

The Weight of the Collective: a Freudian Perspective

Sergio Paulo Rouanet

Professor Candido Mendes has asked me to comment on the weight of “collective totalities” in the world today. I shall start by opposing two main types of collectivity—culture and society—and by outlining schematically the role to be played by the individual in each of them.

In effect, the collective may be a cultural entity, and refer to a group, an ethnicity, or even a “civilization,” in the sense of Huntington. The status of the individual depends on the limits or absence of limits assigned to the collectivity. We may assert the primacy of the group, and even speak of a group mind or a group soul, a general structure of binding beliefs partly or entirely determining the con-

sciousness and behavior of individuals. This would be a historicist position, usually associated with the name of Herder. Or we may proclaim, in the liberal tradition, the sovereignty of the individual, holder of universal rights, going beyond national or cultural borders, irrespective of the specific community in which he or she happen to be inserted.

Alternatively, the collective whole may have a political or sociological physiognomy. The individual is no longer conceived as part of a *culture*, in which conflicts are masked by an overarching pattern of symbols and beliefs, but as part of *society*, in which conflicts are explicitly recognized and mechanisms are provided for their arbitration. In a democracy, the individual is protected from illegitimate State controls and is able to participate in the decision-making process. The issue, here, is to find out to what extent individuals in these societies are really free, or have succumbed to what La Boétie called “voluntary oppression,” induced by “false consciousness,” a useful Marxian concept that seems to have fallen into disrepute.

What is the present plight of the individual, in those two variants? Let me state at once that my answer will be somewhat biased by my sympathy for the Enlightenment. I prefer to avow from the start the full extent of my iniquities. I don't consider the Enlightenment as the forerunner of colonialism and sexism, nor do I think, with John Gray, that Nazism is heir to the Enlightenment. If

Nazism is heir to anything, it is heir to German romanticism, which is one of the main strands of Counter-Enlightenment. I agree with Peter Gay, who named Enlightenment “the politics of decency.” I further believe that as a historical movement it may be dated, but that its spirit survives, as Todorov asserted in a recently published book, *L'esprit des Lumières*. I would go further, and suggest, with the indirect support of Jürgen Habermas, that even as a historical trend it preserves its relevance. As the philosophical underpinning of modernity, which for Habermas is an incomplete project, it may be argued that the Enlightenment is itself incomplete. Its full realization lies in the future. In this view, far from being an anachronism, it has not even entered fully the stage of history.

Having made a clean breast of my sins, it should come as no surprise that as a convinced *Aufklärer* I consider the appearance of the individual was as a turning-point in the history of mankind. This epoch-making event made it possible to look at man as independent from his community, his culture, his religion. He is no longer his clan, his people, his city, his nation, and begins to exist for himself, with his own needs, with his inalienable claims to happiness and self-fulfillment. It is certainly true that human beings cannot exist outside of culture, but it is also true that they are not *free* human beings if they don't have the possibility, whenever necessary, of going outside the boundaries of their culture. The highest achievement of the Enlightenment was to have made it possible for the in-

dividual to transcend the limits of his family, his village, his religious community. It enabled him to establish for himself new identities and allegiances, through adult acts of choice, rejecting the fortuitous circumstances of birth. This was stated by Beaumarchais, in the revolutionary war-machine called *Figaro's Marriage*. This is how our subversive barber addresses Count Almaviva, the aristocrat who wanted to sleep with Figaro's wife. "Noblesse, fortune, un rang, des palaces (...) Qu'avez-vous fait pour mériter tant de biens? Vous vous êtes donné la peine de naître, et rien de plus." These words are quite valid today. The ideal of the Enlightenment was the self-constitution of human beings, their individual *Bildung*, which presupposes the appropriation of the existing culture, but also the permanent possibility of contesting it.

If the collective is a social or political community, the challenge is to ensure to individuals an optimum of civil and political autonomy, which includes the right to dissent from mainstream political views. This presupposes the enjoyment of what Isaiah Berlin called negative freedom—freedom from coercion. All democratic societies have enshrined in their constitution mechanisms to proclaim and safeguard this freedom. But positive freedom—freedom to, and not from—is equally important. Among the elements of positive freedom is the freedom to participate fully in the political process, and this freedom is denied when social and political power suppress-

es or distorts information or when the general ideological climate blocks critical thinking.

