The emergence of subregional spaces: the city and street protests

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Despite the numerous structural problems tormenting Brazil's economic and political situation, and which in the last few months have multiplied even more, in the period before the protests registered in June there was a dominant official ideology aimed at convincing the majority of Brazilians that we lived in a Panglossian universe¹ identified as "the best of worlds." Everything went on as if the political project in effect was guaranteed to continue and remain in place, in spite of all the serious setbacks.

A closer look at the situation just before the demonstrations detects, at least in Rio de Janeiro, how the protes-

^{1.} Voltaire, Candido ou o Otimista.

tors' political discourse has grown more radical, especially that of the younger actors who expressed themselves in the Electoral Campaign of 2012 through strong criticism of the idea of a rosy world invented for a country that reduced inequalities and seemed absorbed in a magical moment of the major events scheduled for the future. The discourse against privatization in general, corruption and irregularities in public policies demarcated a preparatory stage of the protest that broke out as a surprising, repetitive and insistent mass movement against the status quo that started in the internet and spilled over into the streets.

The main characteristic of the outburst of demonstrations in June was the "surprise effect" and rejection of the system. The movement signals the strength of its dissent and rejection of "los que mandan," besides revealing the singularity and de-centrality of being convoked through a network organization. The movement made different social forces converge on the same stage, and in turn sent various types of messages to the whole of Brazilian society, messages with a variety of content and proposals that deserve a thorough examination.

On analyzing the critical content of the messages that circulated through the demonstrations of June, one must bear in mind the different levels of awareness and abstraction, ranging from the most elementary, such as vaguely and generically declaring discontentment with education,

^{2.} Jose Maria Imaz: "the powers that be" (those in command).

to more incisive forms of protest against bus fares—an old tradition in Brazilian cities.

The movement mainly attacked the illegitimacy of our political institutions—especially the representative and party system—in addition to combating corruption or introducing a significant novelty into the debate, namely, condemning the old ways of doing politics.

Also, as of a certain moment the old social movements—above all the trade unions and political groups somewhat contaminated the new spaces of street protesting, at the same time as, by common accord, the general issue was the symbolic veto of the participation of parties.

A third phase witnessed the detachment of a radical minority that insistently wandered the streets wrecking public and private property, as a counter-point to the initial demonstrations with their remarkable presence of masses. This aggressive radicalism, which included some elements of anarchist ideology, ended up being confused with agile, improvised forms of urban guerrilla fighting—at times anti-capitalist, at other times motivated by predatory attacks, imitating gestures and expressions identified with the police violence of times past: a police force turned inside out.

To these demonstrations we apply the classic categories used by Alain Touraine to classify a social movement: identity, opposition and totality. In respect to their identity, no doubt remains that the June demonstrations were characterized by a strong identity, albeit a heterogeneous and unstable one. The actors in question saw themselves as a plurality of individuals, emotions and interests, never as

a unified segment. Hence the tendency to discontinue, by virtue of the different social categories that took part in the movement.

- The movement included an enraged middle class that has lost power and influence, suffering from a strong feeling of abandonment and political orphanhood, and hostile toward a political class that is predatory, poorly qualified, and indifferent to the city's disorder and collective problems.
- There was also a young contingent, feverish, dissident, and potentially under-employed, with problems as regards transportation and education, as well as their precarious financial situation.
- A new middle class participated, formerly socially modest and whose ascension seemed until then assured. These new-comers were often internet friends from cultural movements in slums and poor communities, hoping to obtain a bigger share in a society that in the present situation reduces their economic and financial opportunities.
- There were leaders disenchanted with their parties.
- There were ex-militants who adhered to the movement as a "revival." *Let's do it all over again!*
- And there were the dissidents of all categories, irritated, alien to the internet, imagining that this might be the only way and the only opportunity to be heard.

The opposition against which the movement was struggling seemed clearer than its identity, occupying the three levels proposed by Touraine to classify the overlapping of

the social movement with the society that it opposes. The first elementary level would be discontent against the organizations whose inefficiency compromises the quality of the public policies they are designed to foster: the inefficiency of hospitals and schools, revolt against the high fares for poor transportation services, whether by train, bus or ferry-boat.

