil affair in France.

Last but not least*,* it seems to be confirmed that one of the most decisive evolutions initiated in the course of the last years concerns numerous militants' abandon of the Islamic State construction problematic, along with the refluxes of *sharî'a* related application claims, but the abandon of these objectives has for counterpart the ever more pressing claim of those groups to a formal participation in the political scenario on explicitly community-minded bases. With the risk of confusing limits between morals and politics and between a public sphere and private sphere where minorities of all types risk to pay the price, as we have been able to verify, for example, at the time of the wave of persecution that hit Egyptian homosexuals in 2001, pushed by authorities, no doubt, concerned with giving pious opinion security.

Produced by western observers—as, in its time the one of "Islamism"—the "post-Islamism" category, risks well,

ultimately, presenting the same insufficiencies and being
exposed to the same approaches as that one. Now and retros-
pectively, the greatest weakness of Islamism categories in
Muslim societies has been, in my opinion, of widely con-
founding the problems put forth in Muslim societies of this
last quarter century—demographic, rural exodus, educa-
tion, social injustice problems, political deadlocks…—and
languages used by the players in attendance to announce the
stakes, all in relating these languages to a "truth of Islam,"
unmovable and global, horizon susceptible sense to trans-
pose itself from one end to the other of Muslim World. With
for effect, on the other hand, to make difficult to think inter-
actions between different player categories demanding a re-
ligious referee—oulemas, State apparatus or dynasties,
properly Islamic—when even the unity of this scene or this
movement is found postulated; and, on the other hand, to re-
duce the analysis of contemporary Muslim societies to the
one of discourses and practices of their most radical compo-
nents, if not the most marginal ones. If we do not beware,
approaches in terms of "post-Islamism" hold the same risk,
somehow inverted: the one accompanying back the cultu-
ralist truism constituting orientalism and its "neo" avatars,
of an irreducible Muslim exception.

Notes

1. For example, François Burgat, *L'islamisme en face*, Paris, La
   Découverte, 1995; Michael Hudson, *Arab politics, the search for
   legitimacy*, New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977.

2. G. Kepel, *Jihad. Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l'islamisme*, Paris, Gallimard, 2000. Paradoxically, countries like Pakistan, Morocco or Saudi Arabia seem to observes, this first moment, not to be concerned with these phenomena: Islam would not have to "wake up" as it is always already in the foundation of political order. These countries would thereby be, at least for some time, sheltered from Islamic "contagion" of which it was beginning to be informed that it was in the process of acquiring Muslim regions reputed to be "peripheral"—Central Asia, Balkans, China, India…—or even, in the underground, European metropolitan suburbs.

3. O. Roy and F. Khosrokhavar, *Iran: comment sortir d'une révolution religieuse*, Paris, Seuil, May 1999.

4. G. Kepel, *op. cit.*, p. 11.

5. For example, "Le post-islamisme," *Revue des Mondes musulmans et de la Méditerranée*, n. 85-6, March 1999, coordinated by O. Roy and Patrick Haenni.

6. A. Roussillon, "Les islamologues dans l'impasse," *Esprit*, 8-9, August-September 2001. The question here would not be of those who, on one side and the other of the Atlantic, see in Islam a convenient adversary in replacement of communism, against which to assert the superiority of the West in a more or less explicit logic of "chock of civilizations."

7. For example, John Esposito and F. Burgat (eds.), *Modernizing islam: religion in the public sphere in the Middle East and Europe*, New Brunswig, Rutgers University Press, 2003.

8. O. Roy, *op. cit.*, p. 105.

9. Abdou Filali-Ansary, *Réformer l'islam?*, Paris, La Découverte, 2003; Rachid Benzine, *Les nouveaux penseurs de l'islam*, Paris, Albin Michel, 2004; Farish Noor, *New voices of Islam*, Leiden, ISIM, 2002; J. Esposito and J. Voll, *Makers of Contemporary Islam*, New York, Oxford University Press, 2001.

10. For example, Patrick Haenni, *L'islam de marché, l'autre révolution conservatri*ce, Paris, Seuil, 2005.

11. After all—and if we do the part of control of candidacies exercised by the Revolutionary Guard Council runned by Ali Khamenei,

Ayatollah Khomeyni's heir—the presidential polling unrolled under remarkably "democratic" conditions, if we hold into the correctness of voting operation, the elected candidate is unquestionably the one chosen by the majority of the electoral body.

12. Diaa Rashwan, "Wishful thinking, present and future," *Al-Ahram Weekly*, 572, 7-13 February 2002.
13. A. Roussillon, *La pensée islamique contemporaine. Acteurs et enjeux*, Paris, Téraèdre, 2005.
14. Dale Eickelman, "Inside the Islamic Reformation", *Wilson Quarterly* 22, n. 1, Winter 1998, p. 82.

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