Unfortunately individuality seems to be on the wane, in culture as well as in society, in non-Western as well in Western countries. With the eclipse of Marxism, traditional cultural values are regaining their ascendancy, as shown by the revival of religion, not only in Islamic but also in Jewish and Christian fundamentalism. The same is true in the sphere of society. Society, the locus of opposing interests and competing views, is becoming as holistic as culture, the locus of shared beliefs. Everywhere the weight of the collective seems to be overpowering the individual.

What is really happening? Let us ask for the assistance of the thinker who in my view provided us with the most illuminating insights on this subject—Sigmund Freud.

As a critical but unmistakable thinker of the Enlightenment, Freud looked at the coming of individuality as a decisive event in world history. This is expressed in what he called “the scientific myth” of psychoanalysis, the philogenetical hypothesis of the primordial parricide. I shall not try to describe this myth in detail. I shall only remind to you that for Freud there was at the origin of mankind a primitive horde, a *Urhorde*, ruled by a tyrannical father, who reserved to himself the possession of all females. This despot was the only person who could afford the luxury of an individuality. All other members

of the horde lived as animals in a herd, without any individual thoughts or emotions. As the tyranny became unbearable, the sons murdered their father. They were the first individuals. They formed a clan of brothers and built the foundation for social life, on the basis of a law recognized by all. The leader of the revolt against the father, for Freud, was the first hero, for he made it possible to pass from collective to individual psychology: “the myth is the first step made by the individual to withdraw from mass psychology.”

Modernity has attempted to establish a balance between individual happiness and the common good, harmonizing individual with social needs. The attempt seemed to have succeed, at least in Western democratic societies. But Freud was fully aware of the precariousness of this equilibrium. Regression was always lurking. The victory over the herd would never be final. Freud illustrated the dangers of regression in his analysis of groups such as the Army and the Church. Under conditions of mass psychology, intelligence declines, affectivity is enhanced. Language ceases to function as a tool of communication and becomes an instrument for passional mobilization. The mass-man tends to think by images, not concepts. He extroverts a part of his ego—the Ego Ideal, successor of the narcissistic stage—on the person of the leader. As a result, the leader becomes immune to criticism, because he is the sum of all virtues that the narcissistic ego found in himself. On the other hand, the mass-man is bound to

other mass-men by desexualized erotic ties, thus giving rise to strong feelings of group solidarity.

All these characteristics appeared in fascism, and can also be noticed in contemporary social and ethnic movements, and even in advanced industrial societies. They have all the elements of mass psychology—the decline of individuality, the uniformity of thoughts and emotions, the predominance of affectivity and of unconscious processes—all of this corresponds to archaic mental activities, similar to those obtaining in pre-history. Every mass is a revival of the horde. Just like primitive man survives in the civilized individual, so does the *Urorde* survive in every modern group. There is a nostalgia of the horde in all holistic manifestations, in all attempts to romanticize or idealize collective subjectivities—cities, provinces, ethnicities, cultures. These manifestations contrast strongly with the social struggles articulated in the framework of Enlightenment, based on class, not on culture, and asserting the right to equality, not the right to difference. It follows, of course, that as this difference is always a group difference, the rights of the individual are always subordinated to those of the group.

We can understand, thanks to the theoretical tools provided by psycho-analysis, how holism can help man offset the de-culturalizing impulse of modernity, which freed man from his dependence on his community. This freedom was not necessarily welcome. De-culturalization can be a traumatic process, which helps us to sym-

pathize with those who want to revert to the collective, looking for warmth and support. Anguished with the obligation to think for ourselves—we cannot all be Kantian philosophers—we may sometimes wish to look back to community values, hoping to get from it ready-made opinions. But is this return to the community worthwhile, if it means annulling all autonomy gains provided by the Enlightenment?

In order to test the validity of a Freudian approach to our subject, I propose to sketch a psychoanalytical interpretation of a particularly disturbing instance of the relationship between the collective and the individual—the molding of individual minds by cultural and social influences. For this purpose, I shall borrow the psychoanalytical categories used by Adorno in his cultural criticism and in his theory of personality.

As is well-known, Adorno's cultural criticism is grounded on two fundamental psychoanalytical mechanisms: identification and projection.