One should note here the concern for the immediate space of the city, jeopardized by inefficiency and neglected by the public authorities. Although sanitation and garbage-collecting are on today's agenda, only the demonstrations led by the Rocinha slum community mentioned the topic and demanded priority for sanitation in the projects financed by the Federal Government, rather than the so- 403 called cable-cars—which would account for almost all the available resources.

The second level of opposition is against the institutions and in favor of transparency, against corrupt political institutions which ought to function in a fairer and more representative fashion. It is on this level of hostility toward parties, the Congress, State or municipal authorities, or the three Powers, that the movement proved to be more powerful, creating the real possibility of increasing the number of blank votes in the upcoming state and Presidential elections

On the deeper, more structural level of historicity, that is to say, the dynamic and structural sphere of powerful ideas that raise society onto a new level—we saw that this field of socalled "totality," albeit identifiable, is in this movement quite

diffuse. What generally predominates is an egalitarian idealism of the anarchistic view hostile to governments, often imbued with a strong corporative or trade-union spirit that is hostile to the market economy and the capitalism of corporations.

Many of the participants in the demonstrations are attune to the world crisis as a phenomenon of the weakening of capitalism and demise of hegemonic potencies and market interests that stand in opposition to those of society and the workers—and to the possibility of defending a socialist society of an interventionist, State-controlled nature.

Nonetheless, in the field of this same totality there arises the concrete reference of the city. The metropolis—this space without contours or face, a true whirlpool—was the backcloth of the movements, demands and real hostility strewn through disturbed streets, neighborhoods and institutions.

More than anything else, the city was the privileged space for neglected public policies. In this nameless metropolis recognized by the internet and the various forms of the cultural movements, a special common denominator must be found, one that can lend meaning to the new agendas of political, social and cultural renovation.

Old and new city planning and the urban pact

Today the Urban Revolution is one of the most significant factors in global society, given that over 50% of the world population lives in cities, a number that is expected to soar to 75% by 2050³. Planning this complex universe is

^{3.} The United Nations (UNO).

a top priority for each country. There is a rational choice in this process of urbanization, seeing that the expectations to attend to basic needs are far lower in the rural world than in the chaotic, concentrated urban world where opportunities and tensions exist side by side.

Population density and diversity nurture innovation and the knowledge that fuels creativity and entrepreneurship by increasing the opportunities of social ascension in spite of the risks of migration that affect thousands of people. When the rhythm of economic growth is satisfactory, the possibilities of personal satisfaction also grow, even in the face of socially segregating adversities, stress, individualism and isolation.

When the climate spells recession or stagnation, as at present, the city becomes a powder keg, calling for better sharing of the available benefits. In fact, it is inevitable that urban conflicts worsen in these highly-concentrated territorial spaces if the pace of inclusion and rationality of policies is not minimally satisfactory to attend to the growing pressures generated by the knowledge society and the new technologies of innovation and information.

On the world level, the urban pact is already underway, signed at *Rio+20* with the mediation of the United Nations and asserting the necessity of converting the conflictive, unequal, unsustainable and chaotic world in which we live into a generalized prosperous and well-balanced middle class by 2050. The goals being set for sustainability will be monitored by the United Nations and demand increasingly more sustainable cities functioning with less waste, more equality and better distribution and use of scant resources.


Urban transition, in general socially painful and difficult, demands a developmentist effort that in the 21st century we might call "sustainable developmentism." Economic growth, together with innovation and creativity, must be accompanied by public policies that effectively educate and attend to unprotected segments of the population. Social-protection cushions must be made available in this transition in order to lower the price and pay for the needier segments. However, sustainability means working to reach as quickly as possible a more satisfactory level of growth, productivity and distribution of benefits.