Through identification, the individual internalizes an external object—the father, the Law, society as a whole—and becomes similar to it. According to Adorno, identification is the final goal of late capitalism: total assimilation of the individual to the existing system. In the past, the successive identifications undergone by each subject was an instrument of individuation. For contemporary capitalism, it is an instrument of des-individuation. This difference corresponds to two different stag-

es of capitalism. At the stage of competitive capitalism, the system could only work well with relatively autonomous personalities. The laws of the whole required the relative autonomy of the particular. Society was an assemblage of monads, every one of which with its own Id, source of blind impulses, its Superego, society internalized, and its Ego, arbiter of the conflicting demands of the individual and the capitalist system. The adjustment of the individual to society took place in the family. It was a long process, always conflict-ridden, and often unpredictable. The price that liberal capitalism had to pay for the production of autonomous individuals was to be confronted with an excessive number of excessively autonomous individuals. All this has changed. If in the past the identification with the existing order was obtained through the control of the Id drives by the Ego, and by the province of the Ego which represents the social, the Superego, this goal is achieved today directly by the social whole. For the system cannot afford the luxury of an imperfect integration. It corrects the flaws in the identification process in the same manner as it had corrected the shortcomings in global demand—by direct administration. Organized capitalism is the manager of a consensus that makes psychology redundant, or rather that annexes it, just as monopoly capitalism does not abolish ownership, but becomes the only owner.

Identification is an end, but also a means. Adorno conceives this twofold role through the concept of mimesis,

the process by which the animals and primitives merge with nature, imitating it. The mimesis is an end—adaptation to the social world—as well as a means, because through it the system seduces the individual, liberating the original mimetic impulse, stifled by the demands of civilization. Mimetic identification is fundamental in modern mass democracies. Through cultural industry, individuals identify mimetically with pop stars and politicians, and through then with the social system as a whole.

Besides identification, the system mobilizes another decisive psychical mechanism, projection. By means of projection the individual expels from himself and displaces onto the external world his own attributes, emotions and wishes. Projection is not necessarily pathological. In normal projection, the subject restores to outside reality the impressions received by the senses, after they have undergone an internal process of reflection. In a way, every perception is a projection. For the world of objects is constituted through the reflexive activity by which the subject processes the external data and gives them back to the outside world, thus contributing to the construction of objective reality. But projection is false when this process of internal reflection does not take place.

As can be seen, for Adorno projection and identification are correlative. In authentic identification, the subject imitates the model in order to individualize itself, and in authentic projection the subject inscribes itself in

external reality so as to make it, paradoxically, more objective. In false identification, on the contrary, the subject extinguishes itself in the imitated object. In false projection the non-entity that considers itself a subject inscribes in the objective world its own nullity. This is the case of the anti-semitite. Anti-semitism is the world of uncontrolled projection. The anti-semitite converts the world into a paranoid system, inhabited by diabolical entities. He invents the Jew as an embodiment of his own persecutory fantasies. Both false identification and false projection derive from the same anomaly, the confiscation of individual psychology by the whole. Crushed by the social system, the psychical apparatus lacks the necessary strength both to assist the subject in preserving its autonomy during the identification process and to carry out the reflexive labour required by normal projection.

The second part of Adorno's analysis—the theory of personality—is closely related to his cultural criticism. His starting point was the survey published in 1935 by the Institute for Social Research—*Studies über Autorität und Familie*—which tried to establish a correlation between personal character and political options. Thus, bearers of a sado-masochistic character were supposed to hold authoritarian political views. A similar study—*The Authoritarian Personality*—was published in 1950 in the United States. The general hypothesis, as previously, was that there ought to be an overall homology between ideology and personality structure. In order

to assess ideology, the researchers created three different scales—the anti-semitism scale, (AS), the ethnocentrism scale (E) and a scale relating to political and social subjects (PEC). The subjects of the experiment were given questionnaires in which they were asked to say whether or not they agreed with assertions of an anti-semitic, of an ethnocentric and of a socially and politically conservative nature. The high scorers in the different scales, that is, those who expressed a high degree of agreement with the assertions, tended to be either anti-semitic, ethnocentric or politically conservative, if not all three. The opposite was the case with the low scorers. However, these scales measured only ostensive opinions, of a socially acceptable nature, without reaching deeper psychological layers. This was the function of an additional scale, the so-called F scale, designed to evaluate deep personality structures. The subjects had to agree or disagree with psychoanalytically loaded assertions such as the following: “Today, with so many people mixing so freely, we must be careful in order to avoid infection and disease.” High scorers in F tended to have an authoritarian personality. Results obtained in the F scale served then as a basis for clinical interviews, in which subjects would be able to express their views more freely than in questionnaires.