It is worth recalling and comparing Brazil and Great Britain, using as a backcloth the industrial and social revolution of the 19th century which began the great transformation and a new cycle of civilization for all the other countries. Urbanization was essential to promote the Industrial Revolution by offering cheap labor in the cities thanks to the rural population that migrated from countryside to town spurred by the so-called *enclosures*. The same process occurred in Brazil in the 20th century: in a few decades, 25 million migrated from the northeast to the southeast to fulfill the same cheap-labor functions in search of conditions to survive

At the time of the first census in the Great Britain of 1801, only about 20% of the population lived in the cities. In 1851 this number rose to over 50%. Eight decades later, in 1881, nearly two-thirds of the population lived in cities⁴.

^{4.} Source: Local Histories Site.

This social trauma was reproduced in Brazil even faster and more devastatingly. Within six decades we registered 20% more than Great Britain in eight.



The above graph shows the sharp curve of urbanization in Brazil, compared also to Africa and Asia. Source: UNO.

The census of 1940 defined only 30% of the population as urban and 70% as rural. In 1970 there was a certain balance, with 56% already living in urban areas. Today we have registered more than 80%⁵. By 2050, according to estimates made by the United Nations, 90% of the world population will be concentrated in large centers, and the national population will be around 200 million. This means

^{5.} Source: IBGE.

that the urban agglomerations will receive 63 million new inhabitants over the next 44 years.⁶

The social problems faced by England in the 19th century remind us of Brazil's difficulties and impasses in the 21st and help us understand the importance of social protest movements and the role of intellectuals, students and an enlightened elite mobilized on behalf of the more needy members of society, to make their lives less miserable.

The books of the English author Elizabeth Gaskel, especially *North and South*, are living examples of the social drama that polluted the cities, jeopardized health and divided consciences—and the territory of many countries—which, like in Brazil and the United States, divided the North and the South. But no-one described the immediate history and social drama of the Industrial Revolution in the streets better than Charles Dickens—portraying the saga of London's orphans in a society with a high rate of early mortality, where parents died very young. A special place is reserved for street children like Oliver Twist, who inspired the incomparable Charlie Chaplin to reinvent him in his unforgettable film of 1922.

The housing issue for the working class was a problem of over-crowding and unhealthy conditions. Housing has always been awful for the poor, but this grew much worse when a whole host of people began to live together, not only as factory workers but also in small and precarious premises. Many such houses were built where before there

^{6.} Source: Ipea.

were only fields and small villages. There was no drainage, and when it rained the streets became mud

Insalubrity was the factor responsible for high mortality rates. It was the habit to toss dirty water out into the streets and the incipient bathrooms were shared by several households. In the early 19th century there were no building regulations and housing for the poor resembled our slums. The houses, piled on top of one another, usually had two or three rooms. The very poor slept on straw because they could not afford a bed. In 1840 the town councils finally began to take some steps to change this situation.⁷

Bathrooms in the 19th century were generally cesspits that were rarely emptied and sometimes overflowed. Urine gathered in the earth and mixed with the drinking water. It 409 comes as no surprise that the cities were devastated by frequent outbursts of cholera, especially in 1831-1832, 1848-1849, 1854 and 1865-1866, until finally in 1848 the Public Health Law was passed: the beginning of the great sanitary reform.8

The new law made it obligatory for local Health Councils to be established in the cities—like those we have today, which function badly—especially if the mortality rate rose above 23 per thousand or if demanded by 10% of the population. Local Health Councils could require new houses to have cesspits and bathrooms—which still is not the case in many places in Brazil. They could also organize

^{7.} Source: Local Histories Site.

^{8.} Source: Local Histories Site.

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the water supply, street cleaning and garbage collecting, thus proving that a good partnership between government and society can be more effective than radically delegating such functions only to State employees.

It was in the middle of the 1850s that important scientific discoveries allowed social medicine to be installed, thereby identifying the real causes of epidemics in the disastrous sanitary conditions where all types of micro-organisms abounded. Salubrity called for the introduction of a modern system of sanitation, something that is still not available to a good many Brazilians.