The expected correlation between the type of personality and opinions on anti-semitism and ethnocentrism was confirmed. Subjects with an authoritarian personal-

ity tended to be both anti-semitic and ethnocentric. *But the correlation between personality and politics was not confirmed.* High scorers in F could be low scorers in PEC, and vice versa, or, to speak in less esoteric language, authoritarian subjects could be progressive in political and economic issues, just as non-authoritarian subjects could be political and economic conservatives.

This anomaly led Adorno to make a significant departure from the original hypothesis. He distinguished in the PEC scale between false and genuine liberals and false and genuine conservatives. The genuine liberals were low scorers not only in F, that is, they were non-authoritarian, but also in PEC, that is, they held progressive views on economic and political issues. For them, the expected correlation held. But false liberals, while being low scorers in PEC, were high scorers in F, and therefore authoritarian, no matter what their ostensive views on political issues might be. The fact that they seemed to agree with a political agenda from the left did not make them revolutionary, for their progressive opinions were offset, at the personality level, by nihilistic and sado-masochistic tendencies. On the other hand, genuine conservatives were low scorers in F, even if they were high scorers in PEC. Thanks to their non-authoritarian personality structure, they adhered to the positive values of the *status quo*, those emphasizing equal opportunities and political freedom. But false conservatives, like false liberals, were high scorers in F. As such, they adhered

only superficially to the democratic *status quo*. Actually, they were right—wing rebels, with elements of destructivity, cynicism and authoritarian submissiveness.

This corresponded to the European experience during fascism. At that time, “false liberals”, including union leaders and members of the Communist Party, voted for Hitler, while the resistance came from “genuine conservatives”—the Church and the aristocracy.

Adorno gave an orthodox psychoanalytical explanation for these discrepancies between consciousness and personality. False liberals and false conservatives go through an imperfect identification with the father’s authority, resulting in an attitude at the same time rebellious and subservient. There is either a seeming adhesion to the Establishment, annulled by a revolt against it, or, as has been the case during Nazism, a “revolutionary” adhesion to the left (negation of the father) associated to deep-seated conformity, coming from blind submission to power (obedience to the father.) In contrast, genuine liberals and conservatives have made a successful oedipal identification, with the result that their political views, liberal or conservative, derive from rational choice, and not from psychological automatisms.

But the growing predominance of conservative opinions in society as a whole, irrespective of personality structures, became so glaring that Adorno saw the need to dilute further the importance of psychological influences. If opinions diverged so much from personality,

it was because they were being shaped by a “general cultural climate,” spread by the media, generating uniform thinking habits, regardless of personalities and social classes. This climate was characterized by stereotyping—the tendency to perceive the world according to empty clichés, and personalization—the tendency to re-define in personal terms abstract social forces. The interaction of these tendencies led both high and low scorers to perceive reality as it wanted to be perceived, that is, deformed by the abstract generality of stereotyping and by the abstract particularity of personalization. But even if the general cultural climate prevented the *status quo* from being challenged, psychological factors had not become irrelevant. As the prevailing ideology is multifaceted, encompassing progressive as well as “reactionary” elements, Adorno thought there was an *a priori* likelihood that non-authoritarian individuals would identify with those aspects of the ideological block most compatible with the characteristics of an open personality.

How valid is this interpretative strategy, more than half a century after Adorno used it to study modern mass culture? Let me test its effectiveness in interpreting a quite recent episode: the massive acceptance by the American public opinion of the official explanation for invading Iraq.