Town councils also began to set up minimum regulations for new houses. Besides this, in 1860 and 1870 the sewage system was built in most of the big cities. The 1870s saw the introduction of water supply. As a result of these measures, the cities became far cleaner and healthier at the turn of the century.⁹

In Brazil the urban revolution took place in like fashion, but even faster and more traumatic—but we are still only half way there, because social inclusion has yet to find the point of equilibrium reached by the welfare societies following the Second World War. The impact of urbanization and its problems, together with the rapid extension of the right to vote after the Constitution of 1946, which today defines a modern mass democracy, made many of these urban problems more dramatic, difficult and slow to solve, leading to popular pressure for common goods and public policies.

^{9.} Source: Local Histories Site.

The urban population explosion had a powerful impact on Latin America and Brazil, following a model that Jose Nun classified in the 60s as urbanization without the corresponding industrialization. This hiatus is a significant corrosive factor inasmuch as it leaves to the State the hard task of correcting distortions via planning. Urban planning was nonetheless neglected for several decades—and its reference institutions decomposed under the impact of the long economic crisis and stabilization policies against uncontrolled inflation

Urbanization reached cities differently, swelling the metropolitan regions of São Paulo and Rio de Janeiro earlier and other points in the country later on. The city that grew the most in population terms over the last three decades, Campo Grande, had a population of 45,000 in 1950, tripling in 1970 to 140,000, and soaring in 2000 to 663,000: almost five times more. Cuiabá also saw its population grow, from 226,000 to one million, while Goiânia swelled from 450,000 to 1.6 million over the same period. The inhabitants in the Federal District and surroundings numbered 761,000 in 1970, and 2.9 million in 2000. These four areas alone became home to 4.7 million additional inhabitants in the last 30 years. Their population today is four times more than in 1970; the rate of population growth has varied from 4.3% to 5.2% a year, against the national average of 2.7%.10

Configured by the Constitution of 1988, political organization became more open and participative, incentivizing the social revolution of the 90s—for all the stagnation and the painful inflationary process—in a context that extended into the first decade of the 21st century. Nevertheless, the results registered are still far from satisfactory, seeing that they have not responded to the key challenge that dominated the streets, namely the urgency to change the way of doing politics and consequently guaranteeing better public policies.

The fact is that it is necessary to attend more efficiently to the demands of a population concentrated in the large urban centers and in need of new rules as regards universal distribution of public services. Such services are still distributed in precarious fashion, depending on a political class that wields restrictive control of the political machine in favor of its own clienteles. This is the price we pay to a registry-office sort of patrimonialism that fails to represent citizens and their individual rights, depending as it does on corporations and the segmented interests of so-called "rent-seeking," a model that is incompatible with mass democracy and broader and more universal policies geared to community interests.

This is the larger meaning of the street demonstrations, in tune with the new techniques of network communications and democracy that portray the urban situation of high population density and deficiencies that are now subject to the increasingly chaotic city transportation that fails to guarantee the basic right to come and

go. Today's cities, in particular the large metropolitan regions, are held hostage to the automobile and alien to the mass transportation services that are necessary to ensure the normal flow of traffic between the outskirts and the urban center

Metropolitan governance

The great political phenomenon of the 21st century is the appearance of urban concentration, especially in the big metropolises. This worldwide metropolitan phenomenon is capable of potentializing or hindering a country's competitiveness and productivity and qualifying cities either by their diseconomies—when the infrastructure is precarious and the labor unskilled—or else by their positive capacity to integrate with a global network of goods and services, once such problems have been resolved.

Brazilian federalism was forged in 1988 by a unique conception of "triple federalism" that configured the municipality as a federative entity, albeit modest in its conformation. The overwhelming majority of the 5,565 municipalities have up to 20,000 inhabitants; only 1,604 have between 20,000 and 500,000; and only 40 have more than 500,000 inhabitants. Nonetheless, the 100 biggest cities in Brazil are home to 77 million inhabitants, that is to say, 40% of the Brazilian population. The metropolitan region of São Paulo has almost 20 million inhabitants, one of the biggest in the world, while Rio de Janeiro accommodates 11 million. This enormity was not taken into account by the Constitution of 1988.

Sample fraction and number of municipalities, according to size of population

Size of municipal population	Sample fraction of households	Number of municipalities
Up to 2,500	50	260
2,500-8,000	33	1,912
8,000-20,000	20	1,749
20,000 -500,000	10	1,604
Over 500,000	5	40
Total	11	5,565

Source: IBGE, Research Departmen, Coordination of Population and Social Indicators and Coordination of Methods and Quality.

Article 40 of the Federal Constitution provides only for State governments to establish Metropolitan Regions, without any concern for their morphology or even their basic rules, such as funds and resources that depend on federal sources. Politically speaking, this initiative is of little interest to State governors or mayors of capital cities. Bearing in mind the financial fragility of the States, it comes as no surprise that there was no political will to put Metropolitan Regions into effect. Another essential question is Fiscal Reform, which needs to benefit the larger—and especially the metropolitan—municipalities.

How does one plan such urban concentration and its energy needs? How to rationalize costs, time and investments? How can adequate infrastructure be built, education and health facilities equitably distributed, water and electricity saved, garbage collected and sanitation offered to all? And how do we avoid pollution? How to develop a good housing policy that saves time and brings workers closer to their place of employment?

Governing Metropolitan Regions is an activity that transcends governments. In fact, government requires governance ability, in other words a solid civil and technological base to build shared administration that involves society and its social leaders, governments and companies. To be efficient, this type of management needs solid informational bases that enable rapid and rational decision-taking via network cooperation. Without such requisites it will be hard to put into effect the law that set up the Metropolitan Regions.

The principal ordering nucleus of the Metropolitan Region is strategic and integrated planning based on a study of its internal characteristics, potentialities and the actors involved, besides its conformation and actual integration. In these times of "smart cities" it is fundamental for planning to start by putting together an adequate information system based on a consistent study of the territorial and human bases. The planning, which should define the strategic guidelines, must also be participative, that is, relying on efficacious rather than manipulated forms of participation.

Just as municipalities multiplied in the 90s, lately there has also been an increase in Metropolitan Regions, many of them without a proper technical base. Some of the 59 Metropolitan Regions established today, on account of political irresponsibility, have only 21,000 inhabitants.

Another indispensable condition for governance and planning is the transparency and compatibility of the planning with the budget, through a Metropolitan Fund. In the past, this fund depended on the Federal Government, which today distributes resources according to criteria of friendship and political-party ties.

The complementary instruments to strategic planning are the Steering Plans of the municipalities, which should be mutually adjusted to the Metropolitan Plan, saving resources and increasing the efficacy of political and administrative actions. The main instruments of the Steering Plan are those offered by the city's byelaws, which can make adjustments between setting up infrastructure and using better the surrounding space to form industrial, housing and transportation nuclei through zoning, the land-use and land-division laws, and Works Codes to integrate the Metropolitan Region. Fundamental to planning is a regionalized budget.

It is also advisable to promote the principle of government integration through transversality, whereby Secretariats and agencies communicate easily. What the Brazilian State most suffers from today is, first of all, disregard for planning. Next, the problem of developing disarticulated sectoral policies which fail to envisage the whole territorial space and the synergies that can and should exist between different government programs, or even between the three federative levels. Frequently there is an overlapping of actions between the Federal Government, States and municipalities, and what is even worse, spheres of public policies that are empty and disarticulated because none of the entities can act alone, and cooperation is made difficult by the different interests of the political parties and forces at play.

Integrating governmental actions is a guarantee of the feasibility of projects and actions from the economic-financial point of view. Integrating civil society in governmental partnerships is in turn a guarantee of the continuity of

actions beyond the period of government and eventual political alliances. This is what is called institutional sustainability: governance—the last level incorporated into the classic dimensions of economic, social and environmental sustainability.

In the prevailing circumstances, we note a serious lack of modern infrastructures that configure intelligent, enterprising and productive cities, which are ever more frequently guided by standards of sustainability.