Let it be said at once that as a Marxist, even unorthodox, Adorno only fell back on psychological explanations when he faced irrationalities that could not be ex-

plained by the sociological theory. He would not classify as “irrational” the attitude of the American people, before examining all other factors. As the respect for international morality and for the principle of non-intervention was never the prevailing weakness of a people used since elementary school to admire the annexation of half of Mexico as an act of heroism, it was not to be hoped that it would feel indignant with a war decided against the will of the United Nations. The belief in the legitimacy of unilateralism was an educational deficit, not necessarily a psychological pathology. In addition, it is clear that 9/11 was an element of reality, not a paranoid delusion. The support given to the invasion of Afghanistan was “rational,” at least in part, because there were plausible grounds to believe that the perpetrator of the act of terrorism had taken refuge in that country. It was “rational” to be on guard against new attacks and to support the security measures needed to prevent them. It was a fact, and not a myth created by propaganda, that the regime of Saddam Hussein was cruel and tyrannical. But if we discard these objective factors, a hard-core remains, that cannot be explained by the usual categories of sociology or political science. What remains unintelligible is first of all the inability of the American population to see through the obvious falsity of the two main allegations used by Bush to justify the invasion: the existence of weapons of mass destruction in Saddam Hussein’s arsenals and Hussein’s complicity with Osama Bin Laden.

Secondly, there is no objective explanation for the continued support given to Bush after these allegations were shown to be false, as confessed by Bush as well as Tony Blair.

As a result, Adorno would have considered it worthwhile to study this irrational hard-core from a psychoanalytical point of view, and would have mobilized for this purpose the two parts of his dyad: cultural criticism and the theory of personality.

His main culture-critical point would be that the war had transformed a large part of the American people in a sort of mass, in the sense of Freud's collective psychology. As such, it exhibited two characteristics, typical of all masses: an unprecedented atrophy of the critical capacity, which made the people accept passively the successive lies (none of which were believed outside of the United States) invented by the Government and the Press, and the intensification of emotivity, under the form of a hyper-patriotism that reduced to silence any velleity of dissent. He would have found at work the two mechanisms he had described in his essays on culture industry, identification, which puts the individual under pressure to adjust to the *status quo*, and projection, by which the subject expels to the outside world what he does not accept in himself or that to which he secretly aspires, transforming the world into a paranoid system, inhabited by hostile entities—in this case, not Jews, but terrorists.

Identification and projection could be seen clearly in the relationship with the leader—in this case, the President of the United States. As the head of the greatest military power on earth, Bush was an ideal identification object. But the figure with whom the mass-man identifies is partly an emanation of the subject himself, a projection of his ego ideal. This is why the President cannot be very different from the man in the street. He must be at the same time all-powerful and banal.

This is what happened to Bush. He was a super hero and an average man. The mass identified with both. As a super hero, he landed in helicopter on an aircraft carrier, Mars in uniform, God of thunder and war. His name was Rambo. But he was also a poor man, not very bright, inarticulate, obviously less prepared than his father to lead the greatest power on earth. A classical oedipal humiliation, that he may have wanted to revenge by overthrowing Saddam, thus doing better than his father, who had stopped half-way.

Together with the atrophy of critical consciousness characteristic of mass psychology, the media and the cultural industry were decisive in the production of consensus, before and after the war. We all know how the main TV networks distorted the news. Crucial information to which the rest of the world had access was not transmitted in the United States. Images of protesters in Bagdad manifesting against foreign occupation were not shown in America. Instead, there were scenes of popu-

lar rejoicing. There were tricks worthy of the Nazi Propaganda Ministry, such as the scene of the soldier hanging an American flag on the statue of the dictator, side by side with the classical image of the soldier at the end of the second world war, hanging an American flag at the roof of the Reichstag.

None of this needs to be interpreted psychoanalytically. Media manipulation is an external, objective fact. The problem is not so much that the media reports were false, for suppression and distortion of data are part of the logic of war, but that apparently it didn't cross anyone's mind to doubt the veracity of what was being said and shown. Adorno would have an explanation for this. Conditioned by culture industry, the spectator can no longer tell the difference between illusion and reality. What is being shown on the screen is by definition true, because it is the very expression of life. The newsman who gave the objectively false information that Saddam Hussein had bought large quantities of uranium in Africa and the speakers who praise the virtues of a detergent move in the same symbolic space, in which truthfulness is not an issue. Cultural industry conditions individuals to gullibility, as a means to produce and stabilize political consensus.

But who are those individuals whose consciousness seems to be so easily molded? Here comes into play the second part of Adorno's theory, the analysis of personality. For a small minority, of course, the psychological

motivation is irrelevant. We don't need to understand the personality structure of the Texan billionaires who coveted the Iraqi oil reserves, the world's second largest, to understand why they supported the war. A traditional Marxist explanation, putting on the forefront the economic interest, would be enough. But for the rest of the population, there was no such "rational" motivation. Bush's policy was clearly contrary to the interests of the majority, both from the economic point of view, because everybody knew that the war effort would be enormously expensive, and from the human point of view, because despite the zero casualty policy of the Pentagon it was obvious that many American soldiers would lose their lives. For this part of the population, Adorno's categories are seen to be valid.

If we consider that the electoral basis of Bush was to a large extent formed by fundamentalist groups for whom the authority of the Bible is absolute, feminism and homosexuality are diabolical, and the United States is the country chosen by God to convert the rest of the world, we may suppose that Adorno would classify such persons as "false conservatives," not really conservatives but right-wing extremists.

Others would be seen as "genuine conservatives," who took seriously certain elements of the American heritage, such as the defense of freedom, and agreed to the war because they believed in the official reason given by the President to justify the invasion, namely, the wish

to liberate the Iraqi people from the tyranny of Saddam Hussein.

No doubt many “false liberals” supported the war, since their ostensibly “progressive” views may have been offset, at the personality level, by a sado-masochistic tendency to side with the existing power, held *de facto* by the President and the Pentagon warlords.

Finally, we may surmise that even a few “genuine liberals,” identifying, as the genuine conservatives, with the more humanistic elements of the American ideology, may have at first supported the invasion, although their personality structure makes it unlikely that this support continued after the allegations justifying the war were shown to be lies.

This, of course was coherent with Adorno’s view that even if psychological factors had not become irrelevant, political choices were being more and more determined by the “general cultural climate,” regardless of personality type.

We have seen that this cultural clime involved the perception of reality according to two complementary distortions: stereotyping and personalization.

One of the most appalling features of the Bush administration was his frequent use of stereotypes, simplifying highly complex situations with clichés such as “the axis of evil,” which of course made America the axis of good. The dualism good—evil was obviously not invented by Bush, for from time immemorial wars have

been justified by both sides in the name of virtue, but never, since Mani, creator of Manicheism, has a head of State drawn so clearly the boundary between the forces of light and those of darkness. This stereotyping by the State has a counterpart in society, afflicted by a sickness of reason that Adorno called stereopathy, the main symptom of which is the inability to think otherwise than by stereotypes. It was stereopathy, during the Iraqi war, that led the American population to push to extremes the We—Other dichotomy. This dichotomy has been used since pre-history by the horde, to demarcate itself from other hordes, but in this specific case it was the popular variant of the “good-evil” dichotomy invented by the White House. *We* were the American people. The *Other*, in its diabolically pure form, was Saddam Hussein, but there also secondary Others, minor devils of the infernal court, such as Chirac, Schröder and Putin. The struggle against these enemies of the soul was a ritual of collective exorcism, in which instead of sacrificing lambs, people decapitated bottles of French wine. The religious ceremony included also a sort of baptism, in which old things received new names. For instance, French fries were rebaptized as Freedom fries. Another manifestation of stereopathy was the obsessive use of the same formulas, such as “weapons of mass destruction,” which worked as a mantra, capable of conjuring, by its sheer reiteration, a whole Pantheon of infernal deities, as they

say that the syllable Om, repeated *ad infinitum*, has the power to call forth Brahma, Shiva and Vishnu.

The other tendency, personalization, was also active on this occasion. All the complex network of social and political relationships underlying the crisis, which included, on the Western side, the drive for access to the oil reserves of Iraq and the global hegemonic ambitions of the American superpower, and, on the Iraqi side, tensions resulting from the conflict between Shias and Sunnites and the separatism of the Kurds—all of this vanished. Only persons were visible. Most visible of all, besides the arch-villain, Saddam Hussein, were the Castor and Pollux of the axis of good, President Bush, submitting to a reverent Congress an anti-terrorist program that abolished many constitutional rights, and the Prime Minister Tony Blair, trying to convince the British Parliament that Saddam needed only 45 minutes to attack the United Kingdom with chemical weapons.

However great the influence of the “general cultural climate” may be, Adorno was almost certainly right in assuming that psychological determinants continued to influence political choices. New empirical studies should be made to determine how great this impact is nowadays. In these studies, a conceptual *aggiornamento* would be in order, bringing into play post-freudian and even non-analytical approaches. But in view of the des-individualizing tendencies that threaten human autonomy everywhere, it would be foolhardy to assume

that authoritarian personalities play no longer a role in setting up and reinforcing undemocratic institutions around the world.