Sustainable infrastructure and transversality


The dressing that guarantees the feasibility of planning is infrastructure, whose logistical, spatial and territorial dimension should be seen as the master spring of sustainability, predominating over the other government actions. As a matter of fact, infrastructure is what makes economic and social intervention feasible. Infrastructure too is what most affects eco-systems and the environment. That is why it requires priority in planning based on the global criterion of sustainability, either from the economic-financial or the social-environmental point of view.

The classic components of infrastructure are the energy-transportation binomial, and more recently the much acclaimed housing-transportation binomial, besides the most obvious: sanitation-housing. This set of binary relations must be present in metropolitan ordering, their common point being the territorial base and its basic regulations—guaranteed through urbanism and urban zoning. This is the only solution to match heavy investments in

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transportation with lower costs, as guaranteed by urban consortium operations, the right to preference and other instruments that alleviate the cost of land use in favor of the greater density needed to make the costs of locomotion feasible. Likewise, investments in popular housing need to be compatible with access to transportation in order to guarantee the rational coming and going of people and productivity of labor. This is not happening in the Metropolitan Regions. Today, such irrationalities, or diseconomies, are the scourge of the population spatially isolated from the work market.

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Between 1977 and 2005 we note in Brazil's Metropolitan Regions a decrease in the use of public transportation (from

68% to 51% of total motorized journeys) and an increase in the use of the automobile (from 32% to 49%). Meanwhile, in Rio de Janeiro in 1950, journeys by train totaled 208 million per year; in 2005 the number stood at 259 million. As for bus journeys, in 1950 this number was 216 million per year, soaring to 1,525 million in 2005. With regard to cars, in 1950 these accounted for 20 million journeys per year, against 1,641 million in 2005. In the urban areas of municipalities with over 60,000 inhabitants, about 148 million journeys are made every day. On average, 38% of these journeys are made walking, 30% by collective transportation, and 27% by car. Buses attend to most journeys (89%) by collective transportation.¹¹


The serious irrationalities are concentrated in the excessive number of automobiles in relation to buses—almost equal. As well as the excessive number of buses as a mode of transportation, to the detriment of more robust modes such as the subway and metropolitan trains. Also, there is a significant imbalance between investments in the capital and the metropolitan periphery, with discontinued lines, duplicate flows in the same direction in the subway, trains and along the Avenida Brasil thoroughfare, and disproportionate investments in urban voids to the detriment of areas of high concentration.

The worsening of the traffic jams in Rio de Janeiro mirrors the expansion of the automobile and irrational, excessive flows of the population who live on the periphery go-

^{11.} Source: Ipea.

ing to work in the center of town. This reality is aggravated by the synchronization that concentrates the flow in short spaces of time, both in the morning and evening. The result is an enormous loss in terms of working hours, extra expenses with fuel, and health treatment due to exposure to pollution.

In 2010, the cost was R\$ 24.3 billion; in 2013, R\$28.7 billion; the estimate for the year 2032 is that the costs generated by traffic jams will be R\$82.2 billion.¹²



The most serious infrastructure needs are obviously to be found in the periphery of big cities—due to lack of plan-


^{12.} Source: prepared by Sistema Firjan.

ning and rational investment in urban infrastructure. These obstacles jeopardize the expansion of production chains and implantation of transversality in sanitation, housing and urban mobility policies that apply principles of sustainability and governance as new paradigms in government policies for large-scale social inclusion. These problems have led to the increasing involvement of discontented masses in street demonstrations.

When the street protests chose transportation as the main target of their demands they were merely reflecting the examples of growing diseconomy and irrationality from the consumer's—and above all the urban citizen's-point of view. We can classify the movements of June as the continuity and intensification of an earlier protest. The middle classes had already shown their deep involvement with the issue by defending the subway network and in their opposition to concentrating investments in low-density areas and building a single line.

Discussions on the irrationality of the new line 4 of the subway to Barra da Tijuca claimed that the priority should be to substitute Barra by the North Zone and the Baixada neighborhoods, where three times the number of passengers are badly attended by precarious train and subway lines. The movement against the new subway line was accompanied by violent protests against the increase in the Rio-Niterói ferry-boat fares and the poor service provided. The main complaint was against the costs spreadsheets and their transparency, together with denunciations of connivance between the transport companies and the government.

Rio de Janeiro subway network



Source: State Department for Transportation

Previous protests were organized in networks defending the train and subway services against the Bus Rapid Transport (BRT) and the bus services, besides the technically complex discussion on the priority of the subway and metropolitan trains.

Once again one notes that the streets were just the critical point that split and intensified the protest, which until then was confined to the educated middle classes, then gained mass dimensions to prove the core thesis of this pa-

per, namely that there exists a serious political impasse in the model of Brazilian development, which is still a prisoner of patrimonialism, parochial groups and electoral clienteles, at a time when collective solutions demand more and more the large-scale universal access that typifies a new democracy—a democracy which, in addition to its digital dimension, is now definitively an urban, metropolitan democracy of the masses.

Accordingly, the movement obeys the law of large numbers and was the signal that we have reached the point of saturation and the end of the limits of tolerance of the large masses that are sacrificed by traffic jams and the growing expansion of the use of the automobile, which is irrationally protected by federal tax-exemption policies.

Another serious flaw of our mass democracy is the precarious condition of sanitation in urban concentrations. Much of the Baixada Fluminense and the Metropolitan Region do not even have access to tap water. Improvised tariff policies aimed only at guaranteeing the finances of the State Sanitation Company, which charges for a service that is not provided—sewage treatment is zero in the Metropolitan Region, which has given rise to an unheard-of quantity of lawsuits which could even close down the company.

Transparency is once more the Achilles heel in the area of sanitation, since the available data are offered without any control by regulatory agencies, according to a precarious management model characterized by high tariffs and waste of water. One of the irrational features of the system is that it depends on a legal system that leaves to the mu-

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nicipality the responsibility for the service, maintains the State company with obscure, secret contracts, and relies on federal resources from the Length-of-Employment Fund (FGTS), which in turn depend on complicated governmental agreements. On this particular matter there exists a (still ignored) vigorous social movement in the Courts and the Public Prosecutor's Office that contests *en bloc* the tariff model in practice. There are approximately 75,000 lawsuits, which have been frozen in order to avoid a financial crisis for the company.

Only 48.1% of the Brazilian population have access to garbage collection; the national average of treated sewers is 37.5%; the loss of distributed water is 38.8%. And Brazil ranks ninth in world shame, with its 13 million people without access to a bathroom.¹³

As for housing, there is actually no national or metropolitan policy. What do exist are private opportunities for investing in areas picked at random rather than previously planned and chosen. In 2011 the number of households in Brazil was 53,219,429, with an urban housing shortage of 5.4 million. He Metropolitan Regions with the biggest housing deficits are São Paulo, Rio de Janeiro, the Federal District and Belo Horizonte. In today's Brazil there exist just over 6.07 million empty households, including those under construction. This quantity is about 200,000 more than the number of households that would have to be built

^{13.} Source: Instituto Trata Brasil

^{14.} Source: IBGE

to enable all Brazilian families to live in locations considered adequate: a total of 5.8 million. The biggest problem is not the shortage, but rather the form of constructing, depending as it does on government financing, whereas the informal real-estate market functions quickly and efficiently and could be formalized with governmental cooperation.

Urban voids exist in the metropolitan fabric that can be occupied by popular housing, but such a policy fails to sensitize our governors, who prefer to rely on federal models that resolve very little and in general fail to reach the low-income masses that can pay for their own houses as long as they have access to long-term financing and city governments offer them more rational policies on urban land use. Land-tenure regulation is a fundamental axis of urban policy that configures the long-awaited Urban Reform that since the 60s has resisted being implemented.

The street movements are a diffused and refracted reflection of the metropolitan disorder of governmental policies. But the backcloth of the wave of protests is the overwhelming precariousness of the civil right to access to policies already in place but ineffective. Furthermore, the sub-use of urban-planning instruments that could make short, medium- and long-term solutions possible for such serious problems through integrated urban policies that guarantee better economic efficiency for the welfare of the population.

Source: Rio de Janeiro State Sub-Secretariat of Works.